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Preface
Gülü seven dikenine katlanır—who loves the rose should put up with its
thorns. When we started the systematic re-assessment of the ever-evolving
EU–Turkey relations more than three years ago, we saw the urgent need
for a volume with handbook character that provided an update of the
existing literature and a comprehensive study of the new complexities
that epitomize the relationship. The world has changed since then more
than most would have anticipated, creating an even greater need for
this volume. We are happy and relieved that the plan has finally come
together, despite the thorny character of this ‘academic rose’. Challenges
concerned the complexity and dynamic evolution of the topic and the
large scope of the volume, as well as the conditions under which it had to
be coordinated, written and prepared. However, the greatness of a rela-
tionship lies not only in the challenges it faces, but in how it meets them.
This insight—and attitude—is not only true for a comprehensive transna-
tional knowledge cooperation project like the volume at hand, but also
for EU–Turkey relations in general.
We are proud that the idea blossomed as a true, transformative collab-
oration between scholars from the EU and Turkey during times when
cooperation at the political level has remained troubled. We initiated
it during our time at the Turkish German University (TDU) in our
capacity as coordinators of the Jean Monnet Module ‘INSITER—Inside
the Turkey–EU Relations’ (2016–2019). During joint research activi-
ties in Berlin, Brussels, Istanbul and Paris, we conceptualized the central
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elements for the different parts of the volume. The situation in Turkey, in
Germany–Turkey and EU–Turkey relations had already become compli-
cated, but the view at the ‘Rotonde de la Villette’ in Paris reminded
us that EU-Turkey relations encompass manifold components that will
endure.1 In recent months, collaborative work on the project helped us
bridge the distance between the EU and Turkey as we worked remotely
from home during the COVID-19 pandemic. In this context, we could
not stress enough how fortunate and thankful we are that this fasci-
nating group of scholars accepted our invitation to work with us. It is
the balanced mix of authors from both the EU and Turkey that makes
the volume a particularly rich academic bouquet.
In this spirit of cross-border and interdisciplinary collaboration, the
volume has benefitted from the Jean Monnet Module INSITER, co-
funded by the Erasmus+ program of the EU. It is published with
support from the Managing Global Governance (MGG) program of
the German Development Institute / Deutsches Institut für Entwick-
lungspolitik (DIE). While the MGG partner countries are a defined group
beyond Turkey, the underlying rationale for and questions around coop-
eration with these countries also apply to the EU/Germany–Turkey rela-
tionship. MGG facilitates knowledge cooperation, policy dialogue, and
training on, with and between emerging economies (or rising powers),
Germany and the EU to jointly address global challenges. Central refer-
ence points are the global goals prominently enshrined in the United
Nation’s 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development. The book is full
of evidence of how the EU and Turkey hold the potential for mutually
addressing these major economic, social and environmental challenges at
the domestic, regional and global levels. The individual political agendas
of the EU and Turkey and the common challenges are complex and inter-
twined, require both intensified cooperation and deepened analysis, and
thus—in their respective and unique way—also speak to the discussion
on cooperation with and among rising powers. Since Turkey shares many
characteristics of the rising powers on which MGG typically focuses, the
volume also contributes to the debate on important overarching ques-
tions of inter- and transnational cooperation, and the quest for global
partnerships and effective multilateralism in times of global power shifts.
1This fine building is located in the 19th arrondissement of Paris. It was originally
erected as a customs facility and part of the city walls of Paris. The EU-Turkey Customs
Union Agreement is one of the relatively stable components of EU-Turkey relations.
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In this context, we are particularly grateful that this piece of knowledge
co-creation can be published as an open access volume, making it widely
available not only in the EU and Turkey but to researchers, policymakers
and students around the globe, including but not limited to the MGG
network.
Clearly, this book would not have been possible without support and
maintenance from many sides. We would like to thank our authors for
working to a high standard, their trust in us and their perseverance over
months. Special thanks go to Dimitris Tsarouhas and Wolfgang Wessels
for the encouragement and support to identify the right publishing house.
In this context, we are much obliged to the external reviewers for their
fertilizing inputs, as well as to Ambra Finotello, Rebecca Roberts, and
John Justin Thomyyar from Palgrave for the valuable guidance during the
publication process. Furthermore, we would like to thank Megan Gisclon
and Jannet King for the language editing, as well as Efsane Deniz Baş
and Lukas Engels for their help in compiling and formatting the final
manuscript. Our gratitude also goes to Atila Eralp, Nilgün Arısan Eralp,
Rahime Süleymanoğlu-Kürüm, Ayselin Yıldız, Melis Cin, Selin Türkeş-
Kılıç, Diğdem Soyaltın-Colella, Beken Saatçioğlu, Özgehan Şenyuva as
well as Kevin Dickmann for their stimulating ideas and encouragement
throughout this transformative process. EU–Turkey relations might not
resemble the scent of sweet flowers these days. However, thanks to all
these helping hands, this collaborative effort could help bring EU–Turkey
studies as a field of analysis at the intersection of EU (integration) studies,
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of EU–Turkey Relations: Merging Theories,
Institutions, and Policies
Ebru Turhan and Wulf Reiners
1.1 The New Complexities
of EU–Turkey Relations
More than 60 years after Turkey’s application for association with the
European Economic Community (EEC), relations between the Euro-
pean Union (EU)1 and Turkey exhibit many unique features driven
by persistent ambivalences, intricacies, and growing interdependencies
across a wide array of issue areas. A tortuous, multifaceted love–hate
1Unless specified differently, the term ‘European Union’ refers also to the political
system of the ‘European Communities’ before the year 1993, when the European Union
was established under its current name.
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relationship between the EU and its oldest associate member has subse-
quently emerged—a ‘curious love affair’ (Aydın-Düzgit & Tocci, 2015:
1). Starting from a broad definition of EU–Turkey relations as ‘the totality
of interactions within the international system’ (Buzan, 2009), the rela-
tionship extends not only to the disciplines of political science, economics,
and history but also to legal and sociological aspects. The multiple layers
of relations produce—and are subject to—a dense net of interdependen-
cies,2 which make issue-specific cooperation and policy harmonization a
necessity (Moravcsik, 1997). The mutual policy sensitivity between the
EU and Turkey engenders costs and benefits for both sides across a broad
spectrum of areas including foreign and security policy, trade, migration,
energy, and the environment. Beyond that, EU–Turkey relations impact
the wider neighborhood and the global arena, be it the conflicts in the
Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region, the transatlantic secu-
rity agenda, or the implementation of the United Nations (UN) 2030
Agenda for Sustainable Development. Building on their respective capac-
ities, Turkey, an ‘emerging middle power’ (Öniş & Kutlay, 2017: 170),
and the EU share the aspiration to shape regional and international devel-
opments and bodies alike. In this, EU–Turkey relations have facilitated
cooperation among a broad set of actors, including state and non-state
actors, which operate in a complex multi-level setup and within multilat-
eral frameworks like the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) or
the Group of 20 (G20).
The strategic importance of EU–Turkey relations in (geo-)political,
economic, and societal terms does not exhibit a clear, linear develop-
mental path. Over many decades, the relationship has not only been
a complex one but has also featured many stop-and-go cycles. There
have been phases of rapprochement and progression, but also periods of
indifference or regression—sometimes dominated by dynamic changes,
sometimes by slow-moving developments or stagnation. Moments of
EU–Turkey cooperation have thus been followed by periods when the
actors drifted apart in non-concerted action—before new developments
reminded them of the need to jointly manage their interdependence and,
eventually, of their commonalities.
Today, the ebbs and flows in EU–Turkey affairs (Narbone & Tocci,
2007) have started to stagnate and cede their place to a ‘seemingly
2Interdependencies are here understood as ‘situations characterized by reciprocal effects
among countries or among actors in different countries’ (Keohane & Nye, 1977: 7).
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divergent relationship’ (Müftüler-Baç, 2016: 17) that lacks a sense of
basic mutual trust and reliability between these ‘key strategic partners’
(Delegation of the EU to Turkey, 2020). While phases of estrange-
ment have started to last longer, periods of consistent collaboration
without major disruptions have practically disappeared (see also Reiners
& Turhan, Chapter 16). Turkey is increasingly perceived by the EU
and its member states as an ‘unpredictable and unreliable partner’ and
as a conflict-inducing ‘hostile neighbor’ (Arısan-Eralp, 2019: 3) that is
gradually dissociating itself from the Union’s core norms and principles.
For Turkey, on the other hand, the EU is progressively regarded as an
enervated transformative power due to the resurgence of ‘illiberalism
as a driving force across Europe’ (Öniş & Kutlay, 2020: 198) and
as an emerging geopolitical rival steering power struggles in Turkey’s
neighborhood, including Libya, Syria, and the Eastern Mediterranean.
These new dynamics unfold against the background of the comatose
state of Turkey’s accession process, which constituted the institutional
substratum of the bilateral dialogue together with the 1963 Association
Agreement for many years. Following their commencement in October
2005, Turkey’s EU accession negotiations entered a long-term trance
in 2011 with only three negotiation chapters opened since then. The
EU–Turkey Statement issued after the joint summit on 18 March 2016
(widely referred to as the EU–Turkey refugee ‘deal’) incentivized Turkey
to cooperate on the management of irregular migration flows to Europe
through, inter alia, promises to ‘re-energize the accession process’
(European Council, 2016: para. 8). Despite this vow, Turkey’s accession
process entered a de jure freeze when the Council concluded in June
2018 that ‘Turkey has been moving further away from the European
Union and […] no further chapters can be considered for opening or
closing’ (Council of the EU, 2018: para. 35).
These developments have led to the gradual emergence of a paradigm
shift in EU–Turkey relations, placing a stronger focus on the possibilities
and opportunities of alternative forms of cooperation beyond the acces-
sion perspective, which has dominated the debates for decades. At the
same time, the failure to agree on the modernization of the EU–Turkey
Customs Union (CU) and the suspension of the EU–Turkey high level
dialogues on energy and economy in 2019 (Council of the EU, 2018:
para. 35; 2019a: para. 4) raise doubts about the prospect of an alternative
partnership model based on sector-specific functional cooperation.
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The paradoxical coexistence of increasing interdependence and the
divergence of normative and material preferences requires a systematic
re-assessment of the EU–Turkey relationship. The book at hand aims to
grasp this new complexity and ambiguity with a focus on the period after
2009 when the Treaty of Lisbon as the EU’s new constitutional basis
entered into force. It aims to view, explore, and decode the evolution
of the multifaceted, ever-evolving EU–Turkey relationship through three
entry points that offer partly complementary, partly competing visions
and explanations of the key drivers, actors, and processes that shape the
relationship: (1) Theories and concepts, (2) institutions, and (3) poli-
cies. The book is accordingly structured in three main parts in order to
unpack the conditions under which EU–Turkey relations have developed
from these three analytical and conceptual perspectives. It assesses both
cooperative behavior and joint approaches to challenges and solutions as
well as the circumstances of those periods when constructive dialogue and
integrated action to achieve common goals were not possible.
The investigation of the conditions and drivers that shape EU–Turkey
relations takes place on the basis of a set of guiding questions and their
synoptic, comparative analysis:
(1) How can existing theoretical and conceptual models grasp and
explain key turning points, periods, and trends in the evolution
of EU–Turkey relations?
(2) What roles did the central actors, forums, and institutional frame-
works play in EU–Turkey relations, and how did the preferences,
functions, and competencies of central EU institutions evolve in
this context?
(3) How did key policies and issue areas of EU–Turkey relations
develop and influence the relationship as a whole?
(4) How are the exogenous, endogenous, and bilateral determinants
of EU–Turkey relations read through the distinct perspectives of
the relevant theories, institutions, and policies?
(5) What impact has the EU–Turkey relationship had on the EU and
Turkey, respectively?
With the ambition to provide full access to a state-of-the-art under-
standing of EU–Turkey relations and their evolution over time, the
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volume at hand combines analyses of institutions, policies, and theoret-
ical and conceptual approaches through a systematic approach. We start
from the understanding that the study of these interconnected dimen-
sions as distinct objects of investigation offers comprehensive coverage
of the interactions between the EU and Turkey. On this basis, comple-
mentary and comparative readings of this evolution become visible. To
illustrate, we aim to reveal similarities or differences across the preferences
and instruments of key EU institutions in their engagement with Turkey
and allow for an assessment of the role of institutional actors. We seek
to contrast different periods of EU–Turkey relations to show when and
how cooperation has developed, whereas progress might have stagnated
in other fields at the same time. We are interested in the influence of Euro-
pean and Turkish actors on each other, be it through accession-related
conditionality dynamics or through geostrategic considerations. Beyond
that, the objective is to contrast competing theoretical and conceptual
explanations for the key developments in EU–Turkey relations, ranging
from neoliberal to constructivist approaches. Ultimately, this complemen-
tary study is meant to generate a basis for extrapolation with a view to
the future trajectory of the relationship. It also provides insight into the
EU’s and Turkey’s relations with their neighbors and regional or global
powers and sheds light on the conditions for cooperation in international
relations more generally.
1.2 Key Determinants and Milestones
of EU–Turkey Relations
The identification of milestones and determinants of EU–Turkey rela-
tions (see Table 1.1) varies depending on the focus of the analysis. The
reading of the evolution of relations from an institutional perspective
such as the European Parliament, for instance, does not necessarily high-
light the same turning points and key drivers as an analysis of a specific
policy field like energy or foreign policy would do. Similarly, a view of
relations through alternative forms of partnership between the EU and
Turkey implies a time horizon different than that of a study of relations
from a historical institutionalist or constructivist angle. Despite the differ-
ences, most studies refer to a shared set of interconnected sources of
influence, which can be categorized into exogenous, endogenous, and
bilateral dimensions. In this context, exogenous determinants include
international law and multilateral frameworks as well as moments of
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Table 1.1 Milestones of EU–Turkey relations (1945–2020)
Date Milestone Dimension
1945, Oct 24 Entry into force of the UN
Charter signed by 12 European
countries, incl. Turkey, as
founding members
Multilateral
1948, Apr 16 Establishment of the OEEC
(later OECD) with 18 European
countries, incl. Turkey, as
founding members
Multilateral
1949, Aug 9 Accession of Turkey to the
Council of Europe
Multilateral
1952, Feb 18 Accession of Turkey to NATO Multilateral
1958, Jan 1 Entry into force of the Treaty of
Rome establishing the EEC
(followed by the Treaties of
Maastricht (1993),
Amsterdam (1999), Nice (2003),
and Lisbon (2009))
EU




1959, Jul 31 Turkey submits application for
association with the EEC
Accession/Sectoral
1960, May 27 Coup d’état in Turkey Turkey
1963, Sep 12 Association (Ankara) Agreement Accession/Sectoral
1970, Nov 23 Additional Protocol annexed to
the Association Agreement
Accession/Sectoral
1971, Mar 12 Turkish Military Memorandum Turkey




1980, Sep 12 Coup d’état in Turkey Turkey
1981, Jan 1 Accession of Greece to the EEC EU
1983, Nov 15 Unilateral declaration of
independence of the Turkish
Republic of Northern Cyprus,
recognized by Turkey but not by
the EEC
External crisis
1987, Apr 14 Application of Turkey for full
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Table 1.1 (continued)
Date Milestone Dimension
1990, Aug 2 Several EU member states and
Turkey join the US-led
multi-national coalition in the
Gulf War
External crisis
1993, Jun 22 Formulation of membership
criteria (‘Copenhagen criteria’)








1997, Feb 28 Turkish Military Memorandum
leads to resignation of the prime
minister
Turkey




1999, Sep 26 Formation of the Group of
Twenty (G20) incl., several EU
member states, the EU, and
Turkey
Multilateral




2001, Mar 8 Adoption of the Accession
Partnership to coordinate
Turkey’s EU accession (revised
in 2003, 2006, and 2008)
Accession
2001, Mar 19 Adoption of the ‘National
Programme for the Adoption of
the Acquis ’ (NPAA) by Turkey
(renewed in 2003 and 2008)
Accession
2001, Sep 11 Terrorist attacks on the United
States
External crisis
2002, Nov 3 Justice and Development Party
(AKP) wins general elections for
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Table 1.1 (continued)
Date Milestone Dimension
2002, Dec 13 European Council decision to
open accession negotiations with
Turkey without delay if Turkey
fulfils the Copenhagen political
criteria
Accession
2003, Mar 20 Invasion of Iraq by the US-led
multi-national coalition incl. EU
member states
External crisis




2004, Apr 24 Referendum on ‘Annan Plan’ in




2004, May 1 Enlargement of the EU,
accession of Cyprus
EU
2004, Dec 17 European Council confirms that
Turkey ‘sufficiently’ fulfils criteria
for opening accession
negotiations in October 2005
Accession
2005, Jul 29 Turkey signs the Additional
Protocol extending the Customs
Union to cover ten new EU
member states incl. Cyprus
Accession
2005, Oct 3 Start of ‘open-ended’ accession
negotiations with Turkey
Accession
2006, Dec 11 Council decision to suspend
negotiations on eight chapters
relevant to Turkey’s restrictions
concerning the extension of the
CU to Cyprus
Accession
2007, Jun–Dec France vetoes the opening of five
accession chapters of the acquis
EU/Accession
2007–2013 Instrument for Pre-Accession
(IPA I) allocates a grand total
of 4.795 million EUR for Turkey
Accession
2009, Dec 1 Entry into force of the Treaty of
Lisbon
EU
2009, Dec 8 Cyprus vetoes the opening of six
chapters of the acquis
EU/Accession
(continued)
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Table 1.1 (continued)
Date Milestone Dimension
2010, Dec 17 Beginning of popular protests in
MENA countries, including
Tunisia, Libya, Egypt, and Syria,
known as the ‘Arab Spring’
External crisis
2011, Mar 15 Start of civil war in Syria External crisis
2012, May 17 Adoption of EU–Turkey ‘Positive
Agenda’ to give new impetus to
accession negotiations
Accession
2013, May 28 Beginning of ‘Gezi park’ protests
in Turkey
Turkey
2013, Dec 16 Signing of EU–Turkey
Readmission Agreement and
launch of the Visa Liberalization
Dialogue
Sectoral/Accession
2014–2020 Instrument for Pre-Accession
(IPA II) allocates a grand total
of 3.533 million EUR (excluding
the allocation for Cross-border
Cooperation)
Accession
2015, Mar 16 Launch of EU–Turkey
High-Level Energy Dialogue
Sectoral/Accession
2015 Over one million migrants
reached the EU irregularly by
primarily using the Eastern
Mediterranean route
External crisis
2015, Oct 15 EU–Turkey Joint Action Plan to
support Syrians under temporary




2015, Nov 29 EU–Turkey Statement: endorses
the EU’s commitment to provide
3 billion EUR for the EU
Refugee Facility for Refugees in
Turkey; calls for reenergizing the
accession process; approves the
organization of high level
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Table 1.1 (continued)
Date Milestone Dimension
2016, Mar 18 EU–Turkey Statement:
mobilization of additional 3
billion EUR for the Refugee
Facility; commitment to
reenergize the accession process,




2016, Jul 15 Attempted coup d’état in Turkey;
two-year state of emergency
Turkey
2017, Apr 16 Constitutional referendum
followed by the replacement of
the parliamentary system with an
executive presidency
Turkey
2017, Nov 27 EU–Turkey High-Level
Transport Dialogue Meeting
Sectoral/Accession
2018, Feb 9 Unfolding of dispute over
exploration and exploitation
rights of gas fields in the Eastern
Mediterranean
External crisis/EU/Turkey
2018, Jun 26 Council decision to suspend the
opening or closing of any
negotiation chapter; ban on the
start of negotiations for the
reform of the CU
Sectoral/Accession
2019, Jul 15 Council decision to suspend
further meetings of all high level
dialogue mechanisms and the
meetings of the Association
Council
Sectoral/Accession
2019, Oct 14 Council condemns Turkey’s
military operation in Syria, and
calls on the UN Security Council
to continue efforts in order to
stop unilateral action
External crisis/Multilateral
2019, Nov 27 Memorandum of understanding
between Turkey and Libya over
maritime boundaries in the
Eastern Mediterranean
External crisis/Turkey
2020, Jan 31 Withdrawal of the UK from the
EU (‘Brexit’)
EU
2020, Jul 13 Increasing tensions between the
EU and Turkey within NATO
over war in Libya; statements by
the EU Foreign Affairs Council









2020, Oct 16, and
2020, Dec 11
European Council deplores
unilateral actions by Turkey in
the Eastern Mediterranean;
stresses the option to adapt
restrictive measures; endorses the
‘conditional’ launch of a ‘positive
political EU-Turkey agenda’; and
calls for a ‘Multilateral





external crises and key international developments. In turn, endogenous
factors encompass internal developments within the EU and domestic
developments inside Turkey. Determinants that are directly tied to the
bilateral dialogue primarily refer to Turkey’s EU accession process as well
as concern sectoral cooperation beyond the enlargement context.
1.2.1 Exogenous Determinants: Multilateral Frameworks
and External Crises
International law and global or regional multilateral settings are among
the fundamental exogenous factors that have shaped EU–Turkey rela-
tions. They partly concern the joint membership of the EU or EU
member states and Turkey in intergovernmental and multilateral orga-
nizations and conventions such as the UN (1945), the Organization
for Economic Co-operation and Development (1948), the Council of
Europe (1949), NATO (1952), the European Convention on Human
Rights (1953/4), and the G20 (1999). Turkey’s membership in these
organizations mostly helped the country legitimize its seemingly inherent
Western orientation (Müftüler-Baç, 1997; Oğuzlu, 2012) and strategi-
cally cooperate with EU member states in all major policy domains in
multilateral platforms. Lately, however, Turkey’s commitment to multilat-
eral setups such as NATO has been challenged by alternate orientations
that are gaining more independence and salience within Turkey (Eralp,
2019). Turkey’s purchase of Russian S-400 missiles is a case in point.
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Beyond the joint engagement in international organizations and multi-
lateral forums, external shocks as well as key international and regional
developments have had strong impacts on EU–Turkey relations. In this
context, EU–Turkey cooperation and policy coordination have been
driven by the need to mitigate crisis-impelled externalities. At the same
time, divergences in visions and policy preferences between the EU, its
member states, and Ankara have become visible in times of external crisis,
too. Important external shocks for the evolution of EU–Turkey rela-
tions include changes to the post-Cold War international system that
sparked Turkey’s partly assertive, partly multilateral regional activism
(Sayari, 2000); the war in Kosovo in 1999 and the terror attacks of
11 September 2001, which reinforced Turkey’s function as a potential
regional security-enabler and bridge-builder for the EU (Turhan, 2012);
the London and Madrid terrorist attacks in 2003 and 2004 and growing
Islamophobia in the EU thenceforward (Müftüler-Baç, 2016); and the
1990–1991 Gulf War and the 2003 Iraq War (Aydın-Düzgit & Tocci,
2015). Ankara’s response to the outbreak of the Arab uprisings in 2011
and the ensuing Syrian civil war largely diverged from its Western allies.
However, European and Turkish ambitions to control irregular migration
impelled a limited, interest-driven rapprochement between the EU and
Turkey in 2015/2016. A particularly complicated case for EU–Turkey
relations has been the crises related to Cyprus. Initially, in 1974, after
the Greek military coup and Turkey’s subsequent intervention on the
island, related developments in Cyprus were treated as a bilateral conflict
between Greece and Turkey. However, Greece’s accession to the Union
in 1981 turned the EU from an observer into a key actor in the evolution
of the dispute. Since then, the Cyprus conflict has become a key imped-
iment to Turkey’s accession process and deepening sectoral cooperation
between the EU and Turkey in trade and energy matters.
1.2.2 Endogenous Determinants: Internal EU and Turkish
Domestic Developments
EU–Turkey relations have been heavily influenced by developments and
adjustments concerning the constitutional and institutional architecture
of the EU, the preferences and domestic conditions of EU member
states, and Union-wide crises. Constitutionalizing acts that led to several
treaty revisions over the years (Treaties of Rome, Maastricht, Amsterdam,
Nice, and Lisbon) altered the institutions and processes that generate
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EU policies vis-à-vis candidate states and key third countries including
Turkey. The entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty in 2009 introduced
considerable changes to the functions and powers of existing EU institu-
tions—inter alia, the European Council, the European Parliament, and
the European Commission (see Peterson & Shackleton, 2012). The
provisions of the Lisbon Treaty also brought in the office of the High
Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy
in juxtaposition to the establishment of the European External Action
Service, which jointly carry out the EU’s Common Foreign and Security
Policy (CFSP)—a policy domain of significant relevance for EU–Turkey
relations.
In addition to reforms in the political system, the enlargement of the
EU has influenced its relationship with Turkey primarily in two aspects.
First, each enlargement round has amplified the political and public
debates over the so-called ‘enlargement fatigue’ of the EU that under-
pins ‘a general post-accession reticence within the EU towards further
widening in favour of a greater focus on deepening integration across
Member States’ (House of Lords, 2013: 43). Turkey’s prolonged EU
accession process has thus become less appealing across European polit-
ical circles. Second, the accession of Greece and Cyprus to the EU in
1981 and 2004, respectively, undermined the bilateral feature of their
disputes with Turkey and transformed the disputes into regular items
on the EU agenda. Partly connected to these enlargements, EU–Turkey
relations have also witnessed the expanding impact of member states’ indi-
vidual preferences in the last two decades. This influence takes the form of
unilateral vetoes on negotiation chapters or on the launch of negotiations
on modernizing the EU–Turkey CU. In addition, national preferences of
individual member states and EU–Turkey relations have been connected
by a wide set of factors that have ranged from public opinion to nationalist
and Islamophobic tendencies to divergences over policy design and crises.
The EU’s efforts to manage irregular migration based on an externaliza-
tion strategy amid the failure to reform its own asylum and migration
policies and find internal solutions have had profound implications for
EU–Turkey relations. The European debt crisis (starting from 2009) and
the withdrawal of the United Kingdom (UK) from the EU (2020) are
additional examples of the EU’s internal crises that have impacted EU–
Turkey relations: for instance, by influencing Turkey’s perception of the
EU and the debates about the future design of the bilateral relationship.
14 E. TURHAN AND W. REINERS
Domestic developments and transformations in Turkey have
contributed to the definition of the scope, components, and overar-
ching complexity of EU–Turkey relations, too. These internal milestones
for Turkey largely relate to influential shifts and continuities in political,
economic, and societal dynamics. In this context, Turkey’s party-political
landscape, Islamist-secularist struggles, the restructuring of civil–military
relations, successive constitutional reforms, as well as their effect on
Turkey’s progress toward compliance with EU norms and principles
have been of relevance. To illustrate, attempted or executed coup plots
against copious Turkish governments have acted as important ‘brakemen’
in EU–Turkey relations. The Turkish military’s fortified influence over
domestic politics after the coups in 1971 and 1980 brought about
the EU’s temporary suspension of its economic and military assistance
to Turkey (Yeşilada, 2002) and delayed Turkey’s application for full
membership. On a similar note, intensified tensions and estrangement
between Brussels and Ankara emerged over passable actions after the July
2016 coup attempt and were coupled with the EU’s criticism of ‘back-
sliding’ in various issue areas, including public service, the independence
of the judiciary, and the freedom of expression in the post-coup political
landscape (European Commission, 2016). Beyond that, the election of
the Justice and Development Party (AKP, Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi) to
power in 2002, the 2013 Gezi Park protests, and the 2017 constitutional
referendum that led to the replacement of the parliamentary system with
an executive presidency are among the domestic developments with clear
implications for the EU–Turkey relationship.
1.2.3 Bilateral Determinants: Accession Process and Sectoral
Cooperation
A final category of major determinants of EU–Turkey relations covers
key events and developments that concern Turkey’s longstanding EU
accession process and the sectoral cooperation both within and outside
the accession framework. The Association Agreement between the EEC
and Turkey in 1963 (Ankara Agreement) envisaged the strengthening
of economic and trade relations between both parties. It foresaw the
establishment of a CU and the exploration of the possibility of Turkey’s
accession to the Community. Whereas Turkey’s initial application for full
membership in the EEC in 1987 was not accepted by the Community,
the EU–Turkey CU entered into force in 1995. After Turkey’s status as
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an accession candidate country had been rejected in 1997, it was finally
acknowledgement by the Helsinki European Council in 1999. In the
following years, the commencement of accession negotiations in October
2005, as well as the selective opening of negotiation chapters, were among
the key milestones in the accession-related developments.3 The provisions
of some of these milestones—for instance, the Ankara Agreement and
the CU—initially addressed sectoral cooperation and issue-specific policy
alignment between the EU and Turkey that were largely separate from
the enlargement context. At the same time, the Turkish side viewed these
sectoral initiatives, for the most part, as a leap toward full membership in
the EU.
Considering the deadlock in the accession process, on the one hand,
and growing issue-specific interdependencies, on the other, the EU and
Turkey gravitated more and more toward the establishment of functional
institutional mechanisms. In this context, the Readmission Agreement
of 2013 in conjunction with the initiation of the Visa Liberalization
Dialogue, the EU–Turkey Statement on the management of irregular
migration flows to Europe in 2016, EU–Turkey joint summits and lead-
ers’ meetings (since November 2015) as well as sectoral high level
dialogues on ‘energy’ (since March 2015), ‘counter terrorism’ (joint
consultations since June 2015), ‘political issues’ (since January 2016),
‘economy’ (since April 2016), and ‘transport’ (since November 2017)
are included among these additional formats. These functional structures
primarily envisage the deepening of interest-driven, sectoral cooperation
and policy alignment between the EU and Turkey parallel, or comple-
mentary, to Turkey’s stalled accession process. As these initiatives can de
facto promote Turkey’s sector-specific alignment with the EU acquis, they
can also indirectly support progress in Turkey’s accession process. Beside
these mechanisms, the EU–Turkey Association Council (54th meeting
in March 2019) and EU–Turkey Joint Parliamentary Committee (78th
meeting in December 2018) have been integral bilateral channels.
3As of November 2020, 16 of the 35 chapters have been opened, one of them is
provisionally closed. See for a detailed overview Table 11.1.
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1.3 A Three-Dimensional Approach
to Advance EU–Turkey Studies
This volume is not the first endeavor that explores the multilayered
universe of EU–Turkey relations. Previous studies built on compara-
tive conceptualizations of Turkey as a partner for the EU across key
policies (Aydın-Düzgit & Tocci, 2015; Linden et al., 2012); its embed-
dedness in changing global, internal EU, or societal processes (Evin &
Denton, 1990; Müftüler-Baç, 1997, 2016; Joseph, 2006); or the key
obstacles to Turkey’s full membership in the EU (Nas & Özer, 2017).
The existing literature has most prominently dealt with the relationship
through the spectacles of EU enlargement. The debate can be traced back
to the 1970s (Burrows, 1978) but accelerated after the Helsinki Summit
in 1999, when scholars started to rethink both the EU’s enlargement
policy (Sjursen, 2002; Schimmelfennig, 2001, 2006; Schimmelfennig &
Sedelmeier, 2002) and the relationship between the EU and Turkey in
this new context (e.g., Eralp, 2000; Müftüler-Baç, 2000; Müftüler-Baç &
McLaren, 2003; Park, 2000; Rumford, 2000; Öniş, 2003; Eder, 2003;
Emerson & Tocci, 2004).
Since the official start of the accession negotiations with Turkey
in 2005, the literature has demonstrated an intensified interest in the
transformation processes inside Turkey that followed the accession nego-
tiations; be it from the perspective of EU conditionality (Schimmelfennig
et al., 2003; Tocci, 2007; Saatçioğlu, 2009; Süleymanoğlu-Kürüm, 2019)
or from the perspectives of ‘Europeanization’ and ‘de-Europeanization’
(Noutcheva & Aydın-Düzgit, 2012; Börzel & Soyaltın, 2012; Alpan,
2014; Tekin & Güney, 2015; Aydın-Düzgit & Kaliber, 2016; Süley-
manoğlu-Kürüm & Cin, 2021). Studies on the ramifications of the EU’s
internal dynamics for Turkey’s accession process (Müftüler-Baç, 2008;
Müftüler-Baç & Çiçek, 2017; Turhan, 2012, 2016), identity questions
(Rumelili, 2008, 2011; Lundgren, 2006; Nas, 2012), and Turkey’s
alignment with EU norms in various policy fields, inter alia, economy
(Togan & Hoekman, 2005; Uğur, 2006), foreign and security policy
(Aydın & Akgül-Açıkmeşe, 2007; Oğuzlu, 2008; Yorulmazlar & Turhan,
2015), and migration policy (Bürgin, 2016; Yıldız, 2016), came into
prominence after the accession talks formally took off.
Reflecting on the ‘never-ending story’ of Turkey and the EU
(Müftüler-Baç, 1998) and the ‘open-ended’ nature of Turkey’s acces-
sion negotiations (Council of the EU, 2005: 5), we can observe, more
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recently, a gradual re-orientation in EU–Turkey studies beyond the exclu-
sive understanding of EU–Turkey relations as just another case of EU
enlargement. An emerging array of studies scrutinizes potentials and chal-
lenges of alternative forms of partnership outside the accession context
(e.g., Müftüler-Baç, 2017; Turhan, 2017, 2018; Saatçioğlu et al., 2019;
Akgül-Açıkmeşe & Şenyuva, 2018). This trend is accompanied by schol-
arly debates on third countries’ selective alignment with the EU acquis
(widely referred to as ‘external differentiated integration’) after the with-
drawal of the UK from the EU (Schimmelfennig et al., 2015; Lavenex,
2015; Gstöhl, 2016; Leruth et al., 2019).
The book at hand not only builds on these existing studies but
also contributes to the state-of-the-art debate on EU–Turkey relations.
The volume has been finalized at a time when the ambivalences in
the EU–Turkey relationship have broadened. The book assesses the
new complexities that have generated the puzzling presence of both
increased sectoral interdependence, on the one hand, and progressively
diverging normative and (geo-)strategic preferences, on the other. Both
sides have witnessed internal developments that bear great potential to
affect the relationship: be it the post-coup political landscape in Turkey
with ongoing ‘backsliding’ in terms of the rule of law and fundamental
rights (European Commission, 2020) or be it the implications of Brexit
for the EU polity and the EU’s relations with third countries accompanied
by the rise of Euroskepticism and populism in EU member states. The
EU–Turkey relationship is a ‘moving target’ that has undergone a critical
transformation in recent years. Since the unfolding of the Syrian refugee
crisis in Europe in 2015 and the EU–Turkey Statement in March 2016,
the relationship has occupied a prominent space in political, public, and
academic debates. Turkey’s accession process to the EU might have come
to a formal pause in 2018. However, continuing and (partially) increasing
interdependencies across a wide set of policies including migration and
asylum, security, transport, economy, and trade make the relationship of
critical importance for the future of both sides. The EU and Turkey are
facing fundamental and immediate common challenges in the neighbor-
hood. These challenges concern the MENA region, Western Balkans, and
the Caucasus, economic recovery from the COVID-19 pandemic, as well
as the management of irregular migratory flows. Beyond that, both actors
have to respond to universal megatrends ranging from climate change and
global power shifts in the international order to the impact of digitaliza-
tion. Entangled in this challenging setup, however, divergences between
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the EU and Turkey dominate the field of foreign and security policy
orientations. The rise of a crisis in the Eastern Mediterranean is a case
in point, where conflicting legal views on gas fields (Aydıntaşbaş et al.,
2020) imperil a spillover of hostile relations to other issue areas driven by
joint strategic interdependencies.
This book starts from the understanding that these developments
necessitate a comprehensive, scholarly re-assessment of the EU–Turkey
relationship in order to generate novel reference points for an assess-
ment of the future trajectory of EU–Turkey relations. At the same
time, the volume goes beyond a mere update of EU–Turkey relations
after critical junctures like the refugee ‘deal’. It is distinct from existing
analyses because of its handbook character that is derived from the three-
dimensional perspective that brings together the analytical lenses of (1)
theories and concepts, (2) institutions, and (3) policies. A particular
advantage of this design is the opportunity to combine and contrast
different angles of assessment. Following a systematic design, all parts
address the guiding questions concerning actors, forums, preferences,
competencies, issue areas, impact, explanations, and periods according
to their roles and relevance for the respective perspectives. In this way,
the distinct strengths of different approaches come together through a
multi-angled approach that is particularly suitable to examine EU–Turkey
relations as a ‘moving target’.
The first part of the book, ‘Theories and Concepts’, puts together
complementary and competing conceptual and theoretical approaches
with distinct analytical frameworks to study the overall evolution of EU–
Turkey relations. The chapters cover approaches from major theoretical
schools that are typically employed or referenced in EU–Turkey studies:
neoliberalism/liberal intergovernmentalism (Müftüler-Baç & McLaren,
2003; Turhan, 2012, 2016; Reiners & Tekin, 2020), constructivism
(Neumann, 1999; Sjursen, 2002; Aydın-Düzgit, 2012), historical insti-
tutionalism (Camyar & Tagma, 2010; Bürgin, 2016; Icoz, 2011), Euro-
peanization (Noutcheva & Aydın-Düzgit, 2012; Börzel & Soyaltın, 2012;
Alpan, 2014; Tekin & Güney, 2015; Aydın-Düzgit & Kaliber, 2016;
Süleymanoğlu-Kürüm & Cin, 2021), rhetorical entrapment (Schim-
melfennig, 2009; Bürgin, 2010; Saatçioğlu, 2012), and differentiated
integration (Turhan, 2017, 2018; Müftüler-Baç, 2017; Özer, 2020). All
chapters include an assessment of the basic features and core assumptions
of the theory or concept under scrutiny, a brief review of the associ-
ated core literature and terminology, and the identification of key actors,
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forums, institutional frameworks, and policies most relevant from the
respective perspective. They offer a thorough reading of the evolution and
key turning points of EU–Turkey affairs through the corresponding theo-
retical or conceptual spectacles and assess the strengths and limitations of
the respective approach in grasping and explaining EU–Turkey relations.
The second part of the book, ‘Institutions’, investigates the insti-
tutional machinery of EU–Turkey relations by analyzing the roles and
perspectives of the EU’s key institutions (European Council, European
Commission, European Parliament) relevant for agenda-setting, external
action, enlargement, crisis management, and for the adoption of the
Union’s common norms and values in the context of EU–Turkey rela-
tions. The study of these institutions is imperative to get a full picture
of the bilateral relationship. Cooperation and competition among them
not only shape the Union’s policies; these considerably interdependent,
ever-evolving institutions also link the EU to the international community
(Peterson & Shackleton, 2012: 8–9). In this vein, the contributions in this
part discuss the key documents produced by the institution(s) in dealing
with EU–Turkey relations and include a description of the respective insti-
tution’s internal structure, including actors, mechanisms, decision-making
processes, and (diverging) positions. These chapters thereby contribute
to the understanding of the evolution of the institutions’ functions and
preferences over time in influencing the bilateral dialogue.
Finally, the purpose of the third part of the book, ‘Policies’, is to offer
readings of EU–Turkey relations from the perspective of the issue areas
most relevant for the relationship: enlargement policy, trade and macroe-
conomic policies, foreign and security policy, migration and asylum
policies, and energy policy. These policy fields have been repeatedly
prioritized in official EU and Turkish documents and statements over
the past decade to show the importance of an EU–Turkey partnership
(European Commission, 2012; European Council, 2015; Council of
the EU, 2019b). The chapters focus on the major dynamics behind the
evolution of the respective policy over time and pay particular attention
to phases and conditions of policy convergence and divergence. The
analyses examine the key documents, speeches, and additional primary
sources in order to assess the drivers of change and both mutually
beneficial and detrimental initiatives.
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1.4 Complementary and Competing
Perspectives: Theories, Institutions, and Policies
While the individual chapters of the volume work as stand-alone contri-
butions, they provide both internal references to other chapters of the
volume as well as external references suitable for a deepened study of
the subject. To help contrast parallels and differences, the chapters work
with similar instruments and elements such as references to relevant insti-
tutional frameworks, key concepts, and time periods. In regard to the
latter, the book covers the full history of more than six decades of EU–
Turkey relations: from the early days, marked by Turkey’s first application
for associate membership to the EEC in 1959, to developments in 2020.
Within this time frame, the edited volume pays particular attention to the
period after the Lisbon Treaty entered into force in 2009.
Clearly, there are limits to this study, and the book has to leave aspects
of EU–Turkey relations unaddressed. To illustrate, in our analysis of the
‘totality of interaction’, the volume does not offer an explicit focus on
transnational or inter-societal relations. In this line, no chapter explicitly
explores the impact of individual EU member states on EU–Turkey rela-
tions despite the great importance of the role of countries like Germany
(Le Gloannec, 2006; Turhan, 2012, 2016, 2019; Reiners & Tekin,
2020), Greece, and Cyprus (Güvenç, 1998; Öniş, 2001; Tsakonas, 2001;
Çelik & Rumelili, 2006; Dokos et al., 2018) or of the public opinion
in individual member states (Ruiz-Jimenez & Torreblanca, 2007).
However, the positions and policies of individual member states are
covered throughout the volume, for instance, in the chapters on liberal
intergovernmentalism (Tsarouhas, Chapter 2), the European Council
(Turhan & Wessels, Chapter 8), foreign policy (Torun, Chapter 13),
and energy (Sartori, Chapter 15). In this way, the volume also addresses
the repercussions of bilateral relations between Turkey and individual
member states on the relations between the EU and Turkey as a whole.
The same is true for important subjects like human rights, which are not
addressed as individual policy fields in this volume but are integral parts of
various contributions, including the chapters on historical institutionalism
(Icoz & Martin, Chapter 4), Europeanization (Alpan, Chapter 5), the
European Parliament’s role in EU–Turkey relations (Kaeding & Schenuit,
Chapter 10), and EU enlargement policy (Lippert, Chapter 11).
The ‘Theories and Concepts’ part of the book opens with the contri-
bution by Dimitris Tsarouhas, who examines EU–Turkey relations from a
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liberal intergovernmentalist perspective in Chapter 2. He argues that the
three-step approach to integration espoused by the theory is key to under-
standing the development of EU–Turkey relations over time. Concrete
steps of integration and cooperation, ranging from the CU to the opening
of Turkey’s accession talks and the refugee ‘deal’ serve as examples to
demonstrate how a transactional, issue-specific character of EU–Turkey
relations has evolved over time and is unlikely to change any time soon.
The EU’s prioritization of sector-specific interests and the complexity of
bargaining between member states with asymmetric powers and diverging
preferences on Turkey’s EU vocation have played a central role in this
context.
In Chapter 3, Senem Aydın-Düzgit and Bahar Rumelili offer a crit-
ical assessment of constructivist approaches to EU–Turkey relations that
pinpoint the impact of norms, values, ideas, identities, and discourse.
Departing from a distinction between ‘thin’, ‘liberal’ constructivism, on
the one hand, and ‘thick’, ‘critical’ constructivism, on the other, they
outline the main tenets of the different variants of constructivism and
discuss the key premises in view of EU–Turkey relations. In doing so, the
chapter provides an encompassing overview of constructivist studies on
EU–Turkey relations over three periods, from 1997 to 2020. The chapter
closes with food for thought on the future of the constructivist research
agenda.
Gülay Icoz and Natalie Martin examine EU–Turkey relations in
Chapter 4 through the lens of historical institutionalism. The authors
stress the analytical power and relevance of a theoretical perspective that
places significance on temporalities, critical junctures, and path depen-
dencies in explicating why Turkey’s accession process has endured despite
the absence of any major progress over the last decade. They argue that
individual member states’ and EU institutions’ vetoes on negotiation
chapters, the Arab Spring, and the illiberal drift within Turkey have served
as critical junctures that have slowed down or sped up Turkey’s acces-
sion negotiations at various points in time. Following this assessment,
the chapter shows how Turkey’s accession process has endured mainly
because of the EU’s security considerations, which have functioned as a
counterweight to normative concerns.
In Chapter 5, Başak Alpan presents a reading of the relationship from
one of the most prominent conceptual approaches in EU–Turkey studies,
the perspective of Europeanization. In her contribution she identifies four
phases of convergence and divergence between the EU and Turkey, which
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are each characterized by a distinct combination of components along
the dimensions of polity, policy, and politics. Alpan argues that while the
Europeanization process considerably transformed polity, policy, and poli-
tics in Turkey until the launch of accession negotiations in 2005, selective
Europeanization and de-Europeanization dynamics have been intertwined
in all three domains from 2006 onward. A key feature of the study is
the analysis of the Turkish domestic debate on ‘Europe’ over time, which
shows how the EU has served as a point of reference for Turkey’s reforms
and domestic discourse, albeit with different connotations.
Frank Schimmelfennig presents the conceptual approach of rhetorical
entrapment in Chapter 6. The approach emphasizes the impact of argu-
mentative commitments on the behavioral preferences of self-interested
community actors. He argues that in the context of EU enlargement,
existing member states commit themselves to the Union’s accession rules
and ethos-based obligations. This ‘entrapment mechanism’ not only func-
tioned as a key driver of the Eastern enlargement but has also shaped
Turkey’s accession process, particularly in the run-up to the launch of
accession negotiations. At that time, he argues, opponents of Turkey’s
membership felt obliged to decide in favor of accession talks against the
background of ‘prior argumentative commitments’ and Turkey’s reform
endeavors to align with democratic community norms. Beyond that,
Schimmelfennig investigates why negotiations started to falter soon after
their onset and concludes that Turkey-skeptics were released from the
rhetorical trap once Turkey started to deviate from the path toward liberal
democracy.
In the final chapter of the first section of the book, Chapter 7, Funda
Tekin starts from the conception of Turkey as a unique accession candi-
date with a dubious accession perspective. On this basis, she examines the
relationship with the EU from the perspective of differentiated integra-
tion. Tekin argues that the multidimensionality of EU–Turkey relations
constitutes a state of conflictual cooperation that demands the consider-
ation of alternative forms of integration outside the accession context in
order to preserve and elevate existing forms of association between the
two sides. The chapter elaborates on whether prevailing variable geome-
tries in EU–Turkey relations can promote the formulation of a partnership
model that would offer a soft landing from the fallout of the accession
procedure. By embedding the concept of differentiated integration into
the key tenets of the main European integration theories, the contribution
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also provides a strong cross-connection to other approaches presented in
this volume.
Part II of the book views EU–Turkey relations through the perspective
of ‘Institutions’. It starts with a contribution by Ebru Turhan and Wolf-
gang Wessels on the role of the European Council in framing EU–Turkey
relations (Chapter 8). Identifying the European Council as the key insti-
tution in determining EU–Turkey relations, they highlight its three main
functions within the EU system for shaping the relationship: ‘master of
enlargement’, ‘external voice and crisis manager’, and ‘agenda and direc-
tion setter’. Drawing on this categorization, Turhan and Wessels explore
the major turning points, shifts, and continuities in the central functions,
internal dynamics, and preferences of the key institution. The findings
suggest a growing trend toward a more conflictual and hostile relation-
ship between the European Council and Turkey as well as the expanding
‘bilateralization’ of the relationship. Still, with their central powers and
functions, the Heads of State or Government will remain a key driver of
the future trajectory of EU-Turkey relations, demonstrating an increased
interest in ‘thinking outside of the accession box’.
In Chapter 9, Alexander Bürgin reviews the European Commission’s
relations with Turkey across a selected array of policy areas. His anal-
ysis illuminates two central aspects of the Commission’s influence: the
Commission serves both as a ‘guardian’ of the constitutive rules of the
enlargement process and as an ‘agent of change’ in Turkish domestic
politics, even in times of severe estrangement and amid bilateral disputes
between the EU and Turkey. Bürgin shows how the Commission’s
management of the Instrument for Pre-Accession Assistance (IPA) has
promoted administrative capacity and policy-learning processes within
Turkey’s bureaucracy, which, in turn, has engendered continued selective
policy alignment despite the waning relevance of Turkey’s EU accession
process. In this context, he characterizes the Commission’s role as an
autonomous actor within the EU system and stresses its relevance for a
norm-based, unbiased assessment of EU–Turkey relations.
In Chapter 10, Michael Kaeding and Alexander Schenuit examine the
formal competencies, key procedures, and internal dynamics of the Euro-
pean Parliament (EP) in shaping EU–Turkey relations. Based on the
voting behavior of the members of the EP, they show how the Parlia-
ment’s position on Turkey and its relationship with the EU have evolved
over time. Following growing support for Turkey’s EU accession from
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2005 to 2008, the EP has gradually developed into the only EU institu-
tion that openly lacks a political majority for the continuation of Turkey’s
accession process. The authors find that the EP has officially closed its
‘accession door’ for Turkey. At the same time, EP resolutions from 2005
to 2019 reveal the increasing relevance of new narratives for coopera-
tion with Turkey that can orient the future trajectory of the EU–Turkey
relationship.
Part III of the book deals with key ‘Policies’ in EU–Turkey relations.
In Chapter 11, Barbara Lippert explores the relationship through the
lens of one of the most influential and studied policy areas, namely the
EU’s enlargement policy. Her chapter presents the concepts, motives, and
criteria for EU enlargement and applies them to the Turkish case. In this
context, she addresses the aspects of Turkey’s potential EU membership
that are also of highest relevance for other areas of bilateral interaction,
such as the question of Turkey’s ‘Europeanness’, its ‘strategic value’, and
the role of ‘political order, democracy, and political culture’. Crucially, the
contribution maps how specific features of the EU–Turkey relationship
have played out from the period of pre-accession to the present accession
negotiations. Lippert concludes that they have made Turkey a unique and
(almost) dead case of EU enlargement policy.
In Chapter 12, Mehmet Sait Akman and Semih Emre Çekin examine
the macroeconomic and trade policy dimension of EU–Turkey relations.
The authors start from the question of to what degree and under what
circumstances the EU has functioned as an ‘anchor’ for the Turkish
economy. Their analysis reveals that the European anchor facilitated
Turkey’s far-reaching macroeconomic and trade policy transformation
until 2008. The establishment of the CU was particularly influential in
Turkey’s trade policy transformation. At the same time, they argue that a
comprehensive study of Turkey’s economic reforms should also take into
account the impact of the ‘multilateral track’ under the guidance of the
Bretton Woods institutions. The authors conclude that the EU’s role in
the economic arena is diminishing and that the ‘anchor’ function might
have been lost amid changing political circumstances, at least as long as an
upgrade of the CU does not bring new momentum to economic relations.
The compatibility of Turkish and EU foreign policy is the focus
of Zerrin Torun’s analysis in Chapter 13. Based on a critical assess-
ment of key international developments and Turkey’s alignment with
the EU’s CFSP, she distinguishes four periods from 1959 to 2020
featuring different constellations of convergence and divergence. Turkey’s
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initial Western orientation after World War II, its increasing aspirations
to create a new regional order, its development of ‘soft power’ instru-
ments in the face of external shocks, and its progressively diverging
(geo-)strategic interests with the EU in Syria and the Eastern Mediter-
ranean are presented as the most influential drivers in this regard. The
chapter concludes that issue-specific future cooperation between both
parties based on ad hoc mechanisms might emerge as a counterweight
to Turkey’s decreasing convergence with EU foreign policy.
In Chapter 14, Ayhan Kaya investigates Turkey’s migration and asylum
policies from the perspective of Europeanization processes. Both before
and after the March 2016 EU–Turkey Statement on irregular migration,
this policy field constituted one of the most relevant and controversial
areas of cooperation. Kaya reveals how Turkey initially aligned and then
started to de-align its relevant policies and laws with or from EU norms
after the 1999 Helsinki Summit. In this context, he scrutinizes the impact
of key international developments, historical roots, Turkey’s EU accession
process, and recent crisis situations in the Middle East on Turkey’s asylum
and migration policies. Kaya shows how the Europeanization of migration
and asylum policies corresponds to Turkey’s internalization of a rights-
based approach up until the eruption of the Syrian civil war in 2011.
He argues that the path dependent, ethno-cultural, and religious logic in
receiving and welcoming Syrian refugees, a logic based on the discourses
of ‘guesthood’ and the ‘Ansar spirit’, has propelled de-Europeanization
dynamics.
In the final chapter of Part III, Chapter 15, Nicolò Sartori assesses the
EU–Turkey relationship from the perspective of energy relations. In his
contribution, Sartori places significance on the key energy policies of both
parties and the main bilateral dynamics in the energy domain. He argues
that energy security was often considered as a domain where mutual
interests bore great potential to trigger convergence between the EU
and Turkey. However, his analysis finds that significant differences remain
regarding both actors’ energy profiles and policy priorities. The chapter
identifies different periods of convergence, stagnation, and controversies
between the EU and Turkey, the latter related to the disputes in the
Eastern Mediterranean. In his contribution, Sartori also shows how new
dialogue formats on energy cooperation were institutionalized between
Turkey and the EU, despite Turkey’s ambition to exclusively connect the
field to the accession process.
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In the concluding Part IV of the volume, we, the editors, aim to
harvest the conceptual, analytical, and empirical findings of the indi-
vidual chapters in view of an overall assessment of EU–Turkey relations
(Reiners & Turhan, Chapter 16). By taking up the guiding questions of
the volume, the chapter condenses key insights derived from theories and
concepts, institutions, and policies and reflects on the different periodiza-
tions of the relationship. In the next step, we assess EU–Turkey relations
against a set of fundamental, mutually reinforcing enablers of coopera-
tion and look at endogenous, exogenous, and bilateral determinants that
are likely to shape the relationship in the future. The synoptic analysis
also aims to translate the new complexities that epitomize the bilateral
dialogue for the academic and political debate. In this context, the chapter
not only presents terms of reference for the reinvigoration of cooperative
trends in EU–Turkey relations but also points out the up-and-coming
avenues for the future research agenda of EU–Turkey studies.
We hope, and are confident, that this volume can make a sustainable
contribution to advance the understanding of EU–Turkey relations, on
the one hand, and the development of EU–Turkey studies as a field of
analysis at the intersection of EU (integration) studies, International Rela-
tions, and global governance studies, on the other. The individual political
agendas of the EU and Turkey, as well as the common challenges at
the regional and global level, are too complex, intertwined, and impor-
tant to ignore the fundamental need for both intensified cooperation and
deepened analysis.
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Öniş, Z. (2003). Domestic politics, international norms and challenges to the
state: Turkey–EU relations in the post-Helsinki era. Turkish Studies, 4(1),
9–34.
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Liberal approaches to regional integration, including neoliberal variants
preoccupied with institutional cooperation, have informed scholarship on
European integration for a long time. They still do today, and for good
reason: their problematization of economic actors and resources offers a
welcome departure from the static diplomatic accounts of high level poli-
tics, while at the same time allowing for an analysis of the state (and
its role in integration) that, occasionally, corresponds more closely to
actual policymaking (instead of offering merely a normative account of
state behavior). When they first emerged some decades ago, they neatly
combined an appreciation for the salience of state interests in allowing for
(or inhibiting) intra-state cooperation and combined that with an acute
understanding of the important role that markets, technology, and inter-
dependence between firms and states had come to play in contemporary
efforts toward regional cooperation. Liberal intergovernmentalism (LI)
has managed to achieve the status of a ‘baseline theory’ on the subject of
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European integration (Schimmelfennig, 2001). In that way, it is a theo-
retical approach, contested and often doubted as to its explanatory rigor,
yet engaged with by most scholars that apply theoretical tools to studying
the EU and its policies.
Does neoliberalism, and LI in particular, help us understand the rela-
tions between the European Union (EU) and Turkey? The question is
far from rhetorical given the significance of this relationship in better
understanding and evaluating Europe’s regional integration efforts. This
chapter begins with a discussion on neoliberalism and its core assumptions
before moving on to a more detailed discussion of LI. The next section
identifies the key institutions, actors, and policy areas applicable to the
relationship between Turkey and the EU with regard to LI from 1963
to the present. The examples chosen, namely the Association Agreement,
Customs Union (CU) and accession talks, seek to incorporate case studies
that would, at first, appear both to fit well with liberal intergovernmen-
talist assumptions and those that do so to a lesser extent. In doing so, that
section also discusses critiques against liberal approaches to enlargement
as well as the specific case of Turkey. The conclusion summarizes the main
findings.
Overall, I argue that liberal intergovernmentalist approaches to EU–
Turkey relations are extremely useful in comprehending the set of
dynamics that led to the signing of the EU–Turkey CU as well as
the interstate forms of cooperation between the two sides in selected
policy areas, not least migration and security. LI’s emphasis on inter-
state bargaining and the salience it accords to economic groups at the
domestic level also go some way toward explaining, at least partially, the
opening of accession talks with Turkey in 2005. Turkish accession to the
Union, given the theory’s preoccupation with state–society relations and
the asymmetry of preferences in the context of interstate bargaining, is
difficult to envisage.
2.2 Neoliberalism: Core
Assumptions and Departure Points
Neoliberalism has made important contributions in International Rela-
tions (IR) theory, especially regarding the role of institutions in facili-
tating cooperation. The debate between neorealism and neoliberalism in
IR theory illuminated different aspects of neoliberalism and allowed for
a structured comparison with (neo)realist thinking. Inspected from up
2 NEOLIBERALISM, LIBERAL INTERGOVERNMENTALISM … 41
close, the two perspectives are not that different from one another (Jervis,
1999). Both focus on the state as the main unit of analysis in IR; both
view the state as a utility-maximizer in an anarchic world and the maxi-
mization of power as crucial for every state’s well-being; finally, both view
intra-state cooperation as a difficult task, since anarchy allows for unilat-
eral attempts by states to enhance their position and concentrate more
resources. There are, however, important differences as well, and these
will be discussed below.
Although neoliberalism does not deny the need for security or indeed
military power, it does not see these features of the international environ-
ment as necessarily determining state behavior. Neoliberalism prefers to
focus on other aspects of international governance such as International
Political Economy, environmental protection, and regulatory politics. The
rationale behind that choice is linked to neoliberalism’s approach toward
international cooperation. The latter is not only necessary in an increas-
ingly interdependent world; it is also often unrealized, as states find
themselves trapped in their own rationality and prove unable to escape
from situations whereby enhancing cooperation would make them better
off. To be sure, conflict in the international arena exists. Nonetheless,
such conflict is, for neoliberals, avoidable and can be minimized through
states’ appropriate behavior. A large part of the relevant literature on
neoliberalism therefore focuses on the set of conditions that would allow
for enhanced cooperation. A realist reading of IR, even when analyzing
cooperation, would draw attention to the implicit or explicit distribu-
tional conflicts inherent in attempts to spread cooperation: for neoliberals,
though such conflicts often occur, they are decidedly less significant than
the gains that states can expect to make. It is in that sense that relative
gains matter for neoliberals much more than absolute gains.
What are the conditions that facilitate cooperation then, and how can
conflict be mitigated? Two of the most important variables underlined by
neoliberalism are information asymmetries and transaction costs. States
will often fail to cooperate less because of malign intentions and more
because they lack knowledge about the other side’s intentions. Failure to
know, and therefore to understand, can then lead to an uncontrollable
spiral of tension, the outcome of which may be open conflict (Mercer,
1996). In that regard, state reputation plays a vital role in signaling one’s
intentions and reducing the possibility of misunderstandings (Mercer,
1996; see also Reiners & Turhan, Chapter 16). Importantly, this is not
to be confused with reputation, which adds to a state’s legitimacy by way
42 D. TSAROUHAS
of a normative ‘logic of appropriateness’. Reputation here allows for iter-
ated games to become routine, meaning safe and predictable, allowing
rational actors to maximize their benefit. Transaction costs can also be
reduced through cooperation.
It is in that context then that neoliberalism underlines the role of
institutions in facilitating cooperation, mitigating conflict, and securing a
more predictable policy environment. Institutions, for neoliberals, are the
‘enduring patterns of shared expectations of behavior that have received
some degree of formal assent’ (Jervis, 1999: 53). They concur with insti-
tutionalists focusing on comparative politics in that they stress how insti-
tutional settlements frame the context within which subsequent action
often takes place and conditions the ability of states/parties/interest
groups to shape their immediate policy environment in accordance with
their own preferences (Hall & Taylor, 1996; Streeck & Kathleen, 2005).
Where exactly lies the value of institutions then? Clearly, institutions have
a functional role to play in reducing (sometimes eliminating) transac-
tion costs as well as information asymmetries. Through their presence,
they allow states to concentrate on benefit maximization. Yet, the most
important aspect of institutions stressed by neoliberals, in sharp contrast
to neorealist thinking, is that institutions can acquire a life of their own:
that is, they are important in themselves and not merely as instruments
of states. To put it in another way, neoliberals claim that the right institu-
tional setup matters not merely in reducing the possibility of conflict but
also because institutions themselves can change the calculations made by
states, alter their set of preferences, and thus lead to forms of coopera-
tion that may not have been envisaged to start with (Keohane & Martin,
1995; Russett et al., 1998; Simmons & Martin, 2002).
It is neoliberalism’s institutionalist emphasis that makes it not only
different from neorealism but also opens new avenues of thinking about
regional integration. Neoliberalism applied to regional integration theory
starts from the assumption, sometimes demonstrated in practice, that
institutional settlements can transform the set of preferences that decision-
makers are likely to adopt. This process will lead to the formation of more
complex networks of interdependence, whereby any subsequent move
adopted will be based on a cost–benefit analysis that does not spring from
that specific round of exchange or bargaining but one adopted earlier.
Over time, this leads to a situation whereby the institutional environment
constrains statecraft to a degree unimaginable by neorealists, leading to
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situations that are difficult to reconcile with a more traditional, state-
centric understanding of international relations. The evolution of the
EU and the pooling of states’ sovereignty can thus be explained in this
institutionalist manner.
Nevertheless, sovereignty remains a cornerstone of the identity that
EU states maintain, and although often pooled and stretched in ways
unforeseen, it maintains a supreme role in the EU policymaking setup.
Delving deep into regional integration theory and seeking to make a
distinct contribution to the puzzle of the EU, LI is worth exploring in
some detail.
2.3 Liberal Intergovernmentalism:
A Three-Step Approach to European Integration
If neoliberal institutionalism assigns an autonomous role to institutions,
LI offers a different interpretation as to the evolution of the EU and
its major decisions over time, more akin to a rational choice institution-
alist perspective (Moravcsik & Schimmelfennig, 2009: 67). It also departs
from the neofunctionalist approaches to integration and returns the focus
to member states and their decisions. However, it incorporates elements
of liberalism in explaining states’ decision-making processes and seeks
to account for the emergence of supranational EU institutions as well,
while firmly grounded on the popular intergovernmentalist approach to
regional integration.
To begin with, it is worth quoting the interpretation of EU integra-
tion by Andrew Moravcsik, the most prominent LI scholar. Though the
definition was written more than twenty years ago, its basic premises still
hold; indeed, their durability is what makes LI one of the most frequently
cited theoretical approaches to the study of the EU:
EU integration can best be understood as a series of rational choices
made by national leaders. These choices correspond to constraints and
opportunities stemming from the economic interests of powerful domestic
constituents, the relative power of states stemming from asymmetrical
interdependence, and the role of institutions in bolstering the credibility
of interstate commitments. (Moravcsik, 1998: 18)
Moravcsik’s formulation encapsulates the gist of the LI argument and
places, in sequential order, the successive steps that the theory applies to
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explaining how and why integration has come about. We examine those
below in turn, starting from the formation of national preferences and the
role of domestic groups.
2.3.1 Step One: State–Society Relations and the Formation
of National Preferences
From a liberal point of view, states’ foreign policies are formulated as
a result of the governments’ interactions with domestic social groups.
Therefore, state preferences cannot be assumed to be a priori fixed; they
tend to evolve in accordance with the way in which domestic groups
pressure their governments and as the latter seek to respond to those
pressures (Moravcsik, 1993). This flexibility in the interpretation of state
preferences allows LI to account for a variety of different policy positions
among EU member states and underlines the salience of institutions in
domestic settings, whether political, social, or economic. What kind of
positions are states expected to assume based on an LI reading of inte-
gration? This is also impossible to presume without examining the specific
policy area of major concern to a given state.
Although LI is often said to privilege economic issues over political
ones, and especially producer groups’ interests, this does not always have
to be the case. LI pays special attention to interdependence and the forces
of globalization, yet it underlines that there may well be policy areas
(for instance immigration policy) where economic interest groups will
not dominate the calculations of policymakers in formulating their state’s
policy position (Wincott, 1995). As will be shown below, this is particu-
larly relevant with regard to EU–Turkey relations today and the central
role assumed by the two sides’ agreement on managing migration flows
in 2016.
One of the most important LI insights in this respect is that EU inte-
gration began on the basis of concrete, issue-specific economic concerns
and, therefore, was for a great period of time (indeed until today) domi-
nated by state preferences formulated on that basis (Moravcsik, 1998: 3).
This by no means suggests that factors such as geopolitics or ideology are
to be excluded from the analysis: they have to be considered and exam-
ined. However, they tend to be of secondary importance in the great
moments of deepening integration. The issue at stake, therefore, is less
whether politics or economics matter but the relative weight of these
variables in explaining state preferences. Moreover, LI’s great advantage
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is its flexible nature, being after all a synthesis of commercial liberalism
and rational choice institutionalism. In that sense, the theory foresees
the possibility of ideological and geopolitical reasoning playing an impor-
tant role in decision-making processes should economic interests be weak
and cause–effect relations uncertain (Moravcsik & Schimmelfennig, 2009:
85).
In line with this approach, EU–Turkey relations have developed over
time based on a mutual rational choice calculation. Bilateral relations
have varied depending on two major variables: (a) the costs associated
with cooperation/non-cooperation that powerful domestic groups would
have to bear; and (b) the variable geometry of state preferences at the
level of the European Council and the Council (see Turhan & Wessels,
Chapter 8).
2.3.2 Step Two: Interstate Bargaining
Once preference formation is complete at the domestic level (if only for
a brief period and if only in specific issue areas), how do states come
together at EU level? The bargaining process that ensues is by defini-
tion hard and prolonged, with different deals agreed between countries
whose options and preferences vary. The bargaining outcome therefore
reflects (relative) power relations between states as well as the degree of
willingness they possess to strike a deal on a specific issue (Moravcsik &
Schimmelfennig, 2009: 71). This affirms that there are important power
asymmetries within the EU and that some states may be able to play their
bargaining cards better than others. Nevertheless, and that is an important
qualification, asymmetry is not necessarily the result of military prowess or
economic might: it is often the result of states’ relative position to other
states with regard to the benefits they expect to derive from a partic-
ular bargain. States are, in that sense, asymmetrically dependent on one
another and possess knowledge of this asymmetry (Moravcsik, 1998: 8).
This can go a long way in explaining their bargaining strategy as they seek
to compromise often conflicting preferences and develop a new arrange-
ment (a treaty or major policy initiative) with which they can all live. A
further key point is the disproportionately high amount of power that
large member states retain in the EU negotiation process, especially at
the level of the European Council.
According to the LI approach, major EU treaties have been fought
over by states insisting on their own preferences and yet willing to
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compromise when the stakes were high. Why? Because they were aware of
the disproportionate benefits they were likely to acquire if they compro-
mised on issues of secondary importance to them (Moravcsik, 1998: 3).
Rational and aware of the iterated game-setting in which they have been
drawn, states have not hesitated to threaten to veto proposals, or indeed
exercise that right, whenever they felt that the cost-benefit calculation
they engaged in saw them potentially ending up with less than they had
expected to gain. On the opposite side of the spectrum, those states with
less to gain at any particular bargaining round could afford to behave in
a more obstructionist manner and press for more concessions, aware that
their own loss in case of a collapse of bargaining was likely to be minimal.
A question that arises relates to the salience of institutions and the role
of supranational institutions. LI concentrates on the role and bargaining
power of member states; leaving little room for supranational actors to
contribute to the formation of state positions in the context of momen-
tous decisions, such as treaty revisions. There are exceptions to be
sure, as Moravcsik (1998: 12) recognizes with regard to the signing of
the Single European Act in 1986, in which the European Commission
(EC) and then President Jacques Delors, in particular, played an active
role. However, and this is key in understanding the rationale behind
LI approaches, information asymmetries and transaction costs are not
thought to be excessive within the EU policy- and decision-making struc-
ture. States know more or less what others think as well as what they
know; they hardly feel the need to employ bodies such as the EC to
cover those gaps, let alone allow such bodies a disproportionately high
degree of decision-making autonomy. Supranational institutions are here
facilitators for state preferences, sharply distinguishing LI from the more
supranationalism-friendly interpretations of neofunctionalist theory. From
an LI point of view, EU–Turkey relations are subject to hard intergov-
ernmental bargaining premised on member states’ willingness to achieve
desired outcomes as well as an outcome acceptable to all. Offering Turkey
candidate country status in the 1999 Helsinki Summit is instructive.
Following turbulence in the Balkans and with the Kosovo war ongoing,
the Union’s decision to offer Turkey the prospect of EU member-
ship was linked to the unanimous EU desire to maintain stability in a
volatile region. The role played by individual member states mattered,
too, however in that they saw stronger relations between the EU and
Turkey as an opportunity to maximize their own benefits. Greece pressed
and succeeded to have its bilateral disputes with Turkey upgraded to the
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European Council level prior to the Helsinki Summit. Because of pres-
sure from Greece, Cypriot membership to the EU would go ahead even
without a solution to the Cyprus problem, while all candidate countries
would have to recognize the jurisdiction of the International Court of
Justice in resolving bilateral disputes (Terzi, 2005).
2.3.3 Step Three: Institutional Formation
The LI model conceives of a third step in integration explaining why
institutions come to be formed. In the history of integration, multiple
new institutions have been formed, many of them able to acquire more
power over time. Beyond the obvious example of the EC, it is worth
highlighting the role played by the European Central Bank in alleviating
the immediate consequences of the financial and economic crisis.
In explaining the role of institutions, LI borrows heavily from regime
theory (Keohane & Nye, 1977), which views institutions as essential
ensuring that unwanted consequences in uncertain conditions will be
effectively mitigated. In that sense, institutions play a crucial role in
reducing the uncertainty that states face in a collective context and are
necessary to ensure the durability of agreements reached and their effec-
tive implementation over time. This is not to be equated, however,
with member states’ permission to institutions to do as they see fit
once established. When supranational institutions do gain more Treaty-
based powers, this is the result of an attempt to control and cajole
others in complying with commitments made earlier and to allow for the
possibility of imposing sanctions in case of non-compliance. The non-
compliance problem is common in international organizations, and LI
attempts to explain the emergence of such institutions through a rational
institutionalist approach (Pollack, 2003). Finally, LI asserts that supra-
national institutions tend to be reduced to the role ascribed to them
in the EU. The vast majority of EU policy implementation, including
abiding by regulatory standards, remains the responsibility of national
administrations.
With regard to EU–Turkey relations, the role of the EC comes into
sharp focus. Not least through its annual progress reports published
since 1998, the Commission has been tasked by the Council to monitor
Turkey’s progress toward accession and warn the Council of possible
red flags. Worsening progress reports after 2007–2008 played a role in
reducing the pace of EU–Turkey negotiations and ultimately bringing the
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process to a near stalemate (Macdonald, 2018). However, LI foresees that
the ultimate decision on negotiations rests with member states. To illus-
trate, the EU–Turkey refugee ‘deal’ reached in March 2016 has little to
do with supranational institutions and all to do with the alignment of
interests between major political actors, most notably Chancellor Angela
Merkel of Germany and President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan of Turkey (see
also Reiners & Tekin, 2020). Further, although institutions such as the
Commission and Parliament have played an important role in first encour-
aging and then discouraging accession talks, Turkish policymakers have
emphasized that, to them, the real decisions relating to Turkey’s acces-
sion lie with EU leaders, that is, the European Council (Erdoğan, 2004).
They have underlined the complementary character of supranational insti-
tutions, often ignoring the real value that lies with them, either in seeking
to reinforce Turkey’s EU path in times of mutual distrust (as with the
Commission’s Positive Agenda initiative in 2012 (European Commission,
2012)) or, voicing their opposition to Turkish accession on grounds of
a malfunctioning democracy (as in the case of the EP’s vote to freeze
accession talks in 2016 (Kroet, 2016).
2.4 EU–Turkey Relations
Over Time: Testing LI Theory
2.4.1 The 1963 Association Agreement
The relationship between Turkey and the then European Economic
Community (EEC) dates back to the 1963 Association Agreement (also
known as the Ankara Agreement) between the two sides. Turkey applied
for associate membership in 1959, and the Agreement signed in Ankara
four years later sent the two sides’ relations down an institutionalized
path that remains in place. The primary aim of the agreement was to
boost economic ties between the two sides and assist Turkey’s economic
development through financial assistance and higher trade volumes. At
the same time, the agreement foresaw a three-stage negotiation process
through which a CU with Turkey became the core objective. This became
reality by 1995, much later than originally envisaged.
Why was the Association Agreement signed? For Turkey, Germany
was one of its major trading partners in the postwar era (along with
the United States) on important products such as tobacco. Economic
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arguments stood side by side with Ankara’s attempt to enhance its inter-
national status and align itself with the nascent Community in the context
of the Cold War rivalry and Ankara’s Western-oriented foreign policy.
Moreover, Turkey applied for associate membership only a few months
after Greece did in an attempt not to be left behind. Germany stood
to benefit from a CU with one of its major trade partners and so did
other EEC countries, such as the Benelux states, whose export-oriented
model also stood to gain from closer economic ties with Turkey. Coun-
tries such as France and Italy, on the other hand, saw in Turkey a direct
rival for many of their agricultural products and resisted the idea of a
CU, pushing this further down the road. For France then, as today,
Turkey’s European identity was questionable, which proved an obstacle
for Turkey in negotiations (Erdoğdu, 2002). German willingness to reach
an agreement prevailed after such a concession was made, but only after
incorporating Article 12 into the agreement and allowing for the transfer
of Turkish migrant workers to Germany to supply the German labor
market with much-needed workers during the postwar labor shortage.
This agreement facilitated full employment and the emergence of the
German Wirtschaftswunder, the ‘economic miracle’ of the postwar years
(Capoulongo, 2015: 7–9). Bargaining between the two sides led to a
three-phase agreement, the last stage of which envisaged the possibility
of Turkey’s EU membership, but only after Turkey abided by Treaty
obligations and without offering any concrete timetable to that effect.
All in all, domestic interest groups and their salience are less important
than interstate bargaining and a process of state preference formation, by
both the EEC and Turkey, in explaining the signing of the Association
Agreement. Tangible economic and political benefits, and the willingness
of Germany to reach an agreement on an issue of high salience to its
domestic policy agenda, played a key role.
2.4.2 Turkey’s Membership Application and the Signing
of the Customs Union
In 1987, Turkish Prime Minister Turgut Özal spearheaded Turkey’s EU
candidacy, and the country officially applied to join the bloc. A lot of
water had flowed under the bridge since 1963: EU enlargement had taken
place and the Union now numbered 12 members, Turkey’s chronic polit-
ical instability had led to a three-year-long military regime in the early
1980s, and Turkey’s economic model was being transformed away from
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import substitution and toward a liberalized, export-oriented approach
to growth. The latter was of special significance for major EU exporters,
seeing in Turkey a rising market economy with large growth potential,
but is not the only salient factor here. The rise of political Islam in Turkey
had been underway for some time already in 1987, and Turkey’s political
elite, as well as its secular business elite based in Istanbul and other major
western cities, was fearful of a possible drift away from Western values.
Özal and most of his successors during the 1990s used this political argu-
ment to obtain EU concessions, anchor their country to the Union, and
complete the CU process (Ulusoy, 2007: 484).
The EEC was caught by surprise by Turkey’s application: not least due
to divisions among them and in order to partially externalize decision-
making costs, member states asked the Commission for an opinion on the
matter, and it took more than two years for the opinion to be released
(European Commission, 1989). The negative assessment of Turkey’s
application cited socio-economic factors: structural disparities regarding
agriculture and industry, low social protection as well as more tech-
nical arguments concerning the need to prioritize the completion of the
Single Market over enlargement (European Commission, 1989). More-
over, the Commission also referred to democratic deficiencies in Turkey
regarding freedom of expression or the right of minorities. By the 1980s,
the Community had been transformed following the accession of former
dictatorships in Greece, Spain, and Portugal: political criteria such as
democracy and human rights would from now on become part and parcel
of EU conditionality, a development that Turkey would confront time
and again, not least following the adoption of the Copenhagen criteria in
1993 (Kahraman, 2000). The fact, however, that the same Commission
opinion stressed the need for ‘intensifying relations’ between the two sides
underscores the calculation in Brussels and most member states: Turkey
remained too important, both economically and politically, to be ostra-
cized. Member states were able to neither support nor reject Turkey’s
application as a result of the Commission opinion: Greece was alone in
objecting to possible Turkish membership (Yılmaz, 2008: 5). To sweeten
the bitter pill, the Council tasked the Commission to develop a plan
to keep relations with Turkey on track, and the Commission set out a
working program in 1992 aimed at completing Turkey’s membership into
the CU (Arıkan, 2006).
While uncertain and divided on the question of Turkey’s membership,
member states undoubtedly wished to keep Turkey in the Community
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fold. The implementation of the CU, foreseen in the Ankara Agreement,
had not taken place at this time, but by the mid-1990s conditions had
become ripe. The EU stood to gain from anchoring Turkey in its markets
and requested that Ankara expose itself to international competition. For
Turkey, membership in the CU was seen (or interpreted) as a decisive
step toward full EU membership. Greece, which had traditionally used
its veto-wielding powers against Turkey’s closer ties with the EU, now
dropped its objections after receiving assurances that negotiations with
Cyprus for membership would soon begin (Vidal-Folch, 1995). This
exchange was, for Greek policymakers, an outcome that maximized their
leverage. Because of the lifting of the Greek veto in the mid-1990s, the
EU–Turkey CU came into being. Turkey’s industrialists initially viewed
the effects of the CU with suspicion, fearful of enhanced competition
(Eralp & Torun, 2015: 17). Over time, however, the benefits from it
have outweighed the costs (Togan, 2015).
Regarding the CU, one sees a successful case for LI and neoliberalism
more generally, through which economic gains are spread to partici-
pating states and the institutions formed thereafter secure safe returns
for contracted parties. A trickier case, however, is the start of accession
negotiations with Turkey in 2005, to which we turn next.
2.4.3 Turkey’s EU Accession Talks: A Difficult Case
Things get more complicated when the focus shifts to politics, and in
particular when ideational perspectives enter the fray (Schimmelfennig,
2001). After all, explaining the decision to open accession negotiations
with Turkey in 2005, and therefore opening the way for its full incor-
poration to the EU, is difficult to reconcile with an approach that sees
domestic groups as key, given strong skepticism among the EU popu-
lation over Turkish entry (Gerhards & Silke, 2011). More importantly,
many member states stand to lose from Turkey’s full entry: competi-
tion for scarce EU resources would increase and less prosperous states
would have to join cohesion and solidarity funding with a large state
more populous but poorer than them. Even if one allows for the LI claim
that distributional consequences in the case of enlargement to Central
and Eastern Europe were insignificant for EU-15 states, thus allowing for
enlargement (Moravcsik & Vachudova, 2003), the same can hardly be
said about Turkey, by far the largest among candidate countries.
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In that context, then, and from an LI perspective, the decision to start
accession talks is indeed a puzzle. This is linked to some of the criticism
directed toward LI in particular for its neglect of previous commitments
made by national governments and the rhetorical entrapment (Schim-
melfennig, 2001; see also Schimmelfennig, Chapter 6) they subsequently
face when confronted with candidates arguing about the relevance of their
candidacy and the ‘Europeanness’ of their polity.
On the other hand, LI retains some explanatory power here, as well.
Powerful domestic groups in key member states, such as the Federation of
German Industries (BDI), openly backed Ankara’s accession bid. What is
more, the BDI has been vocal in its support for continued accession talks
with Turkey as late as in 2013: that is, when relations had started to sour
(BDI, 2013). Stressing the salience of Turkey’s geostrategic importance
and the fact that Germany is the country’s biggest trading partner were
foremost in the BDI’s argumentation. Further, leading politicians in EU
states were keen to emphasize the potential security gains for the Union
with Turkey in it. In such an event, the argument went, the EU would
demonstrate its openness to Islam and the Muslim world (Desai, 2005).
In that sense, LI’s emphasis on the prioritization of economic, sector-
specific interests and its focus on asymmetrical bargaining at the level of
the European Council and the Council appear vindicated. Moreover, the
decision to begin accession negotiations was formulated in such a way that
the open-ended nature of the negotiations’ outcome allowed for member
states to read into the agreement whatever they wished. After accession
talks had been agreed, French President Jacques Chirac stated that the
issue would eventually be put to a referendum, a view echoed by Austrian
Chancellor Wolfgang Schüssel (Yılmaz, 2008: 11).
2.4.4 The EU–Turkey Trajectory Post-2005: Transactionalism
in Action
LI stresses the dominance of national predilections, the complexity of
bargaining between states with asymmetrical preferences on Turkey, and
the prioritization of economic and issue-specific interests over the more
comprehensive and complex political relations that EU accession entails.
It also maintains a rather skeptical view regarding enlargement in general,
as new member states make bargaining ever more complex, thus making
it harder to find a common denominator satisfying diverse priorities.
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The start of accession negotiations in 2005 was controversial among
many EU capitals and thus included several provisos that impeded
progress in Turkey’s accession talks. To start with, no EU acquis
chapter was to be fully closed unless all of them had been success-
fully concluded. Second, although the aim of talks was full accession,
other forms of aligning Turkey to the EU remained open in case acces-
sion talks stalled. Third, some member states reserved the right to ask
their people via a referendum as to whether they would approve Turkish
membership once negotiations had been concluded (BBC, 2004). No
previous enlargement round had been negotiated under such circum-
stances, and the fact that Turkey-skeptic governments had taken over
in France and Germany played into the hands of forces wishing to
stall Turkey’s accession progress. Moreover, the credibility of condi-
tionality was compromised early when senior political figures disputed
Turkey’s ‘Europeanness’, thus deeming it ineligible for full member-
ship (Uğur, 2010: 967–992), while rising Euroskepticism made things
worse. Turkey’s reform momentum, which had kicked off following the
1999 Helsinki Summit and culminated in political and economic progress
by 2005, stalled afterwards. Ankara’s erstwhile enthusiasm gave way to
increasing skepticism and accusations of ‘double standards’ against Brus-
sels, and major EU capitals became subject to Turkey’s EU bashing
(Hale, 2012). Progressive reforms were gradually rolled back (Aybars
et al., 2018), despite the Commission’s attempts to keep the talks going
through initiatives such as the 2012 Positive Agenda (European Commis-
sion, 2012). The EU anchor soon lost its relevance in Turkey’s domestic
political debate, yet foreign direct investment (FDI), mostly originating
from EU states, continued to flow into the Turkish economy. An
increasing disjunction between political and economic relations ensued.
The attempted coup in the summer of 2016 and the subsequent crack-
down by Turkish authorities only made the situation worse. In 2020,
the prospect of Turkey joining the EU is as distant as it was more than
20 years ago.
The EU–Turkey trajectory since 2005 fits a liberal intergovernmen-
talist approach. Member states remain divided on the question of Turkish
accession, with some, such as Sweden and Spain, forming a small ‘Friends
of Turkey’ circle, and with others, such as Austria, Cyprus, and France,
remaining intensely skeptical. This diversity of preferences makes a deci-
sion difficult to reach. Hence, the concept of a ‘privileged partnership’
as first molded by Germany’s Christian Democrats (Euractiv, 2004) (and
other major industrial member states) is greatly beneficial to the EU
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as it keeps Turkey economically anchored to the EU trade and indus-
trial market structure through the CU while Turkey is prohibited from
striking its own agreements with countries bound by agreements struck
with the EU. FDI flows from Europe to Turkey make the latter dependent
on such flows and increase the leverage of member states over Turkish
decision-makers. The latter have often threatened Europe with the end
of negotiations but have yet to take that step. According to LI, they are
very unlikely to do so in the future, unless Turkey’s economic salience
becomes fully overshadowed by chronic political instability and isolation
from the West.
Full Turkish membership would make the country an equal partner
both politically and economically, raising its clout and redirecting
resources away from current recipients. Instead of full membership, there-
fore, the EU aims at anchoring Turkey to its structures, since the country
remains a major market for its goods and a vital regional player in a
volatile region. Turkey wants EU accession much more than the EU does
(or at least used to), and this bargaining asymmetry allows the Union to
impose a de facto differentiated form of integration with Turkey, cooper-
ating closely with it when it stands to benefit from such cooperation and
rejecting full membership due to the strains it will impose on it.
The refugee crisis provides further testimony to that argument: the set
of preferences for member states was clearly tilted in favor of outsourcing
the problem of incoming irregular migrants and refugees, as the issue
reached an explosive nature and threatened to destabilize domestic
EU polities and integration itself. Turkey was a convenient partner for
outsourcing, and the deal reached between the two sides relieved EU
member states, primarily Germany, from a major problem. Using its clas-
sical tools of financial assistance and providing promises on accession
talks and visa liberalization, the EU was able to entice Turkey to sign
the deal. However, accession talks have been and remain part of demo-
cratic conditionality: Turkey’s backsliding in this regard has allowed for
the implementation of the deal without Ankara taking any concrete steps
toward accession. From an LI perspective, a form of association between
the EU and Turkey makes full sense, allowing the Union to benefit from
the (economic and trade-related) leverage it holds over the country and
use its relations with Ankara to deal with issue-specific problems, such as
migration. Finally, confirming the centrality of member states and their
preferences in decision-making is the fact that the EU–Turkey refugee
‘deal’ was made possible once the European Council opted for it (see
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Turhan & Wessels, Chapter 8). The deal, which led to a sharp reduc-
tion in the number of irregular arrivals in EU member states (European
Commission, 2018) became possible after the EU Heads of State or
Government and the Government of Turkey released an ‘EU-Turkey
Statement’ (European Council, 2016) to end irregular migration flows,
assist Turkey in managing the flows, and provide for legal pathways for
Syrian refugees to reach EU territory.
The EU decision to externalize migration governance to Turkey
(Tsarouhas, 2018) became topical again in 2020, when the Turkish
government decided to open its border to migrants wishing to leave.
Chaotic scenes followed, with thousands of Pakistanis, Afghans, East
Africans, and some Syrians trying to cross into Greece. The latter claimed
the right to defend itself from an unexpected ‘invasion’, while Turkey
claimed that the EU’s lack of solidarity toward Turkey prompted the
move (Boffey, 2020). While the Commission president openly accused
Turkey of politicizing the border to gain concessions from Brussels, Euro-
pean Council President Charles Michel referred to ‘differences of opinion’
and called for an open dialogue to overcome the challenge. The Union
tasked the High Representative Josep Borrell to work with the Turkish
foreign minister and come up with a way of overcoming differences
regarding the migration deal. Turkey decided to open the borders to
extract more support from Brussels, not only regarding financial assis-
tance within the framework of the existing refugee ‘deal’ but also political
support for its deep military involvement in Syria, which resulted in scores
of dead Turkish soldiers. When EU leaders visited Greece and toured
the border area together with the Greek prime minister, the solidarity
displayed toward Greece indicated the failure of Ankara’s move (Fox,
2020).
This latest deterioration in EU–Turkey relations followed rising tension
in 2018 and 2019 over the exploitation of hydrocarbons in the Eastern
Mediterranean. Turkey conducted drilling off Cypriot territorial waters
and with no agreement between the two sides on delineating their respec-
tive Exclusive Economic Zone. Despite EU warnings Turkey went ahead
with a second drilling operation and a series of sanctions followed. In
July 2019 the Council decided to freeze Association Council talks with
Turkey, suspend all high level dialogue meetings between the two sides,
and reduce pre-accession financial assistance for 2020 (Council of the
European Union, 2019a). In November and amidst continued drilling by
Turkey, the Council imposed an EU travel ban and asset freeze on Turkish
individuals behind the ‘unauthorised drilling activities of hydrocarbons in
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the Eastern Mediterranean’ (Council of the European Union, 2019b).
Sanctions and measures followed the call by the European Parliament in
March 2019 to fully suspend EU accession talks with Turkey (European
Parliament, 2019).
The assumptions and projections of LI in the post-2005 are confirmed.
Enlargement to Turkey is a very distant prospect and asymmetrical pref-
erences on Turkey make accession unrealistic. Brexit has weakened the
‘Friends of Turkey’ circle considerably, as have Ankara’s actions in the
Middle East and the Eastern Mediterranean. Divisions within the Council
on Turkey remain but are currently overshadowed by Ankara’s belligerent
and rather dismissive approach to the Union. If relations improve, these
divisions will emerge again. Powerful economic ties make cooperation
relevant and even necessary, if only on a pragmatic and transactional
basis. The migration crisis is a clear example: although tensions rose again
in 2020, both sides maintain open channels of communication. Turkish
President Erdoğan was invited to Brussels for talks with the Council and
the Commission, and a few days later a meeting involving the leaders of
Turkey, Germany, France and the UK took place on the migration deal
and the situation in Syria (Euractiv, 2020). Relations with Turkey are now
handled at a strictly intergovernmental level involving the heads of state
and government, as the latest Merkel-Erdoğan-Macron meeting reveals.
The Commission’s role is secondary, as the Positive Agenda reveals, and
the voice of the European Parliament, while loud, is hardly affecting the
day-to-day handling of relations with Turkey.
2.5 Conclusion
This chapter has examined the core assumptions and departure points of
neoliberalism and LI in IR. Neoliberalism’s emphasis on the centrality of
states in mitigating conflict and the institutionalist focus on regular inter-
action that builds trust and is even able to alter state preferences sits well
with the evolution and development of the EU. LI, directly applicable to
regional integration theories, shares most of the neoliberal institutionalist
assumptions and adds layers of complexity through its three-step model
of explaining the emergence of the EU as well as its major decisions over
time.
LI is a major EU integration theory but has clear explanatory limits.
Its rationalism struggles to account for the ideational and normative
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elements embedded in at least some of the Union’s policymaking, espe-
cially regarding external relations and enlargement to poorer states. Its
emphasis on state–society relations as the initial integration step appears
unrelated to the elite-driven origins of Cold War-era integration. Its disre-
gard for supranational institutions downplays the role played by individual
actors representing supranational institutions such as Delors in launching
the Single Market or Draghi in diffusing the Eurozone crisis.
In the case of EU–Turkey relations examined above, and considering
the evolution of relations in recent years, LI is a credible and convincing
theoretical approach. It successfully accounts for the development of
economic ties between the two sides starting from the 1960s, and its
analytical tools also justify the continuous ups and downs in bilateral rela-
tions over the last decades. A form of association between the Union and
Turkey is consistent with the three steps of LI, and one can plausibly argue
that such an association is in fact exactly what underpins their relations.
The EU and Turkey are joined by a CU (from which both, but espe-
cially the EU, benefit), have institutionalized cooperation and common
bodies (supervised and directly controlled by states), and enjoy close ties
on issue-specific areas, such as migration. The Union is likely to culti-
vate close ties with Turkey in a differentiated manner and to the extent
that the specific policy area under consideration is one in which member
states have clear and intense preferences. The trajectory that accession
negotiations have followed since 2005 points to the new emphasis, by
both Turkey and the EU, on issue-specific cooperation and the salience
of member state preferences as well as powerful economic groups in a few
member states.
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CHAPTER 3
Constructivist Approaches to EU–Turkey
Relations
Senem Aydın-Düzgit and Bahar Rumelili
3.1 Introduction
The end of the Cold War and the European Union’s (EU) decision
to enlarge to countries of Central and Eastern Europe (CEECs) while
leaving Turkey out of the new enlargement queue sparked a rising
academic interest particularly in the role of identity in EU–Turkey rela-
tions in the late 1990s. As Turkey’s accession process progressed between
1999 and 2005, debates on the desirability of Turkish accession inten-
sified in the EU. As the prospect of accession became more real, the
opposition also began to be increasingly based on the grounds that the
country posed a profound challenge to the European project due to
the perceived ambiguities over Turkey’s ‘Europeanness’. It was explicitly
and increasingly voiced, most prominently by former French President
Nicolas Sarkozy and German Chancellor Angela Merkel, among others,
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that Turkey’s democracy, geography, history, culture, and the mindset of
its politicians as well as its people qualify it as a non-European state unfit
to become a member of the EU.
This chapter focuses on the emergence and proliferation of construc-
tivist approaches to EU–Turkey relations between 1997 and 2020,
which placed significance on the role of identity in academic studies on
the relationship. Constructivist approaches define identity as a socially
constructed and relational concept. Being socially constructed means that
identity is not an essentialist trait that exists as intrinsic to an individual
or collectivity, but gathers its meaning through social interaction. Iden-
tity being relational implies that identities can only be articulated and
enacted with reference to their constitutive Other(s). We will first outline
the main tenets of constructivism and the premises of a constructivist
approach to EU–Turkey relations. In doing so, we highlight the theoret-
ical diversity within constructivism, especially the difference between the
‘thin’, ‘liberal’ constructivism on the one hand, and the ‘thick’, ‘critical’
constructivism that builds on poststructuralism on the other. On the basis
of a literature overview, we discuss how these theoretical differences have
played out in constructivist analyses of EU–Turkey relations through an
in-depth analysis of selected works in three periods: 1997–1999, 2000–
2010, and 2011–2020. We do not aim to provide a comprehensive
overview of the entire constructivism-inspired literature on EU–Turkey
relations; rather, we study exemplary authors for each period. In conclu-
sion, we identify some future directions for constructivist research on
EU–Turkey relations.
3.2 Constructivism and EU–Turkey Relations
Constructivist approaches in the broadest sense share an emphasis on
the role of norms, values, ideas, identities, and discourse in the consti-
tution of the social world. Norms set standards of appropriate behavior,
ideas constitute shared understandings, discourse reflects dominant ways
of representing reality, and identities are images and concepts of selfhood
held by and attributed to actors (Jepperson et al., 1996). Constructivist
approaches to international relations underline that states, just like human
agents, do not exist independently from their social environment and its
shared systems of meanings (Risse, 2009: 145) as reflected in norms,
ideas, identities, and discourse, and they thus reject the treatment of states
as strictly rational and self-interested actors pursuing strategic preferences
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geared toward maximizing self-interest. Hence, according to a construc-
tivist approach, the EU is a socially constituted actor; the interests of the
EU and its member states are shaped by their identity conceptions and the
prevailing norms and values of European and global international society.
This is reflected in the EU’s foreign policy behavior, such that its rela-
tions with all other actors, not only with ‘Muslim’ Turkey, are shaped by
norms, values, and identity considerations (Manners & Whitman, 2003;
Merand, 2006; Sedelmeier, 2005). In other words, EU–Turkey relations
are not a unique case, where an exception from a strategic, utility-driven
EU foreign policy unavoidably arises due to civilizational differences with
non-EU actors.
Constructivist approaches are also united in their empirical emphasis on
meaning and meaning structures. Hence, in a constructivist study of EU–
Turkey relations, it is necessary to focus on the meanings that relevant
actors attach to policy decisions. For example, it is not enough to note
that the EU started accession negotiations with Turkey; what matters is
how this decision was made sense of, explained, and justified by EU offi-
cials, member states’ politicians, and other relevant actors. Similarly, it
is not enough to simply list the political reforms Turkey undertook to
buttress its membership bid; what matters are the meanings attached to
those reforms.
There has been an overwhelming emphasis in constructivist approaches
to EU–Turkey relations on the notion of identity. This is mainly because
the prospect of Turkish accession to the EU has raised heated political
debates in Europe on whether Turkey is a European country that can
have a credible accession perspective on the grounds of culture, religion,
geography, and history.
This almost exclusive focus on identity brings us to the necessity to
clarify at the outset how constructivists approach the issue of identity, and
the relationship between identity and norms, discourse, and behavior in
international politics. One of the fundamental tenets of the constructivist
approach is that identities are not fixed and rooted in some supposedly
objectively identifiable characteristics of populations; instead, they are
continuously constructed (and reconstructed/shaped), negotiated, and
contested through interactions between political actors (Cederman, 2001:
10–11). The constructivist perspective does not claim that identity can be
completely divorced from objectified traits, such as race, ethnicity, reli-
gion, history, culture, or the political system, but stresses that identity
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is ultimately a presentation of self that is recognized by others (Wendt,
1994: 404–405) and that the meaning and salience of various objecti-
fied traits in constituting identities are negotiated and contested between
political actors. For example, while constructivism would not deny that
most European citizens subscribe—at least nominally—to the Christian
belief, it would contend that the meaning and salience of Christianity
in constituting European identity cannot simply be assumed as an objec-
tive fact. Similarly, other elements of European identity, including history,
democracy, market economy, etc., are also products of an ongoing process
of construction and negotiation within Europe and between European
actors and others.
Applied to the case of EU–Turkey relations, the constructivist perspec-
tive would contend that the identity incompatibility between the EU
and Turkey on the grounds of mainly cultural and religious differences
between the two is socially constructed and cannot be assumed as a given.
Identities are ‘historically contingent, tenuous, and subject to construc-
tions and reconstructions’ (Risse, 2009: 167). Yet, this possibility of
change, which arises from the socially constructed nature of identity,
does not amount to a claim that identities can be changed, reimagined,
and reconstructed overnight. Particular identity constructions are sticky,
and they matter in terms of impacting attitudes and behavior in a given
context. Although this is not a given, that relevant European and Turkish
political actors represent European and Turkish identities as incompatible
with one another matters because it shapes how the two sides make sense
of each other’s political moves.
Over time, substantive variations have developed between construc-
tivist approaches in their outlook on the ways in which identities, ideas,
norms, values, and discourses play a role in the construction of social
reality. There are many constructivist approaches that range along a
continuum from a ‘thin’, ‘liberal’ constructivism to ‘thick’, ‘radical’, or
‘critical’ constructivist approaches (Checkel, 2007: 58). The former is
an explanatory theory in competition with rationalism, which contends
that identities, norms, values, ideas, and discourses matter in shaping
states’ interests and hence influencing their actions. For that, thin-
liberal constructivism pits norm- and identity-based accounts against
purely interest-based ones and shows that the latter are insufficient
in explaining the said outcomes. Accordingly, thin-liberal constructivist
accounts emphasize, for example, that one cannot explain why the EU
embarked on an ambitious enlargement policy that includes Turkey
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without taking into account the constraining effects of enlargement
discourse which underlined the duty of the EU to enlarge to demo-
cratic European states, hence rhetorically committing itself to enlarging
to a democratizing Turkey, despite controversies over the country’s Euro-
pean identity. States as agents interact and constitute the social structure
of international politics, which in turn shape their identities and pref-
erences (Wendt, 1999). In this case, the member states constructed
the enlargement discourse, which imposes on them a duty to complete
the unification of Europe and ties the expansion of EU membership
to the fulfillment of value-based conditions. This, in turn, shaped their
conceptions of European and national identity and preferences toward
enlargement.
‘Thick’ and ‘critical’ constructivist approaches, influenced by poststruc-
turalism, shy away from explanatory theory and, rather, focus on the
‘how possible’ question (Checkel, 2007: 58). For example, instead of
debating whether interests or norms ultimately shape the EU’s deci-
sions on enlargement toward Turkey, thick-critical constructivists focus
on laying out the set of meanings in discourses on European identity
that make it possible for the EU to oscillate between inclusion and
exclusion of Turkey (Aydın-Düzgit, 2012). Also, in contrast to the thin-
liberal approach, thick-critical constructivists do not treat language as a
simple mirror of social reality but point to its constitutive dimensions.
In line with their poststructuralist premises, they stress that there is
no social reality outside language. In other words, neither the EU nor
Turkey exist as independently constituted actors outside of discourse.
Broader discourses on modernity and civilization, as well as more specific
discourses on Europe and EU enlargement, produce certain subject posi-
tions for the EU and Turkey from and within the limits of which they act.
Foreign policy, in this framework, is thus conceptualized as a discursive
practice that constructs particular subject identities for states, positioning
them vis-à-vis one another and thereby constructing a particular reality
in which certain policies become possible (Doty, 1993: 305). The EU’s
enlargement policy is therefore first and foremost a discursive practice
of constituting European identity in relation to others—be they candi-
dates or outsiders. Thick-critical constructivists are interested in laying
out how European identity and relations of difference and hierarchies of
moral superiority/inferiority between Europe and others are constructed
through the EU’s enlargement policy. In poststructuralism, discourse
is intimately linked with power, and a critical analysis of discourse
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serves to expose how taken-for-granted structures of meaning naturalize
hierarchies, limit agency, and marginalize alternatives.
Another key difference between thin-liberal and thick-critical construc-
tivism emerges in the conceptualization of the relationship between
identity and difference. As Rumelili (2004, 2007) points out, in thin-
liberal constructivism, the discursive dependence of identity on difference
is often overlooked. Hence, the formation of collective identities among
states, such as European identity, is viewed mostly as a self-generated,
self-sustained process based on shared norms, ideas, and understandings
among states. In other words, European identity is constituted by charac-
teristics that are internal to the EU—such as democracy, the rule of law,
and respect for human rights—and not necessarily through differentiating
Europe from others. Thin-liberal constructivists have argued in different
formulations that European identity is not dependent on Othering; that
it is a liberal, inclusive identity that constructs outsiders as less-than-
Europe rather than as non- or anti-European (Wæver, 1998: 100) and
a post-national identity premised on Othering its past rather than those
external to it. In the context of EU–Turkey relations, this means that
Turkey is not Europe’s Other and that the relationship is not based on
Othering. In a thin-liberal constructivist perspective, the EU does not
discriminate against Turkey, and the membership of Turkey in the EU is
possible depending on how well Turkey adopts the EU’s self-generated,
value-based conditions.
In contrast, thick-critical constructivist scholars have insisted that iden-
tity among states, like all other forms of identity, is constituted in relation
to difference; it always resides in the nexus between the collective Self and
its Others, not in the Self as seen in isolation (Neumann & Welsh, 1991;
Neumann, 1998). Moreover, thick-critical constructivist scholars empha-
size that identities are performed through practices of differentiation that
distinguish the identity in whose name they operate from counter iden-
tities (Campbell, 1998; Weldes et al., 1999). Consequently, thick-critical
constructivist analyses of EU enlargement and foreign policy have focused
on the ways in which Europe constitutes its identity by constructing
Eastern Europe, Russia, Turkey, the Mediterranean, and the United States
as different, inferior, and in some cases threatening. It needs to be noted,
however, that whereas in essentialist approaches, the difference between
Self and Other is pre-given and rooted in inherent characteristics, in thick-
critical constructivism, it needs to be produced and reproduced. In other
words, Turkey is an Other of Europe not because it is Muslim and hence
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different, but because the reproduction of European identity depends
on the production of Turkey as different. Collective identity formation
is a process that inevitably defines other identities and produces them
as different. Consequently, thick-critical constructivist accounts of EU–
Turkey relations have focused on identifying prevailing constructions of
difference in various European discourses, focusing on EU institutions as
well as different national discourses within the EU (Aydın-Düzgit, 2012;
Tekin, 2010).
In sum, constructivism provides a rich conceptual and theoretical basis
to make sense of EU–Turkey relations. It enables scholars to study the
identity and value-laden aspects of the relationship without resorting to
simplistic essentialism. The case of EU–Turkey relations also brings to the
foreground competing propositions put forward by different variants of
constructivism.
3.3 The Constructivist Literature
on EU–Turkey Relations: Navigating Through
Change and Theoretical Differences
Having laid out conceptually how the basic premises of constructivism
and its different variants would apply to the case of EU–Turkey relations,
in this section we turn to analyzing actual constructivist accounts of EU–
Turkey relations. We do not aim to provide a comprehensive overview.
Most of the case-specific literature on EU–Turkey relations is theoretically
eclectic and thus hard to classify in terms of theoretical perspective. Many
constructivist studies on European identity and EU enlargement refer to
the Turkish example but not at the level of depth necessary to consider
them as a constructivist analysis of EU–Turkey relations. Therefore, below
we analyze a sample of works and focus on discussing the ways in which
they adopt certain constructivist premises in making sense of EU–Turkey
relations and the ways in which they use the case of EU–Turkey relations
to validate constructivist theoretical premises.
The constructivist literature on EU–Turkey relations can be tempo-
rally divided into three periods. First is the 1997–1999 period in which
scholars tried to explain why and how Turkey was excluded from the ‘big
bang’ wave of EU enlargement in the 1990s. The second period roughly
spans from 1999 to 2010, when Turkey was for the first time given a
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credible membership perspective through the decision to launch acces-
sion negotiations. This created a virtuous cycle of political reforms in
the country, although this began to stagnate from 2006 onward. The
third and the final period covers the post-2010 years in which Turkey’s
EU accession negotiations stalled with the de facto freezing of acces-
sion talks along with the EU’s own internal crises and the democratic
decline in Turkey. In many ways, the shifts in EU–Turkey relations—
where the exclusionary relationship of the 1990s moved toward a credible
membership perspective and convergence in the 2000s but reverted back
to divergence in the 2010s—have created challenges for formulating a
consistent constructivist perspective on the relationship.
3.3.1 1997–1999: Exclusion from the Enlargement Wave
Despite its expectations, Turkey was excluded from the list of countries
announced by the EU in 1997 that were to join the EU as part of its ‘big
bang enlargement’. It was only in 1999 that Turkey was officially granted
the status of candidate country destined to join the EU. The question of
why the EU had been reluctant to accept Turkey as a member state was
answered in most of these earlier works primarily with references to iden-
tity (Müftüler-Baç, 2000: 32; Öniş, 1999). While engaging with the role
of a key constructivist concept, in this case mainly with regard to identity,
these earlier works of the late 1990s stayed away from the heated theo-
retical debates between rationalism and constructivism ongoing at the
time in the field of International Relations. Subsequently, a new gener-
ation of studies started to approach the question of Turkey’s exclusion
from/inclusion to Europe from an explicitly constructivist theoretical
vantage point. Rather than only seeking to explain the state of EU–Turkey
relations, these studies were also interested in demonstrating the impact of
norms, values, ideas, and discourses in European enlargement and foreign
policy through the case of Turkey.
A pioneering critical constructivist analysis of the EU–Turkey relation-
ship in this period is Neumann’s work on the discursive construction of
European identity via its historical relations with the ‘East’. In an initial
study conducted with Jennifer Welsh (Neumann & Welsh, 1991), they
argued that the discourses on Turkey in European history still have rami-
fications for contemporary European representations of the ‘Turk’ and
Turkey. In Neumann’s later work, he showed that despite the historical
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importance of the Russian Other in the construction of European iden-
tity, ‘the constitutive exclusion of the Turk was central to the becoming
of the “European”’ (Neumann, 1999: 60). In other words, in European
history, being European was relationally defined as being non-Turkish,
with the positive attributions associated with the former and the negative
traits ascribed to the latter. Neumann argued that these long-lasting and
well-entrenched historical stereotypes also impact on how the EU views
modern Turkey and leads to a reluctance in its admission to the EU by
also referring to Turkey’s exclusion from the enlargement queue in the
1990s. Nevertheless, carrying the sensitivity of a poststructuralist scholar
over competing and contested representations, he also highlighted that
in the case of Turkey, selective utterances from history and contempo-
rary rhetoric tend to ‘present a picture that is a bit too stark in that it
largely fails to highlight the ongoing struggles over representations of the
“Turk”’ (Neumann, 1999: 63).
3.3.2 2000–2010: Rise of Membership Prospects and the Period
of Convergence
In the 2000s, the European integration studies literature came under the
strong influence of a variety of constructivist approaches. In the mean-
time, as the prospects for Turkey’s accession to the EU improved, interest
in the case of EU–Turkey relations surged. As a result, constructivist
approaches to EU–Turkey relations flourished and even diversified.
Earlier works in this period continued to focus on the reasons behind
the tardy inclusion of Turkey in the EU enlargement queue. A highly
influential study undertaken in this period explicitly took on the question
of why the EU prioritized the CEECs over Turkey in the enlargement
process (Sjursen, 2002, 2006). It rested on a Habermasian perspective,
which argues that efforts to achieve consensus through discourse via
appeals to legitimacy contributes to the construction of a social struc-
ture of politics. As such, Helene Sjursen focused on the ‘reasons’ given
by policy actors in the EU to justify enlargement to candidate countries.
Within this framework, she classified the arguments that were given in
favor of enlargement under three categories à la Habermas: those that
emphasize utility, those that refer to rights, and those that focus on values.
She argued that enlargement to CEECs was justified on the basis of all
these three argument types, while justifications for enlarging to Turkey
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did not include a ‘value’ dimension that corresponds to a ‘shared iden-
tity’ and a ‘kinship based duty’, leading to the prioritization of CEECs
over Turkey in the EU’s decision to enlarge (Sjursen, 2002).1 Theoreti-
cally, overall, Sjursen’s contribution, which sought to identify the meaning
structures used to justify EU policy toward different candidate countries
and explain the different policy choices on that basis, reflected thin-liberal
constructivist premises.
As relations between the EU and Turkey took a more positive turn,
culminating in the launching of accession talks between the two sides
in 2005, the focus of thin-liberal constructivist scholars shifted toward
explaining Turkey’s later inclusion in the enlargement project despite the
fundamental disagreements between the member states and the social,
political, and economic challenges that the country was perceived to pose.
Frank Schimmelfennig responded to this conundrum with his concept
of ‘rhetorical entrapment’, which focused on the role of norms in the
accession process (see also Schimmelfennig, Chapter 6). According to
this thesis, which he had first developed to explain the EU’s decision
to enlarge to the CEECs, member states had agreed to the opening of
accession negotiations with Turkey not due to the convergence of their
national preferences but because they were normatively constrained by
the liberal-democratic identity through which the EU defined itself. As
Turkey undertook key political reforms on the way to fulfilling the Copen-
hagen political criteria, objections to Turkish accession on culturalist,
institutionalist, or economic grounds began to lose traction, and member
states that no longer had legitimate grounds to deny accession gave the
green light to the start of accession talks (Schimmelfennig, 2009).
In the early 2000s, Bahar Rumelili (2004) sought to make sense of
the EU’s different treatment of various neighboring/candidate states and
their changing approach toward Turkey within a thick-critical construc-
tivist framework. She argued that while European identity is constituted
in relation to difference, its Othering of outside states takes different
forms, and constitutes different aspects of European identity. Contra
Schimmelfennig, who argued that the EU’s liberal identity normatively
constrained the member states in their approach toward Turkey, Rumelili
claimed that European identity embodies both inclusive and exclusive
1In later years, the same analytical framework drawing from Habermas’ theory of
communicative action was also used in analyzing the ways in which Turkish political
parties justified their views on Turkish accession to the EU (see Balkır & Eylemer, 2016).
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aspects, which are invoked in relation to different Others at different
times. She argued that the discourses on European identity situate Turkey
in a ‘liminal’, ‘partly Self-partly Other’ position, which makes the EU
both inclusionary and exclusionary toward Turkey.
Shortly after accession negotiations began between Turkey and the
EU in 2005, incoming center-right governments in Germany and France
reverted to exclusionary rhetoric toward Turkey, and the impasse over
Cyprus led to the partial suspension of negotiations in 2006. Following
Schimmelfennig’s thin-liberal constructivist argument, Engert claimed
that both the EU’s decision to open accession negotiations with Turkey
in 2005 and the subsequent partial suspension of negotiation chapters
were the results of the EU’s adherence to liberal-democratic norms.
In the former instance, the EU rewarded Turkey’s ‘norm confirmative
behaviour’, but the refusal of Turkey to extend the Customs Union Addi-
tional Protocol to Cyprus constituted a violation of fundamental EU
norms (Engert, 2010: 67).
Simultaneously, the case of EU–Turkey relations became embedded
in the literature on European identity and normative debates about
the future direction of the European polity. Thomas Diez (2004), for
instance, criticized the claims that the EU constituted a fundamental
challenge to the modern territoriality of the nation-state by resembling
a ‘postmodern polity’ (Wæver, 1998). He noted that the presence of
geographic and cultural Otherings in the EU’s discourses on third coun-
tries such as Turkey shed considerable doubt on whether the EU could
actually be defined as a ‘postmodern polity’ (Diez, 2004). Thomas
Risse identified two broad contours of European identity: an inclusive,
cosmopolitan Europe that is more open to the idea of Turkey’s acces-
sion to the EU and an exclusive, essentialist understanding of Europe
that rejects seeing Turkey as a member country (Risse, 2010: 213–220).
Baban and Keyman (2008) explored the potential conceptual implications
of Turkish membership for constructions of European identity along this
exclusivist/cosmopolitan nexus. As such, they found that ‘the potential
for a pluralistic cosmopolitan future for the EU depends on the possibility
of a post-national, multicultural, and global Europe with the capacity to
contribute to the creation of democratic global governance’ and that this
would largely depend on the EU’s approach to Turkish membership and
Turkey’s success in consolidating its democracy (Baban & Keyman, 2008:
109).
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It was in this period that thick-critical constructivist studies began to
delve deeper into the political debates on Turkish accession in the EU
and specific EU member states. Adopting a constructivist ontology of
identity as relational and discursively constructed, Tekin (2010) analyzed
French oppositional discourses on Turkish accession, and by using Critical
Discourse Analysis (CDA) as her method, demonstrated the discursive
strategies through which Turkey had been subject to Othering in France.
The example illustrates how toward the end of this period, constructivist
approaches started to pay closer attention to methodology as well as to
the need to differentiate between sites of authority in the EU, such as the
specific EU institutions and the EU member states, in their analyses.
3.3.3 2011–2020: Freezing of Accession Negotiations and the Period
of Conflictual Cooperation
Attention to methodology and differentiation between sites of analysis
became a more dominant characteristic of the constructivist contributions
in this period. For instance, Catherine MacMillan (2013) conducted an
in-depth discourse analysis of the EU elites’ discourses on Turkey to study
the diverging national discourses on ‘state’ and the ‘nation’ in selected EU
member states (France and Britain) as well as in Turkey to understand
how these discourses impacted these states’ overall discourses on Euro-
pean identity. Paul Levin took up the point expressed in earlier works
by Neumann on the need for empirical historical research by conducting
a detailed study of the historical evolution of the concept of Europe
in relation to its encounters with the Muslims and the Turks over the
entire history of their interaction. By theorizing identity as a dramatic
reenactment where past representations are reproduced in novel ways,
he argued in line with Neumann that this rich historical repertoire had
largely penetrated contemporary European representations of Turkey. To
illustrate his point, he analyzed the European Parliament debates (1996–
2010) on Turkey, where he found that ‘the historical legacy and repertoire
of images generated over the course of centuries of hostile attitudes
toward Islam and Ottoman Turks continue to influence perceptions of
Turks and Turkey in the EU’ (Levin, 2011: 182). Selin Türkeş-Kılıç also
analyzed European Parliament debates (2005–2012) on Turkey, but from
a Habermasian perspective focusing on justifications that the parliamen-
tarians used in arguing for or against privileged partnership with Turkey.
She found that the members of right-wing political party groups who
3 CONSTRUCTIVIST APPROACHES TO EU–TURKEY RELATIONS 75
supported ‘privileged partnership’ rather than full membership for Turkey
discursively constructed an essentialist European identity that excluded
Turkey (Türkeş-Kılıç, 2020).
Aydın-Düzgit (2012) employed CDA to analyze EU elite discourses
on Turkey in EU institutions and selected member states (France,
Germany, and Britain). While also engaging with the normative debates
on the modern/postmodern identity of the EU, she concluded that there
are multiple ‘Europes’ that are being constructed through the discourses
on Turkey, depending on the national, institutional, and the ideolog-
ical milieus within which the discourses are (re)produced. Her analysis
of EU texts revealed that the construction of European identity in the
EU takes on complex dimensions that are impossible to reduce to the
binary dichotomy of the modern/postmodern constructs of identity. She
argued that the degree to which the modern state’s designation of terri-
tory and identity is employed in the discursive construction of European
identity is dependent not only on the entity against which a relational
identity is established but also on the nodal points (such as security)
around which identities are constructed (Aydın-Düzgit, 2013). Similarly,
Münevver Cebeci also looked at the type of Europe articulated through
its foreign policy and claimed that an ‘ideal Europe narrative’ is discur-
sively constructed by academics and the policymaking community to
present Europe as a power that acts in ‘ideal ways’ on the world stage
to ‘colonise’/‘influence’ others (including Turkey) (Cebeci, 2012: 583).
Toward the end of the 2000s, as Turkey under the single-party rule
of the Justice and Development Party (Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi,
AKP) began to turn further away from democratic consolidation and
EU accession, poststructuralist scholars began to focus on the changing
discourses on Europe within Turkey, hence shifting the level of analysis
from the European to the Turkish national level. Alpan was among
the first to point out the discursive shift that took place among the
governing elite in Turkey after the opening of accession negotiations
with the EU. By using Laclau and Mouffe’s discourse theory and its
concept of ‘hegemony’, she claimed that while Europe was the central
point of reference and thus ‘the main focus of the political struggle’
among the Turkish political elite in the period between 1999 and 2005,
it ‘lost its central role in the political debates’ from then onwards (Alpan,
2014: 80). In her later work, she centered her analysis specifically on
the AKP’s discourse on Europe, arguing that although Europe lost its
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centrality in political debates in 2005, the AKP still utilized it as a refer-
ence point in giving meaning to its empty signifiers such as ‘advanced
democracy’, where Europe was construed as an ‘unwanted partner’
and/or a ‘partner in crime’ (Alpan, 2016: 20–24). These findings were
confirmed also in Aydın-Düzgit’s critical discourse analysis of President
Erdoğan’s speeches on Europe, where she identified that the president
discursively constructed Europe as an ‘unwanted intruder’, ‘inherently
discriminatory’, or having an ‘inferior democracy’ (Aydın-Düzgit, 2016:
50–55). She argued that these representations in turn helped dismantle
the discursive legitimacy of the EU’s democratic demands on Turkey and
create a more difficult climate for the adoption of democratic reforms in
the country (Aydın-Düzgit, 2016: 56). Adopting a focus on the recep-
tion and contestation of European discourses in Turkey, but focusing
on their relationship with domestic governance, others have argued that
the neo-conservative ‘style of thought’ espoused by the AKP allowed
it to ‘sublimate the position of the ‘Other’ in the ideational structure
of Europe’, which helped in turn ‘reconstitute the identity’ of Turkey
through neo-conservative ideas (Ertuğrul, 2012).
Meanwhile, Rumelili focused on the impact that changes in Turkish
discourses had on Europe. She argued that Turkish discourses criti-
cizing Europe as a Christian club and situating Turkey as both European
and Islamic had a contestatory and subversive impact on discourses on
European identity (Rumelili, 2007, 2008: 97–110). Subsequently, with
Morozov, she comparatively analyzed how Russia and Turkey responded
differently to exclusionary European discourses (Morozov & Rumelili,
2012). They found that the discursive debates and practices in Russia
and Turkey have enabled certain articulations of European identity and
constrained others. While Turkey challenges the constitution of Europe
and Islam as mutually exclusive and inherently incompatible identities,
Russia advances alternatives to the dominant Western liberal interpreta-
tion of European values.
Aydın-Düzgit’s more recent work moved the focus from elite construc-
tions of national identity to those of the public by exploring via focus
group methodology whether the discursive shifts in the AKP’s debate on
Europe led to changes in public constructs of national identity. She found
that the AKP’s representation of Europe as politically and/or economi-
cally inferior to Turkey and Turkey’s representation as a superior nation
to Europe, thanks to its unique Ottoman history, had penetrated public
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discourse; however, Europe was also increasingly associated with norma-
tive values such as democracy and human rights in Turkey, particularly
among those who identified themselves with the left-wing opposition
parties (Aydın-Düzgit, 2018a, 2018b).
3.4 Future of Constructivist
Approaches to EU–Turkey Relations
This chapter first outlined the main contours of the constructivist school
of thought in international relations with a discussion of how the different
variants of constructivism can be applied to the study of EU–Turkey rela-
tions, followed by an illustrative survey of the academic contributions in
the field of EU–Turkey relations that base their accounts on constructivist
theoretical premises.
Metatheoretical debates in IR are on the wane, and the rapid
changes in EU–Turkey relations caution against teleological accounts.
This context underlines the importance of change and urges constructivist
scholars to explain the changes and continuities in identities and norms
in both the history and the current state of the EU–Turkey relationship
through systematic studies. As the more recent works in the field have
shown, it is also imperative that future constructivist works in this area
take into consideration mutual encounters and interactions in the (co)
construction of identities and contestations of norms in the EU–Turkey
relationship.
In line with this need, in their more recent studies, the authors of
this chapter have attempted to display the changes and continuities in the
identity representations between Europe and Turkey since the proclama-
tion of the Tanzimat Edict in 1839. In line with this goal, they have
studied cultural and identity interactions between Europe and Turkey
from 1789 to 2016 in four key periods in the EU–Turkey relationship
(1789–1922, 1923–1945, 1946–1998, 1999–2016). Conceptualising
identity as discursive and relational, they have shown how representa-
tions of the European and the Turkish Other varied and evolved through
cultural exchanges and political interactions in different historical periods
(Aydın-Düzgit et al., 2017, 2018, 2020).
Overall, constructivist approaches to EU–Turkey relations have been
particularly useful in showing how and when identity matters in the
EU’s stance toward Turkish accession and, more recently, how it impacts
Turkish policies toward Europe through shaping the Turkish elite and
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public conceptions of identity. The key actors which have been studied
in constructivist analyses were officials and politicians from the EU, its
member states and Turkey as well as EU institutions and most notably
the European Commission. While the main focus of interest has been the
inclusion/exclusion of Turkey from the European project, it is important
to note that there are few studies that apply a constructivist approach
to specific policy areas of interest to both sides. One policy area where
constructivist attention has recently been turning to is migration coopera-
tion between Turkey and the EU and more specifically, how the migration
deal between the two sides is compromising the EU’s liberal identity
(Martin, 2019). Constructivism has also proven useful in showing how
Turkey competes with and contests the EU’s development policy in sub-
Saharan Africa by presenting itself as a ‘virtuous actor’ in the region as
opposed to ‘neocolonial Europe’ (Langan, 2017).
External contestations of European normativity by Turkey through
its foreign policies that extend beyond official development assistance in
their shared neighborhood could also be another potential area of inquiry
that could benefit from constructivist insights. Shifts and fluctuations in
mutual identity representations in response to key contemporary devel-
opments in the EU and Turkey such as the EU migration crisis and
Brexit could constitute other subjects of constructivist research. Finally,
constructivism could be used in studying the implications of the changing
nature of European integration toward further differentiation on mutual
identity representations and normative expectations.
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CHAPTER 4
Historical Institutionalism and EU–Turkey
Relations: Path Dependence and Critical
Junctures in the Accession Process
Gülay Icoz and Natalie Martin
4.1 Introduction
Historical institutionalism (HI) returned to the fore in the early 1990s as
part of the new institutionalism group of theories, which also includes
rational choice institutionalism (RCI) and sociological institutionalism
(SI) (Hall & Taylor, 1996). HI is distinguished by its emphasis on
processes over time, rather than examining snapshots, or moments in
time, and theorizes two main concepts: stasis and change. Stasis, or why
things stay the same, is attributed to ‘path dependence’, whereby what
comes after is dependent on previous events (Sewell, 1996). Change
is attributed to events of varying magnitude originating either within
the institution or outside of it. Accordingly, HI considers whether the
change process is one of ‘punctuated equilibrium’, implying a series
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of smaller scale events (Krasner, 1984), or fewer, but more significant
‘critical junctures’, as the mechanism that may sway path dependence
off course (Cappoccia & Kelemen, 2007: 343–344). It is argued here
that the Turkish accession process is a prime candidate for using this
temporal approach—not least because EU–Turkey relations have existed
since 1959, and hence, there is a rich process to study that would benefit
from taking politics ‘[…] as a movie rather than a series of individual
snapshots’ (Pierson, 2004: 1).
This chapter argues that HI is apposite to Turkey’s EU accession
process because it asks questions that cannot be answered by snapshot
theories.1 The political landscapes of the EU and Turkey are complex
and diverse, and mere snapshots cannot encompass this complexity. It
argues that EU–Turkey relations exist—and have endured—for security
reasons. These reasons began as strategic issues, during the Cold War,
but have developed into a broader understanding of security since the
1990s to encompass human and energy security as well (among others)
(Buzan et al., 1998). Moreover, the relationship is highly path-dependent
for both material and ideational reasons: materially, the strategic secu-
rity value of Turkey has endured, and ideationally, the liberal democratic
reputation of the EU was staked upon it (Martin, 2015a: 109). The EU
felt obliged to honor its commitments, pacta sunt servanda, regarding
enlargement firstly from Eastern European states and then Turkey.
This chapter concentrates on the period from 2005, when Turkey’s
accession negotiations with the EU began, to 2020. It will identify the
path-dependent nature of the enduring relationship and the points at
which endogenous and exogenous changes have influenced events. These
points are characterized as ‘critical junctures’ (rather than punctuated
equilibrium) and fall into two categories: those which have hindered the
process and those which have expedited it. In the first category is the
succession of member states which vetoed the opening and closing of
the acquis communautaire chapters between 2006 and 2009, which led
to a stalemate in the accession process. In the second, we see how the
Arab Spring rejuvenated Turkey’s geostrategic value and its moribund
accession process. It prompted, at least partly, the May 2012 Positive
Agenda initiative to kick-start the accession process. The Arab Spring and
the subsequent civil war in Syria also contributed to the refugee crisis of
1For instance, other forms of institutionalism and theories such as Liberal Intergovern-
mentalism (see Moravcsik, 1999; Tsarouhas, Chapter 2).
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2015/16, which further expedited the process and led to the Ankara-
Brussels joint statements of November 2015 and March 2016 (the latter
also known as the EU–Turkey refugee ‘deal’). Both statements attempted
to breathe life into Turkey’s accession process to procure wider Turkish
goodwill and cooperation. However, any progress made was then negated
by the backlash to deteriorating human rights following the July 2016
attempted coup d’état (see also Turhan & Reiners, Chapter 1).
The net effect has been that neither attempts to sideline Turkish acces-
sion (through vetoes and opposition) nor kick-start it (from geostrategic
need) have been effective—the process has continued regardless of posi-
tive or negative influences displaying resilient path dependence. This
chapter will first outline the theory of historical institutionalism, placing
it in the context of wider theory and metatheory, and exploring its rele-
vance to Turkey and the EU. It will then analyze the nature of the critical
junctures identified and how they relate to the underlying path depen-
dence of Turkey’s accession process. Lastly, it will assess the explanatory
value of HI and suggest directions for future research.
4.2 Historical Institutionalism
4.2.1 The Role of Time in Political Science and International
Relations
Historical institutionalism has fallen between the disciplinary silos of polit-
ical science and International Relations (IR), which have very specific
and individual theoretical approaches. Moreover, it has also been caught
between metatheoretical debates in IR—positivism and post-positivism.
The result has been that HI remains a niche theoretical approach that
often gets lost within wider disciplinary disputes. However, this chapter
will argue that HI has a valuable contribution to make to European
studies, EU–Turkey studies and Turkish studies in explaining EU–Turkey
relations because of its emphasis on temporality. As Steinmo (2008) has
argued, what we now call HI is actually a form of historical description
and not a new phenomenon. Within IR it was undermined by the influ-
ence of behavioralism in the 1950s and the subsequent development of
positivist theories. It was the need to conform to the positivist norms
of statistical measurement which led to an overemphasis on ‘snapshot’
approaches rather than the processes over time, which are harder to
quantify because they retain context and explanatory power (Hay, 2002).
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4.2.2 New Institutionalism
HI came into the theoretical lexicon of political science and IR in the
early 1990s. It was coined by Steinmo et al. (1992), who drew on the
macro-historical approaches of comparative political economy (Skocpol,
1979) and placed HI as one of the three variants of new institutionalism.
Steinmo et al. applied the macro-historical emphasis to much shorter
timescales and focused on the processes of stasis and change within
institutions. As such, this approach still largely conformed to the contem-
porary positivist norms within IR and was couched within deductivist
terms, seeing ‘institutions’ as either dependent or independent variables
(Steinmo et al., 1992: 15).
It was further developed by Hall and Taylor (1996), who placed HI
alongside RCI and SI as ways of theorizing institutions in general. Each
strand of new institutionalism differed in its approach to the study of insti-
tutional policy and decision-making. RCI applied rational choice theory
to institutional settings to examine the role of institutions in tempering
the self-interested inclination of members (Steinmo et al., 1992). SI,
on the other hand, incorporated the then-nascent approach of social
constructivism to look at institutional decision-making from a cultural
perspective (Hall & Taylor, 1996), which also taps into the logics of
consequences and appropriateness (March & Olsen, 1984).
HI emphasized the importance of looking at more than snapshots of
time, as both RCI and SI were inclined to do. Around this time, it was
common for RCI to be characterized as a positivist approach and SI as
an interpretivist approach, with HI characterized as a hybrid or eclectic
approach (Hall & Taylor, 1996). However, it is argued that HI is a sui
generis approach rather than as a compromise to solve a metatheoretical
conundrum. As analyzed by Pierson and Skocpol, its defining charac-
teristic and explanatory value lie in its emphasis on taking a long-term
view:
Without the kind of attentiveness to temporally specified process […]
important outcomes may go unobserved, causal relationships may be
misunderstood and valuable hypotheses may never receive consideration.
(Pierson & Skocpol, 2002: 699)
Arguably, because of straddling disciplinary and metatheoretical divides,
the concept of HI is ‘woolly’ and ill-defined (Rixen & Viola, 2016).
Neither its definition nor its metatheory are consistent between advocates,
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and HI would benefit from ‘theoretical refinement’ (Pierson, 2004: 139–
142). However, the eclecticism of HI is a strength and is only problematic
if judged by positivist standards. Instead, we argue that HI can be both
deductive or inductive: hypotheses can relate to a time span, or evidence
can be assessed over a time span. Furthermore, HI can also address mate-
rial factors, for instance, written policies, or ideational factors, such as
norms and values. Accordingly, it can use an array of data sources—quan-
titative, qualitative, or both (although usually qualitative)—because its
defining feature within these broad parameters is time. As Pierson persua-
sively argues, although it has emerged as part of new institutionalism, HI
is as concerned with history as it is with institutions:
[HI] scholarship is historical because it recognizes that political devel-
opment must be understood as a process that unfolds over time. It is
institutionalist because it stresses that many of the contemporary implica-
tions of these temporal processes are embedded in institutions, whether
these be formal rules, policy structures, or social norms. (Pierson, 1994:
29)
HI scholars such as Pierson and Skocpol (2002) emphasize three key
elements of HI: big real-world puzzles, temporality, and context—and
this is HI’s uniqueness. However, this is not a zero-sum game but merely
an assertion that different theories ask different questions. Therefore,
which one is chosen will depend on the question being asked. With regard
to Turkey’s EU accession process, HI can illuminate processes over time
in a way in which RCI and SI cannot. HI is able to illuminate processes
of change—or non-change—and, hence, more recently has come to be
seen as a ‘useful tool’ in the study of institutions (Rixen & Viola, 2016:
4) and specifically the EU–Turkey accession process.
4.2.3 Stasis and Change
If the defining characteristic of HI is its attention to processes over time,
then the tools it uses are those that look at the processes of stasis and
change. Furthermore, HI examines the cause of the change in question,
whether it is incremental or sudden. The primary tool for examining
policy inertia, i.e., stasis, is ‘path dependence’, defined by Sewell as a
concept in which ‘[…] what happened at an earlier point in time will
affect the possible outcomes of a sequence of events occurring at a later
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point in time’ (Sewell, 1996: 262–263). Similarly, Rixen and Viola (2016:
12) have characterized path dependence as ‘[…] a specific kind of process
that is set in motion by an initial choice, decision, or event, which
then becomes self-reinforcing’. Policy decisions become fixed because
funds may have been invested or reputations are staked on their success;
therefore, reversing the policy is more costly than continuing with it.
Path dependence therefore can be defined as the process in which
what comes after depends on what went before. However, its simplicity
is deceptive, because there are various reasons why path dependence—
and therefore policy stasis—exists, and not all of them are present every
time. These reasons are sunk costs, the notion of ‘lock-in’ or institu-
tional inertia, and sequencing, which argues that some things may not
happen because of previous decisions in which things may have happened
if the previous event had not have happened (Cappoccia & Kelemen,
2007: 342). This contingent aspect of the concept of path dependence,
therefore, has contributed to the criticism of the theory’s ‘woolliness’.
As Mahoney has argued: ‘Discussions of path dependence have been
hampered by a basic problem; analysts often lack a clear understanding
of the meaning of path dependence’ (Mahoney, 2000: 535). The best
way to understand path dependence is to acknowledge the influence of
past decisions on what may follow and be aware that there may be several
reasons for this. The factors involved should be established case by case.
For this reason, process-tracing (George & Bennett 2005; see also Collier,
2011) is an oft-used methodology with this approach:
The aim has been to demonstrate the existence and effect of historical
legacies in the political processes and institutions of the present. […] For
them, (HIs) […] history matters; to understand the present is to under-
stand how it has evolved from the past and to trace the legacies of that
evolution. (Hay, 2002: 136)
Another recurrent criticism of HI is that its emphasis on path dependence
precludes explanations of change. In other words, ‘[…] although it is well
suited for explaining the persistence of policies, it is much less capable of
explaining change in those same policies’ (Peters et al., 2005: 1288). This
criticism is countered by the concept of ‘critical junctures’, first used by
Collier and Collier (1991).
Inevitably perhaps, the notion of a ‘critical juncture’ is also ‘woolly’:
it can be seen as the start of a path-dependent process or the result
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of exogenous factors that cause change to develop in a path-dependent
process. Alternatively, it can be viewed as a necessarily arbitrary point
or a convenient theoretical device to avoid going ever farther back into
history or ‘infinite explanatory regress into the past’. The critical juncture
is crucial to HI because ‘[…] after this […] major alternative development
trajectories are increasingly closed off’ (Mahoney, 2001: 8).
Cappoccia and Kelemen urge ‘caution and clarity’ in the approach.
They define ‘critical’ through ‘probability jump’ and ‘temporal leverage’.
That is increased likelihood—but not proof—that choices made at the
given time will affect the outcome by triggering a path-dependent process
‘which constrains future choices’. Critical junctures must also be anchored
to a unit of analysis as they are relative to time and space rather than
absolute concepts. What is a critical juncture for one policy area may not
be for another—or it may be at another time. These junctures are also
relative to each other: ‘[…] the duration of the critical juncture must
be brief relative to the duration of the path dependent process that it
initiates’ (Cappoccia & Kelemen, 2007: 350).
4.2.4 Historical Institutionalism and Turkey’s EU Accession Process
What gives HI theoretical value is that it asks different questions than the
other ‘institutionalisms’ as well as provides different theoretical perspec-
tives due to its emphasis on temporality. When applying this to the case of
Turkey’s EU accession process, we can ask what periods of stasis or change
have occurred since accession negotiations were opened in 2005 and why
these may have occurred. Additionally, it is useful in discussing what the
sources of stability or change may be, and this may help with future
predictions about the process. These sources or triggers can be internal,
to the country or institution in question, or external (Cortell & Peterson,
1999: 185). External (global) triggers include war, pandemic, geopolit-
ical conflict, changing balance of power within institutions, technological
change, and macroeconomic change; internal triggers include revolution,
civil war, military coups, elections/changes of government, economic
growth rate, demographic change, and social movement/conflict (see also
Turhan & Reiners, Chapter 1). In this case, we will consider the strength
of the path dependency of the accession process and the nature of the
various critical junctures it has reached—namely, member states vetoing
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the opening and closing of the acquis communautaire chapters for Turkey
between 2006 and 2009, the consequences of the Arab Spring and the
illiberal nature of governance in Turkey.
Stasis and change can also be the result of individual action or agency
(Gourevitch, 1986: 236). At critical junctures, individuals have a greater
ability to influence policymaking. This has two consequences: (1) the
range of plausible choices open to powerful political actors expands
substantially, and (2) the consequences of their decisions on the outcome
are potentially much more momentous (Martin, 2019). We believe paying
attention to what politicians in Turkey and EU leaders do during these
critical junctures is also crucial in explaining what impact the critical
junctures have had on the accession process. For instance, emphasizing
how politicians, such as then Turkish EU minister, Ali Babacan, or EU
Enlargement Commissioner, Štefan Füle, present opportunities to enact
new plans and realize new ideas during the critical junctures (Gorges,
2001: 156), we can explore if any critical juncture in the accession process
has translated to opportunities for new ideas or new plans.
The analysis below concentrates on the accession process from the
opening of negotiations in 2005 until 2020. It considers the points
of change already outlined and the impact they may have had on the
accession process. It argues, the accession process remains in a state
of ‘managed containment’ (Martin, 2019) that has been constant since
2005. The points of change, or critical junctures, have been the result of
internal EU dynamics, in particular opposition to the Turkish case, and
external geopolitical factors, namely the Arab Spring. These have slowed
down or sped up the process at various points in time; but overall, very
little has changed due to Turkey’s poor record of liberal democracy.
4.3 Turkey’s EU Accession Process:
Stasis and Change Since 2005
The Turkish case is the longest standing accession process in the EU.
Ankara’s first approach to join, what was then the EEC, was in 1959 and
an Association Agreement was signed in 1963. The delay was the result
of the intervening coup d’état in Turkey in which the Prime Minister,
Adnan Menderes, and others, were executed by the Kemalist military. The
illiberality on display ruled out imminent membership for Turkey but the
Association Agreement enabled the member states to maintain Ankara’s
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goodwill within ‘Europe’ and, crucially, within NATO. Although very
separate institutions, Brussels had come under some pressure from the
USA not to alienate Ankara for these hard power geostrategic reasons
(Martin, 2015a: Chapter 1). Even after the Cold War ended, Washington
used possible EU candidacy as an incentive for democratization in Turkey
because that was deemed to be in NATO’s interests. With the UK as
a proxy within the EU, the USA encouraged the EU–Turkey Customs
Union of 1995 and the candidacy offer made at the Helsinki European
Council in 1999. Once the offer had been made Turkey was then able to
‘sufficiently fulfill’ enough of the Copenhagen criteria, with some nudging
from the UK, for the EU to feel obliged, pacta sunt servanda, to honor its
commitment and open accession negotiations in 2005 (Martin, 2015b).
Hence, Turkey was admitted into the European sphere, as an aspi-
rant member, and subsequently a formal candidate, because of its security
value in different ways at different times. This security value became a
driver of the enduring path dependence and is still evident in Turkey’s
accession process. Since the beginning of the Cold War it has been too
valuable strategically to cast adrift from ‘Europe’ but not quite valuable
enough for this to override the liberal democratic criteria of the EU. This
‘ying’ and ‘yang’ dynamic, between security and liberal identity, is what
has maintained the process in stasis despite several junctures over time
where it may have changed by going forward—or ending altogether.
4.3.1 Vetoes
As agreed at the European Council meeting in December 2004, the
EU opened accession negotiations in 2005 by adopting the Negotia-
tion Framework (European Commission, 2005), which set out principles
governing the negotiations on the thirty-five chapters of the acquis
communautaire.2 However, difficulties centered on Turkey’s reluctance
to recognize the sovereignty of Cyprus and the legitimacy of its shipping
flag soon emerged. Consequently, in December 2006 the Council agreed
to block the opening of eight chapters, covering policy areas relevant
to Turkey, as well as the closure of other chapters due to the problems
between Turkey and the Republic of Cyprus (Council of the European
Union, 2006). Relations with Cyprus were (and remain) highly sensitive
2For a comprehensive overview of the accession negotiations and the status of individual
chapters see also Lippert (Chapter 11).
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in Turkey, especially after the 2004 referendum (Hannay, 2005), and the
EU’s actions made Turkey’s EU accession dependent on the resolution
of the Cyprus issue, which was highly unlikely. The EU negotiator Ali
Babacan reacted by accusing the EU of discrimination:
[…] for Turkey we have found out that the opening of the chapters and
closing of the chapters could be influenced by reasons which are of a
very political nature. […] Now we cannot open eight chapters, we cannot
close any of the chapters until the Cyprus issue is resolved […]. (Parker &
Thornhill, 2007)
The incident also negatively impacted Turkish public opinion of the EU
as the Cyprus issue was seen as evidence of prejudice against Turkey as
a Muslim country. This loss of trust affected the future of the accession
process.
While the Turkish authorities were still absorbing the effects of the
December 2006 veto, French President Nicholas Sarkozy blocked the
opening of Chapter 17, ‘Economic & Monetary Policy’, in June 2007.
Furthermore, Sarkozy was highly undiplomatic when justifying this block,
stating, ‘I do not believe Turkey has a place in the European Union’
(Parker et al., 2007). Following this, France blocked another four in
December 2007 and a further six in December 2009 (Turhan, 2016:
469). However, regardless of the reaction to Sarkozy’s comments and the
subsequent Cypriot actions, the accession process remained intact, albeit
dormant. It is thus pertinent to ask why the accession process endured
these vetoes from 2006 to 2009. There are two interconnected points to
answer this question. The first is that while both the Council and Nicholas
Sarkozy vetoed the opening of negotiations on certain chapters, they did
not suggest calling off the accession process. Secondly, since the Turkish
authorities did not drastically react to the European Council’s veto posi-
tion, apart from an expression of disappointment, the course of action did
not change.
4.3.2 The ‘Positive Agenda’
Hence, although the initial period of accession negotiations was turbulent
and little progress was made, the negotiation process continued despite
the vetoes. Subtracting the 2006 Council veto (eight chapters), then the
4 HISTORICAL INSTITUTIONALISM AND EU … 93
French veto (five chapters), and finally Cyprus’ veto (six chapters), there
were only three chapters left to open.
In May 2012, Commissioner for Enlargement and European Neigh-
borhood Policy, Štefan Füle, and Turkish Minister for European Affairs
(and then Chief EU negotiator) Egemen Bağış, launched the ‘Positive
Agenda’ in Ankara. The aim of this process was to keep Turkey’s acces-
sion process alive and put it back on track after a period of, in their words,
‘stagnation’. The Positive Agenda was described as ‘[…] a new way of
looking at the accession negotiations. It is the new way we communicate
and interact with each other. It is the way how we look at each other as
two equal partners’ (European Commission, 2012). It was designed not
to replace but to complement the accession process and give it renewed
impetus (Paul, 2012). The initiative outlined policy areas in which Turkey
was expected to carry out reforms:
• Fundamental human rights





Working groups were established on eight chapters designed to accelerate
Turkey’s process of alignment with EU policies and standards in those
areas. The Positive Agenda, which was Füle’s personal initiative (Paul,
2012), increased the scope for dialogue between the EU and Turkey and
opened doors for further integration.
While the Positive Agenda was treated as an opportunity to restart
the process by both sides after the vetoes and years of stagnation, the
accession process soon returned to a stalemate due to the deteriora-
tion of human rights in Turkey including press freedom (Committee to
Protect Journalists, 2012). The accession process was further stymied
when Ankara suspended contact with the EU while Cyprus held the
rotating EU presidency from July to December 2012. Ankara had consis-
tently refused to recognize the sovereignty of Cyprus due to the sensitivity
of the reunification issue and had made its views clear regarding the legit-
imacy of Nicosia assuming the rotating presidency role for the EU. When
this transpired regardless, Ankara was implacable. Turkish Deputy Prime
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Minister, Beşir Atalay, said: ‘[…] we will freeze our relations with the EU.
We have made this announcement, as a government we have made this
decision. Our relations with the EU will come to a sudden halt’ (Dombey,
2011).
This freeze put the accession process back on hold, and the Positive
Agenda stalled. When Füle stepped down from being European Commis-
sioner for Enlargement and European Neighborhood Policy in October
2014, the Positive Agenda fizzled out. Although the accession process
itself endured, the legacy of the Positive Agenda was not positive: Turkey
continued to believe the EU did not want Turkey as a member, and the
EU was concerned by the Turks’ implacability over Cyprus.
4.3.3 The Refugee Crisis
It took the refugee crisis of 2015–2016 to bring the accession process
back to life. The EU had actually begun discussing migration matters
with Turkey in 2013, and France subsequently removed its veto over
Chapter 22, ‘Regional Policy and Coordination of Structural Instru-
ments’. In December 2013, the European Commission and the Turkish
authorities had signed the EU–Turkey Readmission Agreement, which
initiated the EU–Turkey Visa Liberalization Dialogue (VLD) (European
Commission, 2014; see also Kaya, Chapter 14). This agreement aimed
to limit the influx of irregular migrants entering the EU through Turkey
and return any irregular migrant who is found to have entered the EU
through Turkey. In return for implementing this agreement, the EU
promised to begin an EU–Turkey VLD to progress toward eliminating
the visa obligation currently imposed on Turkish citizens travelling to the
Schengen area for short-term visits. The VLD had a positive impact on the
Turkish public opinion about the EU, which had been lukewarm previ-
ously. In 2013 only 45% believed membership would be a good thing,
while in 2014 this had risen to 53% (German Marshal Fund, 2014).
Since Turkish people had waited for a visa-free regime for several years,
they regarded the Readmission Agreement as part of the price to pay.
However, many Turkish officials still regarded Brussels with suspicion as
a result of the vetoes from 2006 to 2009.
So, while some progress had already been made in implementing the
Readmission Agreement, the migration issue in Spring/Summer 2015
brought the matter to a head following a sudden increase in the number
of people moving through Turkey into the Schengen area. This sentiment
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was particularly acute following the death of the two-year-old refugee,
Aylan Kurdi, in September 2015 and the heartbreaking photograph of
his body on a Turkish beach (Smith, 2015). The need to procure Turkish
cooperation to manage the refugee issue became acute and forced the
EU to offer incentives on accession. In the November 2015 EU–Turkey
Statement (European Council, 2015), which followed several weeks of
negotiation, the EU and Turkey agreed to initiate regular EU–Turkey
summits (see also Turhan & Wessels, Chapter 8), to ‘re-energize’ the
accession process and open Chapter 17 of the acquis communautaire.
Additionally, there was the promise of visa liberalization, 3 billion euro of
humanitarian aid and the Joint Action Plan on ‘migration management’
to curtail the number of people reaching Greece from Turkey (Turhan,
2016). The Commission also delayed the 2015 progress report, which
highlighted a negative trend in respect for the rule of law and fundamental
rights, until after the November general election in Turkey.
A further EU–Turkey Statement was agreed in March 2016 under
which there would be an ‘acceleration’ of visa liberalization and irreg-
ular migrants would be returned to Turkey in exchange for migrants in
Turkey to go to the EU. An additional 3 billion euro was agreed for
humanitarian aid and work to ‘upgrade’ the Customs Union was ‘wel-
comed’ by both sides (European Council, 2016). Moreover, the accession
process would be re-energized, again, with the opening of Chapter 333
and preparatory work on other chapters would ‘continue at an acceler-
ated pace’ (European Commission, 2016). The opinion in Brussels and
other member state capitals was that these measures would not have
been agreed without the imperative of the migration situation. The two
joint statements (of November 2015 and March 2016) and the March
2016 deal were achieved despite Turkey’s deteriorating human rights
record (Esen & Gümüşçü, 2018), which was the reason for considerable
cynicism.
The March 2016 refugee ‘deal’ was criticized both for its inherent illib-
erality and its reliance on the illiberal human rights regime in Turkey.4 On
the second point, the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees
and Amnesty International opposed the plan to return migrants back to
3Chapter 33 of the acquis communautaire refers to financial and budgetary provisions.
4 It was also criticised on the grounds that it relied on an unlikely solution to the
Cyprus problem to make it work (see Martin, 2019).
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Turkey because of its human rights record and the fairness of its asylum
system (Pitel, 2016). Amnesty International was also scathing of the
EU, claiming it was ‘shirking its responsibility to people fleeing war and
persecution’ by using Turkey as a ‘border guard’ (Amnesty International,
2016). After the first joint statement, in November 2015, Marc Pierini,
the former EU Ambassador to Ankara, had said the EU’s willingness to
reach such agreements with Turkey in spite of Ankara’s human rights
record was ‘EU Realpolitik at its worst’. Pierini attributed it to ‘political
panic’ and said the EU had gone to Erdoğan ‘on our knees’ and ‘now he
is playing us’ (Pitel & Beesley, 2015). A senior EU diplomat said Erdoğan
had gone from being ‘untouchable’ in the EU in the summer of 2015, to
being the ‘dinner companion of choice’ of the EU’s three presidents (of
the Parliament, Commission, and the European Council) as well as that
of German Chancellor Angela Merkel in the autumn (Barker, 2015). The
migration issue should therefore be seen as an exogenous shock to the
EU–Turkey relations which kick-started the accession process temporarily
but undermined the liberal credentials of the EU (Martin, 2018).
4.3.4 Authoritarian Drift
Hence the accession process slumped after the vetoes and was revived,
but only temporarily, by the Positive Agenda. It took the geopolitical
imperative of the refugee crisis to bring both sides back to the table
primarily because the EU felt it had no other option at that time.
However, once the refugee situation stabilized, the accession process
returned to stasis, this time because human rights in Turkey deteriorated
even further following the July 2016 coup d’état attempt. Moreover, the
mainstay of the March 2016 deal, visa liberalization, had not been forth-
coming because Turkey had failed to meet the condition of liberalizing
its counterterrorism legislation.
Whilst Turkey had been ‘drifting’ toward authoritarianism prior to
2016, the scale of detentions, many on spurious grounds of ‘terror-
ism’ (Martin, 2018), after the attempted coup d’état, provoked hostility
within the EU despite the need to maintain the refugee ‘deal’. Dimitris
Avramopoulos, the EU’s Migration Commissioner, said: ‘We have always
been clear with our Turkish partners on visa liberalization—if Turkey
wants visa liberalization, all conditions must be met’ (Pitel & Brunsden,
2016). The European Council President at that time, Donald Tusk,
said the decline of liberal democracy in Turkey jeopardized its accession
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prospects: ‘We want to keep the doors open to Ankara, but the current
reality in Turkey is making this difficult’ (Barker et al., 2017). Austria,
a longstanding critic of Turkey’s accession, called for membership talks
to be frozen (Beesley, 2016), and Germany also voiced misgivings about
human rights in Turkey (Wagstyl & Chazan, 2017). Erdoğan’s response
was to call the EU member states’ bluff: he accused them of discrimi-
nating against Turkey and dared them to ‘do the necessary thing’ if they
could no longer tolerate working with his country (Pitel, 2017).
In 2019, the European Parliament (EP) voted to suspend accession
talks with Turkey (European Parliament, 2019) due to concerns about
human rights and civil liberties, political pressure on the judiciary, and
the unresolved territorial disputes with Cyprus and other neighboring
countries, which were also stressed in the 2019 country report of the
Commission (European Commission, 2019). Although EU governments
have the final say in any suspension, the EP’s decision was a serious
setback for accession negotiations. The Turkish government dismissed the
vote as ‘worthless, invalid and disreputable’ (Reilhac, 2019) but further
problems emerged in Summer 2019 over Cyprus. In July, Turkish Foreign
Minister Mevlüt Çavuşoğlu said that his government was suspending the
Readmission Agreement with the EU due to the stalemate over visa liber-
alization following the 2016 refugee ‘deal’ (Candau, 2019). There has
also been controversy over the sovereignty of gas reserves found in the
Eastern Mediterranean and Turkish drilling activities (Pitel, 2019), which
resurrected Turkey’s issues with Cyprus and led to several sanctions by
the Council, inter alia, the suspension of the Association Council and
further meetings of the EU–Turkey high level dialogues for the time
being (Council of the European Union, 2019). So, in summary, the
refugee crisis was an opportunity to progress the accession process, but
this did not materialize because of the authoritarian drift in Turkey which
worsened further following the attempted coup in July 2016. Since then,
the situation has continued to flounder and has been complicated further
by a dispute over gas reserves with Cyprus.
4.4 The Accession Process Goes on (and on?)
Turkey’s EU accession process began as a result of a security imperative
during the Cold War and has demonstrated ongoing path dependence
for related reasons. Even after the Cold War ended, Turkey retained
geostrategic significance for the EU and NATO, including during the
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Balkan wars, the Iraq war, and more recently, the Syrian civil war and the
parallel migration crisis. It is argued here that since accession negotiations
were opened in 2005, the accession process has been tested and thrown
off course at various times by different events; however, the process has
also shown remarkable resilience, as a result of path dependence. HI illu-
minates this temporal process, unlike comparable theories such as RCI,
SI, or liberal intergovernmentalism. While RCI, SI, and liberal intergov-
ernmentalism may have valid points to make about, say, the December
2004 European Council or the EU–Turkey Statements in 2015 and 2016,
they consider these events as snapshots rather than as part of a long-term
process. They simply do not ask these questions; they ask other types, of
equally valid questions, but not questions of temporality.
Since 2005, there have been several points of change, both pushing
and constraining accession, which we have identified as critical junctures.
The accession process has been influenced by the changing constellation
of state leaders within the EU and their views on Turkey as well as the
consistent hostility of member states such as Austria and Cyprus to the
Turkish case. However, the EU’s need to placate Turkey over security
issues and maintain wider cooperation has boosted Turkey’s accession
progress. While vetoes have acted as a deterrent to accession, security
issues have been an incentive for Turkey’s accession. However, neither
has sustainably impacted the actual accession process.
Various actors’ vetoes on opening and closing chapters between 2006
and 2009 deterred the Turkish government from continuing with liber-
alizing reforms as it lost confidence in the EU’s sincerity about accession.
It should be noted that, at this time, Turkey’s withering accession process
was convenient for several member states which had not been whole-
hearted supporters of opening negotiations in 2005 but had felt cornered
into agreeing to it because of the pacta sunt servanda effect. However, as
has been outlined, whilst the accession process was moribund after 2006,
the process itself continued as a bureaucratic entity. Conversely, the Posi-
tive Agenda was hailed as a ‘new beginning’ for EU–Turkey relations but
never overcame the twin problems of Turkey’s declining human rights
record and the legacy of its Cyprus relationship. It failed to kick-start the
process, and no tangible progress was made, but accession continued as
before within the EU bureaucracy for the same reason: security. Turkey’s
covert involvement in the Syrian civil war was an open secret even then.
Turkey’s overt relevance to both the future of the Assad regime and the
Kurdish issue was obvious, and this was enough to maintain relations.
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The refugee crisis in 2015 was another factor which kick-started acces-
sion process in spite of the EU’s liberal credentials. While the 2016
refugee ‘deal’ was signed before the further deterioration of human rights
following the attempted coup in July of that year, it was nevertheless
signed amidst the ongoing persecution of journalists and academics as well
as serious human rights issues in eastern, Kurdish areas of Turkey such as
Cizre and Nusaybin (United Nations, 2017). The EU sealed the deal
despite challenges to its liberal principles in the face of rising populism
and opposition to immigration in some member states. However, the
further deterioration of human rights provided cover for various member
states to backtrack on the visa aspect, and yet, like before, the accession
process itself remained intact. Overall, accession has been strongly path-
dependent, based on a security imperative that has endured, but has failed
to advance because of human rights concerns.
4.5 Conclusions
HI’s raison d’être is to highlight the existence and significance of
processes over time. Analyzing Turkey’s accession process through this
approach, it has been argued that the path-dependent nature of Turkey’s
EU accession process has endured for broadly defined security reasons.
Turkey became an applicant and a candidate because of security consid-
erations and the process has continued for broadly similar reasons in a
broadly similar way meaning the status of Turkish accession in 2020 is not
that different to 2005. Overall, the positive influence of security concerns
in forwarding the process has been balanced by the negative influence of
Turkey’s poor human rights record. Hence, the accession progress has
been driven by its security value, but this has never been strong enough
to overcome the residual misgivings (and hostility) from the EU side to
translate into real accession progress. Turkey has progressed more when
its perceived security value was higher—and the converse is also true—
but the net effect, over time, is managed containment. Overall, it has
retained its place as a potential candidate of the EU, for security reasons,
but has never maintained sustained and meaningful progress. The secu-
rity reasons have not been enough to override the underlying hostility of
several member states who have been able to fall back on ‘human rights’
to put the brakes on. The significance for HI is that it is these patterns, of
100 G. ICOZ AND N. MARTIN
stasis and change, over time which would not be revealed by other theo-
ries within political science or IR because they do not ask such temporal
questions.
Nevertheless, the value of HI could also be viewed as a weakness as
it does not address the details of the other institutionalisms and liberal
intergovernmentalism, among others. It has neither the forensic rigor
of RCI, nor the ideational freedom offered by the interpretivism of SI.
In taking such a long-term view, HI inevitably has to make generaliza-
tions, leaving it susceptible to accusations of ‘woolliness’. In addition,
HI does not address the minutiae of wider issues inherent within the
argument presented here. For example, the locus of this path dependence
argument is the ‘security imperative’: this is not part of HI theory per
se but is incorporated into it instrumentally when it helps explain the
concept of path dependence. A similar logic applies to the notion of
liberal democracy which is acting as a counterweight to security in this
path-dependent process. HI uses these concepts to explain the temporal
processes but does not speak to them directly and does not address the
issues of metatheoretical commensurability.
However, what HI does do is identify patterns over time. The future
for HI is to streamline the metatheory and extricate HI from the metathe-
oretical no-mans-land so it can develop on its own terms and incorporate
the ‘thick description’ and context that was stripped out by the domi-
nance of positivism. It is suggested that the development of HI within a
critical realist metatheory would be a productive way forward (Bhaskar,
1989; Wight, 2006). Tighter definitions of the change mechanisms would
also help it lose its ‘woolliness’. As Rixen and Viola (2016) argue, HI
has much to offer to the study of institutions in general and EU–Turkey
relations in particular.
Lastly, it is likely that the path dependence of Turkey’s EU acces-
sion process will survive the authoritarianism of the ruling Justice and
Development Party (AKP) and the Erdoğan government because of the
ongoing security imperative. This has underpinned the path-dependent
nature of the relationship since the beginning, and it has been further
galvanized by sunk costs and institutional inertia. If illiberality in Turkey
were tempered, it is possible that the accession progress could resume.
However, what cannot be predicted are the critical junctures yet to
happen. These could be endogenous—as a result of the political or
economic collapse of the EU itself or a collapse resulting from pandemic.
Alternatively, these could be exogenous factors concerning regional
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geopolitics (see also Reiners & Turhan, Chapter 16). The accession
process could restart if Turkey liberalized, but what we do not yet know
is the severity of the events which could blow it off course once more.
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CHAPTER 5
Europeanization and EU–Turkey Relations:
Three Domains, Four Periods
Başak Alpan
5.1 Introduction
The concept of Europeanization has by now become one of the most
versatile concepts of European studies. From the early 1990s, scholars
have used the term as a tool for the analysis of different aspects of the
transformative power of European integration (see Cowles et al., 2001;
Kohler-Koch & Eising, 1999; Featherstone & Radaelli, 2003), as well
as for studying various facets of the transformation triggered by Euro-
pean integration in the member states of the European Union (EU)
and candidate states. Since the 1999 Helsinki decision, when Turkey
was granted EU candidacy, Europeanization has been one of the leading
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conceptual approaches1 through which EU–Turkey relations have been
examined. According to the seminal conception of the term by Radaelli,
Europeanization is
a process of construction, diffusion and institutionalization of formal and
informal rules, procedures, policy paradigms, styles, ways of doing things,
and shared beliefs and norms which are first defined and consolidated in
the making of EU decisions and then incorporated in the logic of domestic
discourses, identities, political structures and public policies. (Radaelli,
2003: 30)
One of the most extensive analyses of the concept is provided by Olsen,
who focuses on two key dimensions of institutional change: changes
in ‘political organization [and] changes in structures of meaning and
people’s minds’ (Olsen, 2002: 926). Thus, the focus of the Europeaniza-
tion approach is to find out how the European level affects domestic
politics, policies, and polity, and whether Europeanization leads to conver-
gence or divergence between the European level and the domestic level
in a particular country. This process of change applies to various domains
that impact the domestic level and to various degrees (substantive scope)
in EU member countries, EU candidate states, and neighboring countries
(territorial scope), including Turkey.2
As far as the EU–Turkey dialogue is concerned, Europeanization could
be explained as the transformation of the way in which Turkish institu-
tions, policies and ‘way of doing things’ are constructed and implemented
so as to ensure Turkey’s overall convergence towards EU standards. In
turn, de-Europeanization can be understood as ‘the loss or weakening of
the EU/Europe as a normative/political context and as a reference point
in domestic settings and national public debates’ in Turkey (Aydın-Düzgit
& Kaliber, 2016: 5).
1The general consensus in the literature is that Europeanization is not a new theory, nor
an ad hoc approach, but rather a way of organizing and orchestrating existing concepts,
and that ‘Europeanization should be seen as a problem, not as a solution’. By the same
token, Europeanization is not the explanans (the solution, the phenomenon that explains
the dependent variables), but the explanandum (the problem that needs to be explained).
In this respect, I will be using the term ‘approach’ or ‘concept’ (rather than ‘theory’)
with regard to Europeanization throughout the paper (see Radaelli, 2004: 1).
2For the distinction between territorial and substantive aspects of Europeanization see
Lenschow (2006: 59–61).
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The ‘territorial scope’ of Europeanization refers to the space within
which the EU has impact. Territorial scope focuses on the question of
whether the EU impact remains limited to the EU member states or
whether it also includes non-member states such as Turkey. Besides the
territorial scope of the concept, Europeanization is also assessed in the
literature in terms of its influence across the interrelated polity, policy
and politics domains. The ‘polity’ domain covers national governance
systems, administrative structures and the executive, legislative, and judi-
cial authorities of the country in question. The ‘policy’ domain refers
to the broader legislative framework, such as the economy, agricultural,
justice, and home affairs policies of the country in question. Finally, the
domain of ‘politics’ concerns the political parties, political actors, elec-
tions, and public opinion of the country (Bache & Jordan, 2006). The
shifts in the domestic identities and discourses are also taken under the
rubric of politics in this chapter, given that the political science debates,
at least from the early 1980s onwards, were an extension of its scope.
Here, the domain includes not only formal institutions but also informal
political processes, identities, discourses, and power negotiations in the
political realm (Bache & Jordan, 2006).
This chapter aims to trace the theoretical underpinnings of the Euro-
peanization approach and to explore the Turkish case by referring to
different mechanisms and variants of Europeanization through an analysis
of these domains in four different periods between 1963 and early 2020.
These periods are in line with major milestones of EU–Turkey relations
(Hauge et al., 2016; Eralp, 2009; see also Turhan & Reiners, Chapter 1).
The underlying question is the extent to which the Europeanization
approach constitutes a useful tool to grasp and understand EU–Turkey
relations, and how it helps make sense of phases of convergence and
divergence between the two parties.
5.2 Europeanization Studies
and the Research Agenda on Turkey
Although the Europeanization approach has been part of the core
research agenda since the 1990s, the analytical focus of the literature
has shifted throughout generations. The literature on Europeanization
initially aimed to explain the development at the European level, focusing
on distinct structures of governance specializing in the creation of author-
itative European rules (Cowles et al., 2001: 3) and their impact on
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policies, politics, and polities at the domestic level in member states
(Börzel & Risse 2003: 59). The early examples of the literature aimed to
define the relationship between the European and the domestic level in a
top-down manner, whereby the domestic is determined by the European
level. This earlier group of studies, also dubbed as ‘first-generation’ (see
Bache & Marshall, 2004) Europeanization literature or ‘Europe-as-fixity’
(Alpan, 2014: 69) studies, depicted ‘traditional Europeanization’ (Moga,
2010), and defined ‘Europe’ as a fixed, categorical, and teleological entity
to which the domestic level has to adjust.
By the late 1990s and early 2000s, Europeanization was re-
conceptualized as a bottom-up process encompassing different aspects of
society and politics in candidate states and in third countries. A bottom-up
approach to the study of Europeanization ‘[…] start[ed] and finish[ed]
at the level of domestic actors’ (Radaelli & Pasquier, 2006: 11). With
Eastern enlargement, in particular, research on the EU’s ‘transformative
power’ (Börzel & Risse, 2009) shifted from membership to the accession
context, and so-called ‘enlargement-led Europeanization’ (Moga, 2010:
6) started to focus on the domestic sphere (Schimmelfennig et al., 2006).
This ‘second-generation’ Europeanization literature (Schimmelfennig &
Sedelmeier, 2005) put the role of conditionality3 and the Copenhagen
criteria at the center of the analysis, which acted as a catalyst for domestic
reforms, such as in the fields of politics, law, and education, in candidate
states.
Turkey’s EU integration was understood and studied within the
context of second-generation Europeanization literature, especially in the
aftermath of the Helsinki decision, with a focus on normative aspects
of integration, identity constructions, and domestic conditions regarding
candidate countries. Several studies examined Europeanization within
the context of Turkey’s EU accession by comparing it with the Central
and Eastern European countries (Kubicek, 2003; Schimmelfennig et al.,
2003) and with the other candidates in the Western Balkans (e.g.,
Noutcheva & Aydın-Düzgit, 2012). However, most scholars used the
term to examine the democratic change in Turkey’s political regime as
a result of political reforms in order to meet the Copenhagen criteria.
3The EU conditionality, the main strategy of the EU vis-à-vis candidate states, is
defined as a ‘reactive reinforcement’ by the EU. It checks fulfilment or non-fulfilment of
the EU’s conditions, imposed on the candidate states without punishing non-compliant
candidates. See Schimmelfennig et al. (2002: 2) for a detailed discussion.
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There has also been considerable interest among Turkish academics
on the impact of Europeanization on specific policy areas such as foreign
policy (Terzi, 2012; Günay & Renda, 2014), minority policy (Yılmaz,
2017; Grigoriadis, 2008a; Atikcan, 2010), gender policy (Özdemir, 2014;
Kılıç, 2008; Dedeoğlu & Elveren, 2008), and migration policy (Bürgin,
2016; İçduygu, 2015). Beyond that, the second-generation Europeaniza-
tion research agenda also included the study of identities (Rumelili, 2008;
Nas, 2012), discourses (Aydın-Düzgit, 2016; Alpan, 2014), and public
debates (Kaliber, 2016).
5.3 Europeanization in Turkey: Four Phases
In line with historical milestones that framed the flow of EU–Turkey rela-
tions and the dominant feature of the Europeanization process during
the respective periods, this chapter scrutinizes Europeanization in Turkey
over four phases. It does so on the basis of an analysis across the
domains of polity, policy, and politics. The first period, ‘Europeanization
as rapprochement’, covers the years between 1959 and 1999 and thus the
time from Turkey’s first application for associate membership until the
European Council’s decision to grant Turkey the status of an accession
candidate. The second period, ‘Europeanization as democratic condition-
ality’, between 2000 and 2005 lasts up until the launch of accession
negotiations. The third period is dubbed ‘Europeanization as retrench-
ment’. It covers the period from 2006 until the Justice and Development
Party’s (AKP) landslide electoral victory in 2011, when the party consoli-
dated its power position and when the pace of EU reforms and the overall
credibility of the EU substantially dropped. The final ongoing period,
‘Europeanization as denial’, includes the developments until 2020 and
signifies the failing credibility, yet ensuing resonance, of Turkey’s potential
EU accession.
5.3.1 Europeanization as Rapprochement (1959–1999)
5.3.1.1 Polity: The European Economic Community as a Natural
Extension of Western Organizations
In the 1960s and 1970s, for the Turkish political establishment, European
Economic Community (EEC) membership was nothing but ‘a logical
extension of Turkey’s inclusion in other Western organizations, since it
was seen as the economic dimension supplementing and cementing the
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Western alliances’ (Eralp, 1993: 26). Therefore, Turkey’s relations with
the EEC in this period did not lead to a fundamental shift in state-society
relations and were mainly based on economic and security narratives
(Hauge et al., 2016: 11). During this period, there was also no substan-
tial institutional change in Turkey associated with the EEC. The most
important development was Turkey’s application for association to the
EEC in 1959 and the signing of the Agreement Creating an Association
between the EEC and Turkey, famously known as the Ankara Agree-
ment. It constituted the first contractual relationship between the two
sides (Aydın-Düzgit & Tocci, 2015: 10). The agreement primarily envis-
aged the establishment of a Customs Union (CU) between the EU and
Turkey in three stages. It also stated that the parties should examine the
possibility of Turkey’s EEC accession ‘as soon as the operation of this
Agreement has advanced far enough to justify envisaging full acceptance
by Turkey of the obligations arising out of the Treaty establishing the
Community’ (EEC-Turkey Association Agreement, 1963: 15).
The institutional structure established by the Agreement consisted of
an Association Council, where top-level officials from both sides would
regularly meet; an Association Committee, to assist the work of the
Council; and a Joint Parliamentary Committee, bringing together Turkish
and European parliamentarians (Aydın-Düzgit & Tocci, 2015: 11). The
establishment of an EU-induced polity change after the Ankara Agree-
ment came first, but it was followed by other institutions, such as the
Capital Markets Board in 1981, which aimed to achieve liberalization and
harmonization with the European economy. Although relations deterio-
rated during the 1970s due to financial crises in Europe and Turkey, and
Turkey’s intervention in Cyprus in 1974 and its subsequent decision to
unilaterally freeze relations and economic obligations with the Commu-
nity in 1978, the institutional structure created by the Ankara Agreement
continued to form the institutional backbone of the CU and EU–Turkey
relations outside the enlargement context. The final stage of the CU with
the EU was reached by Decision No. 1/95 of the Association Council
(EC-Turkey Association Council, 1996), and the CU entered into force
on 31 December 1995.
5.3.1.2 Policy: First Steps in EEC-Induced Policies
Europeanization in terms of policy change was less significant in the first
period. Most of the policy changes were realized, with Turkey’s fulfillment
of its obligations stemming from the Association Agreement. Accordingly,
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after the completion of the CU, Turkey aligned its customs tariff with
the Common Customs Tariff imposed on third countries (EC-Turkey
Association Council, 1996: Article 13). This also meant the alignment of
Turkey’s commercial policy, customs law, competition law, taxation law,
and intellectual property law with the EU acquis (European Commission,
2020).
Within the context of the military memorandum of 1971 and the
coup d’état in Turkey of 1980, EU institutions increasingly criticized
the democratic deficits and human rights violations (Hauge et al., 2016:
13). The European Parliament (EP) issued eleven resolutions regarding
human rights violations between 1980 and 1985, criticizing Turkey’s
death penalty, use of torture, and mass trials against demonstrators (Balfe,
1985: 47; Hauge et al., 2016: 13). In return, Turkey accepted the
right of individuals to petition the European Court of Human Rights
(ECHR) in January 1987, and the compulsory jurisdiction of the ECHR
in September 1989 (ECHR, 2010: 52). The early signals of the EEC’s
democratization agenda regarding Turkey did not, nevertheless, lead
to any significant policy change in Turkey in the realm of democracy
and human rights in the 1990s. Despite the EEC’s human rights-based
approach, Europeanization in this period was generally an extension of
the normalization and economic liberalization in Turkey that came after
the 1980 coup. Turkey’s first application for full membership in 1987 and
its rejection in 1989 should be understood within this context.
The EEC’s focus on human rights and democratization in Turkey
continued in the 1990s. However, the confinement of democratization
to the economic realm in the 1980s was now increasingly replaced
by democratization attempts within the political sphere. To give one
example, in March 1994, the EP harshly criticized the removal of the
parliamentary immunity of deputies of the pro-Kurdish Democracy Party
(DEP), although this did not resonate in Turkish politics. Accordingly,
the Luxembourg European Council of December 1997, again denied
Turkey full candidate status on the grounds that ‘the political and
economic conditions allowing accession negotiations to be envisaged
are not satisfied’ (European Council, 1997: para. 31). However, despite
Turkey’s lack of progress in the fulfillment of the political criteria, just
two years after the Luxembourg decision, in December 1999 the Helsinki
European Council confirmed Turkey’s candidate status in the wake of
the strong support of the then German chancellor Gerhard Schröder and
from the USA (Park, 2000: 36).
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5.3.1.3 Politics: ‘Europe’ as an Identity Marker in Turkish Politics
While Europeanization in this first phase significantly affected economics
and institutions, we also see that the European level impacted the negoti-
ation of collective identities on the various levels of subjective affiliations.
In continuation of the tradition in Turkish politics since the eighteenth
century, political actors used ‘Europe’ as an identity marker in their public
discourses during this period. Turkish media, business, and the majority
of the political elite highlighted the symbolic and political importance of
joining the EEC, expressed as Turkey’s determination to be a permanent
member of the ‘European society of states’, an ideal prescribed by the
founder of the republic, Mustafa Kemal Atatürk. Similarly, despite its over-
whelmingly economic character, the signing of the Association Agreement
in 1963 was described in the Turkish press as the ‘reaffirmation of
Turkey’s Western identity’ and ‘Europeanness’ (Çalış, 2015: 125; Kaliber,
2013: 11). In the 1980s, Turkey perceived that its Western identity
was approved and its place in the East–West divide of Cold War poli-
tics was consolidated through Europeanization. During the November
1987 general election campaign, the election motto of the Motherland
Party (Anavatan Partisi, ANAP) under the leadership of Turgut Özal
was ‘Turkey: a European country which is able to catch up with the era’
(Alpan, 2015: 13). Similarly, after the CU Agreement, prime minister
Tansu Çiller referred to the CU as the obvious outcome of Turkish efforts
to include Turkey in the ‘European family’ (Neziroğlu & Yılmaz, 2013:
7071).
At the same time, Turkey’s EEC association application also gener-
ated resentment in political circles. On the one side, the Islamist political
movements of the late 1960s conceived Turkey’s integration with the
EEC ‘as the last stage of the assimilation of Turkey’s Islamic identity into
the Christian West’ (Güneş-Ayata, 2003: 216). The rising pro-Islamic
party of the time, MSP (Milli Selamet Partisi, National Salvation Party),
characterized the EEC as a ‘Christian Club’. Economically, these parties
claimed that the EEC would weaken domestic industries and make Turkey
a prey to ‘Western imperialism’ (Güneş-Ayata, 2003: 216). On the other
side, the Left’s motto ‘They are the partner, we are their market’4 pointed
to the economic asymmetry between Turkey and the EEC.
4In Turkish, the word ‘ortak’ means both ‘partner’ and ‘common’. Hence, with this
slogan, the detrimental and ‘colonizing’ effects of the Common Market for Turkey and
Turkish economic independence were emphasized.
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While the excitement of the CU positively affected political actors’
opinions about the EEC/EU in the first half of 1990s, the second half of
the 1990s was marked by intense domestic and external political devel-
opments, such as consecutive coalition governments getting into power,
the 28 February process,5 the Imia crisis,6 the Cypriot acquisition of
Russian S-300 missiles, and Cyprus’s prospective EU membership. The
picture in Turkey became even more complicated with the 1997 Euro-
pean Council decision in Luxembourg. Both the Turkish government
and the opposition parties were critical that EU accession talks could not
start. In this context, Turkey’s Foreign Minister at that time, İsmail Cem,
stated that ‘Turkey is European anyway. […] We do not need anyone’s
approval for this’ (Erdoğan et al., 2008: 47). Not surprisingly, the political
tide completely reversed in the aftermath of the Helsinki decision, when
Prime Minister Ecevit signaled, ‘Europe cannot exist without Turkey, and
Turkey cannot exist without Europe’ (Demirtaş, 1999).
5.3.2 Europeanization as Democratic Conditionality (2000–2005)
5.3.2.1 Polity: Transformation of the Strong State Tradition
The anchoring of Turkey to EU conditionality brought about by the
Helsinki decision triggered a shift in state–society relations throughout
the Turkish political landscape. Turkey’s introduction of several consti-
tutional reform packages between 1999 and 2004 was perceived as a
direct challenge to the traditionally strong state structure (Glyptis, 2005).
Historically, in Turkey, the state, rather than the government, consti-
tuted ‘the primary context of politics’ (Keyman & Koyuncu, 2005:
109). This shift away from the state emerged within the broader context
of cosmopolitan democratization in the late 1980s and 1990s, which
anchored citizenship, rights, and freedoms in the international context
rather than in the nation-state (Rumford, 2003).
The era of democratic conditionality ushered in the introduction of
basic freedoms such as the freedom of thought and expression, the
5The National Security Council during its meeting on 28 February 1997 forced the
pro-Islamist Welfare Party (RP) to withdraw from government due to its anti-secular
activities. This development is known as a ‘postmodern coup’ in Turkish public discourse
and is dubbed as the ‘28 February process’ in Turkish politics.
6 In 1996, Imia, a pair of uninhabited Greek islets, was at the epicenter of a rapid
escalation that brought Greece and Turkey to the brink of war.
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prevention of torture, strengthening of democracy, and civilian authority
(Republic of Turkey Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2007). However, the
civilianization process of Turkish politics did not necessarily equal demo-
cratic consolidation within the country (Güney, 2015). The AKP govern-
ment claimed to need ‘the protection of democratic rights and liberties’
more than any other political group in Turkey, specifically in order to
survive in the Turkish secular context (Hale & Özbudun, 2010: 10).
Accordingly, legislative measures in this period that intended to civilianize
politics ‘helped solidify the AKP’s position vis-a-vis the secular military
via lessening the latter’s political influence’ (Saatçioğlu, 2014: 91). The
most important among these were the changes that concerned the role
and structure of the National Security Council (MGK), an essential state
institution, established in 1961, that strengthened the role of the military
in politics. The October 2001 amendments to the constitution increased
the number of civilians in the MGK and reduced the power of its decisions
to that of simple recommendation (Cizre, 2003: 222).
In this period, another noteworthy EU-induced institutional change
was the establishment of a Secretariat General for EU Affairs in 2000
to ensure internal coordination and harmonization in the preparation of
Turkey for EU membership. In line with the economic criteria of the
Copenhagen criteria, the liberalization of the markets and harmoniza-
tion with the CU continued during this period. The establishment of
the Turkish Accreditation Agency (1999), the Energy Market Regula-
tory Authority (2001), the Turkish Sugar Authority (2001), the Tobacco
and Alcohol Regulatory Authority (2002), and the Public Procurement
Authority (2002) all contributed to the Europeanization of Turkey’s
institutions (Erdenir, 2015: 28–29), since these regulatory and super-
visory institutions aimed to harmonize the market with European and
international standards.
5.3.2.2 Policy: Policy Reforms to Meet EU Accession Criteria
Turkey’s candidacy status created pressure on the country to adopt EU
rules and resulted in comprehensive reforms between 1999 and 2004.
The main impact of the 1999 Helsinki decision was of the introduction
of a pre-accession strategy for Turkey. This strategy included providing
assistance to Turkey to ensure a faster adaptation to the EU acquis
through several programs and funding schemes. In order to ‘participate
in Community programs and agencies and in meetings between candidate
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States and the Union in the context of the accession process’ (European
Council, 1999), Turkey had to undertake a substantial degree of democ-
ratization and human rights reforms, which rendered reform synonymous
with Europeanization. Some of those reforms were directly related with
the obligations of the CU and functioning of the free market, such as the
amendment of competition policy in 2002 and the introduction of the
Public Procurement Act in 2003. Turkey’s ambitious structural reform
program of 2001, with the aim of laying a foundation for sustainable
growth, can also be interpreted as laying the foundations of harmoniza-
tion with the European and international economy (Dutz et al., 2005:
283).
Other reforms had a wider resonance in terms of compliance with the
Copenhagen criteria and would fall more within Chapter 23 (Judiciary
and Fundamental Rights) and Chapter 24 (Justice, Freedom, and Secu-
rity) of the EU acquis. In 2001, the Turkish parliament was engaged in
the most pervasive constitutional change of the Republican era, as 34 arti-
cles of the constitution of 1980 were amended to meet the EU’s demands
with regard to civil–military relations. The amendments were a part of the
so-called ‘silent revolution’ between 1999 and 2005 (Aydın-Düzgit &
Tocci, 2015: 6). Examples include the amendment of the Press Law, the
Law on Political Parties, the Law on Associations, the Law on Meetings
and Demonstration Marches, the Law on Civil Servants, the Law on the
Establishment of and Proceedings at the State Security Courts (Republic
of Turkey Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2007: 6). These laws were deemed
a fundamental step toward meeting the Copenhagen criteria in the 2002
progress report of the Commission. The Turkish government also revised
the Civil Law in 2001, Labor Code in 2003, and Penal Code in 2005.
The 2004 constitutional amendment is particularly important in Turkey’s
Europeanization process with a view to the change in Article 10 stating
that Turkey’s international obligations are superior to Turkish law. This
was a radical step in transitioning the Turkish state’s traditional definition
of sovereignty in preparation for EU accession (Müftüler-Baç, 2016a: 5).
The alignment of Turkey’s foreign policy with EU standards
commenced in this period in a parallel fashion (see also Torun,
Chapter 13). To illustrate, starting from 2002, the Turkish Minister
of Foreign Affairs began to attend the so-called ‘Gymnich Meetings’,
informal meetings of the EU foreign ministers (Müftüler-Baç, 2016b:
99). Similarly, in view of the Helsinki European Council conclusions and
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the Accession Partnership document, which linked Turkey’s EU member-
ship to resolution of its border conflicts with Greece, the two states agreed
to cooperate on various issues, such as tourism promotion, the fight
against terrorism, the removal of landmines along the border, irregular
migration, and trade and environmental issues (Çelik & Rumelili, 2006:
218).
Against this background, at its meeting in December 2004, the Euro-
pean Council decided that Turkey sufficiently fulfilled the criteria to open
accession negotiations. The EU opened membership negotiations with
Turkey in October 2005 and adopted a negotiating framework to outline
negotiations in the 35 acquis chapters (European Commission, 2005).
5.3.2.3 Politics: Europe as Everybody’s Project
During the post-1999 period, ‘Europe’ held the utmost salience and
significance for political actors and institutions. There was almost no polit-
ical party that did not possess an opinion on Europe in its discourse
or party program. The EU was also a significant element of identity
negotiations for political actors. During the coalition government of the
Democratic Left Party (DSP), the Motherland Party (ANAP), and the
Nationalist Action Party (MHP) from 1999 to 2002, as well as under
the following AKP government, ‘Europe’ had an apolitical, natural, and
consensual connotation, and emerged as a common platform bringing
everyone together (Alpan, 2014: 74). As stated by İsmail Cem, ‘Europe is
not an issue of controversy but an issue of compromise’ (Radikal, 2002a)
and ‘an extra-political party issue’ (Radikal, 2002b). This consensual and
non-ideological tone was frequently used by the AKP. In his first speech
after the launch of the EU negotiations, Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, then
AKP party leader, pointed to the ‘natural’ character of Turkey’s Euro-
pean project, neutralizing the internal contradictions of Turkish society
(as quoted in Yetkin, 2005). He also considered that for the ‘40-year-old
European dream of 70 million’ to come true, Turkey should be accepted
as an EU candidate (as quoted in Radikal, 2004). This consensual tone
was also reflected in public opinion. In a poll in which respondents
were asked whether they would vote for or against Turkey’s bid for full
membership in the EU if a referendum were held in 2002, 64% of the
respondents indicated that they would vote for EU membership, whereas
30% said that they would vote against it (Çarkoğlu, 2003: 172).
The Europeanization process also drew new, favorable attention
toward minorities in Turkey. After the European Commission’s 2004
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progress report for Turkey had designated the Kurds and Alevi people
as minorities (European Commission, 2004), ‘Europe’ emerged as a
keyword for minorities and multiple identities (i.e., simultaneous iden-
tification with Kurdish identity and Turkish citizenship). Right after the
Helsinki Council, the famous motto ‘the way to the EU passes through
Diyarbakır’ (as cited in Munyar, 2002)7 was put forward by Mesut
Yılmaz, then deputy prime minister. Business circles also showed similar
support for EU-related democratic reforms. The Turkish Industry and
Business Association (TÜSİAD) played an active role in lobbying in Brus-
sels before the Helsinki Summit and pressed for the resolution of highly
controversial issues such as the extension of cultural rights and the Cyprus
dispute (Öniş, 2003: 19).
That said, the EU reforms also triggered an anti-reform reaction across
the political landscape. For instance, according to Tuncer Kılınç, then
Secretary General of the MGK, the EU posed a ‘danger’ to Turkey, with
its hidden agenda and demands for ‘unilateral concession’ (as cited in
Radikal, 2003). According to this line of thought, the EU emerged as a
body that created social cleavage where it had not previously existed. This
idea also found resonance, to some extent, among the general public. The
reform package ratified in 2002 on the abolition of the death penalty, for
example, was supported by only 38% of the public (Çarkoğlu, 2003: 187).
All in all, the EU penetrated domestic debates, and political actors’ refer-
ences to Europe drew the contours of the political domain during this
period. The EU was the lingua franca of politics so that each and every
political identity had to talk that language and make the EU a reference
point in order to assert its location within politics (Alpan, 2014: 69).
5.3.3 Europeanization as Retrenchment (2006–2011)
5.3.3.1 Polity: Focus on State-Society Relations
The picture of EU–Turkey relations started to change after 2005. A new
Ministry of EU Affairs was established under the auspices of the first
EU Minister, Egemen Bağış. There was an institutional focus on the EU
perspective, and selective institutional reforms were carried out. However,
these changes mainly relied on popular support to legitimize reforms
in sensitive areas, such as in civil–military relations (Yılmaz, 2016: 93).
7Diyarbakır in South-East Turkey holds the largest Kurdish population of any Turkish
city.
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While civil–military relations had undergone many reforms since the post-
1980 period, the government still chose to retain some of the infamous
remnants of the 1980 coup, such as the High Education Board YÖK
(Yükseköğretim Kurulu), which exercises significant government control
over universities (Noutcheva & Aydın-Düzgit, 2012: 70).
A similar situation was seen in the area of judicial reform. In August
2009, the government announced the Judicial Reform Strategy and put
its main provisions to the public vote in the 2010 referendum. The
amendments were presented as democratizing the judiciary and making it
more responsive to society’s demands by diversifying the background of
the members of the Constitutional Court and by widening the composi-
tion of the High Council, which determines the career paths of judges
and prosecutors. But these amendments were criticized for retaining
substantial provisions that compromised judicial independence, in partic-
ular with regard to the powers of the Minister of Justice in the High
Council (Noutcheva & Aydın-Düzgit, 2012: 70). These developments,
which culminated in the 2010 constitutional changes, contributed to the
primacy of the executive over the legislative and the judiciary, which was
identified by some as the beginning of the so-called ‘de-Europeanization’
trend in Turkish politics (Saatçioğlu, 2016: 136).
5.3.3.2 Policy: Selective Europeanization
Formally speaking, Europeanization was still at the top of the agenda in
this period. For instance, 2008 was proclaimed the ‘European Year’ by the
AKP, and in early 2009 the Turkish parliament passed the long-overdue
‘National Programme for the Adoption of the Acquis ’, a blueprint for the
reforms needed to gain full membership of the EU. Nevertheless, what
characterized this period was the dramatic decrease in the number of legal
amendments (Yılmaz, 2016: 90). So-called ‘selective Europeanization’
came to the forefront, in which the government cherry-picked which areas
and which issues within these areas to reform (Yılmaz, 2016: 90–94). For
instance, as a part of the Ninth Reform Package, minority protection was
further strengthened by adopting new laws such as the Law on Foun-
dations and implementing minority protection rules (e.g., the launch of
Turkish Radio Television 6 broadcasting in Kurdish). In this period, some
elements of the controversial Article 301 were also amended in line with
the strong social pressure from civil society and the EU. Article 301 of
the Turkish Penal Code had penalized those ‘who explicitly insult Turk-
ishness, the Republic, or Turkish Grand National Assembly’. According
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to the new, less restrictive wording, Article 301 penalized ‘insulting the
Turkish nation’ and required the permission of the Minister of Justice to
file a case.
However, despite these reforms many problematic issues for minority
protection were untouched, such as restrictions on the use of minority
languages in political life (Yılmaz, 2014: 245). Rather than pursuing
a comprehensive EU-triggered reform agenda, the government carried
out significant yet sparse reform attempts congruent with its own polit-
ical agenda. Starting in 2005, in parallel with the relaunch of Kurdistan
Workers’ Party (PKK) terrorism and rising nationalist movements, Turkey
also witnessed the delimitation of fundamental rights and freedoms,
especially after the amendments made to the Anti-Terror Law in 2006
(Aytar, 2006). The 2010 constitutional referendum paved the way for the
concentration of power in the hands of the executive, and undermined the
independence of the judiciary (Özbudun, 2015).
On the foreign policy front, Turkey’s participation in the EU-led oper-
ations that had made use of NATO assets since 2003 made it possible for
the country to continue its alignment with the Common Foreign and
Security Policy of the EU during this period (see Torun, Chapter 13).
Active Turkish participation in the NATO missions in Afghanistan, in the
UN Interim Force in Lebanon in 2006, as well as in the EU-led opera-
tions in the Balkans indicated ‘a Europeanization of foreign policy where
Turkey demonstrated its ability as a team player for the EU’ (Müftüler-
Baç & Gürsoy, 2010: 412). However, toward the end of this period,
Turkey started to become less inclined to comply with the EU’s foreign
policy parameters. Ankara’s stance on the Iranian nuclear deal at the June
2010 United Nations Security Council and its response to NATO’s inter-
vention in Libya in 2011 indicated that Turkey had started to follow its
own foreign policy options, rather than acting in line with European and
American positions (Müftüler-Baç, 2016b: 99).
5.3.3.3 Politics: ‘Europe’ No Longer the Lingua Franca
After 2005, ‘Europe’ no longer emerged as the lingua franca of politics
in Turkey (Alpan, 2016: 23). Support for EU accession in the country
shifted from 74% in favor in December 2002 to 57% in favor in May 2006
(Yılmaz, 2011: 187). With the launch of EU–Turkey negotiations, the
idealistic, historical-emotional rhetoric turned into a much more realistic
and down-to-earth perception of the EU.
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During this period, Turkish politics was dominated by debates on
charges against well-known novelists and journalists based on Article
301, and the fight over Abdullah Gül’s presidency, which was seen by
some circles as an AKP maneuver to further ‘Islamicize’ the country
and to harm secular and Republican values. The picture got even more
complicated with the e-memorandum released by the Turkish Chief of
the General Staff in April 2007, which voiced the military’s concerns
over the diminishing secular values of the Republic (Grigoriadis, 2008b).
Europeanization was still a significant narrative but not the indispensable
goal it had been before. Rather, the AKP’s emphasis on a multidimen-
sional approach to foreign policy, and its claim to be a soft power in the
region due to the country’s newly assumed leadership role in the East,
were the dominant narratives during this period (Çağaptay, 2009; Batalla,
2012; see also Kaya, Chapter 14). This new activism in Turkey’s foreign
policy created question marks about whether or not Turkey was shifting
its axes away from its predominantly Western orientation toward a more
Eastern-oriented foreign policy.
In this respect, identity constructions during this period rarely entailed
references to ‘Europe’ or ‘Europeanness’. ‘Europe’ in this period was
usually used by the adversaries of EU accession in Turkey, rejuvenating
the historical ‘double standards’ discourse, which revolves around the
EU’s ‘insincerity’ and ‘insensitivity’ to Turkey’s priorities and values stem-
ming from history and state tradition. For instance, Hüseyin Kıvrıkoğlu,
former Chief of General Staff, accused the EU of aiming to impose on
Turkey conditions similar to ‘Sèvres and Lausanne’, the two post-World
War I agreements between Turkey (or rather the Ottoman Empire) and
the European states (as cited in Bila, 2005). The latter point was raised
during the Article 301 trials, where members of the European Commis-
sion, who were among the audience during the trials, were accused of
trying to ‘intervene in the Turkish judiciary’ (Radikal, 2006).
During this period, criticism from the EU on democratic practices
in Turkey continued, especially when the Turkish Constitutional Court
banned two pro-Kurdish political parties, the People’s Democracy Party
(HADEP) in 2005 and the Democratic Society Party (DTP) in 2009, on
charges of aiding the PKK and carrying out activities challenging the state.
The government’s reactions to the intensified EU criticism were indicative
of the AKP’s weakened reliance on the EU (Noutcheva & Aydın-Düzgit,
2012: 70). To illustrate, in response to the critical report of the EP
on Turkey published in 2011 (European Parliament, 2011), then Prime
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Minister Erdoğan stated that the ‘Parliament is entrusted to draft the
report, and we are entrusted to do as we see fit’ (as cited in Milliyet Daily,
2011). At the same time, the opposition Republican People’s Party’s
(CHP) Euroskepticism during this period was mainly ‘an outcome of its
distrust of the AKP government’s honesty and ability in implementing
the required reforms for Turkey’s EU membership’ (Celep, 2011: 425).
Some CHP officials expressed concerns that the EU’s purpose might
be to maintain Turkey’s candidate status forever or to treat Turkey as
a second-class partner, because both scenarios served the EU’s interests
better (Gülmez, 2006). In either case, Europe had lost its central role
within political debates, accompanied by growing skepticism and indiffer-
ence in Turkish society toward Europe—even a turning away from Europe
in many spheres of politics and society (Alpan, 2014: 69).
5.3.4 Europeanization as Denial (2012–2020)
5.3.4.1 Polity: Customs Union and Migration at the Forefront
Although the picture of Europeanization in the realm of polity after
2011 was gloomy, there were some noteworthy developments during this
period. Perhaps the most important milestones in this respect came with
two events: the debates on the modernization of the CU Agreement, with
the intention to extend its scope beyond the manufacturing sector on the
one hand, and the December 2013 Readmission Agreement followed by
the March 2016 EU–Turkey Statement (also known as the EU–Turkey
refugee ‘deal’) connected to the visa liberalization process for Turkish
citizens on the other (see also Kaya, Chapter 14). The mutual willingness
to cooperate on irregular migration partially revived the accession nego-
tiations, with the opening of the chapters on ‘Economic and Monetary
Policy’ and ‘Financial and Budgetary Provisions’, and was connected to
an envisaged acceleration of the visa liberalization process.
The CU and its institutional structure had contributed to the EU–
Turkey relations and the introduction of EU-induced polity in Turkey in
the previous periods, but the overall backsliding in the reform process
was reflected in the operation of the CU, as the ‘institutional rule-
based economic governance [was] weakened’ in this period (Arısan-Eralp,
2018: 3). Nevertheless, the discussions on upgrading the CU started
in 2014 at the initiative of the European Commission and were accel-
erated with the May 2015 declaration by Turkey’s Economy Minister
Nihat Zeybekçi and the European Commissioner for Trade Anna Cecilia
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Malmström (Arısan-Eralp, 2018: 1). Based on an impact assessment, the
Commission recommended to the European Parliament and the Euro-
pean Council the commencement of negotiations for the modernization
of the CU and ‘to further extend the bilateral trade relations to areas such
as services, public procurement and sustainable development’ (European
Commission, 2016). Although the European Parliament supported the
CU revision, ‘which would keep Turkey economically anchored to the
EU’ (European Parliament, 2019: para. 23), negotiations have not been
launched as of the time of writing.
From a polity perspective, it could be argued that this period has
witnessed a number of changes, and even ruptures in terms of EU–
Turkey institutional relations. The EU–Turkey Association Council, the
main body of the CU, which was officially designed to meet twice a
year, had a meeting in March 2019 after a four years hiatus (Council of
the EU, 2019). During this period, most of the institutional communi-
cation between the parties took place in the form of bilateral meetings
and high level dialogue mechanisms outside the accession framework.
Indeed, cooperation between the EU and Turkey was heightened in this
period through the establishment of the High-Level Energy Dialogue
in 2015 and High-Level Political Dialogue in 2016; the latter within
the framework of the March 2016 EU–Turkey Statement. This tendency
to underline the possibility of enhancing sectoral cooperation between
parties without Turkey being a full EU member, thereby introducing a
differentiated polity framework to EU–Turkey relations outside accession
perspective, has been dubbed as ‘external differentiated integration’ in the
academic debates on EU–Turkey relations.8
The emphasis on issue-based cooperation between the EU and Turkey
also appeared in the domain of migration. A Readmission Agreement
was signed in December 2013 (EU–Turkey Readmission Agreement,
2013), which also initiated the Visa Liberalization Dialogue and created
a roadmap for the accomplishment of the visa liberalization between two
8‘External differentiated integration’ stipulates that the EU increasingly seeks alterna-
tive models of alignment with third countries that promote non-member states’ selective
adoption of EU norms. For a discussion on ‘external differentiated integration’ and its
impact on EU-Turkey relations see Turhan (2017) and Tekin (Chapter 7).
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parties. The March 2016 EU–Turkey Statement accelerated the fulfill-
ment of Turkey’s obligations stemming from it, but as of the time of
writing, six benchmarks have yet to be fulfilled.9
A final highlight of this period has been the adoption of a controversial
18-article constitutional amendment package by the Turkish Parliament
in January 2017, which aimed to transform Turkey from a parliamentary
governance system to an executive presidency (Paul & Seyrek, 2017). The
constitutional changes, approved in the April 2017 referendum, scrapped
the role of prime minister and gave the president sweeping powers,
making the president the head of government as well as the head of state.
The referendum results were fiercely criticized by the opposition CHP,
the Peoples’ Democratic Party (HDP) (BBC News, 2017), and the civil
society. The EU Delegation election observers found that the referendum
was unfair and not free (McIntyre, 2017), documenting in this way the
limited degree of Europeanization in the process.
5.3.4.2 Policy: The Continuation of Selective Europeanization
Although it is possible to observe a high degree of compliance with EU
rules and laws in Turkish legislation in the years after 2011 (European
Commission, 2018), the steady decrease in the commitment to Euro-
peanization continued in this period. Crucially, Turkey continued an
approach of selective Europeanization in ‘policy’, following its priorities
and responding to external challenges.
During this period, the government focused on various judicial reforms
aimed at increasing the efficiency of the system. The EU and Turkish
government launched the so-called ‘Positive Agenda’ in 2012 in order to
revitalize EU–Turkey relations, which prioritized judicial reform as ‘the
most essential of all areas’ (European Commission, 2012). Beyond that,
in 2014 Turkey published a policy statement regarding its EU acces-
sion process, titled ‘Turkey’s European Union Strategy’. It aimed to
promote EU harmonization efforts and accelerate ‘the work in all chap-
ters, whether politically blocked or not’ (Republic of Turkey Ministry for
EU Affairs, 2014: 5).
In this context, EU-related reforms continued in fields that included
civil-military relations, freedom of expression and media, and the fight
against corruption (Yılmaz, 2016: 94). However, in contrast to earlier
9For a detailed analysis of the EU–Turkey Readmission Agreement see Kaya
(Chapter 14).
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reforms, the judicial reform packages of 2013 and 2014 aimed at
decreasing the relative independence of the judiciary from the execu-
tive (TRT Haber, 2014). In December 2013, a governmental decree
was adopted to guarantee that all forms of investigations conducted by
public prosecutors can proceed only on the basis of a green light from
their superiors, especially the Minister of Justice (Müftüler-Baç, 2016c:
18). Thus, the Europeanization impact continued more as a continua-
tion of the government’s political agenda rather than as an attempt of
harmonization with EU legislation.
In the field of migration policy, the EU–Turkey Statement to end
irregular migration from Turkey to the EU, as announced by the Euro-
pean Council and Turkey on 18 March 2016, re-calibrated Turkey’s
migration policy. The so-called refugee ‘deal’ stipulated that ‘all new
irregular migrants crossing from Turkey into Greek islands as from 20
March 2016 will be returned to Turkey’ and ‘for every Syrian being
returned to Turkey from Greek islands, another Syrian will be resettled
from Turkey to the EU taking into account the UN Vulnerability Crite-
ria’ (European Council, 2016). Besides the connection to EU accession
negotiations and the visa liberalization roadmap, the arrangement implied
enforced border-control measures by Turkey. However, it was subse-
quently subject to several disputes between the two sides, which points
to the fragility and reversibility of EU-induced policies in this period.
5.3.4.3 Politics: ‘These Things Happen in Europe As Well’
The AKP’s landslide victory in parliamentary elections in 2011 was a
turning point for the Europeanization debate and EU–Turkey relations.
The crackdown on the Gezi Park protests in 2013, the government’s
ban on social media sites such as Twitter and YouTube in 2014, and
the handling of the Ergenekon and Balyoz trials were indicative of a
reversal of the Turkish government’s commitment to the EU’s polit-
ical rules (Müftüler-Baç, 2016a: 6). The feeling of disenchantment and
disappointment with the EU peaked when EU officials, again, aired alter-
native forms of partnership with the EU other than full membership
(see also Tekin, Chapter 7), bringing back the aforementioned ‘double
standards’ discourse. In April 2017, Commissioner for European Neigh-
bourhood Policy and Enlargement Johannes Hahn suggested that EU
member states and Turkey should initiate a more essential discussion on a
‘new format for relations with Turkey’ (Politico, 2017). The EU anchor
moved even further away as Commission President Jean-Claude Juncker
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made it clear that no enlargement would be possible until 2019, effec-
tively freezing Turkey’s accession to the EU—while mentioning the need
to ‘maintain a credible enlargement perspective for the Western Balkans’
(European Commission, 2017).
Nevertheless, Europe did not completely disappear from political
debates and identity negotiations. Political actors made references to
Europe as an ‘unwanted guardian’ and/or ‘a partner in crime’ (Alpan,
2016: 23). In particular, just before and after the 2011 parliamentary
elections, then Prime Minister Erdoğan claimed that ‘these things happen
in Europe as well’, when he was accused of being authoritarian and anti-
democratic. In a speech at the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of
Europe, Erdoğan stated that he
embraced every kind of group in Turkey including Kurds, Turks, Romas.
[…] But, what I see in France today is that the Roma population is being
expelled. Is this democracy? I see that there is no respect for religious
beliefs in France. Those who attempt to criticize Turkey should first look
at themselves. (Erdoğan, 2011)
The same attitude could be sensed in Erdoğan’s answers to criticisms
posed against him for use of excessive force in the Gezi Park protests
or when asked what would happen to those who were jailed, tried, or
expelled from work after the 15 July 2016 coup attempt (The Guardian,
2017). These examples illustrate the new role of ‘Europe’ in the Turkish
political discourse.
5.4 Conclusion
‘Europe’ has been the most popular yet most volatile buzzword in Turkish
politics. Stretching from Selim the Third, the Ottoman sultan who initi-
ated the restructuring of the Ottoman army along European lines in the
eighteenth century, to Mustafa Kemal Atatürk, who saw Europe as the
embodiment of civilization and constructed Turkish modernity on this
premise, the emergence of ‘Europe’ as a journey and as a target to reach
has colored Turkish political history. This intense preoccupation gained
particular momentum and form with the 1963 Ankara Agreement and the
1999 Helsinki European Council decision. The academic Europeaniza-
tion literature also agrees that the issue is not whether Europe matters for
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Turkey, but how it matters, to what degree, in what direction, at what
point in time (Börzel, 2003).
Since 1959, the ‘European impact’ on Turkey has been predominantly
associated with the reforms made within domestic legal and institu-
tional structures and the overarching democratization and pluralization
processes in the country. There has been considerable interest in the
impact of Europeanization on particular aspects of policies and policy
areas. The EU acted as a ‘democratization anchor’, and ‘reinforcement by
reward’ worked as a powerful trigger for compatible reforms, in line with
EU legislation (Schimmelfennig & Sedelmeier, 2004: 662). The Euro-
peanization process not only shaped polity, policy, and politics in Turkey
but also complemented domestic, regional, and global processes.
The picture started to change after 2005, when Europeanization and
the EU accession started losing salience both for the AKP government
and other domestic actors, accompanied by an increase of Euroskeptic
tendencies in the wider public. In the period after 2005, ‘Europe’ was no
longer the lingua franca in the Turkish political landscape in the context
of a trend that is sometimes dubbed as ‘de-Europeanization’ in the litera-
ture. However, this does not mean that ‘Europe’ completely disappeared
from domestic policy orientations, political debates, and identity negoti-
ations. Rather, the AKP used ‘Europe’ strategically to justify actions that
the EU criticized.
Many variables, such as the unwillingness of European and Turkish
leaders to foster Turkey’s full EU membership, Turkey’s poor score on
human rights and democratization, the blockage of numerous negotia-
tion chapters, and Europe’s own perpetual crisis in economics, identity,
and politics have created the impression that the Europeanization process
has come to a halt for Turkey. However, as this chapter has shown,
Europeanization is a versatile and complex process, covering vast areas of
policy, politics, and polity, accompanied by larger domestic, regional, and
global processes. This process is not limited to Turkey’s EU accession.
The concept of Europeanization will therefore continue to constitute a
valuable point of reference for the study of the EU-orientation of polity,
policy, and politics, regardless of whether Europeanization will create
opportunities for new political debates, discourses, policies, and actors
in the case of Turkey.
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TBMM Basımevi.
Erdoğan, R. T. (2011, April 13). Speech at the Council of Europe Parliamentary
Assembly. Available online as video at: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=
t8bQQPDGJ4I. Accessed 7 Jun 2020.
European Commission. (2004, October 6). Regular progress report on Turkey’s
progress towards accession. SEC(2004) 1201. Brussels.
European Commission. (2005, October 3). Negotiating framework. Luxem-
bourg. https://ec.europa.eu/neighbourhood-enlargement/sites/near/files/
pdf/turkey/st20002_05_tr_framedoc_en.pdf. Accessed 8 Jul 2020.
European Commission. (2012, May 17). Positive EU–Turkey agenda launched
in Ankara. MEMO/12/359. Brussels.
European Commission. (2016, December 21). Impact assessment accompa-
nying the document recommendation for a Council decision authorising the
opening of negotiations with Turkey on an agreement on the extension of the
scope of the bilateral preferential trade relationship and on the modernisation
of the Customs Union. SWD(2016) 475 final. Brussels.
European Commission. (2017, September 13). The State of the Union 2017:
Catching the wind in our sails. IP/17/3164. Brussels.
European Commission. (2018, August 18). Annex to the commission imple-
menting decision amending Commission decision C(2014) 5998 of 26
August 2014 adopting the indicative strategy paper for Turkey for the period
2014–2020, C(2018) 5067 final. Brussels.
European Commission. (2020). Turkey: Customs Unions and preferential
arrangements. https://ec.europa.eu/taxation_customs/business/calculation-
customs-duties/rules-origin/customs-unions/turkey-customs-unions-prefer
ential-arrangements_en. Accessed 25 Nov 2020.
132 B. ALPAN
European Council. (1997). Luxembourg European Council (12 and 13
December 1997)—Presidency conclusions. https://www.consilium.europa.eu/
media/21114/luxembourg-european-council.pdf. Accessed 25 Nov 2020.




European Council. (2016, March 18). EU–Turkey statement. Press release.
https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2016/03/18/
eu-turkey-statement/. Accessed 27 Nov 2020.
European Court of Human Rights. (2010). The conscience of Europe: 50 years of
the European Court of Human Rights (1st ed.). https://www.echr.coe.int/
Documents/Anni_Book_content_ENG.pdf. Accessed 27 Apr 2020.
European Parliament. (2011, March 9). European Parliament resolution of 9
March 2011 on Turkey’s 2010 progress report. P7_TA(2011)0090. Stras-
bourg.
European Parliament. (2019, March 13). European Parliament resolution of
13 March 2019 on the 2018 Commission Report on Turkey, P8_TA
(2019)0200. Strasbourg.
EU–Turkey Readmission Agreement. (2013). Agreement between the European
Union and the Republic of Turkey on the readmission of persons residing
without authorisation. Official Journal of the European Union, L 134/3–27,
7.5.2014.
Featherstone, K., & Radaelli, C. (Eds.). (2003). The politics of Europeanization
(1st ed.). Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Glyptis, L. (2005). The cost of rapprochement: Turkey’s erratic EU dream as a
clash of systematic values. Turkish Studies, 6(3), 401–420.
Grigoriadis, I. (2008a). On the Europeanisation of minority rights protection.
Mediterranean Politics, 13(1), 23–41.
Grigoriadis, I. (2008b). Islam and democratisation in Turkey: Secularism and
trust in a divided society. Democratization, 16(6), 1194–1213.
Gülmez, B. (2006). The Republican People’s Party and Turkish foreign policy.
Unpublished master’s thesis, Middle East Technical University, Ankara.
Günay, D., & Renda, K. (2014). Usages of Europe in Turkish foreign policy
towards the Middle East. Journal of Balkan and Near Eastern Studies, 16(1),
47–67.
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CHAPTER 6




Rhetorical entrapment is a causal mechanism that induces self-interested
and strategic actors to behave in line with the norms of their commu-
nity. International communities define common standards of appropriate
behavior to which their member states commit themselves. When member
states violate the community standards, they can be shamed into compli-
ance by exposing the inconsistency between normative commitment and
actual behavior. The rhetorical entrapment mechanism synthesizes key
elements of rationalist institutionalism as we find it in neoliberal or liberal-
intergovernmentalist theories of international politics and European inte-
gration (see Tsarouhas, Chapter 2) and sociological institutionalism,
the foundation of many constructivist approaches (see Aydın-Düzgit &
Rumelili, Chapter 3).
In the context of European Union (EU) enlargement, and EU–Turkey
relations specifically, rhetorical entrapment refers to a process through
which member and candidate countries are induced to abide by the EU’s
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membership norms—above all, its liberal democratic values. In line with
the rhetorical entrapment mechanism, the better a candidate state meets
the membership norms of the EU, the more likely rhetorical entrap-
ment is to occur, and the more likely the opponents of membership
are compelled to accept enlargement against their national preferences.
Candidate countries are more easily entrapped the more they identify with
the EU community and its fundamental values.
This chapter has two main parts. First, I present the theoretical assump-
tions, scope conditions, and propositions of the rhetorical entrapment
mechanism in contrast to alternative mechanisms of international coop-
eration. Subsequently, I apply the mechanism to EU–Turkey relations
with a focus on the period between 1999 and the start of accession
negotiations.1
6.2 Theory: Strategic Actors, Community
Environments, and Rhetorical Action
The causal mechanism of rhetorical entrapment draws on both rationalist
and sociological institutionalism. In line with rationalist institutionalism, it
assumes that international actors interact strategically based on exogenous
policy preferences. In line with sociological institutionalism, it assumes
that this interaction takes place within a community environment defined
by a common ethos (a collective identity based on fundamental common
values and norms) and a high interaction density.
6.2.1 Rationalist Institutionalism and Enlargement
Rationalist institutionalism conceptualizes the international system as an
anarchical environment characterized by the predominance of material
structures like the distribution of power and wealth.2 These material
conditions are the most important explanatory factors for the processes
and outcomes in international relations. Ideas and institutions are mostly
treated as intervening variables between the material interests and the
1The chapter builds on earlier studies, in particular Schimmelfennig (2001, 2003a, b,
2008, 2009). Please confer to these publications for further references and data.
2A classical statement is Waltz (1979).
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material environment of the actors, on the one hand, and the indi-
vidual actions and collective outcomes, on the other (see Goldstein &
Keohane, 1993). They provide constraints and incentives, not reasons,
for action. Rationalist institutionalism further assumes that actors act
egoistically. They choose the behavioral option, which promises to maxi-
mize their welfare, or at least satisfies their selfish goals, under the given
circumstances.
These premises provide the theoretical foundation for the rationalist
analysis of international organizations and their enlargement. In the ratio-
nalist account, international organizations help states pursue their foreign
policy goals more efficiently. These assumptions can be applied easily
to issues of EU membership and enlargement. A member state favors
the admission of a non-member state—and a non-member state seeks
membership—under the condition that it will reap positive net benefits
from enlargement and that these benefits exceed the benefits it would
secure from a different kind of relationship (such as simple cooperation
or association). Enlargement then takes place if, for both the member
states and the candidate countries, marginal benefits exceed the marginal
costs.
6.2.2 Sociological Institutionalism and Enlargement
The assumptions of sociological (or constructivist) institutionalism differ
from rationalist institutionalism with regard to both structures and actors.
Sociological institutionalists regard the environment of social actors as a
cultural or institutional environment structured by collective schemata
and rules. Collective ideas and institutions shape the identity and the
interests of the actors. Social actors are assumed to internalize or habitu-
alize institutional rules and rule-following behavior.
Accordingly, sociological institutionalism assumes that social actors act
on the basis of internalized cultural values and social norms rather than
their self-interest. The most widely assumed logic of action is the ‘logic of
appropriateness’ according to which ‘political institutions are collections
of interrelated rules and routines that define appropriate actions in terms
of relations between roles and situations’ (March & Olsen, 1989: 160).
Actors judge alternative courses of action not by the consequences for
their own utility but by their conformity to institutional rules or social
identities.
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Whereas rationalist institutionalism emphasizes the instrumental,
efficiency-enhancing functions of international organizations in the
service of state actors, sociological institutionalism sees them as
autonomous and potentially powerful actors with constitutive and legit-
imacy-providing effects. International organizations are ‘community
representatives’ (Abbott & Snidal, 1998: 24) as well as community-
building agencies. Whereas in the rational-institutionalist perspective,
the EU serves the economic or security interests of its members, in
a sociological-institutionalist perspective, it represents an international
community of values, it upholds these values vis-à-vis the member states,
and it disseminates them among non-members. The EU’s institution-
alized collective identity is that of a community of European, liberal
democratic states. In its current version, the Treaty on European Union
states in Article 2 that the ‘Union is founded on the values of respect for
human dignity, freedom, democracy, equality, the rule of law and respect
for human rights, including the rights of persons belonging to minorities’.
According to sociological institutionalism, enlargement is shaped by
ideational, cultural factors, too. The most relevant of these factors is ‘com-
munity’ or ‘cultural match’, that is, the degree to which the actors inside
and outside the organization share a collective identity and fundamental
beliefs. Studying enlargement in a sociological perspective, then, primarily
focuses on the analysis of social identities, values, and norms, not the
material, distributional consequences of enlargement for individual actors.
Whether applicants and member states regard enlargement as desirable
depends on the degree of community they perceive to have with each
other. The more an external state identifies with the international commu-
nity that the organization represents and the more it shares the values and
norms that define the purpose and the policies of the organization, the
more it aspires to membership and the more the member states are willing
to admit this country. If enlargement decisions are contested, we expect
to see an arguing process to determine which decision is most in line
with the collective identity, the constitutive beliefs and practices of the
community, and the norms and rules of the organization.
The organization’s enlargement decisions follow its membership rules
and practices rather than expedient interest-based calculations and the
distribution of material bargaining power among the member states. The
membership rules of a community organization oblige the EU to grant
membership to all states that share, or aspire to, the collective identity
of the community and are committed to their constitutive values and
norms—even in the case of net costs.
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6.2.3 Rhetorical Action and Enlargement
Rhetorical action is the strategic, self-serving use of arguments. Rhetor-
ical entrapment denotes the mechanism by which actors are compelled
to act in conformance with their prior argumentative commitments in a
situation in which conformance runs counter to their current preferences.
Rhetorical action and entrapment start from a strategic view of norms
and normative action. In this view, norms are not motives for action
nor are they merely constraints; they are ‘resources for human strate-
gies’ in social interactions (Edgerton, 1985: 12–14). In the same way,
Erving Goffman’s theory of ‘dramaturgical action’ views individuals as
performers. As performers, ‘individuals are concerned not with the moral
issue of realizing standards but with the amoral issue of engineering a
convincing impression that these standards are being realized’ (Goffman,
1959: 251). Performers do not internalize the values and norms of
their community but understand that conformity is expected from and
beneficial to them. Communities exhibit a ‘veneer of consensus’ that is
‘facilitated by each participant concealing his own wants behind state-
ments which assert values to which everyone present feels obliged to give
lip service’ (Goffman, 1959: 9).
This strategic view of norms bridges rationalist and sociological insti-
tutionalism. In contrast to the rationalist focus on material bargaining
power, social values and norms are theorized to produce strong effects
on actor strategies and collective outcomes. In contrast to sociological
assumptions of internalization and appropriate action, they are seen to
do so among strategic actors. Rhetorical action assumes that the actors
involved in EU policymaking have self-centered preferences and act strate-
gically to achieve an outcome that maximizes their utility. The actors
follow a logic of consequentiality, not appropriateness, and they do not
change their identity or learn and internalize new, appropriate preferences
as a result of the interaction.
At the same time, rhetorical action assumes that the EU consti-
tutes a community environment for actors. A community environment
affects interactions and outcomes in four important ways. First, it trig-
gers arguments about the legitimacy of preferences and policies. In a
rhetorical action perspective, actors are able—and forced—to justify their
preferences on the basis of the EU’s community ethos. They choose
ethos-based arguments to strengthen the legitimacy of their own pref-
erences against the claims and arguments of their opponents. Second,
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the community ethos is both a resource of support for legitimate actions
and a constraint that imposes costs on illegitimate actions. It adds legit-
imacy to and thus strengthens the bargaining power of those actors
that pursue preferences in line with, although not necessarily inspired
by, the community ethos. Third, community membership forces actors
to be concerned about their image. This image not only depends on
how they are perceived to conform to the community ethos but also on
whether their arguments are perceived as credible. Credibility is the single
most important resource in arguing and depends on both impartiality
and consistency (Elster, 1992: 13–50). If inconsistency and partiality are
publicly exposed and actors are caught using the community ethos oppor-
tunistically, their standing as community members suffers. As a result,
their future ability to argue successfully will be reduced. Finally, commu-
nity members whose preferences and actions violate the community ethos
can be shamed into compliance by other community actors who (threaten
to) expose the inconsistency between their earlier commitment to the
community ethos and their current actions.
This is rhetorical entrapment. Because rational members of a commu-
nity are concerned about their image of legitimacy, a community environ-
ment has the potential to modify the collective outcome that would have
resulted in an anarchical, material environment. In a community environ-
ment, norm-based collective outcomes are possible even among strategic
actors and in absence of coercive power or egoistic incentives to comply.
There are a number of scope or facilitating conditions for rhetorical
entrapment to work. First, rhetorical entrapment depends on the exis-
tence of an international community and the strength of its community
ethos. Technical or global international organizations are less likely to
have a strong community ethos and exhibit rhetorical entrapment than
community-building regional organizations. Second, rhetorical entrap-
ment depends on the density and permanence of the community. Partic-
ipating in a community with a long-term horizon, actors’ standing and
credibility matter more than during a short-term interaction. And the
more densely the community members interact, the higher the likelihood
is that inconsistencies and partiality in the use of community standards are
detected. Whereas permanence makes it costlier for actors to argue oppor-
tunistically in their own favor, density makes it more difficult to do so.
Third, the more constitutive a policy issue is or the more it involves funda-
mental questions of community purpose, the easier it is for interested
actors to bring in questions of legitimacy and to frame it as an issue of
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community identity that cannot be left to the interplay of self-interest and
bargaining power. Controversial questions of EU constitution making or
membership will therefore engender a more ‘value-laden’ policy process
than issues of technical regulation or subsidy distribution. Fourth, even
among issues that are constitutive or can be linked to constitutive issues,
community effects may vary according to the values and norms in ques-
tion. According to Thomas Franck, the degree to which an international
rule ‘will exert a strong pull on states to comply’ depends on four prop-
erties that account for its legitimacy: determinacy, symbolic validation,
coherence in practice, and adherence to a norm hierarchy (Franck, 1990:
49). To the extent that the relevant community norm possesses these
qualities, it becomes difficult for the shamed member to circumvent the
practical implications of the norm rhetorically.
These conditions are all present within the EU and in the EU enlarge-
ment process. From its start, the EU has been designed to build an ‘ever
closer union’ of the peoples of Europe. Over the course of time, and
especially since the ratification of the Treaty of Maastricht, the density
of integration has increased strongly. Moreover, the EU has developed,
explicitly formulated, and institutionalized its European, liberal demo-
cratic community ethos and linked the issue of enlargement to this
ethos. Article 49 (TEU) explicitly links EU membership to the liberal
democratic values and norms proclaimed in Article 2 of the Treaty.
In sum, the hypotheses on EU enlargement decisions based on the
rhetorical action/entrapment approach borrow from rationalist institu-
tionalism with regard to the preferences and behavior of the actors and
from sociological institutionalism with regard to the outcomes. Accord-
ingly, member states’ initial enlargement preferences are divergent and
reflect individual concerns and cost-benefit calculations. Actors use their
bargaining and veto powers in EU decision-making to push enlargements
they prefer and prevent those they reject. If the bargaining outcome
based on the intergovernmental constellation of preferences and power
is in line with membership norms, rhetorical action is unnecessary. If the
two diverge, however, and the preferences of the less powerful member
states match the community norms, they will use rhetorical action to
shame the more powerful member states into conformity with their ethos-
based obligations. The better a candidate state meets the ethos-based
membership norms of the EU, the more likely rhetorical entrapment is to
occur, and the more likely the opponents of membership are compelled
to accept enlargement against their national preferences. In contrast, if
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the candidate does not meet the ethos-based conditions for admission, or
if the proponents of enlargement lack credibility in arguing the case for
enlargement, rhetorical entrapment will fail.
6.2.4 Eastern Enlargement: The Original Context of the Rhetorical
Action Argument
In the EU context, the rhetorical action argument was first used to
explain Eastern enlargement (Schimmelfennig, 2001). When the Central
and Eastern European countries (CEECs) demanded EU membership in
the early 1990s, this demand was met with divergent member state prefer-
ences. The distribution of preferences largely corresponded with member
states’ strategic and financial self-interest. Member states that neighbored
the CEECs generally favored Eastern enlargement because of higher
interdependence. In contrast, the main recipients of the EU budget’s
infrastructure and agriculture subsidies as well as low-tech producers
among the member states feared budgetary and trade competition with
the relatively poor, agricultural, and low-tech producing CEECs. Geopo-
litical interests also had an influence. The Southern member states were
concerned that the community balance of power would shift east and in
favor of Germany.
The pro-enlargement member states such as Germany, the UK, or
Denmark represented not only a minority of member states but also
wielded less bargaining power than their opponents. Even for Germany,
the greatest potential beneficiary of Eastern enlargement, the CEECs
were of far smaller economic and political importance than the other EU
member states. Under these circumstances, the supporters of enlargement
had no attractive outside options and could not credibly threaten the
opponents with exit or alternative agreements. In the absence of material
bargaining power, they, therefore, turned to rhetorical action.
The rhetorical strategy of the proponents of enlargement constructed
enlargement as an issue of identity, values, and norms and opposition to
enlargement as a betrayal of the community’s principles, purpose, and
past promises. The CEECs invoked the pan-European, liberal identity of
the community and claimed to share this identity. According to this line
of argument, the CEECs have traditionally shared the values and norms
of European culture and civilization, confirmed their European identity
in the revolutions of 1989, and ‘returned to Europe’ after the Cold War
period of artificial separation. Advocates framed enlargement as an issue
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of EU identity, arguing that it ought not to be seen and decided from the
vantage point of national interests and material cost–benefit calculations.
They accused the reticent EU member states of acting inconsistently and
betraying the fundamental values and norms of their own community
if they continued to prioritize their individual economic or geopolitical
interests.
It was difficult for the enlargement skeptics to rebut these arguments
without, at the same time, casting doubt on their own commitment to
the institutionalized identity and fundamental norms of the EU. They
were thus rhetorically entrapped. Consequently, they did not publicly
reject Eastern enlargement for instrumental reasons. When the European
Commission presented its report on enlargement based on the Commu-
nity’s vision of a pan-European liberal order and proposed accession
criteria focusing on liberal democratic political and institutional condi-
tions at the Copenhagen summit in 1993 (European Council, 1993), the
skeptics acquiesced to Eastern enlargement. CEECs that met the liberal
democratic accession criteria were invited to accession negotiations.
6.3 Rhetorical Entrapment at Work: The Way
to EU Membership Negotiations with Turkey
6.3.1 A Hard Case
The opening of accession negotiations with Turkey in 2005 is a partic-
ularly ‘hard case’ for the rhetorical entrapment explanation developed in
the context of the EU’s Eastern enlargement. While the initial conditions
were similar in both cases—such as divergent member state preferences
and net costs for the EU in comparison with the status quo of associa-
tion—the opposition to Turkish accession ran deeper, and the potential
costs of Turkish membership were higher.
Four conditions inhibited Turkey’s membership prospects in the
second half of the 1990s, when Eastern enlargement started. First,
Turkey was poorer and more agricultural than any member state. Turkish
membership was thus likely to increase the divergence of living standards
in the EU, create high potential for labor migration, and instigate demand
for high net payments from the structural and agricultural funds. Second,
the impact of socio-economic divergence was magnified by the size of
Turkey’s population. With more than 70 million inhabitants and a rapidly
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growing population, Turkey was projected to be the largest member state
by the time it joined. Third, as a large Muslim society, Turkey would have
strongly increased cultural diversity in the EU. Fourth, Turkish democ-
racy was unstable and illiberal. It is thus no small wonder that Turkey’s
membership had the lowest approval rating in public opinion surveys
among all candidates and was strongly contested among the member
states. And yet, the EU decided to accord Turkey official candidate status
in 1999 and to open accession negotiations in 2005.
EU member states held intense and highly divergent preferences on
Turkish membership in the period from the late 1990s to the opening of
accession negotiations (Schimmelfennig, 2009: 413–431). In 1997, the
opponents of granting Turkey candidate status were the clear majority.
Principled opposition based on cultural grounds was strong among the
Christian Democrat and conservative parties. In March 1997, the group
of the European People’s Party in the European Parliament framed the
EU as a Christian community and categorically excluded the membership
of a Muslim country. The conservative heads of government of Belgium,
Germany, Ireland, and Spain supported this declaration. Because of its
territorial conflicts with Turkey and the Turkish occupation of Northern
Cyprus, Greece was another principled opponent of Turkish membership.
Other member states, in particular in Northern Europe, stressed the defi-
cient human rights situation in Turkey. France and Italy appeared to be
most inclined to grant Turkey a more concrete membership perspective.
As in the case of Eastern enlargement, the UK was the member state
most consistently in favor of Turkish accession. Member state preferences
on Turkey differed somewhat from the pattern in the Eastern enlarge-
ment case in that they had a strong party-political component and in
that Turkey’s EU neighbors, Greece and Cyprus, had generally not been
supporters of Turkish membership. In both cases, however, member states
had conflicting enlargement preferences.
Even though Turkey was a difficult candidate and gave rise to strong
controversies among the member states and societies, the EU opened
accession negotiations in 2005. How was that possible? From a rhetorical
action perspective and in analogy with the Eastern enlargement case, we
can formulate the following expectations. First, the EU officially judged
and decided on Turkey’s eligibility in accession negotiations based on
the democratic and human rights situation in the country. Conversely, all
other criteria that shaped member states’ preferences and the debate on
Turkey’s membership—be they religious-cultural, economic, geographic,
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or military-strategic—were of lower legitimacy and therefore not part
of the official discourse of EU institutions. Second, EU member states
were obliged to consider Turkish candidacy for membership based on the
(Ankara) Association Agreement of 1963, which acknowledged Turkey as
a ‘European’ country and committed the EU to ‘examine the possibility
of the accession of Turkey’ (EEC-Turkey Association Agreement, 1963).
Blocking candidate status became more difficult to sustain the more coun-
tries in a similar situation were granted membership perspective. Third,
the opening of accession negotiations depended on Turkey’s compliance
with the constitutive political norms of the EU. Blocking accession nego-
tiations becomes more difficult to sustain the more Turkey complies and
the more the European Commission, the authoritative EU organ for
reviewing the fulfillment of accession criteria, confirms compliance. Advo-
cates of accession negotiations with Turkey would point toward Turkish
progress in meeting the EU’s criteria and call on the EU to keep its condi-
tional promise of membership. Progress in accession negotiations equally
depended on compliance with the constitutive political norms of the EU.
Only a breach of these norms (or the promises made to respect them)
constituted legitimate grounds for suspending or canceling these negoti-
ations. The historical record of the process leading to the start of Turkish
accession negotiations in 2005 largely supports these expectations of the
rhetorical action approach.
6.3.2 From No to Yes on Turkish Candidate Status
At the meeting of the EU–Turkey Association Council in April 1997,
the EU reaffirmed that Turkey was eligible for membership and that the
country would be judged on the same criteria as the other applicants.
In December 1997, however, the European Council at Luxembourg
followed the Commission’s recommendation to exclude the country from
the list of candidates for membership. The Commission justified its
recommendation on the grounds that Turkey did not fulfill the Copen-
hagen criteria. Given the political situation in Turkey at the time, and
in comparison with other (potential) candidate countries, this assessment
was not discriminatory and in line with community norms.
In 1999, however, the EU surprisingly reversed its 1997 decision
and granted Turkey official candidate status, even though the political
and human rights situation had not significantly improved. Thus, the
EU decision cannot be explained by rhetorical entrapment. It may have
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been motivated in part by the fact that Turkey’s non-candidate status
became more and more awkward as an increasing number of countries
in Turkey’s neighborhood (Bulgaria, Romania, and the Western Balkans)
obtained a membership perspective. More importantly, however, the deci-
sion resulted from a combination of the perceived need to upgrade the
Turkish status for strategic reasons and a change in pivotal member state
preferences.
For one, the member states were concerned by the Turkish govern-
ment’s harsh reaction to their 1997 decision. Turkey refused to participate
in the European Conference set up in Helsinki for the ‘European states
aspiring to accede to the EU’, blocked meetings of the EU–Turkey Asso-
ciation Council, suspended talks on the solution of the Cyprus conflict,
and threatened to veto the use of NATO facilities for EU military
missions. There was a widespread perception that the EU had to make
an accommodative gesture to safeguard the strategic partnership and to
ensure Turkey’s cooperation on these important security issues (Öniş,
2000: 470).
The most consequential change between 1997 and 1999, however,
was the softening of the German and Greek positions due to predomi-
nantly domestic causes (Müftüler-Baç & McLaren, 2003: 17–31; Öniş,
2000: 473). In Germany, the center-right government was replaced by
a coalition of the Social Democrats and the Greens in 1998, which did
not share the religious-cultural concerns of its predecessors and advocated
a proactive strategy to bring Turkey in line with European norms and
closer to membership. In Greece, the hardliner foreign minister Theodore
Pangalos was replaced with George Papandreou in 1999. He stood for a
new foreign policy outlook advocating the inclusion of Turkey as a way
of cooperatively solving the security problems in the Aegean Sea.
6.3.3 Rhetorical Entrapment and the Opening of Accession
Negotiations
Even though the 1999 decision cannot be explained by compliance with
community norms, it opened the path to rhetorical entrapment. First, it
considerably strengthened the rather vague membership commitment of
the Association Agreement. Second, it strengthened the role of the Euro-
pean Commission in the process. It was now up to the Commission to
assess Turkey’s progress with regard to the Copenhagen criteria and to
recommend the opening of accession negotiations. Third, it constrained
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the EU to use the same criteria for Turkey that it had used for the CEECs.
Consequently, Turkey’s application would be judged primarily on the
merits of democracy, human and minority rights, and the rule of law.
Cultural, religious arguments were excluded from the assessment, and
economic criteria were of secondary importance. This meant that Turkey
could be certain to enhance its prospects for accession negotiations by
improving its dismal human rights record. It would become difficult for
the principled opponents of Turkish membership to block the opening of
accession negotiations if Turkey fulfilled the political criteria.
Encouraged by its candidate status and credible membership perspec-
tive, the Turkish government undertook significant reforms. The Euro-
pean Council meeting in December 2002 welcomed ‘the important steps
taken by Turkey towards meeting the Copenhagen criteria’ (European
Council, 2003: 5). It concluded: ‘If the European Council in December
2004, on the basis of a report and a recommendation from the Commis-
sion, decides that Turkey fulfils the Copenhagen political criteria, the
European Union will open accession negotiations with Turkey without
delay’ (European Council, 2003: 5). This tangible goal prompted the
Turkish government to accelerate the pace of reform—in particular,
since the new Justice and Development Party (AKP) government had its
own self-interested reasons to constrain the power of state institutions
dominated by the Kemalist establishment through these reforms.
After far-reaching reforms in sensitive issue areas such as judicial
reform, civilian control of the military, Cyprus, and Kurdish minority
rights, the Commission in 2004 positively assessed the political criteria
and recommended the opening of accession negotiations. In December
2004, the European Council followed the recommendation under two
conditions. First, Turkey needed to adopt six additional pieces of legisla-
tion. Second, and more controversially, the Turkish government agreed
to sign an Additional Protocol to the Ankara Agreement that would
extend the Customs Union (CU) to all new member states including
Cyprus. Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan refused to sign
the Additional Protocol at the summit but promised to do so before the
actual opening of negotiations on October 3, 2005. At the same time, he
insisted that this signature would not be tantamount to recognizing the
Republic of Cyprus.
In 2005, the EU context deteriorated. First, the failed referendums
in France and the Netherlands were widely interpreted not only as a
negative vote on the Constitutional Treaty but also on the enlargement
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of the EU. The opponents of Turkish accession used the referendum
results as evidence for the need to change course. More directly, the
referendum further weakened French President Jacques Chirac. Second,
the early parliamentary elections in Germany resulted in the defeat of
the Social Democrat-Green government. The Social Democrats stayed
in government with the Christian Democrats but had to accept Angela
Merkel as chancellor, who had campaigned for ‘privileged partnership’
rather than full membership. Thus, two key advocates of accession nego-
tiations had become neutralized. Third, the Republic of Cyprus, which
had the strongest stake in Turkey’s decision on the Additional Protocol,
had become a member state. Thus, while the pro-Turkey camp was weak-
ened, the anti-camp was reinforced through the membership of a country
with particularly intense preferences.
Thanks to rhetorical entrapment, however, the opponents of Turkish
membership could not deny Turkey’s progress on its way toward liberal
democracy and could not legitimately call into question the Commission’s
report and recommendation to open accession negotiations. However,
they brought up alternative routes to block or prevent the talks and
eventual membership. For one, they tried to include alternatives to
full membership such as ‘privileged partnership’ into the Negotiating
Framework. In addition, they sought to exploit the Turkish reluctance
to recognize Cyprus. Both attempts failed in 2005. The Negotiating
Framework of the Commission listed accession as the only ‘shared objec-
tive’ of the negotiations (European Commission, 2005). Moreover, the
Commission reiterated that, in contrast to the extension of the CU, the
recognition of Cyprus under international law was not a precondition
of accession talks. Turkey signed the Protocol extending the CU in July
2005.
The opponents of Turkish membership only acquiesced in accession
negotiations as long as Turkey continued to comply with EU norms and
keep its own promises. Otherwise, they could seize the opportunity to
block the path to Turkish accession. This became obvious in 2006. With
accession negotiations secured and parliamentary elections approaching,
the reformist zeal of the Turkish government weakened. The Commis-
sion’s regular report revealed a mixed picture, with small progress in many
fields and stagnation in others. The main bone of contention, however,
was Turkey’s refusal to fully extend the CU to Cyprus. It continued
to deny access to Cypriot vessels and aircraft (or those coming from
Cyprus). The opponents of Turkish membership (such as Cyprus and
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France) promptly demanded sanctions. Now, the supporters of Turkey
were entrapped. On 29 November 2006, the Commission presented
its recommendations on the continuation of Turkey’s accession negoti-
ations: eight chapters relevant to Turkey’s restrictions on Cyprus should
not be opened, and no chapter should be declared provisionally closed
until Turkey lifted the restrictions against Cyprus. At their meeting
on 11 December 2006 the foreign ministers of the EU accepted the
recommendations.
The decision of 2006 demonstrates that rhetorical entrapment cuts
both ways. As long as Turkey complied with EU norms, it backed the
supporters of Turkish accession and constrained the skeptics. However,
when Turkey failed to comply, it gave legitimacy to the skeptics’ demands
to slow down the accession process and forced the supporters of Turkey’s
membership bid to join in. The events of the first half of the 2000s
thus demonstrate the typical actor constellation of rhetorical entrap-
ment in enlargement. To overcome the standoff between proponents and
opponents of enlargement among the member states, the Commission
plays the role of a referee enforcing the community rules. Whereas the
member states take the ultimate decisions on enlargement issues, they are
constrained by the norms of enlargement to the extent that the accession
country abides by these norms and the Commission is perceived as an
impartial arbiter.
6.4 Conclusions
This chapter introduced the mechanism of rhetorical entrapment and
applied it to EU–Turkey relations. The theoretical approach is best suited
to explain the period between the granting of candidate status (1999) and
the start of accession negotiations (2005), which is positioned against the
backdrop of Turkey’s unfavorable starting position as a candidate country
and increasing opposition to membership among EU member govern-
ments and publics. As long as Turkey progressed on meeting the official
political criteria for EU membership, the supporters of Turkish member-
ship could legitimately argue in favor of the EU’s obligation to heed past
promises and include all European countries willing to adopt the EU’s
core values and norms. In contrast, the opponents were silenced. The
rhetorical entrapment mechanism also elucidates why accession negoti-
ations began to stall soon after their start. The opponents of Turkish
membership were released from the rhetorical trap when Turkey failed
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to heed its own promises and honor its own obligations as a candidate
state.
However, rhetorical entrapment fails to explain the earlier and later
periods of EU–Turkey relations. Before Turkey conformed to the liberal
democratic norms and conditions of EU membership, it could not entrap
the member states. As explained above, the 1999 decision to grant candi-
date status to Turkey was not due to entrapment but to geopolitical
considerations (and a favorable ideological constellation of EU member
state governments). Similarly, rhetorical entrapment did not help Turkish
membership prospects after 2006. A vicious cycle developed between
Turkey’s stagnating liberalization (and, later on, increasing authoritar-
ianism), on the one hand, and the shrinking credibility of the EU’s
accession perspective, on the other. The more the Erdoğan government
and presidency ignored the liberal democratic community norms of the
EU, the less the member states felt obliged to uphold a credible member-
ship promise for Turkey. Because the Turkish government lacked a sincere
commitment to the community norms, the decreasing credibility of the
membership perspective could not prevent democratic backsliding.
Geopolitical and strategic interests have come to dominate EU–Turkey
relations again, as before 1999. These interests also explain why the acces-
sion negotiations that started thanks to rhetorical entrapment continue
formally. The return of rhetorical entrapment depends on two conditions
that appear unlikely in the near future: a credible return to liberal democ-
racy in Turkey and a credible membership perspective for Turkey in the
EU. In the meantime, the dominant mode of interaction between the EU
and Turkey has shifted from arguing to bargaining, from the use of values
and norms to the exchange of threats and promises. Characteristically,
the most recent—but ultimately empty—agreement on re-energizing the
EU–Turkey accession process did not follow from an improvement in
Turkey’s compliance record with EU membership norms, or from a cred-
ible signal of EU commitment to Turkish membership. Rather, it was part
of a quid pro quo in the context of the March 2016 EU–Turkey refugee
‘deal’.
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CHAPTER 7
Differentiated Integration: An Alternative
Conceptualization of EU–Turkey Relations
Funda Tekin
7.1 Introduction
The year 2019 marked the twentieth anniversary of the European Coun-
cil’s decision to grant Turkey the status of accession candidate. However,
over the past few years there have been few reasons to celebrate this
milestone. In 2018, the Council of the European Union (EU) claimed
Turkey ‘has been moving away from the European Union’ (Council
of the EU, 2018: 13), which makes its accession highly unlikely. A
basic dilemma renders Turkey a ‘unique’ accession candidate: while
Turkey officially entered the accession track in 1999, considerations of
Turkey’s place ‘out(side) of the accession box’ (Turhan, 2017) have never
subsided—mainly for three reasons.
Firstly, in addition to the general enlargement fatigue that has prevailed
in the EU for the past decades, so-called ‘Turkey fatigue’ (Soler et al.,
2018) has led member states and societies to question whether Turkey
could actually ever belong in the EU for cultural, economic, geostrategic,
and political reasons. The 2005 Negotiating Framework between the
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EU and Turkey clearly reflects such fatigue. It introduces a new open-
ended framework for negotiations with all future accession candidates,
‘the outcome of which cannot be guaranteed beforehand’ (European
Commission, 2005: para. 2). Additionally, and more importantly, the
framework considers ‘long transitional periods, derogations, specific
arrangements or permanent safeguard clauses’ and Turkey’s full anchoring
in European structures ‘through the strongest possible bonds […] if
Turkey is not in a position to assume in full all the obligations of
membership’ (European Commission, 2005: para. 12). The latest devel-
opments in Turkey, such as the constitutional changes to an executive
presidential system in 2018 as well as Turkey’s drilling activities in the
Eastern Mediterranean and military interventions in Syria since 2018,
have increased doubts as to Turkey’s membership qualities.
Secondly, accession negotiations began stagnating immediately after
their initiation in October 2005 and came to a standstill with the Council
conclusions of June 2018, which consider ‘no further chapters […] for
opening or closing’ (Council of the EU, 2018: 13). Political and legisla-
tive reforms that determine Turkey’s compliance with the Copenhagen
criteria moved in a downward spiral from the golden years of full-swing
reforms in the early 2000s to a phase of stagnation between 2005 and
2013. Lately, Turkey seems to have left the European track altogether,
with a strong de-Europeanization trend in reforms moving Turkey
away from the EU (Tekin & Deniz, 2019; for de-Europeanization see
Aydın-Düzgit & Kaliber, 2016; see also Alpan, Chapter 5; Kaya,
Chapter 14). Additionally, individual EU member states and the Council
have been blocking the opening of 14 chapters of accession negotiations.
Cyprus represents the most prominent veto player in this process. The
EU’s negotiation record with Turkey is poor: as of May 2020, only
16 out of 35 chapters have been opened, of which only one has been
provisionally closed (Chapter 25—Science and Research; see also Lippert,
Chapter 11).
Thirdly, EU–Turkey relations have always included other forms of inte-
gration in addition to the accession process. Turkey is associated with
the EU through the Customs Union (CU), and both sides cooperate
specifically in various fields of mutual interest, such as migration, energy,
security, counterterrorism, and economic and trade relations as well as
transport and agriculture. This cooperation is mainly framed through high
level dialogues. In November 2015, the decision was taken to hold bian-
nual meetings, so-called EU–Turkey summits, on the highest political
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level. Yet, so far there is a rather scattered picture of such a framework
of enhanced institutional engagement: since November 2015 there have
been four high level dialogues on economic issues; five on political issues
such as migration, counterterrorism, rule of law, and the current state of
play in the accession procedure; two on transport; and three on energy
(European Commission, 2019: 3). However, EU–Turkey summits disap-
peared from the agenda after the failed coup attempt in Turkey in July
2016, and later the General Affairs Council decided to suspend the high
level dialogue format in July 2019 in reaction to Turkey’s drilling activities
in the Eastern Mediterranean Sea (Council of the EU, 2019). Although
this affects EU–Turkey relations at a technical level, cooperation between
the two sides continues in areas of mutual interest.
EU–Turkey relations are trapped between the accession procedure and
looser forms of cooperation resulting from the multidimensionality of
the relationship, where conflicts disrupt cooperation rooted in mutual
economic, geostrategic, cultural, and political interests. In addition to
being an accession candidate, Turkey functions as a ‘key partner’, which
is annually confirmed by the European Commission’s Turkey reports
mostly referring to the economic dimension of the relationship (European
Commission, 2019: 6). Additionally, the EU acknowledges the country’s
strategic relevance by referring to Turkey also as a ‘key strategic partner’,
which was most evident during the so-called migration crisis in 2015 and
2016 (European External Action Service, 2017). The challenge is that the
EU and Turkey are caught in a relationship of ‘conflictual cooperation’
(Saatçioğlu et al., 2019: 3) that prevents both sides from fully breaking
apart while at the same time precluding any form of closer integration.
With the aim to assess the challenges that result from the state of
conflictual cooperation for the future of EU–Turkey relations, this chapter
introduces the concept of differentiated integration and discusses its
explanatory value by analyzing the complete spectrum of possible forms
of Turkey’s integration into the EU—reaching from full accession on the
one end to issue-specific ad hoc cooperation on the other. Differentiated
integration means that ‘one group of [member] states is not subjected to
the same [Union] rules as others’ (Tekin & Wessels, 2008: 25), referring
to ‘any modality of integration or cooperation that allows states (members
of the EU and non-members) and sub-state entities to work together in
non-homogeneous, flexible ways’ (Lavenex & Krizic, 2019: 3). Differ-
entiation can thus narrow the separation between EU membership and
non-membership, because as it becomes the ‘new normal’ of European
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integration (Schimmelfennig et al., 2015; Lavenex & Krizic, 2019: 3),
the scope, nature, and form of membership as such will transform, too.
This is a precondition for ‘variable geometry Europe’, which represents a
form of differentiation in which ‘the EU does not work on the basis of
a “one size fits all” principle but can actually adopt tailor made initiatives
consistent with the legitimate needs and wishes of all its member states
and peoples’ (Bertoncini, 2017: 6) and third countries.
This chapter builds on the general assumption that such variable
geometries in EU–Turkey relations could provide a soft landing from the
fallout of the accession procedure. The first section of this chapter is dedi-
cated to providing a concise overview of the many faces of differentiation
in European integration and EU–Turkey relations. It provides a compre-
hensive definition of differentiated integration before it discusses how
this concept is reflected in political and academic debates in Turkey and
the EU. After having established that differentiated integration has only
recently been acknowledged as a relevant concept to apply to EU–Turkey
relations, the second section explores different European integration
theories in order to highlight different methods of explaining differentia-
tion in EU–Turkey relations. Section three traces the empirical evidence of
variable geometries in EU–Turkey relations with the aim to establish the
need for conceptualizing EU–Turkey relations in view of differentiated
integration. The chapter concludes in section four by linking the empir-
ical findings to the conceptual elements of differentiated integration and
discussing their explanatory value for the future EU–Turkey relationship.
7.2 The Many Faces of Differentiation
in European Integration and EU–Turkey Relations
Since the early 1950s, differentiation has featured in the European inte-
gration process. Its many faces—including forms of differentiation in
primary and secondary law, in internal and external governance, and of
a short-, medium- or long-term nature (Stubb, 1996: 283; Holzinger &
Schimmelfennig, 2012: 292)—draw a complex picture of a ‘Union united
in diversity’. First, it is important to understand the broad concept of
differentiated integration in general terms. Second, an assessment of how
this concept is generally perceived by the EU and Turkey in view of their
relationship will lay the grounds for discussing the concept’s explanatory
value for EU–Turkey relations.
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7.2.1 Defining the Concept of Differentiated Integration
The broad body of literature on differentiated integration reflects the
complexity of existing forms of differentiation, providing multiple defini-
tions of the concept depending on the object of analysis (Schimmelfennig
et al., 2015; Lavenex, 2015: 836; Tekin, 2012; Gänzle et al., 2019). In
general terms differentiated integration encompasses all ‘forms of partici-
pation below the threshold of full membership’ (Lavenex & Krizic, 2019:
3). It has an internal and an external dimension (Schimmelfennig et al.,
2015: 764). Internal differentiation refers to the phenomenon that some
EU members do not take part in cooperation arrangements adopted
by other EU members. External differentiation means that some third
countries selectively join existing EU arrangements or selected regula-
tory structures in specific policy areas such as the internal market or the
Schengen Area (Lavenex & Krizic, 2019: 3).
Internally, European integration has always featured various forms of
differentiation in terms of transitory periods, different levels of implemen-
tation of secondary law, individual member states opting out of certain
EU policies, or pre-defined rules applicable only to a certain group of
member states (e.g., Article 136 of the Treaty on the Functioning of
the European Union) (Tekin, 2012). The time dimension of differen-
tiation inherent to the legal provisions becomes relevant for assessing
the implications for the European integration process (Goetz, 2009,
2010). Temporality of differentiated integration fosters either sustain-
able fragmentation or inherently provides for complete integration at
some point in the future. Some forms of differentiation can also provide
a link between the internal and external dimension. In this context,
the Schengen Area is a textbook example of differentiation: it includes
Norway, Iceland, Liechtenstein, and Switzerland as third countries to
the EU, but not all EU member states have joined that area either
permanently, like Ireland and formerly the United Kingdom (UK), or
temporarily, like Cyprus, Bulgaria, Romania, and Croatia.
The EU’s external differentiation is just as diverse as its internal differ-
entiated integration. There is one general feature that currently applies
to all forms of external differentiation. In institutional terms, based on
the current EU treaties, partial membership in the EU does not exist as
only accession according to Article 49 of the Treaty on European Union
(TEU) grants a state full rights and obligations of membership in the EU.
162 F. TEKIN
This creates a general difference between internal and external differen-
tiation: EU member states that have opted-out of certain policies cannot
vote on the respective files but do not lose their voting rights on the
policies they remain part of. Third countries, however, generally lack the
right to fully participate in EU institutions, which means they do not have
voting rights in the policy fields in which they participate. To illustrate,
the countries of the European Economic Area apply a substantial part
of the internal market’s acquis communautaire but cannot vote in the
respective legislative procedures. This makes the EU the decision-giver
of such decisions to third countries, creating an asymmetric relationship
that determines external differentiation. We can state, however, that there
is no model of association or integration with the EU that would apply
universally to any third country. Consequently, the re-association of the
UK with the EU after its exit from the Union (Brexit) cannot provide a
blueprint for the EU’s relations with Turkey or any other third country,
even though political leaders’ expectations were high (Gabriel, 2017a).
The scope, content, and aim of each relationship differ and hence require
a tailor-made approach.
The concept that provides the best picture of the EU’s external differ-
entiation is ‘variable geometries’ (Tassinari, 2006; Bertoncini, 2017),
which constitutes different—and sometimes even overlapping—forms of
association and integration with different member and non-member
states. Each state sets up different regulatory and organizational bound-
aries as well as establishes different scopes of alignment with the acquis,
levels of policy harmonization, instruments of enforcement, and inclu-
sion in EU structures (Ülgen, 2012: 12–15). This concept is particularly
relevant for Turkey, because due to its uniqueness, the EU–Turkey rela-
tionship has already established variable geometries of its own as explained
below in Sect. 7.3.
7.2.2 Concepts of Differentiation in Debates on EU–Turkey
Relations
Although differentiation plays an important role in the overall EU–Turkey
relationship, for a long time, this concept was not prominently included
in the broader literature on EU–Turkey relations. Ever since the misper-
ception in Turkey of the general, underdeveloped concept of ‘privileged
partnership’ introduced in 2004 (zu Guttenberg, 2004), the EU has tried
to avoid political debates with strong references to alternative forms of
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integration. Only in view of developments in Turkey and the EU in the
2010s, such as democratic backsliding in Turkey or rising populism and
Euroskepticism in the EU, did differentiated integration gain ground in
academic and political circles on both sides, resulting in a broad variety
of conceptions.
Still, in the political debate these concepts are seldom discussed and
do not provide many details on the already existing institutional forms
of cooperation between the EU and Turkey outside of the accession
framework. In 2017, Sigmar Gabriel, former German Minister of Foreign
Affairs, demanded ‘alternative forms of closer cooperation’ (Gabriel,
2017b). One year later former Commissioner for European Neighbour-
hood Policy and Accession Negotiations Johannes Hahn promoted the
idea of a ‘realistic strategic partnership’ (Hahn, 2018) between the EU
and Turkey. Such statements set a certain tone in the debate but do
not provide sufficient information on the detailed structure of a variable
geometry for EU–Turkey relations. To qualify for this, there needs to be
further consideration on the actual scope, institutional form, and content
of such alternative forms of integration. Academic and policy-oriented
assessments of EU–Turkey relations discuss more elaborate concepts
(see Müftüler-Baç, 2017; Hürsoy, 2017; Aydın-Düzgit, 2017; Turhan,
2017), specifically looking at options such as ‘associate membership’
(Duff, 2013), ‘gradual membership’ (Karakas, 2013), ‘virtual member-
ship’ (Ülgen, 2012), or ‘junior membership’ (Lippert, 2017). All of
them share the fundamental requirement of full adherence to the values
and principles of the EU. Yet, they define the quality of the envisaged
membership differently. While associate and gradual membership foresee
Turkey’s ‘membership without full integration’ based on sectoral voting
rights in the (extended) Council, virtual membership builds on the prin-
ciple of ‘integration without full membership’ (Karakas, 2013: 1067),
granting Turkey consultation rights in institutional bodies only. Such
concepts, however, do not conclusively solve the dilemma that according
to the current treaties, partial membership as such does not exist.
Another issue that such concepts address is the question of whether or
not to abolish the accession perspective altogether. ‘Associate member-
ship’, for example, is conceived as a true alternative to the EU’s enlarge-
ment policy proposing the introduction of a separate procedure with
its own treaty provisions (Duff, 2013). At the same time, given the
strong lock-in effects of the accession procedure and the political costs
of its termination, concepts such as ‘dynamic association’ (Saatçioğlu
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et al., 2019) or Turkey’s functional integration into the EU (Müftüler-
Baç, 2017; Cianciara & Szymański, 2020) consider alternative forms of
integration in addition to the accession procedure. They recommend
canceling the accession track only if the new form of integration has been
successfully institutionalized.
7.3 Theoretical Considerations
on the Explanatory Value of Differentiated
Integration for EU–Turkey Relations
Differentiated integration is a concept rather than a theory of European
integration in its own right (Holzinger & Schimmelfennig, 2012). In
order to deepen our understanding of the explanatory value of internal
and external differentiation for EU–Turkey relations from a theoretical
perspective, it is helpful to revisit some of the most prominent European
integration theories, i.e., historical institutionalism, liberal intergovern-
mentalism, functionalism, post-functionalism, and constructivism. In this
context, it is helpful to embed differentiated integration into the respec-
tive theoretical background and to apply them together to the EU–Turkey
relationship.
Building on key arguments in historical institutionalism, external differ-
entiation can provide neither an explanation nor a solution to EU–Turkey
relations, because there is no future scenario other than Turkey’s EU
membership. The main assumption is that ‘institutional choices taken in
the past persist, or become “locked in”, thereby shaping and constraining
actors later in time’ (Pollack, 2008: 4; see also Icoz & Martin, Chapter 4).
This would imply that the decisions to grant Turkey accession candidate
status in 1999 and to open accession negotiations in 2004 were ‘sticky’
and therefore resistant to change. Both transaction costs and institutional
thresholds for canceling the accession procedure are high (Pollack, 2008:
3). The political damage within the EU’s relationship to a ‘key strategic
partner’ that has been promised full membership would be significant.
The decision to cancel the accession process with Turkey would require
a unanimous vote of all member states. These lock-in effects create a
path dependency that motivates policymakers to stick to past decisions
even though this might represent an inefficient outcome that neither
Turkey nor the EU has full confidence in ever achieving (Pierson, 1996:
123; 2000: 251). In historical institutionalism, internal differentiation is
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a crucial element of EU–Turkey relations, because it can help solve this
dilemma. Following this logic, Turkey could accede to the EU under
stricter conditions compared to other member states—e.g., permanent
safeguard clauses—which would represent some sort of ‘underprivileged
membership’ but would follow the logic of path dependence.
Liberal intergovernmentalism explains internal and external differenti-
ation by focusing on member states as prominent actors. Member states’
national preferences, driven by the issue-specific interests of powerful
domestic constituents and the intergovernmental bargaining power of
state actors, are key variables in this context (Karakas, 2013: 1058; see also
Tsarouhas, Chapter 2). This approach can facilitate our understanding
of why Turkey accepted a negotiating framework that not only strongly
deviates from those of other accession candidates but also seems to be
disadvantageous. The permanent safeguard clauses, expected to apply
after accession, would create a high degree of internal differentiation. The
negotiation framework already prepares the ground for anchoring Turkey
in the EU through the strongest possible bonds, if Turkey would not
be capable of assuming all obligations of membership. This means that
alternatives to full membership compete against the accession procedure.
Accession negotiations represent asymmetric relations in which Turkey—
still driven by strong support for EU membership among its domestic
constituents1—has less bargaining power than the EU.
A functionalist explanation of EU–Turkey relations deals with
‘anchoring Turkey in multiple layers into EU institutions and policies’
(Müftüler-Baç, 2017: 418). Issue-specific interdependence and spillover
effects instead of the accession promise are the main drivers of such a
functional EU–Turkey relationship. Based on this logic, cooperation or
sectoral integration in one area creates functional pressures demanding
integration in another related area. External differentiation is hence deter-
mined by a logic responding to functional needs rather than solely
member states’ preferences. A functionalist analysis can also extend to the
governance level, focusing on participation in transgovernmental regula-
tory agencies (e.g., Frontex, Europol, European Environment Agency)
(Lavenex, 2015: 840). Respective patterns of flexible integration reflect
third countries’ sectoral interdependence and bureaucratic affinity ‘with
arrangements reaching from full membership to association without
1According to polls in 2019 public opinion support for EU membership was 60% (see
İktisadi Kalkınma Vakfı, 2019).
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voting rights, observer status and punctual participation in particular
functions and fora’ (Lavenex, 2015: 838).
In view of EU–Turkey relations, a purely functionalist logic cannot
provide a full explanation of the potential of external differentiation
becoming a structuring principle of the relationship. Building on post-
functionalist arguments (Hooghe & Marks, 2009: 1), interdependences
are a necessary but not a sufficient variable of differentiation. Politiciza-
tion in the sense of ‘an increase in polarization of opinions, interests or
values and the extent to which they are publicly advanced towards the
process of policy formulation’ is the variable that completes the picture
(Schimmelfennig et al., 2015: 771; Saatçioğlu, 2020: 169; Cianciara &
Szymański, 2020). While interdependences are drivers of integration,
politicization is an obstacle to it. This means that ‘external differentiation
results if non-members that are unable to join because EU membership
is highly politicized opt in selectively in highly interdependent but weakly
politicized policy areas’ (Schimmelfennig et al., 2015: 765) (e.g., in
economic and monetary affairs), security and defense (engagement with
Eurocorps, Frontex, Europol, PESCO), as well as research and devel-
opment. Turkey’s EU membership is highly politicized both in Turkey
and EU member states, and therefore, external differentiation seems
to be an appropriate frame for the relationship between the EU and
Turkey. Yet, alternative forms of integration with the EU other than
full membership—such as ‘privileged partnership’—are also highly politi-
cized in Turkey, which limits the options for structuring the relationship
(Saatçioğlu, 2020: 173).
Constructivism (see Aydın-Düzgit & Rumelili, Chapter 3) can provide
information on differentiation in EU–Turkey relations in two ways:
whether and to what extent alternatives to accession are viable options
as well as under which conditions full integration into the EU remains
possible. Both sides can agree on alternatives to accession if there is
ideational consensus, which means that legitimate constitutional ideas
about European integration should match on both sides (Leuffen et al.,
2013: 99). In this context, differentiation could narrow the separation
between EU members and non-members if the dominant constitutional
ideas in the EU and in Turkey allowed the two parties to choose their
scope and form of integration within a broader set of variable geometries
(Leuffen et al., 2013: 100). Since 2014, EU institutions have started to
officially acknowledge differentiated integration to represent an impor-
tant tool for managing heterogeneity among member states as long as
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it is not of a permanent nature (European Council, 2014: 11). Turkey
can consider alternatives to its accession to the EU only if ‘EU regula-
tions change, different membership alternatives are developed, and several
membership countries decide to alter their membership status’ (Bağış
quoted in Karakas, 2013: 1058). As constitutional ideas of both sides
agree to differentiation only conditionally, it currently seems highly chal-
lenging to think out of the accession box and to construct alternative
forms of Turkey’s association or integration with the EU.
A constructivist analysis can further facilitate our understanding of
external differentiation in EU–Turkey relations in view of the unlikeli-
hood of Turkey’s full membership in the EU. To this end an assessment
of ideational contestation is helpful. Policy areas with little contestation
feature high integration potential and vice versa (Leuffen et al., 2013:
100). More importantly, identity representations of one another in Turkey
and in the EU can impact Turkey’s integration into the EU and/or the
extent of external differentiation. If there is reciprocal representation of
the ‘Other’ as part of a common/shared identity, Turkey’s full integration
into the EU will remain an option (Aydın-Düzgit and Rumelili, 2021).
The more identity representations diverge, the less integration will be
possible, and forms of external differentiation will become more relevant.
As soon as both sides represent each other as the alien ‘Other’ in the
formation of their identities, external differentiation will be undermined
and eventually threatened. Ideational contestation in EU–Turkey relations
has continuously increased and acts as a hurdle to full membership in the
EU.
This brief overview has highlighted that we can find explanatory value
in the concept of differentiated integration for EU–Turkey relations. This
is important because the relevance of the EU’s external variable geome-
tries increases as the likelihood of Turkey becoming an EU member
decreases to the point of vanishing altogether.
7.4 The Variable Geometries
of EU–Turkey Relations
The variable geometries of EU–Turkey relations take three distinct forms:
accession, functional cooperation in terms of ‘regulatory approximation
for neighbouring countries without accession’ (Lavenex, 2011: 373), and
cooperation in international organizations.
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7.4.1 Accession: A Lost Cause for EU–Turkey Relations?
Accession is the most institutionalized framework of EU–Turkey relations
(Schröder & Tekin, 2019). If completed, Turkey will be fully included in
EU structures with the rights and obligations of a full member state. This
implies commitment to the values referred to in Article 2 of the TEU and
their promotion (Art. 49 TEU) and, hence, to stable institutions guar-
anteeing democracy, the rule of law, human rights, and respect for and
protection of minorities. Additionally, full membership in the EU requires
complete implementation of the acquis communautaire, including adher-
ence to the aims of the political, economic, and monetary union, as well
as having a functioning market economy and the capacity to cope with
competition and market forces in the EU (European Council, 1993: 13).
The accession framework includes multiple enforcement measures that
aim at facilitating Turkey’s eventual full integration in the EU (e.g., Acces-
sion Partnership, Negotiating Framework, the Commission’s progress
reports that are since 2015 titled Turkey reports, and screening of nego-
tiation chapters). In financial terms the Instrument for Pre-Accession
Assistance provides support for reforms in Turkey on its way into the
EU. By 2014 Turkey had adopted 326 primary and 1,730 secondary
pieces of legislation to ensure alignment with the EU acquis in all 35
chapters (Müftüler-Baç, 2017: 424). Afterward, the pace of alignment
slowed down with ‘more instances of backsliding regarding a number
of key aspects in the areas of free movement of capital, public procure-
ment, competition, information society, economic and monetary policy,
and external relations’ (European Commission, 2019: 8). The acces-
sion process is of a highly asymmetrical nature, because it is strongly
determined by the EU’s conditionality. Turkey has no influence on the
conditions for accession, which are defined by the Copenhagen criteria.2
7.4.2 Functional Cooperation: Differentiating the Picture
of EU–Turkey Relations
Functional cooperation in EU–Turkey relations is multifaceted. External
differentiation takes the form of pure association without any participa-
tion or representation in EU institutions but in joint association councils,
2For a detailed overview of the evolution of Turkey’s accession process see also Turhan
and Reiners (Chapter 1) and Lippert (Chapter 11).
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high level dialogues, joint summits, or committees. The 1963 Association
Agreement between Turkey and the European Communities/European
Union has aimed at promoting ‘the continuous and balanced strength-
ening of trade and economic relations between the Parties, while taking
full account of the need to ensure an accelerated development of Turkish
economy and to improve the level of employment and the living condi-
tions of the Turkish people’ (EEC-Turkey Association Agreement, 1963:
Art. 2). This agreement constitutes the most prominent framework for
functional cooperation so far. The framework for achieving the aim of the
Association Agreement is the Customs Union (CU), which entered into
force on 31 December 1995. Within the CU Turkey aligned with the EU
acquis in trade policy, the Common External Tariff, and parts of agricul-
tural policy in relation to industrial components of agricultural products.
The association framework is also highly institutionalized with regular
meetings of the Association Council, which includes representatives of the
Turkish government, the European Council, and the European Commis-
sion. This body is supported by a number of committees (e.g., Association
Committee, Customs Union Joint Committee). The Association Council
is supposed to meet annually, but after the failed coup attempt in Turkey
on 15 July 2016, the meetings were canceled and only taken up again in
2018; these meetings were canceled for a second time in 2019 in reaction
to Turkey’s drilling activities in the Eastern Mediterranean off the shores
of Cyprus (Council of the EU, 2019). Although the association frame-
work is highly institutionalized, Turkey’s integration in EU structures is
rather low, because it is not represented in EU institutions and hence
not involved in the decision-making procedures of the relevant EU poli-
cies. This asymmetric relationship becomes particularly evident whenever
the EU is negotiating free trade agreements with other third countries.
In that case Turkey is required to negotiate similar arrangements with
the respective country on a bilateral basis (Müftüler-Baç, 2017: 426;
see also Akman & Çekin, Chapter 12). In December 2016, the Euro-
pean Commission asked the Council for a mandate to modernize the CU
(European Commission, 2016) with the aim to extend it in the service
sector and in terms of public procurement and to integrate Turkey further
into the internal market. Such upgrading of the CU would even out some
of the asymmetries in the relationship, but this endeavor was blocked by
a group of EU member states (Council of the EU, 2018).
In addition to the association framework, which has a strong focus
on the CU, functional cooperation has been structured in high level
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dialogues on key thematic issues since 2015. Such meetings on energy,
economy, transport, the fight against terrorism, and foreign and secu-
rity policy framed within the high level political dialogue contribute
to exploring the vast potential of EU–Turkey relations in the fields of
common interest (European Council, 2015). The Heads of State or
Government of the EU member states and of Turkey decided to establish
this framework with the EU–Turkey Statement of 29 November 2015,
when the high number of refugees on their way through Turkey into
the EU demanded a comprehensive and joint solution. This joint state-
ment also endorsed the realization of biannual EU–Turkey summits to
discuss and assess the EU–Turkey relationship on the highest possible
level (European Council, 2015). This institutional framework of summits
and high level dialogues acknowledges the importance of overcoming
common challenges while working with key partners and strategic allies
in the region. It does not particularly aim at Turkey’s alignment with the
EU’s acquis, but both sides agree on joint actions such as the exchange
of good practices and closer cooperation between Turkish authorities and
EU agencies as well as on joint work programs.
Finally, functional cooperation takes the form of Turkey either
contributing to certain EU policies or being affiliated with the EU’s agen-
cies. Turkey’s contribution to the Common Security and Defense Policy
(CSDP) is somewhat remarkable. It has participated in multiple CSDP
missions and operations—mostly within the framework of the NATO-EU
cooperation scheme. With contributions to nine out of 30 EU-led oper-
ations, Turkey constitutes one of the biggest contributors after France,
Germany, and the UK (Müftüler-Baç, 2017: 428). The Lisbon Treaty
introduced the procedure of the Permanent Structured Cooperation
(PESCO; Art. 42, 46 TEU), which a group of EU member states can
use for establishing more binding commitments on military cooperation
among themselves. In December 2017, PESCO was activated, including
multiple ad hoc capability projects enhancing the operational readiness
and contribution of the armed forces of the 25 participating member
states. Although the PESCO arrangement generally is open to third
countries’ contributions through invitations in projects to which they
can bring ‘substantial added value’ (Notification on PESCO, 2017: 8;
see also Aydın-Düzgit & Marrone, 2018: 18), the likelihood of PESCO
becoming an important feature in the variable geometries of EU–Turkey
relations is rather uncertain. Such an invitation requires a unanimous
decision by the member states, which in view of the conflictual relations
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between Turkey and Cyprus seems rather unlikely (for detailed discussion
see Aydın-Düzgit & Marrone, 2018).
Turkey is also an important strategic partner in the EU’s energy policy
in view of large-scale projects such as the Southern Gas Corridor or the
Trans Anatolian Natural Gas Pipeline (see Sartori, Chapter 15). Addition-
ally, functional cooperation in the EU’s Area of Freedom, Security, and
Justice is quite substantial. On the one hand, there is the EU–Turkey
Statement on migration of March 2016 establishing a 1:1 mechanism
for returning and relocating Syrian refugees with the aim to decrease the
migration pressure on the Greek islands as well as a Refugee Facility for
Turkey totaling 6 billion EUR for supporting Turkey in hosting about
4 million refugees. This form of cooperation has turned into a stone of
contention which has been repeatedly instrumentalized by the Turkish
president for negotiating terms of cooperation also in other areas. On the
other hand, Turkey is affiliated with Europol and Frontex not through
membership but through strategic cooperation and working arrangements
(Lavenex, 2015). It is included in the Civil Protection Committee of
the Commission’s Directorate General for European Civil Protection and
Humanitarian Aid Operations. This diversity of functional cooperation
frames the EU’s relations with Turkey as a ‘strategic’ or ‘key’ partner
guided by mutual benefits and structural needs for cooperation that might
have spilled over from other policy areas.
7.4.3 Intergovernmental Cooperation: The Outer Layer of the EU’s
Variable Geometries with Turkey
The third dimension of the EU’s variable geometries with Turkey is
framed by intergovernmental cooperation through memberships in other
international organizations. All member states of the EU are members
of the Council of Europe and so is Turkey. The EU and the Council
of Europe are bound to each other through shared values and funda-
mental rights. The Council of Europe has a large-scale country-specific
cooperation scheme in Turkey consisting of EU/Council of Europe Joint
Programs providing assistance in the fight against corruption, in the
field of justice, in the education system, and in meeting the reform
agenda. Consequently, it can be perceived as an additional reform driver
for Turkey’s alignment with the EU’s acquis and fundamental values.
Another important international cooperation for EU–Turkey relations is
the European Energy Community. Its aim is to extend the EU’s internal
172 F. TEKIN
energy market to Southeast Europe and the Black Sea region. Turkey is
only an observer state and is not willing to become a full member as
long as its perspective of eventually becoming a full member of the EU
is uncertain. Membership in the European Energy Community would
require alignment with most of the acquis. The Turkish political estab-
lishment is prepared to comply with this requirement only shortly before
accession into the EU (Kopac & Ekinci, 2015).
The variable geometries of EU–Turkey relations account for the EU’s
relations with Turkey as an accession candidate, an ‘association partner’, a
‘key partner’, and a ‘strategic partner’. This creates a complex picture
with different levels of institutionalization and asymmetry in the rela-
tionship. Nevertheless, this multi-structure-approach allows for relations
stretching across the dimensions of politics, economics, security, energy,
and migration.
7.5 Conclusions and Outlook
on the Differentiated Future
of EU–Turkey Relations
By 2018, the accession procedure between the EU and Turkey had run
dry. Turkey’s accession to the EU seems to be an unrealistic scenario for
the (near) future of EU–Turkey relations. Consequently, alternative forms
of Turkey’s integration with the EU are worthwhile. Thus, differentiated
integration provides an appropriate conceptual framework. The presented
discussion of the concept of differentiated integration, its theoretical logic
in view of EU–Turkey relations, and finally, practices of differentiation in
this relationship allows us to generally confirm the guiding assumption
that variable geometries of EU–Turkey relations represent a soft landing
from the fallout of the accession procedure. Nevertheless, such a confir-
mation requires a concluding assessment of the benefits and limitations of
the explanatory value of external differentiation in this relationship.
EU–Turkey relations are becoming increasingly conflictual in all rele-
vant dimensions due to developments both in Turkey as well as the EU,
particularly between 2016 and 2020 (Soler et al., 2018; Saatçioğlu &
Tekin, 2021). Politically, the failed coup attempt of July 2016 and the
subsequent state of emergency as well as the constitutionalization of
the executive presidency in Turkey have moved the country away from
the EU and its core values. Rising right-wing populism in the EU and
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crises in the European integration process have further contributed to
‘Turkey fatigue’. On both sides the EU–Turkey relationship in general
and Turkey’s accession to the EU in particular have become increasingly
politicized, which was especially evident in 2017 when Turkey held the
constitutional referendum and several EU member states—e.g., Germany
and the Netherlands—held national elections. This fueled the blame
game on both sides, culminating in Turkish government representatives
comparing the German and Dutch approach toward Turkey to methods
used during the Nazi regime (The Guardian, 2017). Turkey was not a
major topic in the electoral campaign of the Spitzenkandidaten for the
European elections in 2019—but when it was mentioned, the abolition
of the accession procedure was the most prominent message (Euronews,
2019).
These events have increased demands for a post-functionalist anal-
ysis of EU–Turkey relations in order to facilitate the understanding of
the scope of differentiation in this relationship. Economically, the insta-
bility of Turkey’s economy and the devaluation of the Turkish lira have
raised concerns in the EU. Until recently the energy dimension had been
perceived as one of the least conflictual areas within EU–Turkey relations.
However, Turkey’s drilling activities off the shores of Cyprus have put this
at risk. Additionally, differences in the two sides’ energy mixes circumvent
closer cooperation. In security terms increasingly divergent geostrategic
interests such as Turkey’s military interventions into Syria as well as its
relations with Russia (e.g., Turkey’s purchase of the S-400 missile system)
drive the EU and Turkey further apart. Finally, in migration policy the
EU–Turkey Statement of March 2016, which was supposed to represent
a stable framework for mutual beneficial cooperation, turned into a poten-
tial strain on relations as Turkey has repeatedly threatened to break up this
deal.
Consideration of this increasingly ‘conflictual cooperation’ in EU–
Turkey relations is relevant for assessing the explanatory value of differen-
tiated integration for two reasons. On the one hand, Turkey’s accession
to the EU becomes an increasingly unlikely scenario even in the longer
term. This increases the demand for alternative forms of integration and
hence the EU’s external differentiation. On the other hand, the increasing
conflicts between the EU and Turkey affect the dimension of functional
cooperation in the EU’s variable geometries with Turkey. In July 2019,
the EU decided to cancel its high level dialogues with Turkey and EU–
Turkey summits. In November 2019, the Council decided on restrictive
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measures in response to Turkey’s illegal drilling activities in the Eastern
Mediterranean, including sanctions on involved persons (Council of the
EU, 2020), which is an unprecedented move against an accession country.
This highlights that the functionalist logic in EU–Turkey relations that
would anchor Turkey in multiple layers of EU institutions and policies due
to mere functional pressures and spillover effects can be undermined and
might eventually lead to ‘spillback effects’ undermining the relationship
at large (see Goldner-Lang, 2020).
Literature on differentiated integration in EU–Turkey relations has
a strong focus on functional cooperation (see Müftüler-Baç, 2017;
Cianciara & Szymański, 2020; Saatçioğlu, 2020). Yet, a constructivist
assessment of the consensus on legitimate constitutional ideas deserves
further attention in future studies, because so far it has been under-
represented in research on EU–Turkey relations. Differentiation has not
yet become the predominant structuring principle of either European
integration or EU–Turkey relations. On the one hand, the Turkish estab-
lishment is only reluctantly and conditionally warming up to the idea of
considering such alternative forms. Brexit might contribute to this devel-
opment, because the UK represents an influential actor both in Europe
and at the global level. Accordingly, Brexit might increase the credi-
bility and attractiveness of forms of association to the EU that would
replace the membership perspective. On the other hand, although EU
institutions have started to officially acknowledge differentiation as a
valid structuring principle for the future European integration process,
differentiation does not yet represent the ‘new normal’, i.e., the new
constitutional idea. Hence, the separation between the EU members
and non-members persists. This is further confirmed in view of insti-
tutionalist considerations; the likelihood for changes to the EU treaties
in the near future is low. This means that although internal differentia-
tion might increase, the scope and commitment of membership will not
substantially change. Even if the scenarios of ‘those who want more do
more’ or ‘doing much more together’ that were outlined by the Juncker
Commission in 2017 for a more differentiated future of the EU27
(European Commission, 2017) would materialize, decision-making in
EU institutions would still remain the exclusive privilege of EU member
states.
In spite of the limitations of differentiated integration for EU–Turkey
relations, this concept represents a way out of the dead-end accession
track. The question remains how to frame such an alternative concept
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for integrating Turkey with the EU. The challenge is that the uniqueness
of EU–Turkey relations, defined by persistent and multidimensional ties,
makes it imperative to develop an original relationship model that would
borrow some elements from other existing models of the EU’s relations
with third countries.3 Any model that would fall below the established
levels of rules-based cooperation and Turkey’s integration in EU institu-
tions such as a pure strategic partnership or the European Neighborhood
Policy would represent a setback in EU–Turkey relations. At the same
time, any model with higher degrees of integration such as the European
Economic Area would require substantial political and legislative reforms
in Turkey.
The modernization of the CU seems to be a tangible option for
generating economic, political, and strategic benefits for both sides.
Economically, it would expand the CU to include services and conse-
quently create expectations for mutual economic gains, although these
would be higher for Turkey than for the EU (Gros et al., 2018). Polit-
ically, the EU could still be a driver for reforms in Turkey in spite of
the weakened conditionality within the accession procedure. Strategically,
within the modernized CU, Turkey would be able to participate in future
free trade agreements negotiated by the EU with other third countries,
which would diminish the asymmetric nature in this form of external
differentiation. At the same time, a modernization of the CU cannot
be the only element in future EU–Turkey relations. Turkey’s involve-
ment in regulatory bodies dealing with key policies that are of mutual
interest to the EU and Turkey remains essential. This can further increase
and solidify EU–Turkey relations and might create some spillover effects.
To this end, the focus needs to be on those areas where interdepen-
dence is high and politicization is low in order to circumvent the strongly
politicized debates on Turkey’s EU membership. The future of EU–
Turkey relations is differentiated through developments across multiple
dimensions; therefore, differentiated integration provides an appropriate
framework for conceptualizing the different forms of Turkey’s integration
and association with the EU.
3For an overview of possible models of internal and external differentiation in EU–
Turkey relations see Saatçioğlu et al. (2019).
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The European Council as a Key Driver
of EU–Turkey Relations: Central Functions,
Internal Dynamics, and Evolving Preferences
Ebru Turhan and Wolfgang Wessels
8.1 Introduction
With its central functions and wide-ranging activities within the political
system of the European Union (EU), the European Council has turned
into the key EU institution in framing and shaping EU–Turkey relations.
Since its establishment in 1974, it has been making the most fundamental
and far-reaching decisions on the EU–Turkey relationship. The influence
of the European Council in EU–Turkey relations is derived from its role
and status in EU decision-making. No institution other than the Euro-
pean Council has enjoyed so much ‘explicit political leadership in the EU
process’ (Wallace, 2010: 82), gradually expanded its functions beyond
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the legal provisions enshrined in treaties, and evolved into a ‘living insti-
tution’. As a ‘place of power […] where great European debate takes
place on a one-to-one basis’ (de Schoutheete, 2012a: 22), the Euro-
pean Council is composed of the Heads of State or Government1 of the
member states, its President, and the President of the European Commis-
sion (Art. 15(2) Treaty on European Union, TEU). It sets the strategic
direction of the Union, amends EU treaties, and takes over key agenda-
setting and decision-making functions in enlargement policy and ‘new
areas of EU activity’ including economic governance and foreign affairs
(Fabbrini & Puetter, 2016: 482).
Since its creation, the European Council has reached agreements on
the most crucial and controversial aspects of Turkey’s EU accession
process. Yet, the functions and powers of the Heads of State or Govern-
ment in EU–Turkey relations are not exclusively limited to the accession
process. The European Council serves as a key ‘driver’ of manifold aspects
of EU–Turkey relations. Drivers are understood as ‘structural/agency-
related’ or ‘material/ideational elements’ that determine the direction and
scope of a relationship (Tocci, 2016: 4). Drawing on both written provi-
sions of the treaties and real-world patterns, this chapter identifies the
European Council’s roles as the EU’s ‘master of enlargement’ (Lippert,
2011: 254), ‘external voice and crisis manager’, and ‘agenda and direction
setter’ as its three central functions that drive the EU–Turkey relationship.
The central focus of this chapter is the evolution of the European Council
in framing relations with a candidate country—or what many now call a
‘strategic partner’—and the identification of the critical turning points
and shifts in the central functions, internal dynamics, and preferences of
this key institution.
The many faces of the European Council make it a core component
of the institutional machinery maintaining relations between the EU and
third countries, including Turkey. Nevertheless, theoretical and empirical
studies on the dialogue of the European Council with third countries
are rare. Such studies are outnumbered by existing empirical analyses of
the institutional evolution, internal dynamics, and influence of the Euro-
pean Council (Bulmer & Wessels, 1987; Wessels, 2016; Werts, 2008;
Tallberg, 2008; de Schoutheete, 2012b), its presidency (Alexandrova
1For the members of the European Council, this chapter uses the official term ‘Heads
of State or Government’ and, contingent on the context, ‘Union’s leaders’, and ‘member
states’ highest political representatives’.
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& Timmermans, 2013; Crum, 2009; Dinan, 2013), and theoretical
considerations on the power of the European Council within the EU
system (Fabbrini & Puetter, 2016). A limited number of works touches
upon the European Council’s relevance for the EU’s relationship with
third countries while studying its role in crisis management, enlargement,
external action, or the area of freedom, security, and justice (Anghel et al.,
2016; Wessels, 2016; Nugent, 2010). However, these studies do not
provide systematic and in-depth insight into the dialogue of the Union’s
leaders with third countries or examine country cases like Turkey.
This chapter first outlines the central functions and powers of the
European Council within the EU system that are of major relevance to
EU–Turkey relations and identifies the key tasks, mechanisms, and actors
related to each role. In the ensuing sections, it elaborates on the evolu-
tion of these a priori identified functions and their impact on EU–Turkey
affairs from 1987 to 2020 while also scrutinizing their limits and potential
to unfold EU–Turkey affairs. As far as the European Council’s role as the
master of enlargement is concerned, the chapter chronologically reviews
the European Council’s far-reaching conclusions on Turkey’s accession
process and examines the expanding impact of member states’ individual
preferences on the European Council’s role as a driver of Turkey’s acces-
sion process. The chapter then elaborates on EU–Turkey cooperation in
times of crisis by paying specific attention to the management of the
2015/16 refugee ‘crisis’ and discusses whether collaboration with Ankara
during external shocks is becoming an ever-growing role and a challenge
for the European Council. Of specific relevance for the last section is
the analysis of the empirical evidence offered by the conclusions of the
European Council, which frame different narratives for the doctrine on
Turkey and offer a systematic assessment of the evolution of the Euro-
pean Council’s role as an ‘agenda and direction setter’ in the EU–Turkey
relationship.
The main finding of this chapter is that the European Council has at
different times functioned as a positive driver of both Turkey’s EU acces-
sion process and of an interest-driven, transactional partnership between
the Union and Turkey. At the same time, the findings showcase a growing
trend toward a more conflictual, relatively hostile relationship between
the European Council and Turkey. Diverging geopolitical interests—espe-
cially in the Eastern Mediterranean—and normative considerations as well
as the expanding impact of bilateral issues and member states’ individual
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preferences shape the European Council’s role as a driver of EU–Turkey
relations.
8.2 EU–Turkey Relations: The Many
Faces of the European Council
As the constitutional architect, key decision-maker, strategic guide, and
external voice of the EU (Wessels, 2016), the European Council has many
functions as a driver of the EU–Turkey dialogue. Its roles as ‘master of
enlargement’, ‘external voice and crisis manager’, and ‘agenda and direc-
tion setter’ stand out in view of their relevance for the design of bilateral
affairs and their salience in political and public discourses.
Despite the comatose state of Turkey’s EU accession negotiations and
palpable challenges concerning their full-fledged revival, Turkey’s acces-
sion process still constitutes the political and institutional backbone of
EU–Turkey relations. The European Council’s role as the master of
enlargement has been a decisive factor in the formulation of EU–Turkey
relations, although the treaty provisions attribute only a marginal role to
the European Council in the widening process. Article 49 (TEU) requires
the Council to be mindful of the ‘conditions of eligibility agreed upon by
the European Council’ for the accession of third countries and charges the
member states with the signing and ratification of the accession treaties. In
June 1993, third countries’ eligibility for membership was tied to certain
conditions by the conclusions of the Copenhagen European Council. The
‘Copenhagen criteria’ require
[the] stability of institutions guaranteeing, democracy, the rule of law,
human rights and respect for and protection of minorities, the existence of
a functioning market economy as well as the capacity to cope with compet-
itive pressure and market forces within the Union’, and ‘candidate’s ability
to take on the obligations of membership’. (European Council, 1993: 13)
This qualitative accession conditionality serves as a ‘bargaining strategy
of reinforcement by reward’ (Schimmelfennig & Sedelmeier, 2004: 670),
making the major exogenous incentive—full membership in the Union
and progress toward it—conditional on Turkey’s and other candidates’
alignment with the EU’s norms (see also Lippert, Chapter 11).
The real-world patterns of accession management reveal the steering
influence of the European Council beyond the legal provisions. For the
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preparatory phase of the accession process, the Heads of State or Govern-
ment frame and adapt their enlargement doctrine in order to display the
EU’s narratives about the necessity for widening the Union (Lippert,
2011). They sign different types of association agreements with third
countries to foster alignment with EU norms and decide by unanimity
about the candidate status of a third country and the launch of acces-
sion negotiations. In the case of Turkey, these steps took place in 1963
(Association Agreement), in 1999 (candidacy), and in 2004 (decision to
start negotiations), respectively (see also Turhan & Reiners, Chapter 1).
Throughout the negotiation phase, the European Council carefully moni-
tors the talks; if necessary, adjusts their course with interim decisions
(e.g., calls for the suspension of talks with the request of one-third of its
members); and makes the political decision on accession. In the follow-up
phase, the Heads of State or Government individually steer the signing
and ratification of accession treaties according to their own domestic
political landscapes and, if necessary, re-negotiate the terms of accession in
the event of a request by prospective members (Wessels, 2016: 183–186;
Turhan, 2016: 465; Nugent, 2010: 175).
Secondly, the European Council’s duty as the external voice and crisis
manager of the Union has been a key driver of the EU–Turkey dialogue,
particularly since 2015. The written provisions assign the President of the
European Council the role of ‘external representation’ in matters relating
to the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) based on a division
of labor with the High Representative (Art. 15(6) TEU). In its capacity
as the crisis manager, the European Council frequently issues statements
and declarations in the area of external action with the purpose of carving
a distinguishable profile in the international system and offsetting the
externalities of regional or international crises. Since the enactment of
the Lisbon Treaty, the EU has become vulnerable to a series of external
shocks. The lack or constrained presence of supranational competences
in crisis-relevant policy areas such as CFSP and Common Security and
Defense Policy coupled with the high degree of political salience carried
by crisis-related issues reinforces the European Council’s role as a crisis
manager (Fabbrini & Puetter, 2016: 488–489).
The Union’s leaders’ intensified efforts to offset crisis-induced nega-
tive externalities for the EU have increased their cooperation with key
third countries, including Turkey. The EU’s leading mechanisms of crisis
dialogue include joint declarations, statements, action plans as well as
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joint summits and bilateral meetings, where the Union is typically repre-
sented by the presidents of the European Council and the Commission.
As the EU’s sixth largest trading partner and ‘key strategic partner’
(European Council, 2015a), Turkey’s pivotal role in the containment of
regional crises was underlined by several European Council conclusions.
The announcement of the EU–Turkey refugee ‘deal’ subsequent to a joint
summit between the European Council and the Turkish government on
18 March 2016 elevated the Union’s leaders’ central role as a collaborator
with Turkey in negating external shocks.
Lastly, the European Council’s ‘most traditional function’ (de
Schoutheete, 2012b: 56) as an agenda and direction setter shapes the
scope and political direction of EU–Turkey relations. The Lisbon Treaty
charges the Heads of State or Government with providing ‘the Union
with the necessary impetus for its development’ (Art. 15(1) TEU). This
function empowers the European Council with the design of the overar-
ching guidelines, political direction, and priorities of the EU, including
those concerning the finalité of the European integration process. The
European Council conclusions are the decisive mechanism for the accom-
plishment of this duty. They are central documents in which issues are
initiated and framed, and the broad political parameters of future policy
are set to be operationalized by other institutions (Princen & Rhinard,
2006). For this purpose, the conclusions of the European Council
produce specific ‘narratives’ on certain issues or agents, which are ‘stories
told by actors to comprehend and frame the world in which they inter-
act’ (Wehner & Thies, 2014: 421). Narratives are helpful to legitimize
policy direction and actions as they characterize and label the agents or
issues involved in the stories and construct a causal relationship between
sequential events (Oppermann & Spencer, 2016). They are contingent
on critical turning points that generate ‘new stories to make sense of the
new events’ (Wehner & Thies, 2014: 421).
European Council conclusions on Turkey construct the strategic orien-
tation, policy objectives, and priorities of the EU and its institutions
regarding their dialogue with Turkey both within and outside the acces-
sion framework. They frame and design certain narratives concerning the
EU’s doctrine on Turkey, which comprise ‘interpretations […] of the
evolution, drivers and actors, as well as the goal (or finalité) of the EU-
Turkey relations’ and emerge ‘in response to key critical junctures and
milestones of the relationship’ (Hauge et al., 2019: 3–4). As casual stories
these narratives characterize Turkey by placing it in relation to the EU
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and its norms and preferences. They also legitimize the European Coun-
cil’s policy direction and enable—or constrain—opportunities for action
of other EU institutions involved in EU–Turkey affairs.
8.3 The European Council and Turkey’s EU
Accession Process: Far-Reaching Decisions,
Unilateral Vetoes, and Growing Doubts
While Turkey applied for full membership in the European Economic
Community in 1987, issues related to Turkey’s accession did not appear
in the European Council conclusions until 1992 (see Table 8.1). The
European Council’s initial reaction to the application appeared in its June
1992 conclusions, which discussed the applications submitted by Turkey,
Cyprus, and Malta, and underlined the need to assess each application
on its own merits (European Council, 1992). The considerably delayed
and vague response to the Turkish case signaled the unexpected timing of
the application and the lack of interest of the Heads of State or Govern-
ment to perceive Turkey as a serious candidate for full membership. In
the aftermath of the Copenhagen conclusions, the leaders’ agenda lacked
any reference to Turkey’s accession until 1997.
8.3.1 The European Council’s Rise as a Positive Driver of Turkey’s
Accession Process
The European Council took up its function as the ‘master of enlargement’
at the Luxembourg Summit on 12–13 December 1997. It became an
active, key player in Turkey’s accession process when it rejected Turkish
demands to be included in the list of official candidates. At the same
time, the European Council also took over the role of ‘stabilizer’ of the
bilateral dialogue and sought to prevent Turkey’s alienation from the EU
by inviting it (alongside official candidates) to participate in the ‘Euro-
pean Conference’, which was planned to act as a forum for political
consultation (European Council, 1997).2 As a result of Greek reserva-
tions, EU leaders affirmed that Turkey’s participation in the conference
was conditional upon the principle of ‘good neighborliness’. While initial
conceptualizations of this criterion appeared for the first time in the July
2However, this substitute arrangement never got off the ground.
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1997 ‘Agenda 2000’ Communication of the Commission (Saatçioğlu,
2009), its endorsement by the EU leaders and affiliation with Turkey took
place at the Luxembourg Summit. Accordingly, the European Council
added another qualitative component to the accession conditionality
outside of the Copenhagen framework.
In the immediate aftermath of the Luxembourg decision, the European
Council abruptly became a positive driver of Turkey’s accession process
with the far-reaching decisions it took in 1998 and 1999. While the
Cardiff European Council in June 1998 endorsed Turkey’s inclusion in
the list of countries to be annually reviewed by the Commission regarding
their progress toward accession (European Council, 1998: para. 64),
the Helsinki European Council in December 1999 confirmed Turkey’s
candidate status (European Council, 1999: para. 12). The Helsinki deci-
sion positioned Turkey within the institutionalized normative system of
the accession process. Yet, the change of heart of the Union’s leaders
was anything but normative. Security considerations of the EU after the
war in Kosovo accompanied by the replacement of Christian Democrat
Helmut Kohl with the Social Democrat Gerhard Schröder as German
chancellor primarily brought about Turkey’s candidacy (Turhan, 2012;
see also Schimmelfennig, Chapter 6). The normative consistency of the
Helsinki conclusions was further undermined by Cyprus’ exemption from
the ‘good neighborliness’ criterion (European Council, 1999: para. 8(b)).
Thus, with its conclusions in Helsinki, the European Council paradoxi-
cally acted as a positive driver of both Turkey’s EU perspective and the
Cyprus conflict.
The period from 2000 to 2004 marked the ‘golden era’ of the Union’s
leaders’ function as a positive driver of Turkey’s EU path. This was
reflected in the mentioning of issues related to Turkey’s accession in 12
of a total of 18 ordinary European Council conclusions, which essentially
acknowledged Turkey’s progress toward compliance with the political
and economic criteria (see Table 8.1). Accordingly, EU leaders sent a
strong political signal both to Turkey and other EU institutions regarding
their ‘position that Turkey will be judged on the basis of objective crite-
ria’ (Müftüler-Baç, 2008: 206). The EU leaders’ solid commitment to
the accession process accompanied by Ankara’s execution of an effec-
tive reform process brought about the historic decision of the European
Council in December 2004 to open accession negotiations with Turkey
on 3 October 2005.
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At the same time, the December 2004 conclusions laid a rocky founda-
tion for Turkey’s accession negotiations, which indicated the EU leaders’
perception of Turkey as a special candidate. They mentioned for the first
time in history the ‘open-ended’ feature of accession talks and included
an exit clause in the framework for negotiations:
While taking account of all Copenhagen criteria, if the Candidate State is
not in a position to assume in full all the obligations of membership it
must be ensured that the Candidate State concerned is fully anchored in
the European structures through the strongest possible bond. (European
Council, 2004a: para. 23)
The conclusions also underlined the possibility of long transition periods
and permanent safeguard clauses, and created a direct linkage between
Turkish membership and the EU’s absorption capacity by stating that,
[…] accession negotiations yet to be opened with candidates whose acces-
sion could have substantial financial consequences can only be concluded
after the establishment of the Financial Framework for the period from
2014 together with possible consequential financial reforms. (European
Council, 2004a: para. 23)3
8.3.2 The European Council’s Development from a Positive Driver
to a Brakeman in Turkey’s EU Path
After the launch of negotiations, two developments precipitated the
gradual evolution of the European Council from a positive driver to a
‘brakeman’ in Turkey’s accession process. The first development was indi-
vidual member states’ vetoes of the opening of talks in various chapters of
the acquis. The initial unilateral veto was adopted by then French Pres-
ident Nicolas Sarkozy in June 2007 against the opening of Chapter 17.
The French move had three major implications: first, the blocking of a
chapter on the grounds that it would bring Turkey closer to membership
(Bilefsky, 2007) de facto abolished the ‘open-ended’ feature of acces-
sion negotiations. Second, the French action served as a model for other
unilateral vetoes, such as the French veto on four chapters in December
3Absorption capacity, also known as ‘the Union’s capacity to absorb new members,
while maintaining the momentum of European integration’ is often called the ‘fourth’
Copenhagen criteria (European Council, 1993: 13).
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2007, the Cypriot blockage of six chapters in December 2009, and
the German veto on one chapter in June 2013 (Turhan, 2016). These
multiple vetoes demonstrated the expanding impact of bilateral issues
and member states’ individual preferences on the European Council’s
role as a driver of Turkey’s accession process (see also Müftüler-Baç &
Çiçek, 2017; Tsarouhas, Chapter 2). Third, the individual vetoes under-
mined the normative consistency of the EU’s acquis conditionality, since
Turkey’s ‘advanced’ or ‘moderately advanced’ level of alignment with
the acquis in various chapters had not been rewarded with the opening
of negotiation talks in those chapters.4 This also impaired the Euro-
pean Council’s role as a credible and cogent player in Turkey’s accession
process.
The weakened interest of the Union’s leaders in Turkey’s full member-
ship emerged as the second major development in the negotiation phase.
From 2005 to 2020, only six of a total of 67 ordinary European
Council conclusions referenced Turkey’s accession process, which gener-
ally contained a negative tonality regarding the matter (see Table 8.1). In
December 2006, the European Council took a far-reaching decision and
adjusted the course of negotiations with its endorsement of the Council’s
conclusions on 11 December 2006. The conclusions suspended talks on
eight chapters of the acquis (Council of the EU, 2006) on the grounds of
Ankara’s non-implementation of the Additional Protocol of the Associa-
tion Agreement that foresees the opening of Turkish harbors and airports
to Cyprus as originally endorsed by the June 2004 European Council.
After December 2006, matters related to Turkey hardly appeared in the
conclusions of the European Council in the context of enlargement. This
represented a stark contrast to the European Council’s statements on the
Western Balkans, which repeatedly underlined palpable support for their
accession (e.g., European Council, 2008, 2011, 2019b).
There were two primary reasons behind the EU leaders’ vanishing
interest in acting as a positive driver of Turkey’s EU perspective. Firstly,
the diminishing appeal of EU norms as a reference point in the reform
processes in Turkey, what came to be known as ‘de-Europeanization’
(Aydın-Düzgit & Kaliber, 2016: 5–6; see also Alpan, Chapter 5; Kaya,
Chapter 14), weakened the plausibility of Turkey’s accession process. The
4According to the 2012 progress report, Turkey had achieved ‘advanced’ or ‘moderately
advanced’ level of alignment with the acquis in these four chapters blocked by member
states: Chapters 15, 17, 26 and 31 (European Commission, 2012).
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Heads of State or Government largely perceived the Turkish govern-
ment’s activities as not contributing to the goal of membership. Secondly,
the resurgence of far-right, Euroskeptic political parties in the EU echoed
the concerns of the European public about migration and cultural diver-
sity (Kaya, 2020). This brought into question the salience of Turkish
membership and constrained the policy options for mainstream governing
leaders.
The European Council’s function as a key driver of Turkey’s EU acces-
sion prospects was temporarily boosted during 2015 and 2016. Faced
with an unprecedented flow of Syrian refugees to Europe in late 2015
and the inability to find an EU-wide solution, the Heads of State or
Government declared the need to re-energize Turkey’s accession process
in their conclusions on 15 October 2015 (European Council, 2015b).
The strategic dependence of the Union’s leaders on cooperation with
Turkey concerning the management of irregular migration flows was
reflected in their realization of two bilateral summits with the Turkish
government, followed by the joint statements of 29 November 2015
and 18 March 2016 (the latter also known as the EU–Turkey refugee
‘deal’). The statements reaffirmed the European Council’s commitment
to restore Turkey’s accession process and its readiness to open Chap-
ters 17 and 33 (European Council, 2015c, 2016a). The EU leaders’
interest-driven support for Turkey’s accession negotiations came at a time
when Turkey’s sustained non-compliance with the political criteria was
reiterated in various EU documents and created a ‘functional give-and-
take relationship’ (Saatçioğlu, 2020: 7) with Ankara based on an illiberal
deal (Martin, 2019; see also Icoz & Martin, Chapter 4).
The European Council’s support for Turkey’s accession process quickly
deteriorated following the announcement of the March 2016 joint state-
ment. After the opening of talks in Chapters 17 and 33 in December
2015 and June 2016, respectively, the European Council conclusions did
not include any reference to the Union’s leaders’ interest in accelerating
Turkey’s accession negotiations. Contrarily, Turkey’s heightened bilateral
tensions with various member states, the deterioration of the EU–Turkey
dialogue in the aftermath of the attempted coup on 15 July 2016, and
diverging geopolitical preferences over Northern Syria, Libya, and the
drilling activities in the Eastern Mediterranean contributed to the rein-
forcement of the European Council’s role as a brakeman in Turkey’s
accession process.
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In October 2017, the European Council tasked the Commission
with evaluating whether to cut or reorient Turkey’s pre-accession funds
(European Council, 2017a), leading to a reduction of 105 million
EUR in Turkey’s pre-accession funds in 2018. More recently, in their
June 2019 conclusions, the Heads of State or Government adopted
the formulation of the Council, claiming: ‘Turkey has been moving
further away from the European Union’ (Council of the EU, 2018: para.
35). They also reaffirmed previous Council conclusions regarding the
suspension of key enlargement-related dialogue mechanisms, including
the opening or closing of any chapters in accession talks and the meet-
ings of the EU–Turkey Association Council (European Council, 2019a).
The expanding ‘bilateralization’ of European Council–Turkey relations
has further boosted the European Council’s growing role as brakeman in
Turkey’s accession process. Turkey has been increasingly confronted with
unilateral statements of member states (e.g., Austria, Germany, France)
suggesting ending the accession process or ruling out the opening and
closing of any chapter (see e.g., Reuters, 2016, 2020; CDU, 2018;
Hürriyet Daily News, 2018). Rising tensions in the Eastern Mediter-
ranean between Turkey and various member states including France,
Greece and Cyprus over drilling rights and territorial claims reinforced the
bilateralization of the European Council’s relationship with Turkey, and
further weakened the likelihood of a revitalization of Turkey’s accession
negotiations.
8.4 EU–Turkey Cooperation in Times
of Crisis: An Ever-Growing Role
or Challenge for the European Council?
Since the early stages of the bilateral dialogue, the Heads of State and
Government have acknowledged Turkey’s post-Cold War geopolitical
role in the EU’s immediate neighborhood as a ‘regional stabilizer’ and
‘arbiter’ (Öniş, 1995: 50–51). The European Council conclusions in
June 1992 attached the ‘greatest importance’ to ‘the Turkish role in
the [present] European political situation’ (European Council, 1992: 5).
Numerous regional crises and security challenges including the Kosovo
war, September 11 attacks and the subsequent war in Iraq, the Arab
uprisings of early 2011, and the ongoing Syrian civil war brought recur-
ring attention to Turkey’s potential as a security-provider for the EU. In
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this context, the European Council conclusions underlined the impor-
tance of ‘Turkey’s regional initiatives with the neighbours of Iraq and
Egypt’ (European Council, 2003: 2) or its efforts ‘to secure progress on
the Tehran Research Reactor agreement’ (European Council, 2010: 13)
amid the international community’s concerns over the Iranian nuclear
program. Successive presidents of the European Council and high level
political representatives of individual member states have repeatedly come
together with the Turkish prime minister and/or president during official
visits or on the sideline of multilateral summits in order to promote policy
coordination in times of severe foreign policy crises.
However, it was not until the transformation of the so-called Syrian
refugee crisis into a European crisis that the Heads of State or Govern-
ment put forth a substantial effort to systematize and institutionalize
EU–Turkey cooperation in crisis management and make regular reference
to Turkey in their summit conclusions as a collaborator in crisis situations.
The unprecedented scale of irregular migration flows to the EU in 2015
moved Turkey to the epicenter of the governance of the refugee crisis
alongside the European Council. The evolution of the roles of the Euro-
pean Council and Turkey in the management of the refugee crisis can be
divided into three distinct stages (see for a similar periodization Anghel
et al., 2016: 14).
The first stage (April–July 2015) commenced in the immediate after-
math of the 19 April 2015 boat disaster off the coast of the Italian island
of Lampedusa in which more than 600 refugees from Syria drowned
on their way to the EU. During this stage the European Council took
measures to prevent the loss of life in the Mediterranean Sea and ease
the disproportionate burden placed on the frontline member states with
‘temporary and exceptional relocation over two years from […] Italy
and Greece to other Member States’ (European Council, 2015d: 2).
However, the Union’s leaders were unable to live up to their commit-
ments as a result of ‘lack of policy harmonization, low solidarity, and
absence of central institutions’ (Scipioni, 2018: 1361). Specifically, the
relocation of Syrian asylum seekers, a German-led initiative, was not
wholeheartedly embraced by the majority of the Union’s leaders, and the
transfer of Syrian asylum seekers from Italy and Greece to other member
states remained at remarkably low levels. This undermined the Euro-
pean Council’s capacity to effectively execute the internal dimension of
its response to the refugee crisis.
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The second phase (August 2015–March 2016) encompasses member
states’ unilateral reactions to the crisis and the European Council’s subse-
quent ‘externalization’ of EU border management to Turkey, which
involved a ‘redefinition of migration management beyond the territo-
rial borders of destination states [in the EU]’ (Üstübici, 2019: 1). With
the purpose of encouraging other member states to relocate refugees
(Niemann & Zaun, 2018), in August 2015 Germany unilaterally declared
its temporary suspension of the Dublin Regulation, which affirms that the
country of first entry should process asylum claims in the EU. But, the
unprecedented number of refugees arriving in Germany did not result in
EU-wide responsibility-sharing. Rather, Germany’s declaration adversely
strengthened unilateralism in the European Council and brought about
a ‘domino effect’ of internal border controls in individual member states
(Scipioni, 2018: 1365). In view of these internal constraints, on the one
hand, and Turkey’s function as a key transit country for the refugees, on
the other, the European Council engaged with Ankara for the purpose
of reducing irregular migration flows from Turkey to the EU. On 23
September 2015, an informal meeting of the Heads of State or Govern-
ment underlined the need to ‘reinforce the dialogue with Turkey at
all levels’ (European Council, 2015e). Former European Council Pres-
ident Donald Tusk’s letter addressed to the Union’s leaders ahead of
the European Council summit on 15 October 2015 (Macdonald, 2015)
and the conclusions of the October summit (European Council, 2015b:
1) signaled the European Council’s readiness to incentivize Turkey in
exchange for cooperation on the management of migratory flows.
The European Council held two joint summits with Turkey on 29
November 2015 and 18 March 2016 to determine the scope and condi-
tions of EU–Turkey cooperation and the reward mechanism to be offered
to Turkey. The EU–Turkey joint statement issued following the summit
on 18 March 2016 framed the final agreement between both parties.
It endorsed Turkey’s readmission of all irregular migrants crossing from
Turkey to the Greek islands as of 20 March 2016 and the EU’s resettle-
ment of one Syrian from Turkey to the member states for every Syrian
returned to Turkey from the member states. Turkey was offered a wide
range of incentives, ranging from a total of six billion EUR of financial
aid for hosting refugees to the acceleration of Turkey’s Visa Liberaliza-
tion Dialogue and accession negotiations (European Council, 2016a; see
also Turhan, 2016). The European Council’s joint summits made Turkey
‘the only candidate country with which the EU holds bilateral summits’
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(Müftüler-Baç, 2016: 100) and fortified Ankara’s function as a key partner
of the EU in crisis situations by institutionalizing policy externalization
and bilateral cooperation in migration matters.
The third phase (April 2016–ongoing) spans from the implementation
of the EU–Turkey ‘deal’, including discussions regarding its sustainability
as well as the evolving conflictual dynamics of EU–Turkey cooperation,
until the present. The European Council conclusions and statements of
key member states largely portray the ‘deal’ as a success story accen-
tuating the decline in irregular crossings from Turkey to Europe (e.g.,
European Council, 2016b: 1). However, various studies question its
unequivocal impact on refugee arrivals in the EU, referring to other
factors like the closing of the Balkan route (Adam, 2017; Walter-Franke,
2018). Return and resettlement numbers related to the ‘one in, one out’
mechanism have remained remarkably low, which has raised doubts over
the Heads of State or Government’s commitment to burden sharing.
While the disbursement of EU financial aid carries on with some delays,
other key components of the reward mechanism (e.g., the acceleration
of Turkey’s accession process and Visa Liberalization Dialogue, joint
summits between the European Council and Turkey, and the upgrading
of the Customs Union (CU)) remain to be fulfilled as a result of technical
benchmarks or heightened political tensions between the EU and Turkey.
Ankara’s periodic unilateral statements indicating the possibility of the
suspension of the refugee ‘deal’ amid political tensions with Brussels or
individual member states (e.g., Deutsche Welle, 2017, 2019) have cast
doubt on the sustainability of the deal. Turkey’s temporary de facto with-
drawal from the deal in late February 2020 with the opening of its
Western borders amidst the emergence of a new humanitarian crisis in
the Syrian province of Idlib and the ensuing prospect of a new refugee
wave indicates the fragility of the deal and the changing dynamics in EU–
Turkey cooperation. In response to Ankara’s appeal for a new ‘deal’, the
EU and Turkey agreed in early March 2020 to enter ‘a process to take
stock of the implementation of the EU-Turkey Statement’ (European
Commission, 2020: 3–4).
Thus, we observe a paradox: issue-specific interdependence in favor of
Turkey accompanied by weak or absent incentives for policy compliance
(Turhan & Yıldız, forthcoming) and growing tensions between the EU
and Turkey over diverging geopolitical and normative preferences make
EU–Turkey cooperation in crisis management both imperative and chal-
lenging for the Heads of State or Government. The European Council
conclusions of 1 October 2020 also illustrated the perplexing co-existence
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of issue-specific interdependencies in favor of Turkey and the growing
estrangement between the EU and Turkey. The conclusions framed a
‘dual strategy’ by offering the conditional launch of a positive agenda
with Turkey, on the one hand, and by threatening to impose restrictive
measures and possible sanctions, on the other (European Council, 2020).
8.5 The European Council as the ‘Agenda
and Direction Setter’ in EU–Turkey
Relations: Competing Narratives on Turkey5
The conclusions of the European Council over the last four decades
frame the Union’s narratives on Turkey, which are ‘legitimizing stories for
specific policy actions’ (Ceccorulli & Lucarelli, 2017: 84). These casual
stories couple lessons from the past with the future when proposing issue-
specific policies (Radaelli, 1999). The European Council’s narratives on
Turkey construct specific characterizations and labels of the country at
different points in time and under distinct circumstances. They show-
case the Union’s leaders’ prevailing perception of Turkey and the present
and future of EU–Turkey relations. The way the European Council
discursively characterizes Turkey justifies the agendas of member states’
highest political representatives concerning EU–Turkey relations and the
policy actions endorsed by the European Council conclusions. Influen-
tial narratives are particularly those that are capable of telling a more
convincing story than the competing narratives, and which are reiter-
ated on a more regular basis over time (Tonra, 2011). The study of the
European Council conclusions from the early 1980s to 2020 reveals both
shifts and continuities in the Union’s leaders’ narratives on Turkey. Four
(master)narratives—the normative, the accession, the transactional part-
nership, and the conflict narratives—stand out in view of their repeated
iteration by the European Council, their distinct readings of past and
present events, and their influence on the direction of the EU–Turkey
partnership.
5This section partially builds on Wessels (2020).
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8.5.1 The Normative Narrative
From the early 1980s to the start of Turkey’s accession negotiations, the
European Council’s ‘normative narrative’ has often remained at the core
of the Union’s leaders’ readings of Turkey and EU–Turkey relations. The
normative narrative refers to the liberal democratic values of the Union
(Art. 2 TEU and Charter of Fundamental Rights of the EU) as the
focal point for the further progression of the EU–Turkey relationship, in
general, and Turkey’s EU accession process, in particular. Notably, respect
for human rights, democracy, rule of law, fundamental freedoms, and
independent and efficient judiciary, which are at the crux of the European
Council’s Copenhagen political criteria and of Chapter 23 of the acquis,
have recurrently provided the Heads of State or Government with legiti-
mate ground for the improvements and setbacks in EU–Turkey relations.
Following its confirmation of Turkey’s candidacy, the European Council
repeatedly acknowledged in its conclusions from 2000 to 2004 Ankara’s
progress in complying with the political criteria while also demanding
further alignment in various issue areas as a condition for commencing
accession negotiations (see Table 8.1). In doing so, it provided Turkey’s
accession process with further normative impetus for its advancement.
Throughout the negotiation phase, the normative content of the Euro-
pean Council conclusions has been largely reduced to concerns over
Turkey’s commitment to good neighborly relations and international law,
while the EU’s criticism of a broad range of Turkey’s normative failings
has rather been left to other institutions like the European Parliament
and the European Commission (see also Bürgin, Chapter 9; Kaeding &
Schenuit, Chapter 10). More recently, in its June 2019 conclusions the
European Council endorsed previous Council conclusions that justified
setbacks in the deepening of EU–Turkey relations, including preventing
the modernization of the CU, according to Turkey’s diminished commit-
ment to good neighborly relations and peaceful settlement of disputes
(European Council, 2019a). Key documents of individual member states
like the German coalition agreement in 2018 also ruled out any reform
of the CU until the situation of rule of law, democracy, and human rights
is improved in Turkey (CDU, 2018). Overall, as Turkey’s membership
prospects started to deteriorate, the European Council’s normative narra-
tive was largely replaced by utility-maximizing calculations, according to
the interest of the Heads of State or Government ‘in the development of
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a cooperative and mutually beneficial relationship with Turkey’ (European
Council, 2020: para. 15).
8.5.2 The Accession Narrative
The ‘accession narrative’ underpins Turkey’s labeling by the European
Council as an accession candidate with a functioning and promising acces-
sion process. This narrative was high on the agenda of the Heads of
State or Government between 1997 and 2006. Throughout this period
almost all European Council formulations on Turkey appeared under
the section ‘enlargement’ in the summit conclusions and communicated
both the positive developments and remaining shortcomings regarding
Turkey’s transformation on its path toward accession. Based on the eval-
uation of past developments and experiences, the EU leaders narrated
policy actions about the future direction of Turkey’s accession process.
Those ranged from inviting the Commission to prepare ‘proposals for
the single financial framework for assistance to Turkey as well as for the
Accession Partnership’ (European Council, 2000: para. 17) to demanding
‘full and timely implementation of reforms at all levels of administra-
tion and throughout the country’ (European Council, 2004b: para. 27).
While the European Council confirmed the launch of Turkey’s acces-
sion negotiations in December 2004, the possibility of long transition
periods and permanent safeguard clauses led to Turkey’s labeling as
a ‘special candidate’. In this context, the December 2004 conclusions
confirmed the EU leaders’ openness to alternative forms of partnership
outside the accession framework. That the European Council conclu-
sions have increasingly dealt with matters related to Turkey under other
sections and that they have not included any precise formulation about
Turkey’s accession negotiations since October 2015 suggest the tran-
sience of the accession narrative and confirm the European Council’s
increasing interest in ‘thinking outside of the accession box’ (Turhan,
2017) in regard to the future design of EU–Turkey relations.
8.5.3 The Transactional Partnership Narrative
With the gradual evaporation of the accession narrative, the European
Council’s ‘transactional partnership narrative’ has gained importance.
The underlying logic of this narrative is its characterization of Turkey
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and its relationship with the EU largely independent from the acces-
sion process and its accompanying norms-based conditionality through
locating an interest-driven, functional partnership in areas of common
interest to the center of bilateral affairs. The transactional partnership
narrative partly draws on the logic of ‘external differentiated integration’,
which refers to forms of cooperation/policy harmonization between
the EU and non-member states ranging from ‘narrow, bilateral, static’
to ‘broad, multilateral, dynamic models’ (Gstöhl, 2015: 855; see also
Tekin, Chapter 7). Former European Council President Tusk’s labeling
of Turkey as a ‘key partner’ of the EU ‘in areas of common interest for
EU-Turkey relations such as security, migration and energy’ (Delegation
of the EU to Turkey, 2018) indicates the broad spectrum of policy fields
concerning this narrative. At the same time, of particular relevance for the
transactional partnership narrative has been the vast number of European
Council conclusions on EU–Turkey cooperation on the management of
the migration influx to Europe. In their October 2009 conclusions, the
Heads of State or Government had already welcomed ‘the beginning of
the reinforced dialogue on migration with Turkey’ (European Council,
2009: para. 38). However, the exacerbation of the Syrian refugee crisis in
2015 and the resulting EU–Turkey ‘deal’ of March 2016 primarily evoked
an interest-driven functional partnership between the EU and Turkey
and induced the recurrent use of the transactional partnership narrative
by the Heads of State or Government. The March 2016 agreement did
not incorporate any normative conditionality that fell back on the EU’s
political criteria. On the contrary, it offered Ankara material rewards and
an upgrade of its institutional dialogue with the EU outside the acces-
sion framework based on frequent joint summits and thematic high level
dialogues. These mechanisms mimic the dialogue procedures the EU
utilizes in handling its official strategic partnerships that are largely of a
transactional and sectoral nature (Turhan, 2017). Following the making
of the EU–Turkey ‘deal’, a large number of European Council formula-
tions on Turkey popped up under the heading ‘migration’ in the summit
conclusions, underpinning the Union’s leaders’ perception of Turkey as
a key partner rather than a promising candidate for accession. During
2016–2017 the European Council reiterated in its conclusions its ‘com-
mitment to the EU-Turkey Statement’ (e.g., European Council, 2016c:
para. 1) and repeatedly demanded the ‘implementation of the EU-Turkey
Statement in all its aspects’ (e.g., European Council, 2017b: para. 20).
The transactional partnership narrative came once again into prominence
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in 2020 when in their 1 October 2020 conclusions, the Heads of State
or Government endorsed the conditional ‘launch a positive political EU-
Turkey agenda with a specific emphasis on the modernisation of the
Customs Union and trade facilitation, people to people contacts, High
level dialogues, continued cooperation on migration issues’ (European
Council, 2020: para. 19).
8.5.4 The Conflict Narrative
The conflict narrative primarily draws on Turkey’s portrayal by the
European Council as a difficult cooperation partner and a problematic
neighbor. Growing disagreements with Ankara over geostrategic priori-
ties and regional threat perceptions as well as Turkey’s strained bilateral
dialogue with several member states have lately evoked the emergence
of this narrative. The conflict narrative pinpoints the gradual shift of
EU–Turkey relations from a primarily cooperative to a progressively
uncooperative and conflictual one, thereby generating cautiousness about
the reinforcement of the institutional dialogue between the EU and
Turkey even for transactional purposes. In recent years, several develop-
ments have served as enablers of the conflictual dynamics in the bilateral
relationship and promoted the conflict narrative. In view of mounting
tensions between the EU/Cyprus and Turkey over drilling activities in the
Eastern Mediterranean, in October 2014 the European Council initially
expressed its ‘serious concern about the renewed tensions in the Eastern
Mediterranean and urged Turkey to show restraint and to respect Cyprus’
sovereignty over its territorial sea’ (European Council, 2014: para. 24).
Since 2018 the conflict narrative has increasingly replaced the transac-
tional partnership narrative in the conclusions of the European Council,
which have recurrently characterized Turkey as a destabilizing actor and
a major source of conflict in the Eastern Mediterranean and Northern
Syria. The conclusions reiterated the Union’s leaders’ ‘full solidarity
with Cyprus’ (European Council, 2018: para. 12) and underlined ‘the
serious immediate negative impact that such illegal actions have across
the range of EU-Turkey relations’ (European Council, 2019a: para. 17).
They characterized Turkey’s Syria policy as a critical threat to European
security (European Council, 2019b: para. 7) and deemed the memo-
randum signed between Turkey and Libya on Mediterranean maritime
sovereignty in November 2019 as incompatible with international law
(European Council, 2019c: para. 19). More recently, in their 1 October
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2020 conclusions, member states’ highest political representatives indi-
cated the possibility of imposing sanctions and restrictive measures in the
event of renewed unilateral attempts by Turkey (European Council, 2020:
para. 20). Such formulations signal a turn toward a narrative that ques-
tions Turkey’s credibility as a reliable partner and stabilizing actor in the
EU’s immediate neighborhood and challenges the further deepening of
EU–Turkey relations even on a primarily transactional and sector-specific
basis.
8.6 Conclusion and Outlook: A Key Institution’s
Ever-Evolving Role in a Conflictual Partnership
The European Council serves as a key driver of EU–Turkey relations.
This chapter has illustrated that the powers of the European Council
are derived from the three functions it performs in the ever-evolving EU
system.
First, as the master of enlargement, the European Council remained a
positive driver of Turkey’s EU accession process from the late 1990s to
2005. The interest and influence of the Heads of State or Government
in Turkey’s EU aspirations were manifested in the far-reaching decisions
they took in 1999 and 2004, and the high number of detailed conclu-
sions they formulated on Turkey’s accession. Throughout the negotiation
phase, the European Council gradually developed from a positive driver
to a brakeman in Turkey’s accession process as a result of the unilateral
vetoes of individual member states, increasing bilateralization of European
Council–Turkey relations, and evolving normative conditions in Turkey.
Second, in their capacity as the external voice and crisis manager of
the EU, the Heads of State or Government systematized EU–Turkey
cooperation in crisis management and placed Turkey at the epicenter of
the governance of the refugee crisis with the EU–Turkey Statement in
March 2016. The commitment of member states’ highest political repre-
sentatives to a reinforced partnership with Ankara based on an extensive
reward package, which even foresaw the acceleration of Turkey’s accession
negotiations at a time of greater normative uncertainty, was an instance
in which the strategic interests of the Heads of State or Government
trumped normative concerns. This demoted the normative consistency of
the EU’s conditionality strategy, placing EU–Turkey relations primarily
along a transactional axis outside the accession framework. At the same
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time, Turkey’s temporary de facto withdrawal from the refugee ‘deal’ put
the sustainability of a functional relationship between two parties with
increasingly diverging geostrategic and normative preferences into ques-
tion, turning EU–Turkey cooperation in times of crisis into a growing
challenge for the European Council.
Third, over the last four decades, the conclusions of the European
Council have framed diverse narratives on Turkey that have shaped
the overarching agenda and course of EU–Turkey relations. The disap-
pearance or, at times, coexistence of some (master)narratives since the
early 1980s highlights the complexity and layered nature of the Union’s
leaders’ mental maps of a moving target. The findings of this chapter
indicate a clear shift from the use of the ‘accession narrative’ and ‘nor-
mative narrative’ to formulations based on the ‘transactional partnership
narrative’ in the European Council’s characterization of Turkey following
the launch of the accession negotiations. However, contrary to the
Parliament’s actions, the Heads of State or Government have refrained
from officially closing ‘the accession door for Turkey’ (see Kaeding &
Schenuit, Chapter 10) and remained interested in acting as a central
‘stabilizer’ of EU–Turkey relations based on their self-interested, utility-
maximizing calculations. At the same time, the latest statements of the
European Council from 2018, 2019, and 2020 emphasize a turn toward
the ‘conflict narrative’, which portrays Turkey as a dissonant partner and
problematic neighbor. The increased use of the conflict narrative by the
Union’s leaders challenges the reconfiguration of EU–Turkey relations
even on a primarily transactional and sector-specific basis.
Growing divergences between the Heads of State or Government and
Turkey over geopolitical interests and normative principles suggest a long-
lasting role for the European Council as a brakeman in Turkey’s accession
process. This brings the European Council to an important crossroads in
its function as a driver of EU–Turkey relations. On the one hand, the
recent turn toward more conflictual and uncooperative relations between
the European Council and Turkey makes the search for an innovative
partnership model for EU–Turkey relations outside the accession scheme
tricky. On the other hand, in view of the ever-evolving political contexts
and issue-specific interdependencies between the EU and Turkey, the
future trajectory of the bilateral relationship is likely to rest on an insti-
tutionalized alternative path. This could force the European Council to
develop a strategy for a special partnership and frame a respective narra-
tive based on geopolitical arguments. The findings of this chapter provide
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plentiful evidence that with their powers and central functions in the
making of the EU–Turkey dialogue, the Heads of State or Government
will remain a key driver in the design of an institutionalized alternative
path for EU–Turkey relations.
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CHAPTER 9




The European Commission (EC), the EU’s executive, is a key actor in
EU–Turkey relations. Its main responsibilities are the monitoring of the
political and economic situation in Turkey, and the management of EU
funds for Turkey. EC–Turkey relations date back to the 1963 Associa-
tion Agreement, whose final goal, a Customs Union (CU), was realized
in December 1995 (EC-Turkey Association Council, 1995). In this
framework, the member states mandated the EC to monitor economic,
financial, and trade developments in Turkey, as well as the implementa-
tion of the CU’s provisions. Since conferring candidate status to Turkey
in 1999, the accession process has become the cornerstone of EC–
Turkey relations, coordinated by the Commissioner for Neighborhood
and Enlargement as well as the Directorate General for Neighborhood
and Enlargement Negotiations. However, due to the slow progress in
accession negotiations, since 2015 the EC has launched institutionalized
high level dialogues on specific policy areas related to but independent
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from the accession process, including foreign policy, economic policy, and
energy and climate policy. In this regard, the EU Delegation in Ankara,
formerly known as the Delegation of the EC in Turkey, plays a crucial
role, as it is in frequent contact with Turkish officials and reports daily to
the EC’s headquarters in Brussels on the developments in Turkey.
The influence of the EC within the EU system is a controversial topic
in the literature, and a final consensus on this issue has not emerged
(Moravcsik, 1998; Sandholtz & Stone Sweet, 1998; Peterson, 2015;
Pollack, 2003). According to the intergovernmentalist view, the EC is
merely an agent of the member states, acting as a secretariat, as in any
other international organization. In contrast, according to the suprana-
tionalist view, the EC is much more: it is able to act autonomously
and provide policy leadership to the EU based on its expertise, legal
competences, and transnational networks (Nugent & Rhinard, 2016).
The EC’s influence in candidate countries’ domestic politics triggered
a similarly intensive academic debate within the Europeanization litera-
ture (Grabbe, 2001; Sedelmeier, 2011; Schimmelfennig & Sedelmeier,
2005). The EC is able to exercise influence via two mechanisms. The
first is related to the EU’s conditionality strategy, offering incentives such
as the opening of a new accession chapter in return for meeting certain
benchmarks. The second is related to social learning in the interaction
between actors from the EU and the candidate country. This implies a
process whereby positions, interests, and identities are shaped through
exchange with other actors (Checkel, 2005). According to this mecha-
nism, harmonization with EU standards is therefore not simply the result
of strategic cost–benefit calculations but rather of the learning and persua-
sion processes in networks between EC officials and bureaucratic actors
in the candidate country.
While the accession literature generally acknowledges the explanatory
power of the EU’s conditionality strategy, several studies on Europeaniza-
tion processes in Central and Eastern European countries also highlight
the relevance of EU-induced learning and socialization processes in a
candidate country’s reform process (Andonova, 2005; Braun, 2016; see
also Alpan, Chapter 5; Lippert, Chapter 11). In regard to Turkey, the
fading credibility of Turkey’s membership perspective due to the EU’s
internal problems, such as rising Euroskepticism as well as Ankara’s
increasing alienation from the EU, have undermined the EU’s condition-
ality strategy; its transformative influence has decreased significantly since
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the opening of accession talks (Aydın-Düzgit & Kaliber, 2016; Aydın-
Düzgit & Noutcheva, 2012; Yılmaz, 2014). With this decline, continued
partial alignment with EU standards is often attributed to domestic factors
in Turkey, particularly the governing party’s domestic agenda (Avcı,
2011; Yılmaz & Soyaltın, 2014) or the country’s modernization strategy
(Kaliber, 2013).
The remainder of this chapter analyzes EC–Turkey relations since
Turkey’s official application for membership in 1987, arguing that it plays
a crucial role in two regards. First, related to the discussion on the EC’s
role within the EU’s institutional architecture, the EC, as a ‘protector of
the rules of the game’, regularly opposes some member states in favor
of candidate countries, illustrating its autonomous role (Bürgin, 2013;
Schimmelfennig, 2008). Second, concerning the EC’s role in Turkish
domestic politics, it has been an important ‘agent of change’, even in
times of deteriorating political relations. Because of its contributions to
regular interactions, in particular in the framework of projects financed
by the EU’s Instrument for Pre-Accession Assistance (IPA), the EC has
continued to increase administrative capacity and policy learning processes
within Turkey’s bureaucracy (Bürgin, 2016).
9.2 Fields of EC–Turkey Relations
9.2.1 Accession Negotiations
The EC has an important agenda-setting and monitoring function in
Turkey’s accession process. After Turkey’s application in 1987, the EC’s
initial evaluation suggested that further reforms were needed before
Turkey could become a candidate country (European Commission,
1989). In 1997, the member states mandated the EC to monitor Turkey’s
progress regarding the membership conditions defined in the Copen-
hagen criteria. These included three critera: first, political criteria, such as
stable institutions guaranteeing democracy, rule of law, human rights, and
respect for and protection of minorities; second, economic criteria, such
as a functioning market economy and the capacity to cope with competi-
tion and market forces within the EU; and third, the ability to take on the
obligations of membership, including adherence to the aims of political,
economic, and monetary union (European Council, 1993).
The EC published its first progress report in 1998, followed by annual
country reports. In preparing these reports, the Commission makes
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use of information from a variety of sources: the Turkish government;
reports and decisions of the European Parliament (EP); the evaluations
of the European Council, the Organisation for Security and Co-operation
in Europe, international financial organizations; and non-governmental
organizations. Based on the EC’s 2004 recommendation to start the
accession process, the member states opened negotiations with Turkey on
3 October 2005. In the first stage, between October 2005 and October
2006, the EC held screening meetings with Turkish officials in order
to compare Turkey’s policies with the EU’s whole body of common
rights and obligations, i.e., the acquis communautaire, specified in 33
policy-related negotiation chapters.1 The EC’s resulting screening report
identified shortcomings to be addressed during the accession process.
In conclusion of these screening reports, the Commission recommended
either the opening of negotiations or the requirement of compliance with
certain opening benchmarks.
The Council, whose agreement to the opening of a chapter depends
on a unanimous vote, set closing benchmarks for most chapters that
Turkey must meet before the closure of negotiations in the policy field
concerned. No negotiations on any individual chapter can be closed until
every EU government reports its satisfaction with the candidate’s progress
in that policy field. The whole negotiation process is only concluded
definitively once every chapter has been closed. According to the negoti-
ating framework, the EC can recommend that the EU suspend accession
negotiations:
In the case of a serious and persistent breach in Turkey of the principles
of liberty, democracy, respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms
and the rule of law on which the Union is founded, the Commission will,
on its own initiative or on the request of one-third of the Member States,
recommend the suspension of negotiations and propose the conditions
for eventual resumption. The Council will decide by qualified majority on
such a recommendation, after having heard Turkey, whether to suspend
the negotiations and on the conditions for their resumption. (European
Commission, 2005)
1In total, there are 35 negotiation chapters, but Chapter 34 (Institutions) and and
Chapter 35 (Other Issues) are addressed at the very last stage of the negotiations. For
a comprehensive overview of the accession negotiations and the status of negotiations
chapters see also Lippert (Chapter 11).
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As of November 2020, the only provisionally closed chapter is the chapter
on Science and Research; sixteen chapters have been opened, while four-
teen chapters are blocked by the political decisions of the Council or
individual member states (see also Turhan & Reiners, Chapter 1, Lippert,
Chapter 11). In addition, although the screening process was completed
in 2006, screening reports of eight chapters are pending approval at the
Council. Since the screening reports are not officially sent to Turkey, the
potential opening benchmarks of those chapters are not communicated.
The IPA is the main financial instrument for supporting the align-
ment of a candidate country with EU legislation and standards. Managed
by the EC, financial assistance under IPA is available for the following
four specific objectives: (i) support for political reforms; (ii) support
for economic, social and territorial development; (iii) strengthening
the ability of the beneficiary country to fulfill the (future) obligations
stemming from membership in the EU by supporting progressive align-
ment with the Union acquis; (iv) strengthening regional integration and
territorial cooperation.
The EU has allocated 3.533 billion EUR (not including the alloca-
tion for Cross-border Cooperation) under IPA 2014–2020 for Turkey.
The EC’s Indicative Strategy Paper for Turkey (European Commission,
2014a) translated the political priorities set out in the enlargement
policy framework into key areas for prioritizing financial support, namely,
democracy and governance; the rule of law and fundamental rights;
environment and climate action; transportation; energy; competitiveness
and innovation; education, employment, and social policies; agriculture
and rural development; and regional and territorial cooperation.
Following the Heads of State and Governments’ decision in October
2017 to decrease IPA funding for Turkey by 175 million EUR in a
symbolic stand against Turkey’s distancing from the EU’s political values,
the EC reoriented the pre-accession funds for Turkey in the 2018–2020
period. According to its Revised Indicative Strategy Paper for Turkey
2014–2020, the EC focused IPA assistance on the pillar ‘Democracy and
Rule of Law’, with continued support for rule of law, fundamental rights,
public administration reform, civil society organizations (CSOs), and
Union programs, while proportionally reducing the support for the pillar
‘Investing in Competitiveness and Growth’ (European Commission,
2018: 17). The focus on CSO support comprises four types of action:
(i) improving the legislative environment for the operation of CSOs
and their participation in policymaking; (ii) strengthening cooperation
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between CSOs and the public sector by supporting the establishment
of balanced and transparent mechanisms; (iii) building the capacity of
CSOs to improve outreach, governance, and institutional capacities, such
as advocacy, administrative, and fundraising skills; and (iv) encouraging
exchanges and cooperation between Turkish and EU citizens on areas
of common interest, sharing technical knowledge and expertise, and
developing long-term partnerships. Regarding the latter, since 2004
Turkish citizens, companies, and non-governmental organizations have
been eligible to participate in European Community programs, managed
by the EC, in particular in the field of education, research, employment,
and social policies.
The IPA funds for Turkey were further cut by 146.7 million EUR for
the 2019 budget in December 2018, in ‘view of the situation in Turkey as
regards democracy, rule of law, human rights and press freedom’ (Council
of the EU, 2018), and by 85 million EUR for the 2020 budget in July
2019 in response to Turkey’s gas exploration off the coast of Cyprus,
which the member states condemned as illegal. In addition to the finan-
cial cuts, the Council also suspended negotiations on the Comprehensive
Air Transport Agreement, agreed to temporarily suspend the Associa-
tion Council and further EU–Turkey high level dialogues, and invited
the European Investment Bank to review its lending activities in Turkey
(Council of the EU, 2019).
9.2.2 Trade Relations
When the CU between Turkey and the EU was realized on 31 December
1995 (see also Akman & Çekin, Chapter 12), a Customs Union Joint
Committee (CUJC), in which the EC represents the EU, was estab-
lished to ensure the proper functioning of the CU. The CUJC exchanges
views on the degree of alignment between Turkish and EU legislation
and on implementation-related problems in the areas of direct relevance
to the functioning of the CU. The CUJC, consequently, formulates
recommendations to the Association Council.
In December 2016, the EC proposed to modernize the CU,
addressing its current limitations, such as the exclusion of agricultural
goods, services, and public procurement (European Commission, 2016a).
Another issue is Turkey’s increased involvement in the conclusion of
EU free trade agreements with third countries. According to the EC,
a modernization of the CU will lead to a 27 billion EUR increase in
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EU exports to Turkey, while Turkey could gain a 5 billion EUR increase
in its exports to the EU (Kirişci & Ekim, 2015). The EC proposal was
based on comprehensive preparatory work throughout 2015 and 2016
under the joint leadership of Trade Commissioner Cecilia Malmström
and Commissioner Johannes Hahn in charge of Neighborhood Policy
and Enlargement Negotiations, including technical discussions with the
Turkish side, a public consultation with stakeholders, a detailed impact
assessment, and a study by an external consultant. The EC underlined
that the reform of the CU constitutes one important element in Turkey’s
accession process and should not be considered as an alternative to it
(European Commission, 2016b: 8). However, as of November 2020, the
member states justify the postponement of approval of the EC’s proposal,
citing concerns ‘about the continuing and deeply worrying backsliding
on the rule of law and on fundamental rights [in Turkey], including the
freedom of expression’ (European Council, 2019).
9.2.3 Refugee Management and Visa Liberalization Process
The EC was a crucial actor in the deepening of EU–Turkey cooperation in
irregular migration management (see also Kaya, Chapter 14). In January
2011, the EC and the Turkish government announced the finalization
of talks on an EU–Turkey Readmission Agreement, which was then
signed by Ankara in December 2013 and entered into force in October
2014. The agreement obliges Turkey to take back irregular immigrants
from third countries who have used Turkey as a transit country on their
way to the EU from December 2016 onwards (EU-Turkey Readmission
Agreement, 2013). Cooperation was further strengthened through the
Commission Action Plan of October 2015 (European Commission,
2015), which guided the EU–Turkey Statement agreed on 18 March
2016 (European Council, 2016), in which both parties, the European
Council and the Turkish government, decided to take steps toward
ending irregular migration from Turkey to the EU. In order to achieve
this goal, Turkey agreed to take back all new irregular migrants crossing
from Turkey into the Greek islands after 20 March 2016. For every
Syrian returned to Turkey, the EU offered to resettle another Syrian
from Turkey to the EU, taking into account the United Nations (UN)
Vulnerability Criteria. In addition, the EU announced a more rapid
disbursement of the allocated 3 billion EUR under the EU Facility for
Refugees in Turkey, established at the end of 2015, and mobilized an
226 A. BÜRGIN
additional 3 billion EUR to be used toward the Facility up until the
end of 2018. Furthermore, the EU committed itself to re-energizing the
accession process and opened Chapter 33 during the Dutch presidency
in the second half of 2016. Finally, the realization of a visa waiver for
Turkish citizens was announced at the end of June 2016 on the condition
that all benchmarks were met (see also Turhan & Wessels, Chapter 8).
The number of irregular immigrants arriving in Greece from Turkey
dropped dramatically after the agreement took effect. According to the
EC, which is responsible for monitoring the implementation of the EU–
Turkey Statement, daily crossings have decreased from 10,000 people
crossing in a single day in October 2015, to an average of 105 people per
day. In total, irregular arrivals remain 94% lower than the period before
the Statement became operational, and the number of lives lost at sea has
decreased substantially, from 1175 in the 20 months before the Statement
to 439 since the Statement has been in place (European Commission,
2020a).
A controversy between the EU and Turkey emerged regarding the
EU’s financial aid for Syrian refugees, agreed within the EU Facility
for Refugees in Turkey. Ankara’s complaint, that that the EU has not
fully disbursed the promised six billion EUR is rejected by the EU who
emphasizes that the transfer of money is made based on the contracted
projects. According to the EC, as of 31 March 2020 all operational funds
have been committed, 4.7 billion EUR contracted, and more than 3.2
billion EUR disbursed. The operational funds for the Facility for 2016–
2017 have been fully contracted, of which 2.48 billion EUR has been
disbursed. For 2018–2019, 1.76 billion EUR has been contracted, of
which 768 million EUR has been disbursed. The main focus areas are
humanitarian assistance, education, health, municipal infrastructure, and
socio-economic support (European Commission, 2020b).
Another controversy emerged on the benchmarks to be fulfilled for a
visa waiver for Turkish citizens. A Visa Liberalization Dialogue (VLD) was
already launched on 16 December 2013, in parallel with the signature of
the EU–Turkey Readmission Agreement. At that time, the member states
mandated the EC to start a VLD with Turkey on the conditions to be
fulfilled for the elimination of the visa obligation currently imposed on
Turkish citizens for short-term visits to the Schengen area. The VLD is
based on the Roadmap toward a Visa-Free Regime with Turkey, which
sets out the requirements that would enable the EP and the Council to
amend Regulation (EC) No. 539/2001, allowing Turkish citizens with
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biometric passports meeting EU standards short stays in the Schengen
member states without a visa (i.e., up to 90 days within any 180-
day period). The Roadmap outlines 72 benchmarks under five thematic
groups, namely document security; migration management; public order
and security; fundamental rights; and readmission of irregular migrants
(European Commission, 2013).
According to the EC’s third report on Turkey’s progress in fulfilling
the requirements of its visa liberalization roadmap (European Commis-
sion, 2016c), seven requirements out of 72 remain unfulfilled, including
in particular the demand for a revision of the legislation and practices
on terrorism in line with European standards—notably, more closely
aligning the definition of terrorism with that set out in Framework
Decision 2002/475/JHA, as amended in order to narrow the scope
of the definition, and by introducing a criterion of proportionality.
The European Parliament Conference of presidents (EP president and
political group leaders) stressed that the EP can only vote on the EC’s
proposal for lifting the visa requirement for Turkish citizens (European
Commission, 2016d) once all benchmarks have been fulfilled (European
Parliament, 2016). As Turkey refused to align its anti-terrorism laws with
the demands of the EU, the visa liberalization talks stagnated.
In response to the controversies over the visa waiver, and on the
EU’s financial aid for Turkey, the Turkish president regularly threatened
to withdraw from the March 2016 refugee ‘deal’ and ‘open the gates’.
Erdoğan finally acted on his threat in February 2020, when he encour-
aged thousands of refugees in the country to move toward the border
crossing between Turkey and Greece. He argued that a joint Russian-
Syrian military offensive in north-west Syria, forcing tens of thousands of
refugees fleeing toward Turkey, made it impossible to contain the flow of
refugees from Turkey to the EU. EU leaders criticized Ankara for using
the refugees as a lever to extract more from Europe. As both sides had
no interest in an escalation of the conflict, the EU and Turkey agreed on
9 March 2020 that the 2016 refugee agreement should remain valid, but
subject to review.
9.2.4 High Level Dialogues
In May 2012, the EC agreed with Turkey on a so-called ‘Positive
Agenda’, intended to both support and go beyond the accession nego-
tiations themselves, covering features important to both sides, such as
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visa and border management, migration, trade, energy, counterterrorism,
and foreign policy dialogue. The Positive Agenda aimed to bring a fresh
dynamic and a new momentum to EU–Turkey relations after a period
of stagnation caused by the freezing of eight negotiation chapters by the
Council in December 2006 and the unilateral blockage of further chap-
ters by France and Cyprus (Turhan, 2016: 469). To this end, working
groups were set up to accelerate the process of Turkey’s alignment
with EU policies and standards, reflecting the intention to comple-
ment and support rather than replace the accession process (European
Commission, 2012a). In 2015, Turkey and the EC launched high level
dialogues between Commissioners and Turkish ministers in the field of
foreign policy, economic policy, energy and climate policy, providing
opportunities to work on projects of common interest beyond the frame-
work of the accession process. The high level dialogues were further
institutionalized at an EU–Turkey summit on 29 November 2015, where
the EU heads of state or government and Ahmet Davutoğlu, then prime
minister of Turkey, agreed to reinforce the political exchange through
more frequent and better-structured meetings, including the organization
of biannual summits (European Council, 2015). While these meetings
were in fact less frequent than planned, due to the deterioration of the
relationship in the aftermath of the attempted coup of 15 July 2016,
these exchanges intensified after May 2017 (European External Action
Service, 2018), before being temporarily suspended by the 15 July 2019
Council decision in response to Turkey’s gas exploration in the Eastern
Mediterranean.
9.3 The Commission as a Critical but Fair
Supporter of Turkey’s Accession Prospects
Regarding the scientific debate on the role of the EC within the institu-
tional architecture of the EU, a chronological review of key EC activities
supports accounts that consider the EC as an autonomous, influential
actor rather than as a powerless agent of the member states. This inter-
pretation is reflected in the decision to open accession talks in 2005.
Despite granting Turkey candidate status in 1999, EU member states
were still divided over Turkey’s eligibility in principle. Attempts were
made by Turkey’s opponents such as the governments of Austria, Greece,
and Cyprus, or French Prime Minister Dominique de Villepin, to include
in the negotiation framework a ‘privileged partnership’ as an alternative
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to full membership and to make the recognition of Cyprus a precondition
for the opening of accession talks (Schimmelfennig, 2008: 21).
However, in 2004, the EC published a country report acknowledging
Turkey’s reform efforts (European Commission, 2004a: 55). The EC
concluded that Turkey had satisfactorily fulfilled the Copenhagen criteria
and therefore qualified for the opening of accession talks (European
Commission, 2004b: 3). While this decision required a unanimous deci-
sion in the Council, the opponents of accession talks found themselves
entrapped, compelled to comply with the rules of procedure agreed in
1999, when Turkey was given the status of a candidate country. There-
fore, they could not legitimately deny negotiations (Schimmelfennig,
2008: 22; see also Schimmelfennig, Chapter 6).
After the talks began, the EC was also crucial for their continuation.
Although Turkey had signed an Additional Protocol to the Ankara Agree-
ment in July 2005, obliging it to extend its CU to the new member state
Cyprus, Ankara refused its implementation. Its argument was that the
EU had gone back on its promise, made in a decision of the Council of
foreign ministers in April 2004, to open trade with the isolated Northern
Cyprus. The EU had promised to open trade with the North as a means
to reward the Turkish Northern part of the island for their ‘yes’ vote
in the reunification referendum. In April 2004, the Greek Cypriots had
rejected the reunification plan under the auspices of then UN General
Secretary Kofi Annan, while the Turkish Cypriots had approved it. Subse-
quently, the Republic of Cyprus joined the EU in May 2004 and vetoed
any direct trade relations between the EU and the Northern part of
the island. After Turkey refused to fulfill its obligation to open its ports
and airports to the Greek Cypriots, some member states requested a full
suspension of accession talks in 2006 (Turhan, 2016: 468). However,
Oliver Rehn, Enlargement Commissioner from 2004 to 2010, reminded
the member states that the EU also had failed to keep its promises. In the
end, the Council decided not to suspend talks entirely but followed the
EC’s proposal to only suspend talks on eight trade-related chapters.
The conditions for Turkey’s accession process further deteriorated with
the Constitutional Treaty’s ratification problems after the negative refer-
endums in France and the Netherlands in 2005 and the rejection of the
Lisbon Treaty in the Irish referendum in 2008. While survey analyses
revealed no significant relation between the ‘no’ vote and public opinion
on Turkey’s membership prospects (Ruiz-Jimenez & Torreblanca, 2008:
29), opponents of Turkey’s accession framed the opposition against the
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Constitutional Treaty in France and Netherlands as an expression of
public opinion against further enlargement and, in particular, as a rejec-
tion of Turkey’s membership (Bürgin, 2010). Commissioner Olli Rehn,
however, strongly rebutted the opponents’ position, arguing, ‘we have to
respect existing commitments’ (Bürgin, 2010: 421).
Rehn’s successor, Štefan Füle, was equally committed to Turkey’s
accession perspective and was the co-initiator of the Positive Agenda in
2012. The EC’s pro-Turkey approach is also illustrated in the debate
on visa waivers for Turkish citizens in the same year. EU member states
offered the Western Balkan countries a visa liberalization process in return
for the Readmission Agreement; however, for Turkey, member states
offered only visa facilitations. The EC, concerned about the EU’s cred-
ibility, argued that Turkey should be offered the same incentives as the
Balkan countries. This strong EC support contributed to the start of talks
on visa liberalization with Turkey (Bürgin, 2013).
The EC’s favor for a re-energized accession process is also evident in
its repeatedly expressed support for opening Chapters 23 (judiciary and
fundamental rights) and 24 (justice, freedom, and security). For instance,
in its 2014 progress report, the EC stated that it was in the interest of
both sides that the opening benchmarks for these chapters were defined
as soon as possible to allow talks on the respective chapters to be opened
(European Commission, 2014b: 1). So far, however, member states have
not agreed on a common position, including a definition of the opening
benchmarks for these chapters.
Despite former EC President Jean-Claude Juncker’s statement at the
start of his term in 2014 that Turkey will not join the EU in the foresee-
able future (CBS News, 2014), and then Commissioner for Enlargement
and Neighborhood Johannes Hahn’s call in November 2018 to end
negotiations with Turkey, the EC has remained committed to the contin-
uation of the accession process. While the EP and some member states
demanded an end of the accession process to show their disapproval of
Ankara’s response to the attempted 2016 coup, the EC, despite joining
widespread criticism toward Turkey, opposed an official breakup of the
talks. The EC did, however, recommend switching the focus to ongoing
work on projects of common interest rather than the accession process
itself (Eder, 2017). During a NATO summit in Brussels on 25 May 2017,
Juncker, then European Council President Donald Tusk, and Turkish
President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan agreed to resume an open dialogue,
at all levels, through a process of engagement in areas of common
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interest, in particular in the form of a resumption of high level dialogues
between Commissioners and Turkish ministers. In February 2018, Tusk
and Juncker jointly invited Erdoğan to a meeting on 26 March 2018 in
Varna, hosted by Bulgarian Prime Minister Boyko Borissov as the leader
of the country holding the rotating presidency of the Council of the EU
at that time (European Council, 2018).
Also the approach to Turkey of Ursula von der Leyen, EC President
since July 2019, is critical but fair. In February 2020, Turkey signed a
memorandum of understanding with Libya on a demarcation of maritime
zones in the region that ignored the island of Crete, which von der Leyen
condemned as unacceptable. However, in the March 2020 controversy
on migration policy cooperation, she struck a more conciliatory tone.
After Ankara’s announcement on 28 February 2020 that Turkey would
no longer stop migrants crossing into the EU, prompting thousands to
make their way to the Greek-Turkish borders, on 9 March 2020, Euro-
pean Council President Charles Michel and Ursula von der Leyen met
President Erdoğan in Brussels. After the meeting, she stressed the need
to support Turkey, involving finding a path forward for the two sides.
To this end, she announced a review of the 2016 refugee ‘deal’ to find
a common understanding of elements that are missing and those that are
already in place, so that missing elements can be implemented (European
Commission, 2020c).
9.4 The Commission as an Agent
for Change in Turkey
The role of the EC in the management of the IPA funds illustrates its role
as an agent for change in Turkey in two regards. First, the EC’s discre-
tion in the approval of IPA projects created an incentive for the project
applicants in Turkish ministries to comply with the EC’s demands. After
consultations with the Directorate for EU Affairs, which is responsible for
IPA coordination on the Turkish side and held ministry status between
2011 and 2018, the EC sets criteria for the distribution of funds. This is
important in balancing the Turkish side’s tendency to prioritize infrastruc-
ture projects with the EC’s preference for directing funds toward projects
focusing on the fulfillment of the political criteria (Bürgin, 2016: 112).
Another source of influence is the EC’s power over the acceptance of
proposals. Once the amount for each component and sector is decided,
Turkish ministries and agencies are requested to submit project proposals.
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The selection process is jointly coordinated by the Directorate for EU
Affairs and the EC; but the final decision belongs to the latter. Thus,
the EC has significant discretion in deciding which projects are accepted,
blocking some and prioritizing others. It can exploit the competition for
projects among departments and oblige ministries to ensure the inclu-
sion of certain aspects in the programming phase, regardless of whether
these are a priority for the applicant. For instance, the EC promotes stake-
holder participation. Thus, consulting civil society actors in the policy
formulation phase is a precondition for a successful project application,
resulting in institutionalized NGO involvement, even though the extent
of the change in attitude varies across the ministries. Potential beneficia-
ries, particularly ministries, tend to modify their project proposals after
direct contact with the EU Delegation in order to increase their chances
of success. Consequently, projects originally designed as simple requests
for technical assistance have been modified into twinning projects in line
with the EC’s preferences (Bürgin, 2016: 113). Twinning brings together
public administration officials of EU member states and beneficiary coun-
tries with the aim of achieving concrete mandatory operational results
through peer-to-peer activities. Between 2002 and 2015, 163 twinning
projects were funded in Turkey in various fields, from civil enforcement
to integrated border management, emission control, public accounts, and
organized crime (Delegation of the EU to Turkey, 2020).
Second, beyond setting incentives, the EC exercises a softer influence
on Turkish domestic politics via institution building and social learning
in networks established between the EC and Turkish administrators in
the IPA process (Bölükbaşı & Ertugal, 2013; Bürgin, 2016; İçduygu,
2007; Kirişci, 2012). In order to manage the EU accession talks and the
IPA process, Turkish ministries established EU departments in which an
increasing number of staff members have benefitted from IPA-financed
trainings. As a consequence, while in the past only a few, rather isolated
international relations experts were involved in EU affairs, today an exten-
sive community of EU experts exists in Turkey, facilitating intra- and
inter-ministerial exchange in EU-related matters. These experts are impor-
tant agents of change, as their recommendations are often more widely
accepted than those from the EU delegation (Bürgin, 2016: 113). In this
regard, the EC was able to establish a partnership with the Directorate
for EU Affairs, which, as the national IPA coordinator, has an impor-
tant mediation function between the EC and the project beneficiaries in
the ministries. Intensive training measures on IPA principles regarding
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programming, implementation, monitoring, and evaluation, in addition
to a significant increase in staff, have resulted in an improved institutional
capacity of Directorate for EU Affairs, thus contributing to more effective
project implementation in all IPA components (European Commission,
2012b).
Further research is required to understand the effect of the attempted
coup d’état in 2016 and the subsequent deterioration of the political
relations on the cooperation at the administrative level. While some EU
officials stated there has been no negative effect on project work at
administrative level, as this work is characterized by high levels of profes-
sionalism and mutual respect, others highlighted that projects at the
administrative level cannot easily escape from the influence of the broader
political context, arguing that increases in mutual mistrust at political
level also affect the technical level.2 Furthermore, it has been stated that
‘Turkish sensitivities over hosting EU or member state officials within
state bodies have become stronger’ and that after the attempted coup
‘cooperation with EU bodies has slowed down’ (Young & Küçükkeleş,
2017). This is illustrated by the cut of IPA funds and a slight decrease in
the number of completed twinning projects since 2011 (The Republic of
Turkey Directorate for EU Affairs, 2020).
9.5 Conclusion
After a review of EC–Turkey relations across a selection of policy areas,
this chapter has illustrated two aspects of EC influence in EU–Turkey
relations. First, as a defender of the rules of the (enlargement) game,
it has rebuffed attempts by some member states to undermine Turkey’s
membership prospects. The EC’s influence in the debate on the most
appropriate approach to Turkey underlines its autonomous role within the
EU system and the relevance of its norm-based argumentation. However,
due to Turkey’s current alienation from the EU’s normative standards,
norm-based arguments in favor of Turkey’s membership have lost much
of their weight. Therefore, an interesting avenue for research is to explore
2Interviews conducted by the author with officials from the European Commission in
Brussels, October 2016, and with officials from Germany’s National Contact Point for EU
Twinning and TAIEX at the Federal Ministry for Economic Affairs and Energy, December
2016.
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the extent to which the EC has been able to maintain its influence in the
debate among the member states on the future of EU–Turkey relations.
Second, the EC’s critical but fair approach and its role in the manage-
ment of the IPA funds have contributed to the survival of the accession
process in Turkey in some policy fields, despite the deterioration of polit-
ical relations since the opening of the accession talks. Ankara’s continued
harmonization with the EU acquis in some sectors, despite the waning
relevance of the EU’s conditionality strategy, can be explained in part by
Turkish domestic factors, such as Turkey’s general modernization strategy,
and by the effects of social learning processes enabled by good working
relations between officials from the EC and the Turkish ministries.
There is still a lack of investigation into how far the EC has been able
to establish mutual trust and lasting policy networks in its frequent inter-
actions with officials in Turkish ministries. In particular, there is a lack of
studies on how the recent deterioration in political relations has affected
EU–Turkey relations at the administrative level. Social learning processes
outside the official accession negotiations framework represent an oppor-
tunity to revive Europeanization processes in Turkey and deserve greater
scholarly attention. Therefore, further research may benefit from greater
attention to the role of the Turkish bureaucracy. These actors, although
frequently engaged with EU actors and EU projects, are neglected by
the Europeanization literature on Turkey, which rather tends to focus
on the behavior of the political elite, in particular the ruling party, in
order to explain the success or failure of Europeanization processes. The
EC therefore remains a crucial actor in shaping the future of EU–Turkey
relations.
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CHAPTER 10
The European Parliament’s Perspective
on EU–Turkey Relations
Michael Kaeding and Felix Schenuit
10.1 Introduction
Over the past fifteen years, the political situation between the European
Union (EU) and Turkey has experienced many ups and downs. Driven by
the migration crisis, the failed coup d’état on 15 July 2016, and ongoing
(mutual) provocations, relations between Brussels and Ankara continue
to face a multitude of challenges. These challenges have also shaped
the debates and decisions in the European Parliament (EP) regarding
EU–Turkey relations. These, in turn, have influenced the current state of
the accession negotiations. According to the EU Treaty, the EP has the
right to veto future rounds of EU enlargements. During the last fifteen
years, several resolutions on the general situation in Turkey, concrete calls
to ‘freeze’ accession negotiations in 2016 (European Parliament, 2016)
and the recommendation to ‘suspend’ negotiations in 2017 and 2019
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(European Parliament, 2017, 2019a) show that relations between the EP
and Turkey have become increasingly politicized and tense. The adoption
of these EP resolutions also confirms the observation that Members
of the European Parliament (MEPs) more and more feel the need and
responsibility to express their opinions and concerns about the situation
in Turkey (Phinnemore & İçener, 2016).
The role of the EP in EU–Turkey relations has attracted some schol-
arly attention, with scholars having explored EP–Turkey relations from
several perspectives. Scholars have analyzed the reasons why the EP’s role
in promoting the EU’s fundamental values in Turkey has remained largely
limited to the implications of the post-enlargement European interna-
tional society for Turkey. They also focused on the discourses of the main
center-right political party group (European People’s Party, EPP) in the
EP concerning Turkey’s accession to the EU, uncovered what drives the
EP’s discussions on a so-called ‘privileged partnership’ for Turkey, and
how MEPs voted on a particular amendment proposing a special status
for Turkey (Gürkan, 2018; Aydın-Düzgit, 2015; Rumelili, 2011; Yuvacı,
2013; Türkeş-Kılıç, 2020).
This contribution will go one step further. Based on MEPs’ voting
behavior on all Turkey-related files since 2005, we will show how the
EP’s support for Turkey’s accession to the EU has changed over time.
After having a supportive role in the first years of official negotiations,
the attitude of the MEPs changed significantly over the years. In 2017,
the EP called for suspending negotiations with Ankara. Twelve years after
the official start of accession negotiations, the EP closed its ‘accession
door’. In this chapter, we will analyze the EP’s perspective on EU–Turkey
relations over the years and its role in Brussels’ institutional structures.
We use VoteWatch Europe data to show why Sjursen’s (2002: 491) early
observation in 2002—that ‘[…] in order to trigger a decision to enlarge,
something more than instrumental calculations and something less than a
selfless concern for human rights has been at play’—is an accurate descrip-
tion of the EU’s negotiations with Turkey. Finally, we will identify a
possible key for ‘re-opening’ the EP’s ‘accession door’ and provide an
outlook for the EP perspective on EU–Turkey relations.
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10.2 EU–Turkey Relations
and the European Parliament
10.2.1 History and Formal Competencies
Unlike any other candidate state, Turkey is a divisive issue in political
discussions surrounding EU enlargement. Back in 1959, at the dawn of
European integration in the European Economic Community, Turkey
applied for (associate) membership of the newly formed confederation
of states. In 1963, an association agreement was drawn up with a view
toward membership (see also Turhan & Reiners, Chapter 1). During this
period, the European and Turkish parliaments started to cooperate in
an EU–Turkey Joint Parliamentary Committee. Initially, each side sent
a delegation of 15 members to the committee, which aimed to meet
twice a year, in venues alternating between Turkey and either Brussels
or Strasbourg. In accordance with the EP’s resolution of 14 May 1965,
the EP is to reflect on all matters relating to Turkey’s relations with the
EU. For example, after the entry into force of the Customs Union on
31 December 1995, the EP also scrutinized Turkey’s implementation
(European Parliament, 2009). At the start of Turkey’s application, both
sides were aware that Turkey’s EU accession would be a long-term
process; the goals of European integration were, and still are, uncertain,
and the cultural, political, and religious character of the states involved
are very different.
Article 49 of the Treaty of the European Union states that an abso-
lute majority of the EP must consent to the accession of a new member
state. Although the European Council and the Council remain the most
important institutions in the enlargement process (Turhan, 2016; see
also Turhan & Wessels, Chapter 8), the EP’s final approval of accession
provides the MEPs with veto power. Therefore, the EP established an
internal monitoring process with regard to Turkey’s accession from 2005
onward. Following the European Commission’s annual country reports,1
the MEPs express their opinions on the current state of the EU’s negoti-
ations and relationship to Turkey through an annual resolution on these
reports. In addition to this, the resolutions on the EU’s enlargement
1Until 2014, the reports were named ‘progress reports’, from 2015 onwards the
published reports by the Commission are named ‘Report on Turkey’. They are also
commonly referred to as ‘country’ or ‘regular’ reports. See also Bürgin, Chapter 9.
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strategy are part of the EP’s role in the negotiations. Another, more
technical, competency stems from its role in the adoption of the multi-
annual financial framework. Within the adoption of this special legislative
procedure, the EP has a vote on the allocation of the Instrument for
Pre-accession Assistance (IPA) (European Parliament, 2018; for a detailed
analysis on the role of IPA in Turkey, see Youngs & Küçükkeleş, 2017).2
The EP is not capable of ‘suspending’ the accession negotiations on its
own, but it can adopt critical resolutions, as it did in 2016, 2017, and
2019.
10.2.2 Relevant Actors and Procedures in the European Parliament
The following section identifies the relevant actors and procedures
regarding EU–Turkey relations within the EP. In addition to the already
mentioned resolutions on country reports by the Commission, this
section will also shed light on important MEPs, the Turkey delegation,
and the importance of ‘resolutions on topical subjects’.
10.2.2.1 Members of the European Parliament
Within the EP, three MEPs are of particular importance for the EP’s role
in EU–Turkey relations. Firstly, the rapporteur, who is responsible for
drafting resolutions on the reports on Turkey, has considerable influence
on the EP’s position on developments in Turkey. As the EP’s rappor-
teur on Turkey between 2014 and 2019, Kati Piri (Progressive Alliance
of Socialists and Democrats (S&D), Netherlands) coordinated these reso-
lutions. For the 9th legislative term (from October 2019 onward) the EP
appointed Nacho Sanchez Amor as the new rapporteur (S&D, Spain).
The prominence of the rapporteur was exemplified in an occurrence in
2016: Shortly before the above-mentioned resolution on suspension in
November 2016 and her forthcoming visit to Turkey as part of an offi-
cial EP delegation, Piri was declared a persona non grata by the Turkish
government (Baydar, 2016). The former president of the EP, Martin
2The Instrument for Pre-accession Assistance for Turkey amounted to 3.533 million
EUR from 2014 to 2020 (IPA II), not including the allocation for Cross-border Cooper-
ation. Between 2007 and 2013, the EU spent 4.799 million EUR for IPA I. For IPA II,
the EU agreed on the following priority sectors for funding: democracy and governance,
rule of law and fundamental rights, home affairs, environment and climate action, trans-
port, energy, competitiveness and innovation, education, employment and social policies,
agriculture and rural development, and regional and territorial cooperation.
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Schulz, therefore, postponed the visit of the delegation, although he
initially arranged to continue the trip in order to strengthen the dialogue
between the EU and Turkey.
The president of the EP is the second MEP of individual importance.
On the one hand, s/he represents the EP’s viewpoint on developments in
Turkey and EU–Turkey relations as well as personally deals with Turkish
government officials during their visits in Brussels; therefore, s/he is in
direct contact with Turkish government representatives. For example, in
2019, EP President David Sassoli declared Turkey’s military incursion
into Northern Syria ‘an act of war’ (Kennedy & Chadwick, 2019). On
the other hand, the president is responsible for reacting to the criticism
of EP resolutions coming from the Turkish government.
In addition to the rapporteur and the president, the chair of the foreign
affairs committee (AFET) is a person of interest. As the AFET committee
is responsible for relations with candidate countries and therefore prepares
the EP’s internal procedures and resolutions, its chair—together with
the rapporteur—is responsible for coordinating and organizing a majority
vote on the EP’s positions on EU–Turkey relations.
10.2.2.2 The European Parliament’s Delegation to the EU–Turkey
Joint Parliamentary Committee
The EP has 41 delegations to third countries. Each MEP is a full member
of one delegation and a substitute member of another. Twenty-five
MEPs are regular members of the Turkey delegation and, together with
twenty-five parliamentarians from Turkey, they form the EU–Turkey Joint
Parliamentary Committee (JPC). According to its Rules of Procedures
approved in 2010, ‘the Committee shall, in principle, meet three times
a year’ with a view to ‘analyse and evaluate issues related to all existing
bilateral arrangements between Turkey and the EU’ and strengthen ‘the
relations between the Turkish Grand National Assembly and the Euro-
pean Parliament’ (European Parliament, 2010: Rule 2). According to the
2019 EP resolution, the JPC met in March 2018 ‘after three years of
standstill in interparliamentary relations’ (European Parliament, 2019a).
The following section analyzes the composition of the EP delegation
during the last three terms of the EP and argues that party group affil-
iations and nationality matter. An analysis of the EP’s composition by
country reveals a remarkable imbalance in both of these categories.
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10.2.2.3 Composition of the European Parliament Delegation
As Fig. 10.1 shows, the composition of the EP delegation according
to political group does not differ significantly from the party-political
composition of the plenary. The relative proportions of the parties seem
to have been consistent over the last four election periods.
However, taking a look at the composition of the EP delegation by
nationality (Fig. 10.2), the proportions of the various nationalities of
MEPs in the delegation have changed significantly over the last few
years, and the proportionality by member state has not been maintained.
The United Kingdom, for example, was no longer represented at all in
the EP delegation in the 8th election period, despite having a relatively
large number of MEPs. However, Greek and Cypriot MEPs have always
been considerably overrepresented (17%). During the 8th legislative term,
the number of Greek MEPs outnumbered even the German delegation,
closely followed by the Cypriot MEPs, despite the clear differences in
their respective absolute numbers of MEPs (Germany: 96, Greece: 21,
Cyprus: 6). Today, still, 17% of MEPs sitting on the delegation are from
Greece and Cyprus.
Traditionally, also, with the exception of the current (9th) election
period, at least one of the vice-chairs has been a Greek MEP. Greece
and Turkey are closely connected with the Cyprus conflict, which repre-
sents one of the key differences of opinion between Turkey and the EU
(see also Turhan & Reiners, Chapter 1). In the 8th election period, chair
and all vice-chairs have been Greek and Cypriot MEPs. The principle
of ensuring that within the delegation ‘Member States […] are fairly
represented’ (European Parliament, 2020: 123), set out in the Rules of
Procedure of the Parliament, is clearly not observed here.
10.2.2.4 Resolutions
In the EP, two different types of resolutions are especially relevant for the
EU’s relations with Turkey. First, MEPs vote on incident-driven ‘resolu-
tions on topical subjects’. They use this to express their opinions about
specific developments in Turkey or EU–Turkey relations in a more general
sense. Second, the EP has a more routinized procedure and formulates a
resolution on the Commission’s country report on Turkey. During the
last few years, so-called ‘own-initiative’ reports have been adopted more
and more frequently (see Table 10.1). The most recent EP resolutions on
Turkey illustrate the relevant topics discussed in the EP in this context:
the Armenian ‘genocide’, the situation of journalists in Turkey, a response
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Fig. 10.1 Composition of the European Parliament’s Delegation to the
EU–Turkey Joint Parliamentary Committee by political group in the 6th (2004–
2009), 7th (2009–2014), 8th (2014–2019), and 9th (2019–2024) election
period3 (Source Own compilation based on European Parliament [n.d.]. Delega-
tion to the EU–Turkey Joint Parliamentary Committee: Members [current term
and archives])
3Abbreviations of political groups in the EP in alphabetical order: ALDE: Alliance of
Liberals and Democrats for Europe—RENEW: Renew Europe since the 9th EP term;
ECR: European Conservatives and Reformists; EFDD: Europe of Freedom and Direct
Democracy; EPP: European People’s Party; GREENS: Greens—GREENS/EFA: Greens-
European Free Alliance since the 9th EP term; GUE-NGL: European United Left/Nordic
Green Left; ID: Identity and Democracy; NI: Non-Inscrits (MEPs not in a political
group); PSE: Party of European Socialists/Progressive Alliance of Socialists and Democrats
(S&D).
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Fig. 10.1 (continued)
to police intervention in the Gezi Park demonstrations, a response to the
political developments after the coup attempt, and the current human
rights situation in Turkey.
The Commission’s annual country reports and the EP’s subsequent
response provide deeper insight into the relationship between the EU
and Turkey. Since the start of the official negotiations in 2005, these
reports have acted as some kind of official barometer for accession nego-
tiations with Turkey. The Commission drafts these reports as part of the
annual ‘enlargement package’ for each candidate country and potential
candidate countries. In the reports, the Commission assesses the current





























































Fig. 10.2 Composition of the European Parliament’s Delegation to the EU–
Turkey Joint Parliamentary Committee by nationality in the 6th (2004–2009),
7th (2009–2014), 8th (2014–2019), and 9th (2019–2024) election period
(Source Own compilation based on European Parliament [n.d.]. Delegation to
the EU–Turkey Joint Parliamentary Committee: Members [current term and
archives])






















































developments in each country on the basis of the criteria that are rele-
vant to accession (see also Bürgin, Chapter 9). In response, the EP then
adopts a resolution on these reports in which it expresses an opinion
on the current developments in the relevant country and the status of
the negotiations. These annual EP resolutions have therefore become a
routine within the Parliament. During the last fifteen years, these reso-
lutions have covered a vast variety of topics and were always adapted to
the current political situation and occurrences in Turkey and the EU.
Nevertheless, some topics have been constantly debated from 2005 until
today. Phinnemore and İçener observe, ‘debates on the Commission’s
regular reports on Turkish accession have often been heated’ and that the
following issues have been debated regularly: ‘the rule of law, freedom
of press, democratic backsliding, authoritarian tendencies, social media
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Table 10.1 List of the European Parliament’s topical resolutions on Turkey
(2009–2019)
Year Title of resolution Document file
Date of the vote
7th Legislative Term (2009–2014)
2009 Resolution on the Commission’s 2009 enlargement




2010 Trade and economic relations with Turkey 2009/2200(INI)
21.09.2010
2012 2020 perspective for women in Turkey 2011/2066(INI)
22.05.2012
2013 Resolution on the situation in Turkey 2013/2664(RSP)
13.06.2013
8th Legislative Term (2014–2019)
2014 Resolution on Turkish actions creating tensions in the
exclusive economic zone of Cyprus
2014/2921(RSP)
13.11.2014
2015 Resolution on freedom of expression in Turkey: recent




2016 Resolution on the situation of journalists in Turkey 2016/2935(RSP)
27.10.2016
2016 Resolution on EU–Turkey relations 2016/2993(RSP)
24.11.2016




2018 Resolution on the violation of human rights and the rule








2018 Resolution covering the cancellation of the support to
Turkey from IPA II
2018/2165(BUD)
02.10.2018
9th Legislative Term (2019–2024)








Source Own compilation based on the Legislative Observatory of the EP
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bans, the freedoms and rights accorded to religious and ethnic minori-
ties, Turkish Government positions on the Cyprus issue and the Armenian
“genocide”’ (Phinnemore & İçener, 2016: 457). Furthermore, Phin-
nemore and İçener highlight the EP’s ‘fierce criticism’ on the handling
of the Gezi Park protests. They conclude that while there is support for
Turkey’s accession in the EP, it is ‘highly conditional, and it cannot mask
the opposition’ (Phinnemore & İçener, 2016: 457).
10.2.3 Methodology: VoteWatch as the Key to Assessing Power
Dynamics in the European Parliament
Focusing on the voting records of MEPs in light of the annual resolutions
on the regular reports on Turkey is a useful tool to trace the state of
affairs in EU–Turkey relations from the EP’s perspective. Our analysis
for the adopted resolutions from 2005 to 2019 is based on data made
available by VoteWatch Europe.4 The study of this data helps identify
possible turning points and other characteristics of the EP’s perspective
on EU–Turkey relations.
The VoteWatch database includes all electronic roll-call votes in the
EP. It includes final votes as well as partial votes on amendments. The
data can be organized by political group affiliation, nationality, and voting
behavior of the individual MEPs. Besides breaking down the votes into
‘For’, ‘Against’, ‘Abstention’, ‘Absent’, and ‘Didn’t vote’, the database
also classifies the MEPs as being loyal to their European political group
line or deviating from it. The political line of the group is determined by
the majority of the votes cast within each party. In addition to breaking
down the voting results in this way, the VoteWatch portal calculates a
cohesion rate within the political groups and member states for each vote.
The main weakness of the data lies in its limited availability. The
VoteWatch database can collect electronic roll-call votes only. Every vote
decided by so-called ‘show of hands’ is not part of the database. In this
particular analysis, the data for the resolutions in 2007, 2010, 2011,
and 2018 is missing. Despite the shortcomings of the available data, the
dataset helps identify voting patterns of individual political groups and
national delegations over the last fourteen years inside the EP.
4VoteWatch Europe is an independent, international non-governmental organisation. It
provides access to the voting data of the European Parliament and European Council.
For the Parliament, the voting data for all roll-call votes since July 2004 is available.
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10.2.4 Changes in Sentiment in EU–Turkey Relations?
Parliamentary Voting Results from 2005 to 2019
Our interpretation of the data is based on the following observation
and assumption: from 2005 to 2016, every single resolution included
the demand to open new negotiation chapters in the accession process.
Although many counterarguments by opponents of Turkey’s accession
can be found in the text of the resolutions, voting for these resolutions, in
the end, legitimized the ongoing process and can therefore be interpreted
as support for the accession process. On the basis of this assumption, it
can also be said that the 2017 resolution then did not include any demand
to open new chapters and even called—as mentioned above—for the ‘sus-
pension’ of the ongoing process. By including the call for suspending
the accession process, the meaning of voting ‘for’ and ‘against’ reversed.
Whereas voting ‘for’ the resolution stood for support of an ongoing acces-
sion procedure from 2005 to 2016, voting ‘for’ the resolution in 2017
was an expression of deep concern about the accession process and the
political demand to put the procedure on hold.
10.2.4.1 Decreasing Support for Turkey’s Accession
in the European Parliament
Looking at the voting behavior of the Parliament on various resolutions
since 2005 (Fig. 10.3), it becomes clear that the EP’s voting behavior
severely changed between 2005 and 2019. The EP’s highest approval
rating of Turkey’s accession was reached in 2008, with just over 70%
of MEPs in favor. In comparison with 2005 (49%), the approval level
had risen by 23%. At the same time, the number of votes ‘against’ had
decreased by 11% in this period (2005–2008). However, this trend was
reversed with the resolution in 2012. Since then, support within the
Parliament has fallen. While the proportion of MEPs rejecting the resolu-
tions rose to 20% by 2014, the approval level dropped to 63% (2014) and
then to 49.9% (2016).6 In 2017, however, the trend of decreasing ‘for’
votes reversed due to the above-mentioned reorientation of the political
6In the case of rulings on which a decision is made by means of a consent procedure,
an absolute majority of the MEPs is required, i.e., 50% of the constituent MEPs plus
one. This means that everyone who does not vote in favor rejects this absolute majority.
This group of objectors, which is made up of three subgroups (Non-voters, Absent, and
Against) would have been able to prevent Turkey’s accession to the EU in 2005 and
again in 2016.
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demand of the resolution. The remarkable increase of ‘for’ votes (+14%)
is therefore due to the inclusion of the political demand to ‘suspend’ the
accession negotiations (European Parliament, 2017: 7). If this reorienta-
tion is taken into account (‘Reoriented For’ in Fig. 10.3), support for the
accession negotiations continued to decrease and reached its lowest level
in 2017.
Figure 10.4 illustrates the support for the accession procedure based
on the condensed observations and assumptions presented above. By
assuming that ‘non-voters’, ‘abstentions’, and ‘against’ votes from 2005
to 2016 and ‘for’ voters in 2017 imply opposition to the formal accession
process, the chart illustrates that the support for the accession procedure
increased from 2005 (47.71%) to 2009 (71.74%) and decreased since then
to 36.23% in 2017. In 2019, 50.67% of MEPs voted for the resolution,
which is due to the fact that the resolution recommends that the EU
‘suspend’ the accession negotiations.
10.2.4.2 Strategic Non-voters in the European Parliament
There is a correlation between the number of MEPs who did not vote and
those who voted ‘for’ the resolution. This trend implies that MEPs who





















Fig. 10.3 Voting results for European Parliament resolutions on reports on
Turkey (2005–2019)5 (Source Own illustration based on VoteWatch)
5Voting results for 2007, 2010, 2011, and 2018 are missing.
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in the vote than abstain or reject the resolution. It is logical to assume that
they do this strategically as to avoid being categorized as ‘rebels’ and to
avoid internal group conflicts. This is particularly clear in the vote on the
2016 resolution, where the ‘for’ vote decreased by 7%, and the number
of non-votes simultaneously increased by 7%. In this vote, more than 20%
of the MEPs did not vote at all.
10.2.5 Politicized Voting Behavior of Political Groups
in the European Parliament
A deeper understanding of the underlying dynamics within the EP can
be established on the basis of voting behavior within political groups (see
Fig. 10.5). The extent to which the political groups themselves coordi-
nate or control the voting behavior of their members can be seen from
the cohesion rates for each vote. Here, interesting differences occur: The
cohesion rates for the conservative groups are, on average, consider-
ably lower than for the groups positioned to the left. The center-right
Fig. 10.4 Support for the accession procedure among Members of the Euro-
pean Parliament (2005–2019)7 (Source Own illustration based on VoteWatch)
7 ‘Non For’ includes ‘Against’, ‘Abstention’, and ‘Non-Voters’.
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European People’s Party (EPP) is—as the biggest group in the EP—
particularly striking in this regard. Since 2005, it has supported every
majority in favor of the EP resolutions on the Commission’s country
reports. However, the cohesion rates for the EPP show that this posi-
tion has been highly contentious within the group. A comparison with
the second-largest political group, the center-left European Socialists and
Democrats (S&D), reveals that the cohesion rates of the EPP have, on
average, been 22% lower over the last years than those of the S&D group.
To get a deeper understanding of this development in individual
groups in the EP, the voting data can be compared at different points
in time. We selected 2005 as the starting point of the accession negotia-
tions, 2012 as the turning point marking decreasing support for Turkey’s
accession, and the latest votes, in particular in 2019 (see Fig. 10.6).
The voting data for the individual political groups at three different
points in time illustrate that S&D, Alliance of Liberals and Democrats
Fig. 10.5 Cohesion of voting behavior of the political groups in the European
Parliament on the resolutions concerning the European Commission progress
reports on Turkey (in %)8 (Source Own illustration based on VoteWatch)
8Abbreviations of further political groups or parties in the EP: ENF: Europe of
Nations and Freedom; IN/DEM: Independence/Democracy; UEN: Union for Europe of
the Nations. PPE-DE is the French abbreviation for European People’s Party–European
Democrats (from 1999 to 2009), which is the EPP since 2009.














































Fig. 10.6 Voting behavior of the political groups in the European Parliament
regarding the resolutions adopted in 2005, 2012, 2016, 2017, and 2019 (in %)
(Source Own illustration based on VoteWatch)
258 M. KAEDING AND F. SCHENUIT
(ALDE) (Renew Europe since, 2019), and the Greens9 had a stable
majority voting in favor of the resolutions and had no major anomalies.
Only the Greens decided by a majority to abstain in the 2019 from voting
on the resolution that called for the suspension of accession talks. One
Green MEP explained this vote in the plenary debate by stating, ‘(w)e
want to be tough on the regime, but we do not want to suspend nego-
tiations. We want them to continue to be frozen’ (European Parliament,
2019b). In contrast, other political groups have continually stood against
the resolutions and shown notable changes over time.
The European United Left/Nordic Green Left (GUE-NGL) group
represents a special case, as does the strongest group in the Parliament
over the last three parliamentary terms, the EPP. In regard to GUE-
NGL, it is worth mentioning that there has been a significant reversal.
While the majority voted in favor of accepting the resolution in 2005,
the majority abstained from the votes in 2012 and 2016. Also, after
the above-mentioned substantive reorientation of the latest resolutions
in 2017, the majority of the GUE-NGL voted to abstain (85%). On the
one hand, the group repeatedly stressed the unresolved Cyprus conflict.
In this context, the Greek GUE-NGL MEP Kostas Chrysogonos said in
2017, for ‘twelve years, Turkey has behaved like a hypocrite. It says that
it wants to come into line with the European Union and the EU pretends
that it believes that’ (GUE-NGL, 2017). At the same time, the German
GUE-NGL MEP Martina Michels stressed in the 2019 plenary debate
on the progress report resolution to ‘opt for the signal of freezing the
negotiations rather than breaking off. Let us show dialogue and solidarity,
because Turkey is more than Erdoğan, it is above all the opposition and
civil society. They need our voice!’ (European Parliament, 2019b). It is
precisely these different aspects of GUE-NGL’s political positions toward
EU–Turkey relations that led these MEPs to vote to abstain.
In this regard, the EPP also seems to have undergone a change. While
there was a slim majority against accepting the resolution in 2005, the
MEPs in the EPP voted 80% in favor in 2012. This strong support might
9One exception is the abstention of the Greens in 2005. From the minutes of the
plenary sessions and a comparison of the motions for a resolution from the various political
groups it is apparent that the Greens were considerably more open to Turkey’s accession
and chose far more positive wording than the other groups (see European Parliament,
2005a). The co-chair of the Greens, Daniel Cohn-Bendit, expressed the criticism that
many of the statements by MEPs of other political groups opposing Turkey’s accession
were based on ‘racist resentments’ (European Parliament, 2005b).
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be explained by a positive-pragmatic agenda that was set in light of a
political context shaped by an economic crisis and international security
challenges. Although the strategic role of EU–Turkey cooperation was
mentioned in adopted resolutions before, the 2012 resolution addresses
strategic aspects of the cooperation in an open manner. In 2016, the
voting behavior of this political group suggested a major disagreement
on this issue. Almost half of the MEPs did not vote in favor (14%
against, 31% abstention/non-voter). It seems that the already mentioned
substantive reorientation of the 2017 resolution, in which the EP called
for suspending the negotiations, solved this disagreement and therefore
helped reduce the number of the above-mentioned strategic non-voters.
In the latest votes, more than 70% of EPP members voted in favor of
the resolution, a few voted against the resolution, and around 20% voted
to abstain or did not vote. In the latest votes the EPP’s cohesion there-
fore increased considerably (from 57% in 2016, to 82% in 2017). After
the significant change in the political message, there was no disagree-
ment between the German or French delegation and their political group.
Thus, the former ‘haven for ‘rebels’ in the German and French EPP
delegation’ (Kaeding & Schenuit, 2016) does not exist anymore. The
remaining rebels within the EPP came from Hungary (11), Croatia (5),
Bulgaria (4), Czech Republic (1), and Cyprus (1).
The latest votes in 2016, 2017, and 2019 show that the European
Conservatives and Reformists (ECR) is divided on this issue. Although
‘for’ votes increased from 30 to 51%, the new political message of freezing
the accession in the 2017 and 2019 resolutions did not solve these
differences. The voting result of the group Europe of Freedom and
Direct Democracy (EFDD), however, seems to be affected by shifting
the political message from continuation to freezing the negotiations with
Turkey.
10.3 Conclusions and Outlook
Our analysis shows how the EP’s perspective on EU–Turkey relations has
changed over time. After increasing support for accession from 2005 to
2008, more and more MEPs have reconsidered their voting behavior.
Support for the resolutions reached its lowest point in 2016: less than
50% supported the resolution on the country report on Turkey and more
than half of all MEPs decided to vote ‘against’, ‘abstention’, or chose
strategic non-voting to hide conflicts in the political group. In 2017 and
260 M. KAEDING AND F. SCHENUIT
2019, however, this trend stopped, and the ‘for’ votes increased, again.
This recent development is due to a political reorientation: in 2017, for
the first time since 2005, the resolution on the report did not demand
the opening of negotiations chapters. In fact, the MEPs voted for the
demand to ‘suspend’ negotiations. The VoteWatch data suggest that the
EPP, in particular, was divided on this issue and that the reorientation
solved internal group conflicts.
Overall, we notice that EU–Turkey relations have not only become
increasingly politicized but also that the EP lacks a political majority for
the continuation of the accession procedure with Turkey. Although its
decisions do not have any immediate impact on the formal ongoing acces-
sion process, this reorientation is another signal of a ‘closed accession
door’ in Brussels.
The development in the EP and its inter-institutional differences with
the European Council (see Turhan & Wessels, Chapter 8) shows that
Sjursen was right when she observed that a decision to enlarge is ‘some-
thing more than instrumental calculations and something less than a
selfless concern for human rights has been at play’ (Sjursen, 2002: 491).
Whereas the European Council is focusing on instrumental calculations,
especially with regard to the migration crisis, the EP is mainly focusing
on the importance of human rights, rule of law, and the EU’s other core
values—the basic elements of a democratic society.
Our analysis clearly shows that the EP has closed its accession door
for Turkey. In the current political situation a re-opening seems unlikely.
Nevertheless, in the years between 2005 and 2019, the reports on
Turkey and the EP resolutions have voiced many arguments for the
importance of a ‘strategic partnership’ between the EU and Turkey.
These arguments should not be wiped away in an increasingly politicized
environment. Vote-seeking and closing the door to accession without
identifying possible alternatives for cooperation would be politically and
geostrategically shortsighted. The identification and establishment of new
narratives for cooperation with Turkey should be a long-term goal for the
EP and its MEPs. The upcoming parliamentary terms could be an occa-
sion for the European parties to present their concepts for the future of
EU–Turkey relations.
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Turkey has always been a special as well as difficult case in the context
of European Union (EU) enlargement. Early on, Ankara’s drive toward
Brussels posed many fundamental questions for the European Communi-
ties (Lippert, 2005a). Thus, Turkey’s plea for membership, with a formal
application sent to Brussels in 1987, contributed to the general devel-
opment of association and enlargement policies by the EU and to the
interplay between them. The political and economic criteria for member-
ship, interests in enlargement among elites in member states and third
countries, and the role of public opinion all had to be considered. The ups
and downs in the decades-long relations between Brussels and Ankara in
the context of enlargement indicate the difficulties both sides experienced
in terms of commencing and concluding accession negotiations. Today,
the outcome is highly uncertain. The EU and its members have some-
what lost their sense of purpose and strayed from their earlier strategy on
B. Lippert (B)
German Institute for International and Security Affairs / Stiftung Wissenschaft
und Politik (SWP), Berlin, Germany
e-mail: barbara.lippert@swp-berlin.org
© The Author(s) 2021




bilateral relations. It is questionable whether Turkey even is still a case for
enlargement or whether it has already turned into a dead case.
To describe and explain Turkey as a special case of EU enlargement
policy, this chapter focuses on the following aspects. Firstly, the overall
concepts, motives, and criteria of EU enlargement are introduced. The
second section deals with critical questions that Turkey poses for the
EU in this respect, in particular in view of Turkey’s ‘Europeanness’, its
strategic value, political order, democracy, and political culture, and in
terms of the EU’s capacity to absorb a new state. The third section
outlines how pre-stages of the accession process, negotiation framework,
and the conduct of negotiations have played out. The focus is thus on
issues that make Turkey a special and (almost) dead case of EU enlarge-
ment policy. The chapter concludes with a brief outlook on future bilateral
relations.
The bulk of recent contributions to the study of EU–Turkey relations
is notably from think tanks that monitor the increasingly strained rela-
tionship and develop policy proposals for how to overcome the deadlock
(e.g., Dalay, 2018; Carnegie Europe, 2018; Hoffman & Werz, 2019;
Pierini, 2019). As far as earlier academic contributions are concerned,
EU–Turkey relations were largely considered in terms of the analyt-
ical concepts of Europeanization, transformation, modernization, and
external governance. These topics were therefore analyzed in the liter-
ature on enlargement and accession policy or neighborhood policy, even
if this did not coincide with the EU’s geographic definition of Euro-
pean Neighborhood Policy (e.g., chapters on ‘Turkey and enlargement’
in Weidenfeld & Wessels, 2005–2019; chapters on ‘Wider Europe’ in
Copsey and Haughton, 2012–2014; Fraser, 2004; Rehn, 2006; Seufert
& Fischer, 2018; Dürkop, 2018; Leiße & Tryk, 2004; Schimmelfennig,
2018; Tocci, 2014). With the diminishing role of the enlargement frame-
work and tensions over Turkey’s membership of the North Atlantic
Treaty Organization (NATO), research on EU–Turkey relations is likely
no longer to be conducted primarily through the lenses of accession
and enlargement,1 analyzing domestic developments inside Turkey and
Ankara’s foreign relations, but increasingly shift back to classical concepts
1See, for example, the research program of the Center for Applied Turkey Studies
(CATS), established in 2019 in Berlin, https://www.swp-berlin.org/en/cats-turkey/. See
also Turhan and Reiners, Chapter 1.
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of International Relations (e.g., structural realism) or comparative govern-
ment (e.g., hybrid regimes, authoritarianism, etc.) (e.g., Özerdem &
Whiting, 2019; Talbot, 2018; Goff-Taylor, 2017; Morillas et al., 2018;
White & Herzog, 2018).
11.2 Concept, Motives,
and Criteria of EU Enlargement
Enlargement is about extending the geographic scope of the legal and
political acquis to third countries that join the EU. Thus, enlargement
policy is not a clearly defined policy field (as are, for instance, competi-
tion policy or foreign and security policy) but a horizontal approach that
impacts the EU’s polity, politics, and policies. It concerns fundamental
principles and provokes soul-searching exercises at the EU and national
levels about the EU’s political identity and its wider aspirations. At the
same time, it tests existing policies and compromises over the distribu-
tion of power and resources within the EU and thus affects the internal
equilibrium in many ways (Lippert, 2011: 238–239; 2019a: 23–25).
In practical terms, enlargement policy is defined as the accession of new
members to the EU, including the EU’s strategies, activities, and proce-
dures related to this process. Over successive rounds of enlargement, the
EU modified its enlargement policy in response to the specific demands
of new entrants. In this context, it developed an ever more comprehensive
pre-accession strategy. The EU also takes account of its own absorption
capacities in light of the state and dynamics of European integration.
The drivers of enlargement are mainly European third countries, such
as Turkey, that want to join the EU. They expect EU membership to
serve their security interests, to improve their prosperity, and to anchor or
advance their democratic political order (Lippert, 2011: 243–244). The
EU’s motives for enlargement are generally not as explicit and straight-
forward as they are for candidate countries. Generally speaking, the EU is
eager to frame accession as a win–win opportunity. There are also endoge-
nous factors that drive enlargement from inside the EU. Right from the
start all European Communities defined and understood themselves as
communities open to new members.2
2 ‘Any European State may apply to become a member of the Community. It
shall address its application to the Council which, after obtaining the opinion of the
Commission, shall act by means of a unanimous vote’ (Art. 237 EEC Treaty).
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The EU does not choose or ask countries to join; it merely examines
the applications of those European countries that want to join. It does,
therefore, need membership criteria. While the democratic credentials of
the first applicant countries, Denmark and the United Kingdom (UK) in
1961, were seen as unproblematic, others were not. On the occasion of
the application of Spain under Franco for association in 1962 (Powell,
2015: 7) and the association negotiations with Greece and Turkey in
the early 1960s, the European Economic Community (EEC) started to
develop criteria and procedures to formalize relations with third countries.
In the case of both association and accession, the European Commission
(EC) and the European Parliament (EP) realized that the political terms
of the future relationship were critical and deserved special attention. As
such, a member of the European Assembly, Willi Birkelbach, produced a
report that outlined both the political and the economic criteria for future
members (Birkelbach, 1962: 5; see also Lippert, 2011: 250).
This acted as a precursor to the Copenhagen criteria, defined by the
European Council in Copenhagen in 1993. The Copenhagen political
criteria stipulate that ‘membership requires that the candidate country
has achieved stability of institutions guaranteeing democracy, the rule of
law, human rights and respect for and protection of minorities’ (European
Council, 1993: 13). This set of political criteria was not directly copied
into the written provisions of the treaties, but its substance is referenced in
the values of the EU as laid down in Article 2 of the Treaty on European
Union (TEU). Article 49 of the TEU, and political documents produced
in the course of developing the practical enlargement policy mostly by the
European Council and the Commission, define core elements with regard
to the political compatibility of applicants: ‘Any European state which
respects the values referred to in Article 2 and is committed to promoting
them may apply to become member of the Union’. Moreover, the Euro-
pean Council has the right to define conditions for membership, as it had
already done with the declaration of the Copenhagen criteria in 1993
(see Turhan & Wessels, Chapter 8). Beyond the political criteria, the
Copenhagen criteria included the economic criteria and the so-called
acquis criteria:
[…] the existence of a functioning market economy as well as the capacity
to cope with competitive pressure and market forces within the Union.
Membership presupposes the candidate’s ability to take on the obligations
of membership including adherence to the aims of political, economic and
monetary union. (European Council, 1993: 13)
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Based on these criteria, the EU applies a policy of conditionality (Börzel
et al., 2017; Schimmelfennig, 2008), understood as the expectation that
once the applicant has fulfilled all conditions, the country can join the EU.
The Commission was tasked with closely monitoring progress in candi-
date countries toward this goal. To support candidates’ efforts in the
pre-accession period, the EU committed itself to the transfer of money
under the Instrument for Pre-Accession Assistance, know-how (for insti-
tution building, setting up of public administration), and participation in
community programs (see also Bürgin, Chapter 9).
11.3 Critical Questions for the EU
with Regard to Turkey’s Membership Application
11.3.1 Europeanness
Following Turkey’s official application for membership in 1987, the first
question to be answered was whether or not the EEC regarded Turkey
as a European country. ‘Europeanness’, although at no point defined in
the European treaties, has always been the principal condition to qualify
as an applicant. Famously, in 1987 the Commission immediately turned
down Morocco’s application because it did not count as a European
country. In contrast, the path toward accepting Ankara’s application was
already paved in the 1960/1970s when the EEC consistently agreed
that Turkey qualified as European. At that time a purely political, not
a geographic, historical, or cultural definition, prevailed among member
states. From their view Turkey was firmly placed in the West: Ankara
was a Marshall Plan beneficiary and later on a member of the Organisa-
tion for Economic Co-operation and Development (1961), the Council
of Europe (1950), and NATO (1952). In the Cold War era, the first
president of the Commission of the EEC, Walter Hallstein, stated that
the EEC and member states shared Turkey’s aspiration for membership
(Kramer & Reinkowski, 2008: 156). A case in point is Article 28 of the
Association Agreement of 1963, which concluded that the EEC will later
consider membership for Turkey (EEC-Turkey Association Agreement,
1963: Art. 28). Thus, the initial agreement among the six EEC members
that Turkey was a European country that could apply for membership
created path dependency from the early 1960s until today. EU institutions
never officially retreated from this early stance. However, when the EEC
reacted to Turkey’s first official application, some governments and public
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opinion in EEC member states challenged Turkey’s ‘Europeanness’, based
on the changing geopolitical landscapes after 1989 (see below). Thus, the
EU’s clarity in regard to Turkey’s Europeanness, and the credibility of
Turkey’s prospective membership were stronger on paper than in reality
even in the late 1980s.
11.3.2 Strategic Value
Turkey’s strategic value for the EEC has always been its geographic loca-
tion. After the Second World War, Turkey secured the southeastern flank
of NATO in its posture against the Soviet Union. Throughout the Cold
War and beyond Turkey’s prospective membership was also regarded as a
means to soften tensions between Turkey and Greece, which had already
become a member of the European Communities in 1981. It was also
hoped that Turkey’s membership would contribute to the resolution of
the Cyprus conflict. Perceptions in the EU changed in the aftermath of
1989.
As a player in East–West politics and as a cornerstone of a post-Cold
War European security architecture, Turkey’s membership was given less
importance in the 1990s, when the Central and Eastern European coun-
tries (CEECs) were first in line for membership negotiations (Seufert &
Fischer, 2018: 274). Turkey was neither included in the so-called Luxem-
bourg group in 1997, nor the Helsinki group that received roadmaps and
indicative dates for the opening of negotiations. At the Helsinki Summit
in 1999 EU leaders did grant Turkey candidate status so that it became
part of the pre-accession process (European Council, 1999), but there
was no clear indication of when negotiations would start. The EU took
this decision in the context of the Kosovo war and the destabilization of
the Balkan region. The security argument in favor of Turkey’s member-
ship had become increasingly contested because of Turkey’s ambivalent
role in its neighborhood as well as the Kurdish question inside Turkey and
beyond its borders (Seufert, 2018a). Since the US war in Iraq in 2003,
many EU actors have considered Turkey as part of the unstable Levan-
tine region in the Middle East. In terms of stability, Turkey’s membership
could be seen as either an asset or a liability to the EU (Barkey & Le
Gloannec, 2005; Lippert, 2005a).
From the start of the Arab Spring of 2011 and the ensuing war in Syria
that triggered the destruction of the regional order in the region, Turkey’s
strategic importance for Europe and the EU increased but at the same
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time became more complex and strained (Morillas et al., 2018). From
the mid-2000s onward, Turkey’s foreign policy under Foreign Minister
Ahmet Davutoğlu proactively pursued a policy of ‘strategic depth’ (see
Torun, Chapter 13). Distancing itself from the West without giving up
its membership aspirations Turkey sought—unsuccessfully—a more diver-
sified policy and declared a policy of ‘zero problems with neighbors’ that
was sometimes at odds with EU positions (Michel & Seufert, 2016: 86).
The EU was confronted with a Turkey that played an opaque role as
a provider of both order and disorder in the region (Karadag, 2017:
42–46).
Turkey’s overriding strategic importance for the EU was again high-
lighted in summer 2015 at the peak of the inflow of refugees to the EU
from war-torn Syria. Since then, Turkey’s relations with the EU and also
the USA and NATO have further deteriorated. Turkey has turned from an
ally to an unreliable partner of the West that has leaned toward Russia and
Iran. The EU realized that Turkey did not align with the EU’s positions
taken in the Common Foreign and Security Policy framework (Council of
the EU, 2019a: para. 36). However, while criticizing Turkey’s democratic
backsliding, the EU still acknowledged Turkey as a ‘key partner/country’
and ‘strategic partner’ (Council of the EU, 2019a: para. 30; 2019b).
The EU–Turkey Statement on irregular migration in March 2016 (the
refugee ‘deal’) was an example of Realpolitik and showed the new balance
of power between both parties (European Council, 2016). Even then,
the EU could not escape the nexus with the negotiation framework—a
sentence on the opening of new chapters was inserted in the declaration
despite a lack of progress in Turkey to meet the political criteria.
11.3.3 Political Order, Democracy, and Political Culture
Despite Turkey being part of the Western bloc for geostrategic reasons,
its internal political development nurtured constant doubts as to its polit-
ical credentials as a Western democracy. Attempted or executed military
coups and interventions (1960, 1971, 1980–1983, 1997, 2016), disre-
gard for separation of powers, rule of law, and human rights (including
the Kurdish question) as well as the lack of political pluralism provided
no firm basis for the opening and continuation of membership negotia-
tions. Contrary to more linear transitions from dictatorship to democracy
in Spain, Portugal, and Greece in the 1970s, Turkey’s democratization
and modernization were often set (or rolled) back, be it for structural or
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specific reasons. Thus, the wave of democratization in the 1970s passed
by Turkey (Leggewie, 2004: 12) gained (only temporary) ground as late
as 2002 with the change of government to the Justice and Development
Party (Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi, AKP), which had a conservative and
religious platform.
Turkey used the accession process under former Prime Minister and
current President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan as a favorable framework for
reducing the power of the secular political camp of the Kemalists and
for abolishing the military’s stronghold. The accession process helped
strengthen the economic and social advancement of Turkey’s religious-
traditional-conservative groups, which supported the AKP (Dağı, 2006;
Seufert, 2018b: 13–16). The EU initially welcomed the liberalization
steps and supported the economic upswing in Turkey that went along
with this. The EU and the Turkish government opened accession negoti-
ations in 2005 based on the assumption of continuing domestic political
transformation. However, since the Gezi park protests in 2013 the AKP
government has not been following a consistent course of Europeaniza-
tion3 but rather has been working toward converting the political system
to authoritarian presidential rule. Since the state of emergency following
the thwarted coup d’état in 2016, Turkey has drifted so far from meeting
the political criteria of membership that a formal halt to negotiations was
demanded by the EP and several national governments. Sebastian Kurz,
then foreign minister of Austria, for instance, demanded the EU freeze
accession negotiations in a December 2016 meeting of the Council of
the EU (Gavenda, 2017).
The AKP’s turning away from secular Kemalism, and the Islamization
of Turkey, have strengthened the perception of Turkey-skeptic segments
of the EU population. In the EU, the debate resurfaced over whether
Turkey is different because of its history, culture, and Muslim character.
In light of the Copenhagen criteria, the EU has implicitly regarded these
debates as subjective and guided by identity politics in an attempt to
fixate on ‘cultural difference’ (see Leggewie, 2004; Seufert & Kubaseck,
2006; Kramer & Reinkowski, 2008: 177–180). The EU started the
3Europeanization refers to the shift of attention of institutions, actors, notably poli-
cymakers at the national level to the EU-level as well as their gradual participation in
EU-policymaking and decision-making processes. The term also refers to respective modes
of governance and norms transfer of actors on the EU-level top down to the national
level (see Radaelli, 2003; see also Alpan, Chapter 5).
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accession process from the working hypothesis that Islam as a religion
and cultural community is in principle compatible with the political
criteria of membership and, as such, is irrelevant to the EU’s monitoring
processes. Thus, the Commission applied its standard checklist of political
criteria—as documented in the annual regular reports—throughout the
pre-negotiation and negotiation period in order to measure their fulfill-
ment (see, e.g., European Commission, 2019: 9–40). Starting from the
government’s reaction to the Gezi park protests in 2013, Turkey’s record
on all key criteria items, such as fundamental rights, and the indepen-
dence and functioning of the judiciary became increasingly negative. In
2019 the Council was ‘[…] especially concerned about the continuing
and deeply worrying backsliding on the rule of law and on fundamental
rights’ (Council of the EU, 2018: para. 31).
Concerns relating to Turkey’s political culture are discussed in member
states and across parties, media, and the wider public. Indeed, Turkey’s
candidacy has become one of the more prominent issues in the public eye
(Özbey et al., 2019). According to a YouGov survey in 2016, there is
distinct hostility to Turkey joining the EU. In Germany (86%), Finland
(83%), Denmark (82%), France (74%), Sweden (73%), and even in the
United Kingdom (67%), there are large majorities against Turkey’s acces-
sion to the EU. In these countries, even Russia would be more welcome
in the EU than Turkey (YouGov, 2016).
11.3.4 Impact and Absorption Capacity
Opposition to Turkey’s membership has often been summarized by the
verdict that Turkey is ‘too big, too poor, with too dangerous borders and
insufficiently ‘European’ to join the Union’. (Hughes, 2004). Indeed,
Turkey’s size matters, as Turkey would be the biggest member ever in
terms of territory and population,4 giving it strong voting power in the
EU’s decision- and policymaking system. Although Turkey has caught up
economically over the years, it is a country with huge regional dispar-
ities and relatively low per capita levels of income. In 2017, its gross
domestic product (GDP) per capita was 66% that of the EU28 average
(European Commission, 2019: 107). Additionally, the weakening of the
Turkish economy since 2018, especially Turkey’s high current account
4Population of 79.8 million and area of 780,270 km2 in 2017, which is almost 1/5
of the total area of the EU27 (European Commission, 2019: 107).
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deficit, has led to deep concerns over the functioning of the coun-
try’s market economy (European Commission, 2019: 52). Therefore, the
debate about overstretching the Union and the limits of its capacity to
absorb additional countries has been applied to Turkey more often than,
for example, to the CEECs and Balkan countries.
This debate refers to considerations that the EU makes in the Copen-
hagen criteria, stipulating, as a ‘fourth criterion’, that
[t]he Union’s capacity to absorb new members, while maintaining the
momentum of European integration, is also an important consideration
in the general interest of both the Union and the candidate countries.
(European Council, 1993: 13)
EU institutions and leaders have frequently insisted on the importance
of taking the ‘absorption capacity’ of the Union into account after the
big bang enlargement (see for example Council of the EU, 2006a: 1).
Turkey and other applicants, on the other hand, have criticized the EU
for being absorbed with internal reform blockages or other challenges, as
in the decade of the ‘polycrisis’ (Juncker, 2016) from 2008 onward, to
the detriment of the applicants.
On all items discussed here—Turkey’s ‘Europeanness’, its strategic
value, its democratic credentials, and its impact on the EU as a member—
a degree of doubt and uncertainty remained among member states as to
whether Turkey would fit as a member. These doubts and ambivalences
were partly tamed and pragmatically channeled through the political rules
and bureaucratic policy that the EU has set up to conduct the negotiation
processes.
11.4 Enlargement Doctrine and Management
of Turkey’s Accession Process
With the advent of the first round of enlargement in 1973, the EEC
developed core elements to its enlargement doctrine to ensure the smooth
integration of new members (Lippert, 2011: 248–258). The first core
element, already discussed above, is that a new member must fulfill all
political criteria. A second element is that the EU’s acquis communau-
taire et politique is not negotiable. Any new entrant has to accept and
implement all primary and secondary laws in full. This makes the rela-
tionship, per se, asymmetric and secures EU dominance throughout the
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pre-negotiation and negotiation period. The third element is the absorp-
tion capacity of the EU, as explained above. All three elements were
taken up in the so-called renewed consensus on enlargement (European
Council, 2007: 2). While the management of Turkey’s application by and
large fits into the EU’s general enlargement approach, some features stand
out, which will be discussed in the following sections.
11.4.1 Pre-stages: Association, Customs Union, Application
for Membership and Candidate Status
Turkey (and Greece) set the example of what has become the typical
staged process from free trade and association to the application for
membership. However, the reference to future membership in Ankara’s
Association Agreement (Article 28) is a provision not found in other
cases, aside from that of Greece. The EU, thereafter, thought that a
political commitment of this kind was both too strong and binding (as
for the CEECs in the 1990s or today for Ukraine or Georgia) or not
necessary (Norway). Due to the lack of experience with association agree-
ments at the time, internal EU conflicts over competencies and political
uncertainty following the military coup in Turkey in 1960, the Associa-
tion Agreement was only signed in 1963 after four years of negotiation
(Ceylanoğlu, 2004: 152–154; see also Turhan & Reiners, Chapter 1). As a
compromise between a customs union (CU) (favored by the Commission
and Germany) and a mere cooperation agreement (favored by France and
Italy) (Ceylanoğlu, 2004: 254), the Association Agreement stipulated that
a CU was to be established over a transition period of 12 years and after
a preparatory phase of at least five years. Only after the preparatory phase
would the details of the transition period be decided on with unanimity.
These stipulations reassured the skeptics within the EU that any future
developments could still be stopped (see Kramer & Reinkowski, 2008:
157–158).
In 1987, Ankara applied to join the EU (then EEC). Although not
formally rejected, the Commission stalled Turkey’s membership applica-
tion in 1989, referring to a number of reasons on both sides: the limited
institutional absorption capacity of the EU after the Southern enlarge-
ment (1987) and in light of the coming European Free Trade Association
enlargement (1995), the priority of the internal market project (1992),
the forthcoming eastern enlargement, Turkey’s unresolved conflict with
Cyprus, and the notorious democratic deficits in Turkey (European
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Commission, 1989: 7). Thus, the establishment of the CU with Turkey
as an intermediary step, and as some sort of compensation for the pre-
accession processes with the CEECs, gained support inside the EU as
the first or second-best choice in lieu of membership. To structure the
lengthy accession processes the EU introduced the status of ‘candidate’,
which has become a necessary stepping-stone to opening negotiations. In
the aftermath of the December 1997 Luxembourg European Council that
turned down candidate status for Turkey, Ankara declined the EU’s offer
to take part in the so-called Europe Conference (until 2000), which the
EU had first organized in 1997 as a pan-European format to compensate
potential applicants for which there was as yet no prospect of accession
negotiations being opened (Lippert, 1999: 46; 2000: 41).
The decision on Turkey’s candidate status, agreed in December
1999 at the Helsinki Summit (European Council, 1999), was initially
contested among member states. A breakthrough came with a favor-
able alignment of the stars in important EU-member states: support
from Germany under the newly elected red-green government (Gerhard
Schröder/Joschka Fischer), from France under President Jacques Chirac,
and Greece under Prime Minister Kostas Karamanlis. The turn toward
enlargement as a foreign and security policy instrument against the back-
ground of the Kosovo war also benefited Turkey’s candidacy. During the
Helsinki European Council meeting, Commissioner Günter Verheugen
and the High Representative Javier Solana traveled to Ankara to explain
to the still reform-reluctant Ecevit government that no further formal
requirements other than the Copenhagen criteria would be applied to
Turkey’s candidacy. However, the EU had established a link between
Turkey’s accession process and the resolution of the conflict over Cyprus
in the European Council conclusions (European Council, 1999; Kramer
& Reinkowski, 2008: 165–166). The Cyprus conflict hampered and still
blocks the negotiation process. At several points it played into EU–Turkey
negotiations, as did other bilateral conflicts in other cases (Dokos et al.,
2018: 28–31; Hillion, 2010).
The decision to start accession negotiations with Turkey was gradual
precisely because it was controversial. In 2002, the European Council
agreed on a rendezvous clause. This clause stated that the EU would
decide on the opening of negotiations with Turkey in 2004, provided
that Turkey fulfilled the political Copenhagen criteria. When the EU25
finally decided in December 2004 to start negotiations with Turkey in
October 2005, it was clear that some member states, namely Germany,
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Austria, and the Netherlands remained skeptical, and the EU therefore
remained ambivalent as to whether Turkey would fit, in principle, and in
terms of the concrete deficiencies of Turkey’s democracy.
An immediate concern ahead of the December 2004 European
Council was the unresolved bilateral conflict with Greece and the new
EU-member Cyprus (see Lippert, 2005b: 429–431). In April 2004, the
resolution of the Cypriot issue according to the ‘Annan plan’ failed to gain
support of the majority in Greek-Cyprus in an island-wide referendum.
To avoid a Greek veto on the upcoming Eastern enlargement, the EU
had already promised Cyprus that it would become a member state of the
EU, representing the whole island but without the acquis communautaire
being implemented in the Cypriot-Turkish part of the country (European
Council, 1999; see also Kramer & Reinkowski, 2008: 165–166). Practical
problems occurred in applying present and future rules for trade between
the whole of the island and the EU (see for example, Council of the EU,
2006b). The EU insisted on Ankara signing the Additional Protocol to be
annexed to the EEC-Turkey Association Agreement and Turkey’s exten-
sion of the CU to the EU25—in other words including Cyprus. The EU
was ready to take the implementation of the Protocol as a substitute for
a formal recognition of Cyprus by Turkey and, at the same time, link
the question of recognition to the accession process (Council of the EU,
2005).
11.4.2 Framework for Negotiations
Turkey was the only case in which EU institutions started talks with
a country that only ‘sufficiently’ (European Council, 2004: 6) fulfilled
the political criteria. The EU knew that Turkey’s political problems were
structural and severe. However, the EU was confident that the opening
of accession negotiations would support political democratization and
economic transformation in Turkey. Against this background, the EU
sought many special arrangements in the negotiation framework, which
would also be applied to another candidate, Croatia (Lippert, 2006: 433–
434). These arrangements were adopted by the European Council in
December 2004 and included long or probably even permanent safe-
guard clauses (with regard to freedom of movement, structural policies,
and agriculture), special regulations, and a suspension procedure. They
were also integrated into the Negotiating Framework document prepared
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by the Commission that outlined the guiding principles of the nego-
tiations with Turkey (European Commission, 2005). As provided for
in this framework, the negotiations were designed to be open-ended,
long-lasting, and not only dependent on Turkey’s fulfillment of the
Copenhagen criteria but also on the institutional absorption capacity of
the Union (European Commission, 2005: para. 3). That way, even if
Turkey complied with the acquis, the outcome of the negotiation process
could not be guaranteed and EU membership would not automatically
be granted.
In terms of procedure, a screening process5 was introduced, and it was
decided to monitor progress through regular country reports on Turkey.
At the same time, in the negotiating framework, the EU had already
safeguarded against the possible failure of the negotiations, including a
suspension procedure in case Turkey violated the fundamental political
criteria. An alternative to membership was also considered
[i]f Turkey is not in a position to assume in full all the obligations
of membership it must be ensured that Turkey is fully anchored in
the European structures through the strongest possible bond. (European
Commission, 2005: para. 2)
This could be interpreted not only as a fallback option but also as a hidden
strategy, because some member states favored a so-called ‘privileged part-
nership’ or other forms of integration and cooperation with Turkey as a
third country, not as a member of the Union (see Tekin, Chapter 7).
While the special provisions in the framework for negotiations could
be seen as a means to deal with the challenges of integrating a special
candidate (in terms of size, economy, and culture) and to reassure skep-
tical member states that the process could still be stopped, some authors
argue that the negotiations were doomed to fail right from the start as
the EU did not (sufficiently) encourage Turkey’s political reform process
in light of this fallback option (İçener et al., 2010: 215; Tekin, 2017: 39).
5During the screening process, the Commission presents the acquis of primary and
secondary law for every negotiation chapter, then both sets of legal provisons are system-
atically compared. The (gradual) implementation of the EU’s legal acquis is monitored in
relation to fulfilling benchmarks defined by the Council in order that a decision can be
made by the EU as to whether to open or close individual negotiation chapters.
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11.4.3 Conduct of Negotiations
In line with the general conduct of negotiations on membership, the
European Council and the Commission have played a pivotal role in
accession negotiations with Turkey. The European Council made all of
the EU’s strategic decisions on Turkey’s accession milestones: the opening
and the framework for negotiations, the introduction of new instru-
ments and formats such as the Positive Agenda, and high level dialogues
(see Turhan & Wessels, Chapter 8). The Council machinery in Brus-
sels, Coreper II, has been important for the preparation of decisions and
the search for consensus among the governments prior to the General
Affairs Council and/or the European Council coming into play. The EC
has also been the manager of negotiations and pre-accession activities
(see Bürgin, Chapter 9). In the case of Turkey, communication between
the EU and Turkey has been intense even when the negotiations were
slow or stalled. As in other cases, the European Parliament gave special
attention to political developments in Turkey and more directly criti-
cized Turkey’s backsliding. The EP was at times split over whether the
EU should explore alternatives such as that of ‘privileged partnership’.
It also called for a suspension of negotiations in 2017 and 2019 (Euro-
pean Parliament, 2017, 2019; see also Lippert, 2017: 423; Kaeding &
Schenuit, Chapter 10).
Compared to all other accession processes, the length of Turkey’s
negotiations is noteworthy. The main reason for this is the ambivalent
position inside the EU toward Turkey’s candidacy and future member-
ship due to Turkey’s insufficient fulfillment of political criteria and its
own genuinely inconsistent accession strategy. Since October 2005, little
progress has been made: only 16 of the 35 chapters have been opened,
one of these is provisionally closed (see Table 11.1).
Since December 2006, the Council has suspended eight trade-related
chapters6 as a response to Ankara’s resistance to implementing the obli-
gations stemming from the Additional Protocol, and no further chapters
are to be closed until the resolution of the conflict with Cyprus (Council
of the EU, 2006b). In relation to the remaining chapters, either Turkey
does not meet the benchmarks, or their opening has been vetoed by single
member states in the Council, including France (in 2007) and Cyprus (in
6The eight negotiation chapters related to trade—chapters 1, 3, 9, 11, 13, 14, 29, and
30—have therefore remained closed until today.
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Table 11.1 Status of negotiation chapters with Turkey (2020)
Chapter Opening Provisional closure
1 Free Movement of Goods Suspended
2 Freedom of Movement of Workers Vetoed
3 Right of Establishment and Freedom to Provide
Services
Suspended
4 Free Movement of Capital 2008
5 Public Procurement
6 Company Law 2008
7 Intellectual Property Rights 2008
8 Competition Policy
9 Financial Services Suspended
10 Information Society and Media 2008
11 Agriculture and Rural Development Suspended
12 Food Safety, Veterinary and Phytosanitary Policy 2010
13 Fisheries Suspended
14 Transport Policy Suspended
15 Energy Vetoed
16 Taxation 2009
17 Economic and Monetary Policy 2015
18 Statistics 2007
19 Social Policy and Employment
20 Enterprise and Industrial Policy 2007
21 Trans-European Networks 2007
22 Regional Policy and Coordination of Structural
Instruments
2013
23 Judiciary and Fundamental Rights Vetoed
24 Justice, Freedom and Security Vetoed
25 Science and Research 2006 2006
26 Education and Culture Vetoed
27 Environment 2009
28 Consumer and Health Protection 2007
29 Customs Union Suspended
30 External Relations Suspended
31 Foreign, Security and Defense Policy Vetoed
32 Financial control 2007
33 Financial and budgetary provisions 2016
34 Institutions Vetoed
35 Other issues
Source Own compilation based on Delegation of the European Union to Turkey (2020)
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2009). Thus, negotiations quickly entered a period of stagnation, and the
Cyprus issue has become an obstacle, which has pleased those who wanted
to slow down Turkey’s accession, be it in Turkey or the EU. Given the
EU’s reluctance to smooth tensions on the island and to ease the isola-
tion of Northern Cyprus, in 2011 then Prime Minister Erdoğan even
challenged the EU by stating that his government would freeze member-
ship negotiations (Seufert, 2011: 521–522). Turkey’s new assertiveness
was a signal to Brussels; its foreign policy was working toward a more
symmetric, bilateral relationship, and a diversification of foreign policy
partnerships (Seufert, 2018b: 16–18). At the same time, the course of
domestic reform was slowing down considerably in Turkey. Hence, as a
prospective future member state Turkey has become an increasingly more
difficult case for the EU.
Annually, the Commission has taken stock of Turkey’s domestic polit-
ical developments in relation to it fulfilling the Copenhagen political
criteria. Between 2005 and 2012, the Commission recorded both ups
and downs as far as fundamental rights and the independence of the
judiciary was concerned. Based on the Commission reports, the Council
and the European Council frequently demanded additional reform efforts
from Turkey, especially in the areas of freedom of expression, freedom of
media, freedom of religion, property rights, trade unions, minority rights,
control over military power, women’s and children’s rights, nondiscrim-
ination, and gender equality. Since 2017, the Commission has abstained
from commenting on whether or not Turkey ‘sufficiently’ fulfills the polit-
ical criteria, which was the basis on which it gave the green light to the
opening of negotiations.
Despite the special provisions in the negotiation framework and
internal divisions, the Commission applied the Copenhagen criteria as
well as the standard screening process and benchmarking to Turkey with
the same pragmatism as was applied to the Eastern enlargement. Since
the Barroso Commission, the accession negotiations have focused on the
issues of rule of law, economic governance, and administrative reforms
as primary conditions for membership (Council of the EU, 2014: para.
3; see also Lippert, 2015: 523). Given the veto deployed by Cyprus,
the EU could not apply what had become its new standard approach:
opening Chapters 23 and 24 related to judiciary, fundamental rights,
justice, freedom, and security at an early stage in order to put addi-
tional pressure (and give additional support) on a country to comply
with membership conditions in the sensitive areas of rule of law and
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fundamental rights. At the same time, in its progress reports on Turkey
the Commission has paid special attention to these essential chapters and
issues (see Table 11.2).
The attempt to revive the reform process with various initiatives
and mechanisms, including the 2012 Positive Agenda, discussions on
a modernization of the CU, and the 2013 roadmap for visa liberaliza-
tion, has so far had little effect. Since two negotiation chapters previously
vetoed by France (Chapters 17 and 33) were opened in the context of the
refugee ‘deal’ in 2015 and 2016 (European Council, 2015, 2016), there
has not been any progress. Although the EP demanded the suspension of
the negotiations (European Parliament, 2017, 2019) the Council did not
follow this request in 2017 and 2019 although it concluded that negoti-
ations had ‘effectively come to a standstill’; and that ‘no further chapters
can be considered for opening or closing’ (Council of the EU, 2018: para.
37). Other dialogue formats, most of which were launched during the
refugee crisis, continued for some time without significant effects on the
accession process (Lippert, 2018: 523). In response to Turkey’s drilling
activities in the Eastern Mediterranean the EU even suspended meetings
Table 11.2 Progress and preparations for Turkey’s EU membership (2018–
2019)
Area of Reform Progress Preparations













Early stage Early stage
Corruption No Backsliding Some Early stage







Early stage Early stage
Economic Criteria Backsliding Serious
backsliding
Well advanced Well advanced
Competitiveness Some Some Good Good
Justice, Freedom
and Security
Good Some Moderately Moderately
Source Own compilation based on European Commission reports (2018, 2019)
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of the EU–Turkey Association Council, and other high level dialogues in
mid-2019 (Council of the EU, 2019c).
11.5 Conclusion and Outlook
The EU’s policy toward Turkey’s membership has been, more so than
in other cases, consistently ambivalent. Turkey’s membership prospects
were vague from the start and less credible than those of other accession
candidates. In general, the conditionality effect is strongest when acces-
sion negotiations are about to be opened (as occurred with Turkey in
the early 2000s) and when the EU is able to provide attractive incentives,
such as visa liberalization throughout the long years of pre-accession. The
debate over both the transformative power of the EU and Turkey’s polit-
ical commitment to transformation in terms of democratization, rule of
law, human rights, and the pooling and transfer of sovereignty is ongoing
(see Börzel, 2012, 2016; Noutcheva & Aydın-Düzgit, 2012; Börzel &
Schimmelfennig, 2017; Schimmelfennig et al., 2003).
Some analysts argue that the EU was too hesitant and too inter-
nally divided to incentivize strong reform politics along these lines both
before and during the critical years of the Erdoğan government (from
2013 onward) (Seufert & Fischer, 2018: 278)—that the EU missed a
big opportunity to contribute to the transformation of Turkey. Other
analysts assume that the EU’s leverage and influence were always signif-
icantly constrained by the politics and interests of Turkey’s domestic
actors. Thus, enlargement was at times a vehicle for Erdoğan to advance
the dominance of his party and the political mission of conservative-
authoritarian rule in Turkey but not a vehicle for transformation on the
EU’s terms (Dağı, 2006). While the relationship between Brussels and
Ankara was less asymmetric than in other cases of membership nego-
tiations, because of Turkey’s size and geostrategic importance, this did
not translate into a relationship in which both parties saw eye to eye.
Turkish governments have consistently complained of being treated as
an underdog by the EU. And the EU is quite aware of the fact that
its enlargement doctrine always works to its own advantage in terms of
power. It also realizes that this is not the case when operating under
transactional rules, as was the case with the so-called refugee ‘deal’.
The ambivalences that characterized the opening of negotiations recur
today in the question over suspending or even ending negotiations.
Despite the massive deterioration in relations between Brussels and
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Ankara, the EU shies away from breaking up membership talks. For now,
the EU wants to sustain the framework of the negotiations in order
to keep open this channel for dialogue. Whenever there is a chance to
restart the process, or at least provide impulses for a political process,
the EU wants to secure the option to return to the negotiation table
and use the accession framework. Even before the peak of the refugee
crisis in 2015 and the deterioration of relations in mid-2016, there
were plausible arguments to replace the enlargement framework with a
more symmetric relationship as with other European countries, such as
Norway, or the United Kingdom after Brexit. Alternatively, the acces-
sion framework could at least be accompanied by intensified political and
security relations (high level dialogues, Turkey’s integration into Perma-
nent Structured Cooperation), the deepening and modernization of the
CU, and more liberal arrangements for free movement of people (see
for similar argumentation, Soler i Lecha, 2019; Lippert, 2019b; Hakura,
2018).
Today, Turkey’s accession process is almost a dead case. Interestingly,
the updated enlargement strategy from spring 2020 refers explicitly to
the ‘credible EU perspective for the Western Balkans’, leaving Turkey out
of the enlargement picture (European Commission, 2020). However, the
EU might be interested in more than a transactional relationship with
Ankara that merely centers on controlling migration, fighting terrorism,
and expanding trade. In contrast to some member states, the Commission
and also parts of the European Parliament hold on to the transformative
power of the accession process and membership perspective. Therefore,
the ambivalence of the EU’s approach to Turkey and its accession process
is likely to continue.
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Ceylanoğlu, S. (2004). Europäische Wirtschaftsgemeinschaft, Griechenland und die
Türkei: Die Assoziationsabkommen im Vergleich (1959–1963). Baden-Baden:
Nomos.
Copsey, N., & Haughton, T. (Eds.). (2012–2014). The JCMS annual review of
the European Union. Issues 2012–2014. New Jersey: Wiley-Blackwell.
Council of the European Union. (2005). Enlargement: Turkey Declaration by
the European Community and its member states. 12541/05 (Presse 243).
Brussels, 21 September.
Council of the European Union. (2006a). Salzburg EU/Western Balkans joint
press statement. 7283/06 (Presse 77). Brussels, 11 March.
Council of the European Union. (2006b). 2770th Council meeting, General
Affairs and External Relations. Press release. 16289/06 (Presse 352).
Brussels, 11 December.
Council of the European Union. (2014). 3362nd Council meeting, General
Affairs. Press release. 16936/14 (Presse 652). Brussels, 16 December.
Council of the European Union. (2018). Enlargement and stabilisation and
association process, council conclusions. 10555/18. Brussels, 26 June.
Council of the European Union. (2019a). Council conclusions on enlargement




Council of the European Union. (2019b). Press statement following the 54th
meeting of the Association Council between the European Union and Turkey in
288 B. LIPPERT
Brussels. Press release. https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-rel
eases/2019/03/15/press-statement-following-the-54th-meeting-of-the-ass
ociation-council-between-the-european-union-and-turkey-brussels-15-march-
2019. Accessed 29 Nov 2020.
Council of the European Union. (2019c). Turkish drilling activities in the
Eastern Mediterranean: Council adopts conclusions. Press release. 15 July.
https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2019/07/15/
turkish-drilling-activities-in-the-eastern-mediterranean-council-adopts-conclu
sions/. Accessed 30 Jun 2020.
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CHAPTER 12
The EU as an Anchor for Turkey’s
Macroeconomic and Trade Policy
Mehmet Sait Akman and Semih Emre Çekin
12.1 Introduction
Relations with the European Union (EU) have served as a benchmark
for Turkey’s domestic policy orientation and as an incentive for reforms
for several decades. In this context, Turkey’s economy is no exception,
although its transformation from an import-substituting economy to an
open and globally integrated economy had its ups and downs. While the
process required domestic policy reforms with strong commitments from
policymakers, implementing optimal policies was difficult and often neces-
sitated the approval of a strong external actor in order to confirm the
credibility of Turkey’s policy commitments. As Öniş and Şenses (2009:
305–306) state, it was a combination of external and domestic factors that
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contributed to the development of the Turkish economy; and a compre-
hensive analysis of the Turkish economy cannot be fully complete without
examining the influence of external actors in shaping economic policies.
The influence of the EU on Turkey’s domestic transformation has been
subject to analysis from different perspectives. Tocci (2005) provides an
analytical distinction for the EU’s role, asking whether Turkey’s acces-
sion process has been an external force triggering reforms and driving
internal change, or whether domestic change has been spearheaded by
domestic actors who used an external EU ‘anchor’ or were strength-
ened by it. Though a clear distinction is subtle and difficult to make,
there are studies that focus on Turkey’s anchor to the EU as a means to
implement domestic transformations. Keyman and Öniş (2004) proposed
that without a strong EU anchor it would be inconceivable for Turkey to
transform itself into a more democratic and economically stable entity. In
an earlier study, Uğur (1999) argued that in the absence of an EU anchor
Turkish authorities’ attempts at reforms and stabilization would remain
largely non-credible, leading to an ‘anchor-credibility dilemma’. In this
context, anchoring can be defined as an attachment to an external entity
that provides stability and confidence in an otherwise uncertain situation.
Serving as a credible anchor, the EU would be expected to help solve
‘time-inconsistency’1 problems stemming from domestic inefficiencies. It
could do so by providing a transparent contract that would guide Turkey
toward convergence with EU standards, and incentives for achieving these
standards (see Uğur, 2003: 165; Öniş & Bakır, 2007: 148 for a detailed
explanation of the argument).
Turkey always relied on a strong external anchor to put constraints
on policymakers. In the economic policy field this role was, for decades,
mostly attributed to Bretton Woods institutions. In particular, Inter-
national Monetary Fund (IMF) conditionality provided an impetus to
Turkey’s quest for stability and macroeconomic balancing for a long time,
before the EU also assumed this role. From the start, Turkey’s quest to
join the EU was partly an integration initiative that necessitated strong
1Time inconsistency problems arise when the government’s original decision on when
to implement a certain policy reform (such as domestic reform or tariff liberalization) is no
longer optimal at the specified time for implementation. A reason for this inconsistency
can be, for instance, domestic inefficiency: the sector is not prepared for the reform
and is therefore unable to successfully operate under the new circumstances. This creates
a credibility problem for the government. External anchors like the EU may help the
government make better-predicated policy commitments.
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convergence in economic policies. The accession process entailed meeting
the Copenhagen economic criteria, which oblige candidates to acquire a
functioning market economy, the capacity to cope with competitive pres-
sures and harmonization with the acquis. In this context, the EU’s role
gained acceptance in Turkey for practical reasons, such as economic bene-
fits and financial assistance, rather than for being a pivotal external anchor
constraining Turkish policymakers’ choices in the macroeconomic policy
field.
This chapter examines the role of the EU in conjunction with other
external actors in facilitating economic reforms in Turkey, concentrating
on the macroeconomic effects of the EU and the effect on trade liberal-
ization. In our analysis, we also discuss the volatility of the EU anchor. We
find that in the macroeconomic policy field, the EU became a significant
actor in Turkey’s economic reform after the Helsinki Summit in 1999,
when Turkey was granted the status of an EU accession candidate (see
also Turhan & Reiners, Chapter 1), and until around the global finan-
cial crisis of 2008, when many structural reforms were implemented that
were mostly aimed at privatization, monetary policy, and public finance
management. The EU anchor significantly deteriorated after 2008 when
the reform process began to lag, the economies of Turkey and the EU
faced significant turbulence after the global economic crisis, and bilateral
political relations worsened.
Particular attention is paid to the establishment of the Customs Union
(CU) between Turkey and the EU in 1995. It was a milestone in Turkey’s
trade policy; it substantially added to the liberalization process started
in the early 1980s, and thereby complemented Turkey’s multilateral
commitments to the World Trade Organization (WTO). Since its estab-
lishment, the CU has been a ruling mechanism that has helped Turkey
preserve its integration with European and global markets. However, the
attractiveness of the CU, if not its exigency, started to dissipate during
the most recent decade largely because of the EU’s growing number of
preferential trade agreements with third parties. These were regarded by
the Turkish political elite as the cause of asymmetries between Turkey
and the global markets. We argue that the failure of the EU and Turkey
to modernize the CU amid growing bilateral tensions endangers the
EU’s anchor role and undermines the strengthening of the trade part-
nership between the EU and Turkey, which remains one of the few
well-functioning legs of the volatile bilateral dialogue between the two
sides.
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The chapter is structured in two main parts. In the first part, it exam-
ines Turkey’s macroeconomic reform process in the context of the EU’s
role as an anchor in three periods: from the 1980s to the Helsinki Summit
in 1999, during the post-Helsinki accession process until 2007, and from
the global financial crisis until the most recent developments. The second
part analyzes the EU’s anchor role for Turkey in trade policy, and in
particular in the framework of the CU. The analysis is again structured
in three periods, covering the years from 1996 to 2007, from 2008 to
2016, and since then. The chapter closes with concluding remarks on the
‘double anchoring’ of Turkey to the EU and international institutions,
and the implications of the absence of a clear EU membership perspective
for Turkey’s macroeconomic reforms and trade policy.
12.2 The EU and Turkey’s Macroeconomic
Reform Process: An Effective Anchor?
12.2.1 From the 1980s to the Helsinki Summit
In 1987, Turkey’s Prime Minister Turgut Özal pushed for Turkey’s
membership of the European Economic Community (EEC), with the
aim of establishing an external anchor for the process of implementing an
outward-oriented growth strategy. Özal envisioned that membership of
the EEC would enable Turkey to further implement liberal policies and,
more importantly, draw financial assistance in the form of foreign direct
investment (FDI) and commercial credits from European countries (Öniş,
2004). At the end of 1989, the European Commission (EC) indicated
Turkey’s eligibility for membership but clarified that full membership was
not feasible for the time being, given Turkey’s size and level of economic
development (European Commission, 1989). Instead, the Commission
focused on the need to establish a CU in 1995 and deferred discussion
of the issue of enlargement until a later date. While the EU’s decision did
not fulfill Turkey’s expectations, this may be due to the fact that at the
time the EU had not yet constructed a European model for its neigh-
boring countries to pursue economic (and democratic) reforms; Turkey
did not therefore receive EU guidance with respect to economic policy
management.
In the 1990s, Turkey’s economy was subject to several domestic and
external challenges, such as the effects of the first Iraq War (1990–1991)
and weak macroeconomic fundamentals. In this period, the establishment
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of the CU in late 1995 constituted the most significant step in EU–Turkey
relations until the Helsinki decision of 1999. However, the positive
atmosphere that formed around the CU quickly deteriorated when the
European Council did not include Turkey in the list of the accession
countries in the Luxembourg Summit in 1997. The EU’s decision was
largely based on Turkey’s domestic deficiencies, inter alia, emanating from
pressures on public finances (see Fig. 12.1), high inflation, and inconsis-
tent monetary policy. Following the Cardiff European Council in June
1998, the Commission started to assess, in its regular country reports,
Turkey’s economy in light of the Maastricht criteria.
Turkey’s candidate status was recognized by the Helsinki European
Council in 1999. Öniş (2003: 9) considers it a ‘fundamental turning
point’, as the candidate status incentivized Turkey to undertake reforms,
including those in the economic sphere, and to conform to EU norms.
The CU—despite its subsequent positive impact—did not have a similar
transformative role in the Turkish economy in its early years.
Fig. 12.1 Fiscal policy fundamentals: Turkey’s public debt and public sector
borrowing requirement (PSBR) as % of gross domestic product (GDP) (Source
Republic of Turkey Ministry of Treasury and Finance [2020])
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12.2.2 Post-Helsinki Process: Rising Hope for EU Membership
on the Eve of Accession Negotiations
The Helsinki decision of 1999 promoted the EU’s role as an anchor
for macroeconomic policymaking in Turkey. However, despite its polit-
ical significance, the effect on the economy was not initially visible, and
the IMF anchor that called for privatization and regulation of the banking
system proved ineffective due to weak political commitments. Amid this
fragile environment, Turkey experienced two consecutive crises—in 1999
and early 2001—that severely affected its banking system (Togan & Ersel,
2005; Öniş & Bakır, 2007).
Following the crisis in February 2001, Turkey introduced the so-called
‘Strong Economy Program’ in order to balance the budget, increase
competitiveness, and restore confidence in the market. Here, the influ-
ence of Kemal Derviş, who worked closely with the IMF and the World
Bank as the Minister of Economic Affairs, was instrumental. The focus
of the program was to restructure the banking system and to discipline
public finances in order to achieve macroeconomic stability.
Along with fiscal discipline, the conduct of monetary policy was
amended in the Central Bank Law—policy independence most impor-
tantly—and became an important element of Turkey’s accession strategy.
Stability in financial markets was addressed with the Capital Market
Law and through the expansion of the role of capital market insti-
tutions such as the Banking Regulation and Supervision Agency and
the Saving Deposit Insurance Fund (Pazarbaşıoğlu, 2005; Hoekman &
Togan, 2005). These reforms and institutional restructuring were crucial
in lowering inflation rates to single digits by 2004.
While Bretton Woods institutions were pivotal in the formulation and
implementation of these measures, the EU anchor also played a key
role in avoiding time-inconsistency problems and raising certainty in the
markets. In its first Accession Partnership Document in March 2001,
the EU suggested the implementation of reforms in financial sectors
and monetary policy, and measures addressed by the IMF/World Bank
(Council of the EU, 2001). Following the guidelines in the document,
Turkey prepared a lengthy ‘National Programme for the Adoption of the
Acquis ’, outlining the steps that would be taken to ensure convergence
with Copenhagen and Maastricht criteria. As Öniş and Bakır (2007: 155)
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put forth following the 2001 crisis, the EU and IMF played a signifi-
cant role as ‘double anchors’ in the process of reform and state-capacity
development by enacting conditional agreements.
Seemingly satisfied with the speed and depth of Turkey’s reforms, in
2004 the Commission made a recommendation to begin accession nego-
tiations with Turkey in October 2005. This process helped the Turkish
economy attract increasing amounts of FDI from EU member states. FDI
inflow volumes remained very high until the effects of the global finan-
cial crisis hit advanced economies in 2008 (see Fig. 12.2). Increasing FDI
flows not only serve to stabilize the financing of the current account,
as opposed to portfolio investments that are short-term in nature, but
also help companies achieve sophistication and complexity in production
(Javorcik et al., 2017). In this way, Turkey achieved its target for primary
surplus.
Fig. 12.2 Value and share of foreign direct investments (FDIs) in Turkey orig-
inating from the EU (2002–2019) (in million USD and %) (Source Central Bank
of the Republic of Turkey, Balance of Payments Directorate, Foreign Direct
Investments in Turkey [2019])
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12.2.3 Backsliding in the Turkish Economy, Changing
Macroeconomic Preferences, and the Weakening of the EU
Anchor
Following the onset of the global financial crisis and the resulting
sovereign debt crisis of the euro area, significant domestic and external
changes adversely affected Turkey’s economy. On the domestic front,
Acemoğlu and Üçer (2015) argue that the quality of Turkey’s economic
growth deteriorated around 2007 due to a change in the nature of the
economic institutions and policies that had previously served to imple-
ment growth-enhancing reforms. They underline that the deterioration
of relations with the EU was followed by a reversal in Turkey’s economic
development trajectory, which led to changes in the domestic political
dynamics in Turkey. Accordingly, ‘the EU’s anchor for Turkish institu-
tional reforms and leverage over Turkish politicians came to an abrupt
end at around 2010 as the accession process almost completely stalled’
(Acemoğlu & Üçer, 2015: 23).
As regards external developments, Turkey’s economic reform process
was further disrupted by the 2008 financial crisis—a crisis of global scale
that primarily started in the US subprime mortgage market and spread
to other advanced and emerging economies through financial linkages.
The crisis caused major disruptions in European financial markets, culmi-
nating in recessions in the euro area and contributing to the subsequent
sovereign debt crisis (known as ‘eurozone crisis’) (Lane, 2012).
Throughout this period, the structural and economic reforms imple-
mented during the early years of the AKP governments, assisted by the
IMF and World Bank, were reversed as a result of the changes in Turkey’s
economic and political institutions. Öniş (2019: 5) argues that in the
post-2011 era in particular, when shifts in global economic and polit-
ical balances between advanced and emerging economies with the rise
of blocks such as BRICS posed an alternative to Western economies and
institutions, the AKP government preferred to embark on an ‘alternative
path of developmentalism’. These new avenues of economic expansion
rendered Turkey less dependent on its traditional Western allies, including
the EU, the IMF, and the World Bank. Hence, Turkey’s reversal of
its external economic conditions and worsening political relations with
the EU triggered processes of ‘de-Europeanization’ (see also Alpan,
Chapter 5), whereas relations with Russia, China, and Qatar became more
relevant.
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In 2013, developments in Turkey and corruption charges against
several ministers led to elevated risks for Turkey’s finances. In its
2014 progress report, the EC encouraged Turkey to address these
economic vulnerabilities by implementing long-term structural reforms
and adopting an appropriate monetary/fiscal policy mix with the aim
of lowering inflation rates and enhancing domestic savings (European
Commission, 2014). Moreover, the eurozone crisis had started to influ-
ence Turkey’s reform process, slowing down the EU’s widening process
and making the EU less appealing as an anchor of stability for third
countries (Panagiotou, 2013; O’Brennan, 2013). While global credit
conditions worsened for emerging economies such as Turkey during this
period, a failed coup attempt in 2016 and the subsequent reaction of the
government, which used emergency laws to allegedly contravene funda-
mental human rights, drew significant criticism from the EU. In its 2016
report, the Commission criticized Turkish authorities, saying that the
reaction to the coup worsened the business climate and warned against
a backsliding of economic reforms (European Commission, 2016a).
The post-2016 period also affected the volume of FDI outflows and
the share of EU member states in FDI flows to Turkey. The decrease in
FDI flows of the EU to Turkey had already kicked off after the global
financial crisis (see Fig. 12.2). This trend became more pronounced with
the political strain that ensued following the failed coup attempt in 2016.
In 2016, the share of EU member states in FDI flows to Turkey decreased
to the lowest level (50%) since 2002, and in 2019 the volume of annual
EU FDI outflow to Turkey decreased to the lowest level since acces-
sion negotiations began in 2005. Strained relations with EU member
states, as well as several terrorist attacks between 2015 and 2017, led
to a significant drop in tourists from Europe, with implications for the
large Turkish tourism economy. As travel statistics reveal, the number of
German tourists, who traditionally comprise the largest group of foreign
visitors to Turkey, decreased from 5.5 million in 2015 to 3.5 million in
2017, a pattern that was similar for other EU member states (Republic
of Turkey Ministry of Culture and Tourism, 2020). In 2018, Turkey also
experienced a serious currency crisis, which saw the Turkish Lira take a
significant plunge, inflation rates above 20%, and rising unemployment.
In its 2019 report, the Commission noted the serious backsliding in
Turkey’s fulfillment of the economic criteria and that the suggestions of
the previous year—such as reducing imbalances by promoting domestic
savings rather than relying on short-term portfolio inflows and improving
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the business conditions by means of strengthened rule of law and the
judiciary (European Commission, 2018)—were not implemented (Euro-
pean Commission, 2019a). Despite the Turkish authorities’ insistence
that Turkey’s membership of the EU remains an important goal, the EU’s
anchor role has diminished as developments on both sides precluded the
reinstatement of a sustainable relationship.
The launch of a High Level Economic Dialogue (HLED) in
2016 following a call from European Council in December 2014, with
the hope that this would support the continuation of economic dialogue
between EU and Turkey and foster alignment of Turkey with the acquis
(Council of the EU, 2014), has been a positive step in this period.
However, HLED was no substitute for the smooth operation of the
accession process, and could not provide a similar anchor. The economic
dialogue between EU and Turkey can be understood as signaling the inte-
gration of Turkey into EU markets without the prospect of an eventual
EU membership (Müftüler-Baç, 2017).
All in all, the EU’s role as an anchor for macroeconomic transformation
was particularly strong after Turkey was accepted as a candidate country
in 1999. The EU was a strong driver of the reform process in conjunc-
tion with the IMF assistance that was initiated after the 2001 crisis and
one of the main sources of FDI flows until 2008. These developments
were closely linked with Turkey’s membership aspirations to join the EU,
especially following the Commission’s advice to start accession negoti-
ations. While the EU played a strong role until 2008 and remains the
major economic partner of Turkey, its gravitational pull in the evolution
of the Turkish economy decreased following the eurozone crisis. Subse-
quently, the end of Turkey’s IMF standby arrangement in 2013, and the
AKP government’s resistance to its renewal, removed the IMF from its
position as an anchor. In addition, political unrest, strained political rela-
tions with the EU, and heightened risk levels for investors weakened the
EU’s anchor role. These developments turned Turkey into a less appealing
investment destination. Worsening economic conditions and a changing
economic paradigm in Turkey started to worry domestic actors as well.
Business associations such as the Turkish Industry and Business Associa-
tion (TÜSİAD) asked for the reinvigoration of relations with the EU and
to upgrade the CU in order to increase foreign investment and to moti-
vate economic reforms. The statement by TÜSİAD’s president, Simone
Kaslowski, documents this understanding:
12 THE EU AS AN ANCHOR … 305
We need progress in our relations with the EU our main economic partner.
[…] EU membership perspective is the strongest element to raise confi-
dence in our country and the interest of investors in a sustainable way.
An assessment of the Customs Union reveals that upgrading tremendously
affects both sides’ economies and strengthens full membership perspective.
(TÜSIAD, 2019, translated from Turkish)
12.3 Trade Policy: The EU
as an External (but Fading) Catalyst
Trade is arguably the most advanced EU–Turkey policy area. Strength-
ening relations with the EU has been a major driving force of Turkey’s
trade policy for decades. Since the entry into force of the CU on 31
December 1995, the EU has been the main catalyst shaping Turkey’s
trade policy. While Turkey implemented its major trade liberalization steps
long before joining the CU, the EU anchor through the CU arrangement
deeply affected Turkey’s formulation, administration, and coordination of
its trade and FDI policies.
In the early 1980s, before the launch of the CU, Turkey decided
to replace its traditional import-substitution policy with the progressive
liberalization of trade, foreign exchange, and investment regimes. Policy-
makers decided to implement an export-oriented industrialization strategy
largely within the context of the paradigm shift in global economic policy
of the time. Accordingly, they started to reshape Turkey’s trade policy by
striving for export promotion, facilitation of import licensing procedures,
and liberalization of capital movements. However, the gradual transfor-
mation was repeatedly interrupted due to domestic resistance. Domestic
actors did not believe that liberalization measures would actually be
implemented, nor did they expect retaliatory tariffs from major trading
partners such as the EU. This was a typical time-inconsistency problem,
which convinced the domestic manufacturing industry not to support any
restructuring and adjustments in order to sustain international competi-
tion, because tariff reduction commitments of the government were not
credible.
During the 1980s and first half of the 1990s, the effect of the EU as
an anchor on Turkey’s trade policy was not significant, and trade reforms
were mostly attributable to the IMF’s policy conditionality and the World
Bank’s structural adjustment programs. The Bretton Woods institutions
were externally motivating liberalization of Turkey’s economic and trade
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policy. In the 1990s, under the domestic political and economic circum-
stances of that era, and without a prospective EU membership, Turkey
began to deviate from the IMF and World Bank anchors. Policies did not
effectively address the problems of fiscal deficits and inflationary pressures
under short-lived coalition governments (Pamuk, 2012: 276–277). The
decision to complete the CU with the EU in the mid-1990s was a turning
point in stabilizing reforms and providing credibility and coherence for
long-term liberalization measures.
12.3.1 Credible Commitments Under EU Anchoring: Trade Policy
and the Customs Union
The entry into force of the CU was expected to place a constraint on
the misallocation of domestic resources, and to lock in structural reforms
to Turkish industry. The CU (EC–Turkey Association Council, 1996)
required Turkey not only to eliminate customs duties on imports from
the EU but to harmonize its policies with that of the EU in customs
administration, technical standards, preferential trade scheme, intellec-
tual property rights, competition policy, and state aids. Prior to the CU,
Turkey’s import regime was complicated by several red-tape procedures; it
did not have a qualitative infrastructure for eliminating technical barriers
to trade and did not have an effective competition law. However, the
scope of the CU was confined to manufacturing and did not enable
market access for services, agricultural products, and public procurement.
It can be observed that in the years following the establishment of
the CU the EU started to become a strong anchor for Turkey’s trade
policy, avoiding the time-inconsistency problem by means of policy assur-
ance. Beyond that, the mid-1990s also witnessed the establishment of the
WTO, of which Turkey became a founding member. The new multilat-
eral rulebook reflected the changing nature of global trade relations and
brought extensive obligations for all parties. The EU had to adapt its own
trade policy in line with the WTO agreements. While the CU ushered in
a broader bilateral trade opening between the EU and Turkey, it also
helped Turkey conduct its trade policy in accordance with multilateral
rules. Corresponding to these developments, Turkey became committed
to the path of trade liberalization and trade policy orientation via two
significant external anchors: the ‘bilateral track’ with the EU under the
guidance of the CU and the ‘multilateral track’ with WTO membership,
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the implementation of the latter being in close coordination with the
former (Akman, 2012).
Amid this new environment, Turkey, in accordance with the CU, elimi-
nated all customs duties, import quotas, and similar charges and measures
with equivalent effects on industrial goods originating from the EU. It
also committed itself to aligning its tariffs to third countries in line with
the Common Customs Tariff (CCT) of the EU and to applying the EU
preferential trade regime, in other words the conclusion of free trade
agreements (FTAs) with third countries. The CU fostered a strong regula-
tory convergence between the EU and Turkey in customs modernization
and trade facilitation based on an alignment process in anti-dumping
and safeguard legislation, competition policy, customs practices, intellec-
tual property rights, and technical standards (see for details Kabaalioğlu,
1998; Togan, 2012). To adhere to the CU requirements, Turkey also
established several domestic regulatory agencies immediately before and
after the establishment of the CU, including the Competition Authority,
Turkish Patent Institute (currently Turkish Patent and Trademark Office),
and Turkish Accreditation Agency. These developments show how the EU
anchor transformed Turkey’s trade policy with respect to policymaking
and to the functioning of institutions in line with European standards
(Balkır, 2016).
The benefits of the CU were hard to realize in its early years, for
economic and political reasons. From an economic perspective, two
factors need further elaboration. First, the CU initially did not boost
exports to the EU—contrary to expectations—because the EU had
already opened its markets to Turkish-manufactured products long before
the entry into force of the CU. In practice, the CU actually opened
Turkey’s market to competition from European exporters. Second, trade
liberalization alone is no guarantee of dynamic gains, an increase in
the competitiveness of the manufacturing industry and boosting of FDI
inflow, if it is not properly coupled with economic reforms.
Despite successful trade liberalization and regulatory upgrading in
trade-related policies, the 1990s ended with economic difficulties. The
stabilization program was adopted in 1999,2 but it did not prevent Turkey
from experiencing a deep balance of payments crisis in 2001, mainly
2Turkey decided to start a stabilization program in 1999 with the support of the IMF.
The program adopted was based on a pegged exchange regime under tight monetary
policy and further liberalization of the economy.
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caused by the inefficient management of the public sector. This revealed
that successful trade liberalization also required macroeconomic stability
in order to help Turkey cope with competitive pressures (Kaminsky & Ng,
2007). Thus, the CU’s anchor role was confined mainly to trade policy
issues and did not extend broadly into structural reforms for macroeco-
nomic stability. The latter was provided instead by IMF conditionality and
domestic policy choices in Turkey.
Politically, the CU was assumed to be not an end in itself but a major
step toward full EU membership. However, it did not take too long to
see that accession was a thorny road. The flaws in a weakly negotiated CU
would be realized in the coming decades. Nevertheless, for its time the
CU was a courageous decision that motivated Turkish business to demand
policy changes and more far-reaching reforms, and to ask both the EU
and the Turkish government to set a date for Turkey’s EU integration
and the opening of accession negotiations. The CU was a step toward
solving the time-inconsistency problem through EU anchoring.
Overall, the CU had a positive impact on the Turkish economy
in its first decade. Yılmaz (2011) argues that the opening of Turkish
industries to international competition improved Turkey’s allocation
of domestic resources and allowed for dynamic gains through rising
productivity and economies of scale in many sectors. Increased compe-
tition from the EU and other trade partners3 raised the total factor
productivity in import-competing sectors such as automotive, consumer
electronics, electrical machinery and equipment, and durable home appli-
ances. The ‘disciplining effect’ of the CU helped these sectors upgrade
their production process by moving up the technological ladder from less-
skilled, labor-intensive products with lower technologies into medium-
technology products with capital and skilled-labor intensiveness (Aysan &
Hacıhasanoğlu, 2007; Akman, 2013). Accompanied by post-2001 crisis
macroeconomic reforms, EU–Turkey bilateral trade increased dramatically
(see Fig. 12.3) until the obvious decline that followed the 2008 global
financial crisis.
This period can be characterized as one of coexistence and macroeco-
nomic stability via a close cooperation with the IMF and the World Bank
and the EU anchor via the CU (Öniş & Bakır, 2007: 150). The political
3Lower tariffs under the CCT and free trade agreements with several neighbouring
countries according to Article 16 of the decision on the CU also provided duty-free
access for Turkey’s trading partners.
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Fig. 12.3 Turkey’s bilateral trade with the EU (1961–2019) (in billion USD)
(Source International Monetary Fund [2020])
perspective for full membership also solidified the EU’s anchor role when
Turkey’s EU accession negotiations commenced in October 2005.
12.3.2 The Customs Union Under Changing Political and Global
Circumstances
The optimism that arose as a result of the launch of accession negoti-
ations in 2005, and with it the EU’s capacity to act as an influential
anchor, began to dissipate in the post-2005 period (Icoz, 2016). The
negotiations did not get off to a smooth start as the EU declared that
Turkey’s accession was an ‘open-ended process, the outcome of which
cannot be guaranteed beforehand’ (European Commission, 2005: Art.
2). Furthermore, the accession of Cyprus without unification was a point
of political turmoil that later induced the Council to block eight chapters
of the negotiations with Turkey in December 2006. These chapters were
mostly relevant to trade policy and the upgrading of the bilateral trade
relationship, including the CU.4 The ambiguity of the accession process
4The blocked chapters are Free Movement of Goods, Right of Establishment and
Freedom to Provide Services, Financial Services, Agriculture and Rural Development,
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and reservations from the EU members emerged as key challenges for
Turkey’s accession negotiations, weakening the mutual trust in relations.
In addition to complexities in the accession process, global economic
circumstances also started to change, exposing flaws in the CU. First,
the global crisis of 2008 led various advanced economies into turbu-
lence. The crisis-related contraction in demand in eurozone countries
influenced the sustainability of European markets for Turkish exporters,
who subsequently started to look for alternative markets (see Fig. 12.4).
Second, long before the global crisis, EU trade policy priorities and
agenda had started to change in response to shifts in global economy.
In October 2006, the Commission published a communication enti-
tled ‘Global Europe’ (European Commission, 2006) to reinforce the
EU’s global competitiveness and ensure that the EU got a fair share in
emerging economies’ markets. The strategy primarily entailed FTAs with
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Fig. 12.4 Turkey’s total exports to the EU (28), Germany, USA, and the rest of
the world (1990–2018) (in billion USD) (Source Updated based on Felbermayr
et al. (2016) and OECD STAN Database for Structural Analysis [2020])
Fisheries, Transport Policy, Customs Union and External Relations. For a comprehen-
sive overview of the accession negotiations and the status of individual chapters see also
Lippert, Chapter 11.
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policy under new international balance of power and domestic concerns
(Young & Peterson, 2006). The repercussions of the EU’s emerging trade
policy for Turkey surfaced after the EU started negotiations with major
trading partners like India, South Korea, Ukraine, Canada, members of
the Association of Southeast Asian Nations, and the Andean countries
during 2007–2009.
The EU’s proliferation of FTAs signaled an obvious shift from multilat-
eralism to bilateralism, with vast implications for Turkey, as Article 16 of
the decision on the CU forces Turkey to harmonize its preferential trade
regime with third countries by signing similar FTAs. Beyond the legal
requirement lies an economic necessity. Without these agreements Turkey
would face an asymmetrical effect; for example, it would be obliged to
open its market to products from the EU’s emerging FTA partners with
no or very low customs duties, while access to these markets for Turkish
exports would not be reciprocated unless the latter agreed to eliminate
tariffs to Turkish goods. However, the provisions of the CU did not
guarantee Turkey being able to make such deals.
Leading business associations, including TÜSİAD and the Union of
Chambers and Commodity Exchanges of Turkey (TOBB), started to
raise concerns about this asymmetry and claimed that Turkey’s prefer-
ences in the EU market would erode under competitive pressure from
the EU’s FTA partners and decrease its leverage with them (TÜSİAD,
2008; TOBB, 2013).5 Criticism peaked when the EU began its Transat-
lantic Trade and Investment Partnership negotiations with the USA in
2013. Turkey’s frustration was voiced not only by business circles but
also at higher political levels. Zafer Çağlayan, former Minister of the
Economy, publicly announced that unless the asymmetric structure of the
CU was removed, a replacement of the CU with an FTA could be consid-
ered (Sabah, 2013). While this suggestion implied a step back from the
ultimate goal of full membership under the Association Agreement, it
mirrored the sensitivities involved.
Ostensibly, in this period the ambiguities of open-ended accession
negotiations and changing trade policy preferences as a result of shifting
global balances increased pressure on the functioning of the CU and
diminished the EU’s anchor role in trade policy. The CU was not
5For more detailed analysis of criticisms see Akman (2010, 2013).
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perfectly negotiated at the beginning and possessed several shortcom-
ings.6 However, it should be remembered that the CU was originally
designed as a transitional step ahead of Turkey’s full membership in the
EU, and was never conceived to last for decades. Calls for a reevaluation
of the CU and for its possible upgrading were expressed for the first time
in 2014 (World Bank, 2014). The report argued that ‘the changing global
economy is exposing design flaws in the CU’ and that ‘the CU is increas-
ingly becoming less well equipped to handle the changing dynamics of
global trade integration’ (World Bank, 2014: i). It proposed far-reaching
recommendations for more effective operation of the CU, including the
reinforcement of the ‘Turkey Clause’ in cases of FTA asymmetries, consul-
tation to foster Turkey’s alignment with the EU acquis , the widening
of the CU’s scope to cover trade in services, public procurement, and
primary agricultural products, and the formulation of a well-designed
dispute-settlement mechanism (World Bank, 2014).
Against this backdrop, the Commission and Turkey announced in May
2015 the launch of preparations for modernizing the CU (European
Commission, 2015a). Soon after this joint statement, the Commission
published, in August 2015, a roadmap that offered a preliminary assess-
ment of likely economic, social, and political impacts of a modernization
(European Commission, 2015b).
12.3.3 Could a Modernized Customs Union Re-Anchor Turkey to Its
EU Route?
The impact assessment of the Commission was completed with the publi-
cation of a report titled ‘Study of the EU-Turkey Bilateral Preferential
Trade Framework, Including the Customs Union, and an Assessment of
its Possible Enhancement’ (European Commission, 2016b). It assessed
the plausibility of two alternative options to maintaining the status
quo: a modernized CU based on an ‘enhanced commercial framework’
(ECF) that would comprise a continued CU plus an FTA in services
and establishment, agriculture, non-tariff barriers (NTBs), and public
procurement; or a ‘deep and comprehensive FTA’ (DCFTA) covering all
6Earlier studies rightly envisaged that the CU was not yet complete, and institutional
weaknesses, together with a loss of belief, threatened its future (Neuwahl, 1999); it was
difficult for the CU to attain the level of integration that the relationship required in
order for it to succeed (Peers, 1996).
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goods trade, including industrial, agricultural, and fishery products, plus
services and establishment, NTBs, and public procurement (European
Commission, 2016b). Both options were estimated to bring welfare
gains, while economic impact of ECF was higher compared to DCFTA.
The findings of the study revealed that the former option creates higher
GDP growth for both Turkey and the EU, and that replacing the
CU with an FTA remains an inferior scenario (European Commission,
2016b). Based on this impact assessment the EC asked for the Coun-
cil’s mandate in December 2016 to start negotiations with Turkey on
modernizing the CU.
In its July 2017 resolution, the European Parliament (EP) accepted the
Commission’s proposal to start negotiations but called on the Commis-
sion
to include a clause on human rights and fundamental freedoms in
the upgraded Customs Union between Turkey and the EU, making
human rights and fundamental freedoms a key conditionality. (European
Parliament 2017: para. 22)
However, political developments precluded the authorization of the
Council. Among the member states with concerns on the update of
the CU, Germany revealed the strongest opposition (Özcan, 2017).
Echoing this sentiment, the Council stated in its decisions from June
2018 that Turkey was moving away from the EU and that ‘no further
work towards the modernization of the EU-Turkey Customs Union is
foreseen’ (Council of the EU, 2018: 13). This sentiment was reiterated
in 2019 alongside the statement that accession negotiations had come
to a standstill (Council of the EU, 2019). In the 36th meeting of the
EU–Turkey Customs Union Joint Committee meeting in July 2019, the
EU recalled the previous Council conclusions and recapped ‘the need
for the full and non-discriminatory implementation of the existing CU’
(European Commission, 2019b: 1). However, as Ülgen (2018) argues,
taking no action to modernize the CU is risky considering that trade
irritants are cumulative and commitments to implement existing rules
are gradually eroding. He underlines that ‘the modernization of the
Customs Union would also allow it [the EU] to regain its anchoring role
for Turkish policy reform’ (Ülgen, 2018: 21).
The trade policy reforms under the EU anchor, largely confined
to upgrading the CU, have become a central point of debate
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for influential domestic actors in Turkey. Leading business associa-
tions, including TOBB, TÜSİAD, Economic Development Foundation,
Turkish Exporters Association, Foreign Economic Relations Board, and
Independent Industrialist and Businessmen Association at every oppor-
tunity declared their belief in modernizing the CU and deep regret for
the EU’s decision to block the opening of negotiations for its upgrading
(Duran, 2018).
However, the discourse by Turkish business and political circles
lacks credibility for various reasons. First, Turkey’s calls to upgrade the
CU is overshadowed by consistent discretionary practices that are not
compatible with the existing CU. Turkey has recently introduced highly
restrictive customs policies, which primarily take the form of so-called
‘additional duties’ that apply to an expanded number of industry sectors.
Since 2014, the number of additional duties introduced by the Turkish
authorities has increased dramatically, directly, or indirectly putting Euro-
pean industrial goods at disadvantage. The stability provided by Turkey’s
adherence to the CU is eroding as Turkey’s regulatory convergence with
the EU has been slowing down for years. Compliance with respect to
technical barriers to trade in pharmaceuticals, electronics and engineering
products, footwear, textiles, and clothing, have become thorny issues.
In the field of state aids, Turkey fails to put an effective law into force
and consistently delays the notification of subsidy schemes and measures
(European Commission, 2016b: 130). Ülgen is correct in noting (2018:
18) that a proper monitoring and implementation of state aid rules
in alignment with EU standards could enhance Turkey’s business and
investment environment.
Second, the impact assessment studies by the World Bank, the EU,
and Turkey insistently called attention to welfare gains to be accrued if
trade in services and, more notably, agriculture were to be included in
the bilateral framework between the EU and Turkey (see World Bank,
2014; European Commission, 2016b; Republic of Turkey Ministry of
Economy, 2016). Yet, agricultural liberalization is a complex issue in
Turkey, as the Ministry of Agriculture and domestic interests are prone
to rent-seeking policies. Despite its willingness to eliminate barriers to
market access in services, and its experience in negotiating trade in services
in its recent FTAs with South Korea, Singapore, and Malaysia, Turkey
has not yet prepared a broad mandate to negotiate service liberalization
with the EU. Public procurement is another area considered to be a part
of a modernized CU between the EU and Turkey. Nevertheless, large
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public bidding is conducive to economic rent-seeking, especially in infras-
tructural contracts, and the construction and housing sectors. Turkish
legislation has changed several times to allow for ever-increasing exemp-
tions and specific favors, and the practices are largely non-transparent
(Ülgen, 2017: 12).
Third, Turkey has not yet come up with any sensible proposal to
address the design flaws, which it considers a key driver in its efforts to
renew the CU: inter alia, FTA asymmetries, a lack of Turkish participa-
tion in regulatory decision-making (in CU-related areas), and an ailing
dispute-settlement mechanism. Turkey’s negotiation objectives under
different scenarios have not been clearly declared yet, nor have they been
subject to any proper analysis and policy debate. The impact assessment
study the Turkish Ministry of Trade commissioned disclosed that Turkey’s
overall gain from upgrading would primarily result from an agricultural
liberalization. However, the study was not publicized except as a one-
page summary (Republic of Turkey Ministry of Economy, 2016), which
signals that transparency for public purposes is disregarded (Altay, 2018:
193).
Under these circumstances, Turkey’s motivation to upgrade the CU,
one of its strongest contractual links with the EU, is weakening, and polit-
ical announcements do not go beyond paying lip service. Once a major
area for Turkey’s anchoring to the EU and a stability factor for Turkish
business, the CU is currently subject to diminishing returns amid political
bickering. It is no longer perceived by Turkish policy circles as a political
step toward EU membership, since the course of accession negotiations
is not promising. As Ülgen (2017: 18) argues, the failure to modernize
the CU may lead ‘Turkey to become totally unanchored from Europe’.
12.4 Conclusion
In this chapter, we outlined how predictable relations with the EU
and prospects for membership promoted domestic economic reforms
in Turkey. Maintaining a European anchor helped Turkey realize much
desired and comprehensive economic and democratic transformation.
Macroeconomic policy reforms brought stability and credibility to the
Turkish economy in terms of sustained growth, job creation, and inflow
of FDI. The EU anchor has given Turkey’s transformation stability and
confidence, especially during times when it was combined with another
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anchor (such as the IMF, the World Bank, and the WTO). In trans-
forming Turkey’s trade policy, the CU played a pivotal role, fostering
orderly and smooth trade relations between Turkey and the EU and with
third countries.
Turkey’s success under the ‘double anchoring’ of the EU and interna-
tional institutions in aligning its macroeconomic and trade policies with
the EU has waned substantially over time. For Turkey, the EU acces-
sion is no longer a prevailing idea amid the complexities of the accession
negotiations, changing domestic conditions, and ambiguous signals from
the EU. At the same time, the growing discretionary power of the exec-
utive under the new presidential system has increased unpredictability in
Turkey. Turkey’s economy is largely backsliding, with current account and
budgetary deficits, rising inflation, and growing external debts.
Trade partnership remains one of the few well-functioning legs of the
volatile bilateral dialogue between the EU and Turkey. At the same time,
it requires a strong upgrading of the CU in order to enhance mutual
gains for both Turkey and the EU under a revitalized bilateral trading
environment. The CU is outdated in its original form and does not reflect
the realities of modern trade relations. Its modernization, as evidenced
by many economic studies, is essential, but the political climate in Europe
and the economic policy approach currently prevailing in Turkey threatens
the process. The failure to upgrade the CU is likely to further diminish
Turkey’s anchorage to Europe.
Given the doubts about Turkey’s full membership prospects and under
changing global circumstances—in particular the shift of the economic
gravity center toward Asia and China, while advanced economies lost
their comparative advantages in setting multilateral rules successive AKP
governments began to reassess their global strategies and degraded the
role of the EU (Esfahani & Çeviker-Gürakar, 2013: 375–376). This
induced Turkey to liberate itself from strict EU-related conditionality
(also from the IMF) once the accession negotiations had lost their
attraction. Despite a continued discourse about Turkey’s willingness to
be involved in the negotiations and to modernize the CU, the poli-
cies of the AKP government indicate that Turkish policymakers are no
longer interested in tying their hands by adhering to an ambiguous
EU anchor. However, Turkey’s current political regime is conducive to
macroeconomic instability in the absence of external anchors. This leads
to a time-inconsistency problem once again, as domestic actors do not
consider macroeconomic and trade policies sufficiently predictable.
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CHAPTER 13
FromConvergence to Divergence: The




Turkey’s potential contributions to the European Union’s (EU) foreign
policy used to be considered as one of the reasons for offering EU
membership to Turkey. For instance, writing in 2004, Emerson and Tocci
(2004: 33) argued that ‘if the EU truly aspires to play a stabilizing,
pacifying and modernizing role in its neighborhood beyond mere token
actions, then the incorporation of Turkey into the common external
policy offers the prospect of real advantages’. However, in order for
Turkey to bring added value to the EU’s foreign policy, the foreign poli-
cies of the two sides have to be compatible. This chapter analyzes Turkish
foreign policy between 1959 and 2020 and its compatibility with EU
foreign policy in this period. The notion of compatibility refers to the
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quality of mutual tolerance, consistency, and congruity (Oxford English
Dictionary, 2020). In the context of foreign policy, as it is used here, it
refers to the degree of harmonization or convergence between Turkey’s
and the EU’s foreign policies.
In Turkey’s EU accession negotiations, Chapter 31, titled ‘foreign,
security, and defense policy’, requires full alignment of Turkey’s foreign
policy with that of the EU. Analyzing the compatibility is thus not only
an academic exercise, but also a political concern. Greater compatibility
of the two foreign policies can, thus, also be seen as an indicator of how
close Turkey is to the fulfilment of relevant EU membership criteria.
Beyond the membership question, a greater compatibility also implies
more chances for cooperation and a higher probability for collective
initiatives in foreign affairs.
The study of compatibility between the EU’s and Turkey’s foreign
policies has drawn attention from a limited number of scholars in compar-
ison with the study of Turkish foreign policy in general. The vast majority
of studies dealing with the period before the outbreak of Arab uprisings
in 2010 and 2011 argue that Turkey’s full membership in the EU would
strengthen the EU’s foreign policy, especially toward its neighbors (Ünal
Eriş, 2007; Eralp, 2010; Üstün, 2010). Analyses of the compatibility of
Turkey’s foreign policy with that of the EU in the period after the Arab
Spring are rare. Two examples of work assessing potential cooperation
between the parties in foreign policy toward the Middle East come to
conflicting conclusions. One view is that cooperation between the EU and
Turkey over Arab countries would be a non-zero-sum game in which the
two sides would complement each other’s deficiencies (Dinçer & Kutlay,
2013: 2). The other view argues that Turkey’s increasingly independent
and sectarian stance, coupled with its assertive tone, makes it hard for
Turkey to complement EU initiatives (Evin & Hatipoğlu, 2014: 187).
This study falls within the latter camp, arguing that in the period after the
Arab uprisings, the foreign policies of the EU and Turkey have steadily
diverged.
The analysis follows Christopher Hill’s definition of foreign policy
as ‘the sum of official external relations conducted by an independent
actor (usually but not exclusively a state) in international relations’ (Hill,
2016: 4). This definition potentially includes all types of external actions,
including those related to economic relations, but the chapter confines its
analysis to the issues covered by the EU’s Common Foreign and Secu-
rity Policy (CFSP). By doing so it focuses on the EU’s external political
13 FROM CONVERGENCE TO DIVERGENCE … 325
and security relations, excluding member states’ individual positions, poli-
cies, or declarations. The chapter also excludes foreign policies that the
EU and Turkey pursue in multilateral fora, such as in the framework of
the United Nations (UN) or the G20. In institutional terms, the analysis
concentrates on key actors of EU foreign and security policy, including
the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security
Policy and vice president of the European Commission (EC), the Euro-
pean Council, the Council of the EU, and the European External Action
Service (EEAS). On the Turkish side, the president, prime minister (until
2018, when the office of the premiership was abolished), and the Ministry
of Foreign Affairs are the primary handlers of foreign and security issues.
The chapter starts by setting forth the points of convergence and diver-
gence between Turkish and European foreign policies until 1998. The
following section analyzes the compatibility of Turkish and EU foreign
policies between 1999 and 2002, and continues with an examination of
the foreign policy during the Justice and Development Party (Adalet ve
Kalkınma Partisi, AKP) governments, in power since 2002. The period
between 2003 and 2010 is distinguished from the period after 2010 (the
period after the Arab uprisings), as there is a higher degree of compati-
bility with the EU’s foreign policy before 2011. The conclusion discusses
the prospects for future cooperation between Turkey and the EU by
taking into account the latest regional and international developments.
13.2 Starting Points of Convergence
and Divergence Within
the Western Alliance: 1959–1998
The founders of the Turkish Republic in the 1920s and 1930s sought
to create a Turkey aligned with the West, in particular Europe, as they
perceived the West as the most modern, advanced civilization of the time.
With the Cold War and the disclosure of Soviet intentions to control
Turkish territory, especially with regard to the Bosporus and Dardanelles,
Turkey’s alignment with the West was even perceived as a necessity.
Turkey became a member of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization
(NATO) in 1952 and sought membership in other Western international
organizations as part of its security strategy. Turkey’s application for an
association agreement with the European Economic Community (EEC)
in July 1959 was also motivated by security concerns, although the goal of
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balancing Greece, which applied for association in June 1959, influenced
the timing of the application (see also Turhan & Reiners, Chapter 1).
Confrontational relations between Greece and Turkey made it necessary
for Turkey to seek membership of international organizations of which
Greece was also a member in order not to be targeted by the international
organization in question.
Turkey acted as a staunch ally of the West during much of the Cold
War, which often put it at odds with its Middle Eastern neighbors. It
was part of the efforts to establish the Baghdad Pact (1955) as a security
organization for the Middle East, which did not receive much favor from
Middle Eastern countries. Turkey voted against Algerian independence at
the UN between 1954 and 1961 in line with Western countries. Turkey’s
recognition of Israel in 1949 was another step that distanced it from the
Middle East at the time.
When the Greek military junta deposed then Cypriot President Arch-
bishop Makarios to establish the union of Cyprus with Greece, Turkey
militarily intervened in Cyprus in order to protect Turkish Cypriots in
1974 (Hale, 2000: 155). As the negotiations between the parties did
not lead to a settlement, Turkish forces have remained in Northern
Cyprus until today. The island has been effectively divided into two sepa-
rate entities. After the intervention, the member states of the European
Communities issued a communiqué reaffirming their ‘support for the
independence and territorial integrity of Cyprus and their opposition to
any intervention or interference tending to put it in question’ (European
Political Cooperation, 1974). Since then, the EU has continued to express
support for territorial integrity and the independence of Cyprus (see, e.g.,
European Council, 1988).
Despite this divergence, a series of developments showed the compat-
ibility of the foreign policies of Turkey and the EEC. Both the EEC and
Turkey condemned the Soviet Union’s invasion in Afghanistan in 1979
(European Political Cooperation, 1980; Tellal, 2008: 781) and the Israeli
military campaign in Lebanon in 1982 (European Political Cooperation,
1982; Fırat & Kürkçüoğlu, 2008: 128). Also, both actors supported
the settlement of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict on the basis of the UN
Security Council Resolutions 242 (1967) and 338 (1973), which called
for Israel’s withdrawal from territories occupied in 1967 and for nego-
tiations between the parties to establish a just and durable peace (see
European Political Cooperation, 1973; Republic of Turkey Ministry of
Foreign Affairs, 2020). Another area where Turkey and the EU shared a
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common understanding was their interpretation of the Bosnian War in the
early 1990s. Both saw Serbia and Bosnian Serbs as responsible for much
of the violence and the Muslim population of Bosnia-Herzegovina as the
principal victims of aggression (European Council, 1992: 101), although
Turkey went further in suggesting that harsher precautions should be
taken against the Serbs (Uzgel, 2008: 493).
Turkey’s foreign policy positions were generally compatible with those
of the EEC (EU after, 1992) until 1998. Turkey’s foreign policy during
the Cold War and its immediate aftermath was primarily shaped by the
goal of being recognized as part of the Western community of states
and by NATO’s preferences, membership of which it shared with most
of the EEC/EU member states (Sözen, 2010: 116). Exceptional diver-
gences between the foreign policies of Turkey and the EEC/EU included
Turkey’s position on the Cyprus problem, and its territorial disputes
with Greece, which is against the EU principle of ‘good neighborly
relations’ (European Commission, 1998: 52). Relations with Middle
Eastern countries, except Israel, were limited. To illustrate, in 1997, then
Turkish President Süleyman Demirel was forced to depart from an Orga-
nization of Islamic Conference meeting as a result of intense criticism
over Turkey’s relations with Israel (Milliyet, 1997). During this period,
Turkey-Africa and Turkey-Central Asia relations were almost nonexistent.
Toward the end of the 1990s, Turkey’s foreign policy agenda started to
expand in terms of geography, number of issues, and foreign policy tools
(Sözen, 2010: 116).
13.3 Turkey’s Regional
Activism à la EU: 1999–2002
After Turkey was granted candidate status at the Helsinki European
Council in 1999, and until AKP came to power in 2002, a coalition
government formed by the Democratic Left Party (DSP), Motherland
Party (ANAP), and Nationalist Action Party (MHP) shaped Turkey’s
foreign policy. During this term, İsmail Cem was the minister of foreign
affairs, having held this post in previous coalition governments since June
1997. Cem is said to have laid the foundation for an active foreign
policy in Turkey’s neighborhood (Kirişci, 2018: 55). In the words of
Kirişci (2018: 55), ‘his initiatives for regional engagement can also be
regarded as a precursor to Davutoğlu’s more ambitious regional integra-
tion projects’, which could be observed in particular in the subsequent
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period, between 2003 and 2010. Greek-Turkish rapprochement can be
regarded as Cem’s enduring legacy. After massive earthquakes in both
countries in 1999, Cem and Greek foreign minister George Papandreou
reenergized the relations between the two countries. The cordial relation-
ship even led to Greece waiving its veto over Turkey’s EU membership
candidacy.
Turkey’s new regional activism also found expression in the Caucasus
Stability Pact, open to all member states of the Organization for Security
and Cooperation in Europe, which was proposed by President Süleyman
Demirel in 2000 with the aim of stabilizing the Caucasus. Cem revised
this proposal in February 2001 and argued in favor of a 3 + 3 + 2 frame-
work, which would include not only Armenia, Georgia, Azerbaijan, and
Turkey but also Iran, Russia, the EU, and the United States. Although
conflicts within and between countries in the region prevented the
Stability Pact from materializing, including the EU in the plan demon-
strates Turkey’s aspiration for joint measures with the EU in the region
(Winrow, 2007: 128).
As documented in the Commission progress reports on Turkey in
1998 and 1999, Turkey had not asked to be associated with the EU’s
CFSP positions during this period (European Commission, 1998: 51;
1999: 41). The situation changed after the Helsinki Summit in 1999,
when the EU granted candidacy status to Turkey and thus made the
membership prospect credible. The decision motivated Turkey to move
closer to EU standards and foreign policy positions. The progress report
of 2000 pointed out that Turkey ‘regularly aligned its positions with
those of the Union and when invited to do so has associated itself with
the Union’s joint actions and common positions’ (European Commis-
sion, 2000: 67). Turkey continued the practice of alignment with EU
statements and declarations and associated itself with the Union’s joint
actions and common positions in 2001 and 2002 (European Commis-
sion, 2001: 89; 2002: 127). However, Turkey’s pursuit of connecting
its foreign policy initiatives with the EU also went beyond the CFSP.
In February 2002, Turkey organized a forum on the harmony of civi-
lizations that brought together the EU and the Organization of Islamic
Conference in Istanbul. The EC’s progress report of 2002 noted that the
forum was important in ‘promoting dialogue and mutual understanding
between EU countries and Muslim countries across the world’ (European
Commission, 2002: 128).
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As Hatipoğlu and Palmer (2016: 234) argue, the end of the Cold War
enhanced Turkey’s willingness to become more active in its foreign policy;
however, at the same time, Turkey’s abilities were still limited. Turkey did
not always achieve positive results from its regional initiatives, as can be
seen in its proposal for a Caucasus Stability Pact. Nevertheless, the period
from 1999 to 2002 marked the beginning of Turkey’s regional activism
and underpinned its clear efforts to align its foreign policy with that of
the EU.
13.4 Turkey Adopts the EU’s
Soft Power Approach: 2003–2010
The AKP government came to power after the November 2002 parlia-
mentary elections. Its foreign policy was guided by the ‘strategic depth’
doctrine of Ahmet Davutoğlu, who served as first foreign policy advisor of
then Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, then foreign minister (2009–
2014), and lastly prime minister (2014–2016). For Davutoğlu (2001:
552), the historical and geographic complexity of countries provide them
with important assets for a long lasting and strategic approach to foreign
policy making. For him, Turkey’s historical and geographic ‘depth’ places
Turkey at the center of its neighboring regions and offers a potentially
extensive influence which should be utilized (Altunışık & Çuhadar, 2010:
376).
A major foreign policy challenge faced by the AKP government
throughout this period was the Cyprus conflict. In 2004, when all
Cypriots were offered a vote on implementing the ‘Annan Plan’ as a solu-
tion to the Cyprus conflict, the AKP government adopted a policy in favor
of the plan with a view to harmonizing its approach with the EU. This
was a major change from Turkey’s previous understanding of the Cyprus
dispute, which can be summarized in the slogan ‘no solution is the solu-
tion’ of the previous military-bureaucratic establishments (Sözen, 2013:
116). Approximately 65% of Turkish Cypriots approved the plan, whereas
76% of Greek Cypriots rejected it. As a result, Cyprus became a member
of the EU as a divided island, leaving the EU and Turkey with a complex
unresolved challenge, which had developed in the realm of foreign policy
but was then turned into a question of bilateral EU–Turkey relations.
Building on Davutoğlu’s ‘zero problems with neighbors’ approach,
Turkish policymakers spoke of Turkey’s ambition of becoming a global
power and of instituting regional order. In this context, Turkey’s policy
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toward its neighborhood aligned with the EU’s ‘soft power’ approach
and employed resources such as ‘cultural attraction, ideology, and inter-
national institutions’ (Nye, 1990: 167).2 In 2003, the EU defined
Turkey as ‘an important actor in promoting stability and security in its
region (Balkans, Caucasus, Mediterranean, and the Middle East)’ and
stated that it ‘has taken a number of initiatives within this role’ (Euro-
pean Commission, 2003: 124). In 2004, it welcomed Turkey’s efforts
‘to improve and deepen its relations with the neighboring countries’
(European Commission, 2004: 155). Turkey facilitated talks between
Afghanistan and Pakistan in 2007 and also took on a facilitator role in
regional conflicts between Syria and Israel in 2008 and between Serbia
and Bosnia-Herzegovina in 2009.
At the same time, Turkey tried to improve its relations not only with its
immediate neighbors but also in other regions. A strategic dialogue mech-
anism was established with the Gulf Cooperation Council in 2008, and a
strategic partnership was initiated between Turkey and the African Union
in 2008. In its relations with neighbors, Turkey followed the EU model of
engaging in functional cooperation in order to establish peaceful relations.
Between 2008 and 2010, it created High Level Strategic Cooperation
Councils, not only with Iraq, Syria, and Greece but also with Russia, in
which cabinets worked on a variety of issues such as healthcare, culture,
trade, transportation, and energy. The coexistence of democracy, secu-
larism, economic success, and balanced foreign policy made Turkey a role
model in the Middle East (Torun, 2016). In contrast with the 1990s,
Turkey was well received in the Organization of Islamic Conference,
and in 2004, the Turkish academic and politician Ekmeleddin İhsanoğlu
was elected as the secretary general of the organization and remained in
office for almost ten years. These examples illustrate how Turkey tried
to embed itself in bi- and multilateral partnerships and how it increased
its cultural and political attraction and visibility with methods similar to
those employed by the EU.
However, this period also saw actions contradicting EU positions on
certain foreign policy issues. For instance, Turkey recognized the result of
the Palestinian elections in 2006, which gave Hamas the majority in the
2 ‘Soft power’ is typically contrasted with ‘hard power’, which refers to coercion and
use of force. For more information on the concept see Nye (1990). For a discussion of
Turkey’s soft power approach in the foreign policy and migration nexus, see also Kaya,
Chapter 14.
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parliament, and Hamas leader Khaled Mashal was welcomed in Turkey
after the elections. The United States, Israel, and the EU, in contrast,
demanded that Hamas disarm and recognize Israel as a condition for the
acceptance of the election results (Daily Sabah, 2017). However, the EU’s
response to Mashal’s visit to Turkey was mild, emphasizing the potential
for a positive outcome from the visit, with then EU High Representative
Javier Solana suggesting that the visit could help reinforce the conditions
set by the Quartet (the EU, the UN, the US, and Russia) for Hamas
to renounce violence and recognize Israel (Krieger, 2006). Another inci-
dent that indicated divergence from the EU was Brazil’s and Turkey’s
brokering of a deal with Iran on its nuclear capabilities in 2010. Although
the office of then EU High Representative Catherine Ashton regarded the
deal as a move in the right direction, it stated that ‘it [did] not answer
all of the concerns raised over Iran’s nuclear program’ (Blua, 2010). The
UN Security Council did not approve the deal either and increased sanc-
tions against Iran. As a member of the UN Security Council at that time
Turkey voted against these sanctions.
Likewise diverging from the EU, Turkish–Israeli relations deterio-
rated during the late 2000s. First, Israel’s Operation ‘Cast Lead’ against
Hamas-led Gaza in December 2008 and January 2009 was criticized
heavily by then Prime Minister Erdoğan at the World Economic Forum in
Davos (International Crisis Group, 2010: 3). The dispute was followed
by the ‘Mavi Marmara’ incident in May 2010. The Mavi Marmara was
part of an international flotilla that aimed to provide direct aid to Gaza
despite the Israeli blockade of the area. Israel intercepted the flotilla in
international waters and killed eight Turkish citizens and one US citizen
of Turkish descent aboard the vessel (International Crisis Group, 2010:
4). In the aftermath, Turkey withdrew its ambassador from Israel and
expelled Israel’s ambassador from Turkey. In response, the EU regretted
the loss of life and condemned the use of violence. It called for ‘an
immediate, full and impartial inquiry’ that included ‘credible interna-
tional participation’. Moreover, by adding that ‘[t]he continued policy
of closure [was] unacceptable and politically counterproductive’ (Council
of the EU, 2010: 11), the EU to some extent also supported Turkey’s
perspective.
To conclude, during the period 2003 to 2010, despite limited diver-
gences, Turkey’s prevailing ethos of the period—relying on soft power
and cooperating with neighbors—was generally in line with the EU’s
foreign policy approach. In addition, Turkey’s alignment with the CFSP
332 Z. TORUN
declarations of the EU was consistently high throughout this period,
showing Turkey’s political will to harmonize its foreign policy with that
of the EU. Ankara aligned itself with 45 out of 46 CFSP declarations
of the EU in 2007 (European Commission, 2007: 74). During 2008 to
2010, Turkey continued its broad compatibility with CFSP, aligning itself
with 109 of a total of 124 CFSP declarations in 2008, with 99 CFSP
declarations out of 128 in 2009, and with 54 out of 73 of the relevant
EU declarations and Council decisions in 2010 (European Commission,
2008: 83, 2009: 87, 2010: 95). This high convergence between foreign
policies led pundits to call for advanced cooperation between the EU
and Turkey in the Balkans and the Middle East (Grabbe & Ülgen, 2010;
Barysch, 2010).
All in all, this period can be seen as the ‘golden age’ of the compati-
bility of Turkey’s foreign policy with that of the EU. In contrast to the
1990s, Turkey’s regional engagement seemed to be producing results, as
it was seen as a role model for its neighbors. Turkey’s above-mentioned
foreign policy divergences from its traditional allies, regarding Hamas,
Iran, and Israel, were no doubt facilitated by the government’s desire to
leave an imprint in the international arena. During this period Turkey
engaged with its regional neighbors to an unprecedented level and aimed
to rise as a regional power through the use of soft power. In the words of
Yorulmazlar and Turhan (2015: 337), Turkey took on a role of ‘a strategic
interconnector between regional interlocutors, as well as between the
West and the Middle East’. However, the picture started to change after
the Arab uprisings of 2010 and 2011.
13.5 Diverging Paths in the Foreign
Policies of Turkey and the EU: 2011–2020
13.5.1 The Arab Spring and the War in Syria
Changing dynamics in the Middle East in 2010 and 2011 left Turkey in a
situation where the AKP’s policy of zero-problems with neighbors was no
longer sustainable. During this period, Turkey’s foreign policy toward its
neighbors focused on interventionism, and it risked being associated with
certain factions in neighboring countries, to the extent that its foreign
policy became largely incompatible with that of the EU.
When President Mohammed Morsi of Egypt was toppled by a military
coup on July 3, 2013, Prime Minister Erdoğan condemned the coup.
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He criticized Morsi’s trial vehemently, to which Egypt’s new adminis-
tration responded by expelling the Turkish ambassador from Cairo and
downgrading its diplomatic relations with Turkey. Turkey reciprocated
by declaring the Egyptian ambassador persona non grata (Deeb, 2013).
The EU did not respond to the military intervention in Egypt as vehe-
mently as Turkey. It declared that ‘the military must accept and respect
the constitutional authority of the civilian power as a basic principle of
democratic governance’, but refrained from asking for President Morsi to
be reinstalled. Instead, it stressed ‘the importance of holding democratic
elections in the shortest possible time’ (Council of the EU, 2013: 1). It
is notable that Turkey did not align itself with this declaration (Council
of the EU, 2013: 2). Brussels also refrained from defining the event
as a coup, instead defining it as an ‘ousting’ (European Commission,
2014: 2). After the presidential elections, which brought the leader of
the military coup to presidency, the EU expressed ‘its willingness to work
closely with the new authorities in Egypt’ and congratulated ‘Abdel Fattah
El-Sissi, as the new President of Egypt’ (Council of the EU, 2014: 1).
In Syria, the Turkish government did not turn against Syrian Presi-
dent Bashar al-Assad immediately after the uprisings began (Davutoğlu,
2013: 869). The delay in this case was mainly due to the personal efforts
of Erdoğan and Davutoğlu, who first attempted to convince Assad to
support reforms. Turkey’s economic cooperation with Syria was also a
source of concern that delayed support for regime change. As Assad
chose to suppress the protests in his country, Turkey made a 180-degree
turn on its Syria policy. It aimed to overthrow the Assad regime, and
began hosting the oppositional Free Syrian Army and Syrian National
Council in 2011 (Stackoct, 2011). The AKP government was seen to have
adopted a pro-Sunni sectarian foreign policy after the Arab Spring, as it
supported Muslim Brotherhood or actors affiliated with Muslim Broth-
erhood against the existing regimes in the Middle East (Öniş, 2011: 3;
Özkan, 2014: 134; Hatipoğlu & Palmer, 2016: 245).
In what followed, Turkey’s response to the developments in Syria
increased its divergence from the EU. Both Turkey and the EU continued
to share the belief that Assad had to resign (Council of the EU, 2016,
2017). However, Turkey’s call for the establishment of a no-fly zone
(BBC News, 2015) did not find support in the EU. In response to a
request to establish a no-fly zone in Syria, then High Representative of
the Union Federica Mogherini stated that refugees now living in Turkey
would continue to run away rather than go back to Syria. In addition, she
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stated that safe zones could only be secured by a substantial ground pres-
ence in northern Syria, and she was not sure whether this was a realistic
option (Weymouth, 2015).
The Syrian war influenced Turkey in a variety of ways, one of which
was the constant flow of Syrian refugees into Turkey. By May 2020,
Turkey was hosting 3.6 million Syrian refugees (UNHCR, 2020: 1). As
Syrians arriving in Turkey tried to reach Europe irregularly, in particular
in 2015, a humanitarian catastrophe unfolded, which exerted substan-
tial pressure on EU member states to act. The EU had to negotiate
with Turkey in order to secure its cooperation for tight border controls
(Kingsley & Rankin, 2016). The resulting EU–Turkey refugee ‘deal’ on
Syrian refugees (European Council, 2016) was based on the return of
irregular migrants who landed in Greece after 20 March 2016 and the
resettlement of one Syrian refugee from Turkey to the EU for each Syrian
returned from Greece to Turkey. The agreement also stipulated Ankara
taking necessary measures to prevent irregular migration through Turkey,
and the EU providing EUR 6 billion toward the Refugee Facility for
Turkey (Reiners & Tekin, 2020: 119). Notwithstanding subsequent prob-
lems with the functioning of the arrangement, it does indicate that despite
the remaining divergences between the EU and Turkey, there is poten-
tial for interest-driven, issue-specific cooperation in their foreign policies
(Dimitriadi et al., 2018; Saatçioğlu et al., 2019: 5; Saatçioğlu, 2020: 171).
In Syria, when the Democratic Union Party (Partiya Yekitiya
Demokrat, PYD) established self-governing cantons in the north in 2013,
Turkish policymakers feared the creation of another autonomous Kurdish
region on Turkey’s frontiers. For Turkey, the PYD and its armed unit, the
People’s Protection Units (YPG), are identical to the Kurdistan Workers’
Party (Partiya Karkerên Kurdistanê, PKK), considered a terrorist orga-
nization with the aim of separating from Turkey. For Western actors, in
particular the US and EU member states, the PYD was a useful partner
in the fight against the terrorist group known as ‘Islamic State’ (IS). This
difference and Turkey’s initial refusal to take part in the anti-IS coali-
tion until 2015 increased the distance between the EU and Turkey (Park,
2015: 585–586).
In August 2016 and January 2018, Turkey launched two military oper-
ations in northern Syria (Operation Euphrates Shield and Operation Olive
Branch) with the objective of cleansing areas close to the border with
Turkey of terrorists, including the PYD/YPG and IS (Kasapoğlu, 2017;
Hürriyet Daily News, 2018). Concerning Operation Euphrates Shield,
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former EU High Representative Javier Solana (2017) stated, ‘the US and
the EU are concerned about Turkey’s attacks against the PYD, given its
central role in pushing back the Islamic State’. Similarly, regarding Oper-
ation Olive Branch, the EU High Representative at the time, Federica
Mogherini, voiced doubts in 2018 about the effectiveness of the opera-
tion in terms of achieving peace in Syria and stated that ‘we believe that
all military action should focus on UN-listed terrorist organizations, not
others; and it should not make peace harder to achieve’ (EEAS, 2018).
In February 2020, military attacks by the Syrian regime killed 33 Turkish
soldiers in Idlib and Turkey launched another military operation (Oper-
ation Peace Spring) (BBC News, 2020). Tension decreased as Turkey
and Russia agreed on a ceasefire and on monitoring the region together
(Aljazeera, 2020).
During the Idlib crisis in February 2020, Turkey let refugees cross its
borders with Greece in an effort to draw attention to Idlib, to obtain
stronger EU support for refugees in its territory, and to force Russia into
an agreement on a ceasefire (Harris, 2020). Turkey’s move amounted to a
violation of the EU–Turkey refugee ‘deal’, intended to avoid a migration
crisis at Europe’s borders. In addition to being motivated by the Idlib
crisis, the move reflected Turkey’s grievances about the EU’s insufficient
financial support for the refugees Turkey hosted and the EU’s unmet
promises to update the EU–Turkey Customs Union, revive the acces-
sion negotiations, and initiate visa-free travel for Turkish citizens (Cook,
2020). Reportedly, the EU ambassadors were outraged by ‘what they
see as an attempt by Turkish President Tayyip Erdogan to ‘blackmail’
the bloc by allowing migrants to mass at Greece’s border’ (Baczynska &
Chalmers, 2020). In order to reach a solution, European Council Pres-
ident Charles Michel and Commission President Ursula von der Leyen
met with President Erdoğan. However, they have only been able to agree
to task the High Representative of the EU, Josep Borrell, and the Turkish
foreign minister, Mevlüt Çavuşoğlu with identifying EU–Turkish differ-
ences and challenges regarding the implementation of the 2016 refugee
‘deal’ (Herszenhorn & Barigazzi, 2020).
13.5.2 Cyprus and the Eastern Mediterranean
Turkey and the EU have also clashed over the Greek Cypriot and Turkish
drilling activities in the Eastern Mediterranean. Unlike previous differ-
ences between the EU and Turkey over Cyprus, the issue is not a foreign
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policy matter for the EU, as Cyprus has been a member of the institution
since 2004. However, Turkey’s approach toward the gas drilling activities
of Cyprus and its partners in the Eastern Mediterranean (Egypt, Greece,
Israel) remains within the realm of its foreign policy. The issue shows that
Turkey has moved further away from the EU’s above-mentioned ‘good
neighborly relations’ principle in foreign policy.
The waters of the Eastern Mediterranean really started to simmer
when, on 8 February 2018, the Italian company Eni and the French
company Total announced a breakthrough gas discovery at the Calypso
block off the Cypriot coast, estimated to be comparable as size to the
giant Zohr field (Andrei, 2018). However, Turkey tried to prevent the
Greek Cypriot government from drilling in the area. A drillship chartered
by ENI was stopped by the Turkish navy on 9 February 2018 (Maltezou,
2018). Turkey issued a statement criticizing the Greek Cypriot admin-
istration’s activities, which disregarded the rights of Turkish Cypriots
(Republic of Turkey Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2018). The Euro-
pean Council described the actions of Turkey as ‘illegal’ and ‘strongly’
condemned them. Additionally, the Heads of State or Government called
Turkey ‘to cease these actions and respect the sovereign rights of Cyprus
to explore and exploit its natural resources in accordance with EU and
International Law’ (European Council, 2018: 5). When Turkey started
its own drilling activities in the Eastern Mediterranean in June 2019,
the European Council called on Turkey ‘to show restraint, respect the
sovereign rights of Cyprus and refrain from any such actions’ (European
Council, 2019a: 4). Since Turkey did not stop its gas drilling activi-
ties, the Council of the EU decided to suspend negotiations on the
Comprehensive Air Transport Agreement. The Council also agreed to
reduce the pre-accession assistance to Turkey for 2020 and called on
the European Investment Bank to review its lending activities in Turkey.
Moreover, the Council agreed not to hold any further meetings of the
Association Council and the EU–Turkey high level dialogues for the
time being (Council of the EU, 2019). Suspension of the high level
dialogue meetings means that one of the key instruments for facilitating
EU–Turkey relations in the fields of energy, economy, transport, fight
against terrorism, and particularly foreign policy would not be available
in the foreseeable future (see also Bürgin, Chapter 9; Lippert, Chapter 11;
Akman & Çekin, Chapter 12).
Regardless of the EU’s position on the issue, Turkey signed a Memo-
randum of Understanding on the delimitation of maritime jurisdictions in
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the Mediterranean Sea with the Government of National Accord of Libya
in November 2019. Through this Memorandum, Turkey declared an
extension of the Turkish Exclusive Economic Zone into the southeast of
the island of Crete and claimed that regional actors had to ‘negotiate with
Turkey for any pipeline project to carry Eastern Mediterranean natural
gas to European markets’ (Daily Sabah, 2019). Thus, Turkey tried to
obstruct the plans of Cyprus, Egypt, Greece, and Israel for transferring
Eastern Mediterranean gas to Europe via a scheme that does not involve
Turkish Cypriots and Turkey. In response, the European Council declared
that the Turkey-Libya Memorandum of Understanding ‘infringes upon
the sovereign rights of third States, does not comply with the Law of the
Sea and cannot produce any legal consequences for third States’ (Euro-
pean Council, 2019b: 4). On this issue, the EU has continued to express
solidarity with its member state Cyprus (Council of the EU, 2020).
Turkey’s increasing divergence from the EU foreign policy after the
Arab Spring can also be seen in its degree of alignment with the EU’s
CFSP declarations from 2011 onwards. Turkey aligned itself with only
32 out of the 67 relevant EU declarations and Council decisions in
2011 (48% alignment) (European Commission, 2011: 106). In 2012,
the rate of alignment slightly increased to 37 out of 70 (53% alignment)
(European Commission, 2012: 87) but was below 50% between 2013
and 2016. In 2018, the rate of alignment reached an all-time low, when
Turkey aligned itself with only 10 out of 64 EU declarations and Council
decisions (around 16% alignment) (European Commission, 2018: 96),
and this trend continued in the following year with an alignment rate of
around 18% (European Commission, 2019: 99).
13.6 Conclusion
In 2018, the Council of the EU noted that ‘Turkey has been moving
further away from the European Union’, and declared that Turkey’s
accession negotiations and the process of the modernization of the EU–
Turkey Customs Union came to a standstill (Council of the EU, 2018:
13). In such an atmosphere, foreign policy becomes even more impor-
tant as an area where both parties have shared interests in preserving
peace and stability in the EU’s immediate neighborhood. Collaboration
in foreign policy could provide a modicum of communication between
parties with increasingly diverging normative perceptions and interests.
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However, as Turkey’s foreign policy has gradually become less compat-
ible with that of the EU, it seems that areas of future cooperation will
be limited to issues where interests overlap, such as pandemics, countert-
errorism, migration, and energy. And, as institutional connections and
channels have been reduced, cooperation is likely to take place more
through ad hoc mechanisms.
Despite the increasing divergence, it is obvious that pressing issues
on the foreign policy agenda, such as the COVID-19 pandemic, migra-
tion, counterterrorism, and energy require the collaboration of the EU
and Turkey. With regard to the COVID-19 pandemic, Turkey attended
the international Coronavirus Global Response conference hosted by
the European Commission in May 2020, and pledged to contribute to
the financial pool for diagnostics, treatment, and vaccines. Turkey sent
medical aid to Italy and Spain, which were hit hard by the virus, and the
Joint Research Center of the EU has been making results and equipment
available to Turkey (Aslan, 2020). Another area that may lead to coop-
eration in the future may be the Iranian dossier.3 In May 2018, former
President Donald Trump withdrew the United States from the agree-
ment on the Iranian nuclear program, reached in 2015, and announced
that the US would impose sanctions on Iran in order to prevent Iranian
nuclear ambitions (Landler, 2018). Both the EU and Turkey were in favor
of adhering to the agreement, and were opposed to sanctions. Although
the situation did not lead to joint action by the EU and Turkey so far,
there is potential for cooperation on the basis of compatible positions
and interests—also in view of the new US administration under President
Biden.
The prospect of cooperation may increase if the EU develops an
institutional framework that provides the possibility of joint actions
with candidate countries in foreign policy issues. Alternatively, if Turkey
and the EU agree on a relationship format short of membership,4 we
may see extended cooperation between the EU and Turkey. In such a
setup, Turkey’s failure to meet the EU’s political standards, in particular
regarding democracy and the rule of law, would probably cease to be
important and the relations could become de-politicized and more tech-
nical. However, limiting EU–Turkey relations to cooperation on specific
3I am grateful to Tuba Ünlü Bilgiç for bringing this to my attention.
4 I am grateful to Atila Eralp for this idea.
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matters where interests overlap risks limiting the bilateral dialogue to
a transactional format, which does not help Turkey’s reform process as
much as an accession-negotiations framework would.
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14.1 Introduction
This chapter analyzes Europeanization and de-Europeanization processes
in Turkey in its migration and asylum policies since the 1999 Helsinki
Summit and, in particular, during the rule of the Justice and Development
Party (Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi, AKP) since 2002. The Europeaniza-
tion of migration and asylum policies and laws corresponds with the
internalization of a rights-based approach by state and societal actors in
Turkey up until the eruption of the Syrian civil war in 2011. In turn,
the de-Europeanization process can be understood as a process by which
migration and asylum policies at the national and local levels in Turkey
have been framed in cultural and religious terms. This chapter asserts that
the AKP leadership redeployed a path dependent, ethno-cultural and reli-
gious logic that underlined the Islamic discourses of ‘guesthood’ and the
‘Ansar spirit’ in receiving and welcoming Syrian refugees—a logic based
on the quest to become a ‘soft power’ in the Middle East.
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Refugees ‘are people who cannot return to their country of origin
because of a well-founded fear of persecution, conflict, violence, or other
circumstances that have seriously disturbed public order, and who, as
a result, require international protection’ (UNHCR, 2020a). Signatory
countries to the 1951 Geneva Convention on the Protection of Refugees
are expected to ensure that migration management policies, practices,
and debates take into account the particular protection needs of asylum
seekers, refugees, and stateless people, and acknowledge the legal frame-
work that exists to meet those needs. Turkey, as a signatory, is bound to
adopt migration policies in accordance with the needs of refugees as well
as of asylum seekers whose quest for sanctuary has yet to be processed.
A key argument of this analysis is that from the very beginning of the
refugee plight caused by the civil war in Syria, Syrians were welcomed
by the Turkish government on the basis of allegedly deep-rooted values
such as ‘Turkish hospitality’, ‘Muslim fraternity’, ‘Arab hospitality’, and
‘guesthood’ traditions.1 The reason Turkey has viewed Syrian migrants in
this light is its intention to uphold the ‘geographical limitation clause’ of
the 1951 Geneva Convention. According to this limitation clause, Turkey
is only bound to accept people as refugees if they come from European
countries.2 It has adopted the Temporary Protection Regulation3 (No.
2014/6883) for Syrians in need of sanctuary.
In discussing (de-)Europeanization, this chapter uses a model based on
policy transfer, which is helpful in understanding the processes of Euro-
peanization in policy areas where the European Union (EU) pressure is
indirect, such as migration and refugees. In this vein, the analysis follows
the understanding of Radaelli (2000: 30), who defines Europeanization
as
processes of construction, diffusion, and institutionalization of formal and
informal rules, procedures, policy paradigms, styles, ‘ways of doing things’,
1For a detailed discussion of these traditions in the region see De Bel-Air (2006),
Pérouse (2013), Chatty (2013), Erdoğan (2015).
2The Refugee Convention of 1951 was initially interpreted as having a ‘geographical
limitation’, meaning that it applied only to refugees from Europe. This was amended by
the 1967 Additional Protocol, but Turkey and a few other countries decided to continue
following the limitation.
3This regulation sets out the rights, obligations, and procedures for the individuals who
are granted temporary protection, a status resembling the subsidiary protection status that
exists in the EU.
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and shared beliefs and norms, which are first defined and consolidated in
the EU policy process and, then, incorporated into the ‘logic of domestic
discourse’, identities, political structures, and public policies.
Accordingly, de-Europeanization can be defined as the process of
reversing the alignment of formal and informal rules, procedures, policy
paradigms, styles, ways of doing things, and shared beliefs and norms (see
also Alpan, 2021, Chapter 5).
The chapter benefits from a set of in-depth interviews conducted with
state and municipal actors, such as the Directorate General of Migra-
tion Management, Yunus Emre Institute, Ministry of Development, and
Ministry of Labor and Social Security, as well as some local municipalities
in Istanbul. Several migration experts and migrants were also interviewed
during this process. The desk research includes the content and discourse
analyses of official texts, speeches of political leaders, and the official
websites of relevant national and local bodies.
The chapter starts with a brief introduction to the global context in
which Turkey’s migration and refugee policies have developed. A short
history of Turkey’s migration and asylum laws provides the background
for the subsequent analysis of legislative changes during the EU acces-
sion process since the Helsinki Summit in 1999. In this context, the
chapter scrutinizes the ‘National Programmes for the Adoption of the
Acquis ’, the visa liberalization process, the Readmission Agreement, and
the instrumentalization of Syrian refugees, which are of particular impor-
tance, as well as Turkey’s Law on Foreigners and International Protection
(2013). On this basis, the study continues with an analysis of Turkey’s
quest to become a model country and soft power on the one hand,
and the discursive framing of ‘migrants’, ‘guests’, and ‘foreigners’ on
the other. It closes with an assessment of Turkey’s de-alignment from
EU norms in connection with its foreign policy aspirations and the
EU–Turkey refugee ‘deal’ of 2016 (European Council, 2016).
14.2 Global Context
Many countries have received large numbers of refugees since the Second
World War. However, the conflict in Syria, coupled with violence and
human rights abuses in other parts of the world, continues to be by
far the biggest driver of mass migration in the past decade. With the
intensification of violence in Syria and several parts of the Middle East
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and Africa, massive numbers of civilians, forcefully uprooted from their
communities, have fled and continue to flee conflict zones, seeking shelter
both in the region and in the EU. In 2015 alone, more than a million
refugees crossed EU borders (UNHCR, 2020b). The EU and its member
states were faced with the enormous challenge of coping with this partly
unexpected mass migration, which created new divisions and political
fissures among member states over how best to deal with resettling these
migrants.
One of the most popular migration routes to Europe starts in Egypt
and Libya and ends in Malta and Italy (Lampedusa and Sicily, respec-
tively). This route is favored mostly by sub-Saharan African migrants.
However, it has also recently been used by Syrians in the aftermath of the
EU–Turkey (Refugee) Statement, which came into force on 18 March
2016, when Germany and the Netherlands took the lead to make a deal
with Turkey to seal off its borders so as not to let refugees travel to the
Greek islands. The statement also included financial terms committed by
the EU to help Turkey accommodate and integrate Syrian refugees as well
as to relocate them in the EU (European Council, 2016). Prior to the
Arab Spring in 2011, the African route was less commonly used than the
Eastern Mediterranean route. The Eastern Mediterranean route simply
refers to the sea crossing from Turkey to Greece. In 2012, it became the
second most popular route by a small margin, only to witness a surge in
2013–2014 due to the civil conflicts in Eritrea and Syria (Frontex, 2015).
Even though migration of refugees to Turkey subsequently slowed,
and more than 350,000 Syrians returned to Syria between 2016 and May
2019, Turkey, as host to more than 3.5 million refugees, is still by far the
country with the highest number of refugees in the world.4
Historically and geographically speaking, Turkey is known to be one
of the leading destinations for refugees. Because of its location between
two continents, imperial legacy, and tumultuous nation-building process,
Turkey has always been exposed to different forms of mass migrations
and emigrations (Erdoğan, 2015; Kaya, 2015). Hence, state actors have
been engaged in formulating migration and asylum policies and laws since
the late Ottoman period (Kale, 2015). These policies and laws will be
4As of 18 November 2020, the number of foreigners under temporary protec-
tion was 3.635.410. For the latest figures see the official website of the Directorate
General of Migration Management, https://www.goc.gov.tr/gecici-koruma5638. Accessed
27 November 2020.
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briefly examined before detailing the processes of Europeanization and
de-Europeanization of Turkey’s migration and asylum policies under AKP
rule.
14.3 A Short History of Turkey’s
Migration and Asylum Laws
Turkey’s migration and integration policies have been formulated in
response to various challenges originating from regional and global
sources. The current policies have been shaped by migration patterns
stemming from the dissolution of the USSR; regional developments in the
Middle East, the Caucasus, and sub-Saharan and North Africa; growing
tension in Afghanistan; the European integration process and growing
right-wing populism; Islamophobia and xenophobia following 9/11; the
financial crisis, and refugee crises. In addition, domestic forces have been
decisive in the formation of migration and integration policies. The most
crucial of these factors is probably the high number of internally displaced
people who have had to leave their hometowns and villages since the early
1990s (Kaya et al., 2009).
Before the enactment of the Law on Foreigners and International
Protection (Law No. 6458) in April 2013 (Resmi Gazete, 2013), there
were three main legal texts regarding immigration and related issues: (1)
the Law on Settlement adopted in 1934; (2) the 1951 Geneva Conven-
tion on the Status of Refugees; and (3) the Regulation on Asylum of
November 1994.
Collaboration with other countries and with international, intergov-
ernmental, and non-governmental organizations is important for the
management of irregular migration. The United Nations High Commis-
sioner for Refugees (UNHCR) plays a significant role, especially in
Turkey’s current asylum policy. During the Cold War period, it was the
main agency overseeing Turkey’s asylum policy and ensuring resettlement
of refugees from Turkey. Moreover, it was responsible for providing basic
assistance and accommodation for asylum seekers and refugees in Turkey.
During the 1980s, UNHCR could continue this practice with respect to
the growing number of asylum seekers arriving from non-European coun-
tries, especially from Iran and Iraq. However, after the massive entry of
refugees into Turkey following the end of the Gulf War in 1991, relations
between Turkey and UNHCR gradually worsened. The deteriorating
security conditions in Southeast Turkey resulting from the activities of the
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Kurdistan Workers’ Party (Partiya Karkerên Kurdistanê, PKK) adversely
influenced Turkish officials’ attitude, particularly toward asylum seekers
who had entered and were present in Turkey illegally (Kirişci, 2005).
The 1994 Asylum Regulation reflected such concerns. The government
ceased cooperation with UNHCR, and the initial implementation of the
Regulation led to criticism from human rights and refugee advocacy
circles. Nevertheless, UNHCR and Turkey’s Interior Ministry officials did
rebuild their partnership in 1997.
Closer cooperation has since also developed between the Turkish
government and intergovernmental organizations such as the Interna-
tional Organization for Migration and the International Labor Organi-
zation. A good example of such collaboration was the program to help
the return of stranded irregular migrants from Turkey to their home-
lands, under which over 550 irregular migrants received return assistance
between 1995 and 1997 (İçduygu, 2003: 62).
However, the most influential anchor for the development of Turkey’s
migration and asylum laws during this period was the EU. In fact, since
the EU confirmed Turkey’s candidate status, the issue of asylum seekers
and irregular migrants has become one of the most significant debates
between the two sides. To reduce the tensions that had arisen regarding
human rights, as well as economic and political implications of irregular
migration, Turkey has taken steps to establish an appropriate adminis-
trative and legal framework to regulate and combat irregular migration
and human trafficking (İçduygu, 2003: 56). Turkish authorities have
since tried to strengthen their efforts to establish and enforce laws and
regulations for achieving this goal.
14.4 Changing Legislation
in the EU Accession Process
14.4.1 The National Programmes for the Adoption of the Acquis
and Legislative Changes in Migration and Asylum Policy
The Helsinki Summit of December 1999 officially recognized Turkey’s
candidacy status and gave impetus to further development of EU–Turkey
relations and to a revision of Turkey’s migration and asylum policy. The
EU adopted an ‘Accession Partnership’ strategy for Turkey in 2001,
followed by the ‘National Programmes for the Adoption of the Acquis ’
(NPAA), which were accepted by the Turkish government (Council of
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the EU, 2001; Resmi Gazete, 2001).5 The NPAA is a detailed, multi-
annual plan for the alignment of domestic legislation with EU regulations.
It was subsequently renewed in 2003 and 2008. The NPAA details
infrastructural tasks, ranging from the establishment of reception and
accommodation centers to the construction, or acquisition, of buildings
to house specialized administrative units to deal with asylum applications.
It also envisages the development of a country-of-origin information
database. The NPAA notes that a reassessment of Turkey’s interpretation
of the geographical limitation clause of the 1951 Geneva Convention will
be taken up during accession negotiations (Kirişci, 2005).
The Accession Partnership coordinating Turkey’s entry to the EU was
prepared by the European Commission (EC) in 2001, and subsequently
revised in 2003, 2006, and 2008 (Council of the EU, 2008). It set
out the following objectives for migration and asylum policy to eradicate
relevant misconceptions between Turkey and the EU:
1. to pursue alignment of visa legislation and practice with the acquis;
2. to adopt and implement the acquis and best practices on migration
(admission, readmission, expulsion) with a view to preventing illegal
immigration;
3. to continue alignment with the acquis and best practices for border
management in preparation of full implementation of the Schengen
Treaty; and
4. to start alignment of the acquis in the field of asylum, including
lifting the geographical limitation of the 1951 Geneva Convention,
strengthening the system for hearing and determining applications
for asylum, and developing accommodation facilities and social
support for asylum seekers and refugees (Tokuzlu, 2007).
The 2003 NPAA promised legislative changes in migration and asylum
laws in Turkey, such as establishing reception centers for asylum seekers,
strengthening the database that keeps track of refugees’ and asylum seek-
ers’ countries of origin, and developing social support mechanisms for
refugees in the fields of education, health, interpretation services, and
5For ‘National Programmes of Turkey for the Adoption of the Acquis ’ see also Republic
of Turkey Ministry of Foreign Affairs (2019).
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employment (Resmi Gazete, 2003). The revisions made in the NPAA
in 2008 included the continuation of Turkey’s efforts to implement the
National Action Plan on Asylum and Migration, such as the adoption of
a roadmap for implementing a comprehensive asylum law in line with the
EU acquis and the establishment of an asylum authority to increase the
capacity for combating illegal migration in line with international stan-
dards. The revisions also included promises to establish an Asylum and
Immigration Unit under the Ministry of Interior, and the employment
of experts to work in this field, which later led to the foundation of
the Directorate General of Migration Management in 2014. Turkey also
promised to establish an Asylum Training Curriculum for the alignment
of the treatment of asylum applicants with the EU acquis (Resmi Gazete,
2008).
The visa regime governing entry and residence in Turkey is more liberal
and flexible in comparison with the EU acquis as it currently stands. As
such, Turkey has faced the problem of balancing its interest in acces-
sion to the EU, which asks Turkey to tighten its entry regime, with
the demands of its growing tourism industry for a liberal visa policy. For
instance, in 2002, there was a disagreement between Turkey and the EU
regarding citizens of third countries in need of visas. There were 21 coun-
tries on the EU ‘negative visa list’ that did not require visas for Turkey.
Consequently, Turkey introduced visa requirements in 2002 for six Gulf
countries: Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and United Arab
Emirates, which are also subject to visa requirements according to the EU
regulations. In 2003, an additional group of 13 countries was deemed
to require visas: Bahamas, Barbados, Belize, Fiji, Grenada, Indonesia,
Jamaica, Kenya, Maldives, Mauritius, Santa Lucia, Seychelles, and South
Africa.
In Turkey’s 2004 progress report, the Commission assessed that
Turkey continued alignment with the EU negative visa list and intro-
duced a visa requirement for citizens of Azerbaijan in November 2003
(European Commission, 2004). Furthermore, in 2005 Turkey intro-
duced visa requirements for the Marshall Islands and Micronesia. By the
end of the same year, the discrepancy between the EU’s visa obligations
list and that of Turkey’s was limited to only six countries. In total, the EU
managed to persuade Turkey to impose visa requirements on more than
20 countries in its blacklist. However, Turkey’s visa regime remained
more liberal than that of the EU due to the possibility of obtaining
sticker visas at the Turkish borders (Tokuzlu, 2007: 3–4).
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In accordance with the accession process, Turkey is required to apply
a uniform visa policy toward all EU citizens and to adopt the Schengen
negative list. The EU also requires Turkey to tighten its borders with
countries such as Armenia, Georgia, Iran, Iraq, and Syria. In 2003, Turkey
opened negotiations on a readmission agreement with the EU. Later, in
collaboration with the EU, Turkey implemented the Integrated Border
Management Strategy in 2006 to comply with the EU acquis on tack-
ling irregular migration and trafficking in human beings. In relation to
visa requirements, aliens must have an entry visa affixed to their passport
or substituting documents to enter Turkish territory. Generally, Turkish
consulates and embassies in the country of origin issue visas or perma-
nent residence, and citizens of countries subject to visa requirements must
apply to Turkish missions abroad.
Of particular importance is the amendment to the Law of Residence
and Travel for Foreigners in Turkey, which was put into force on 1
February 2012 (Law No. 5683). It makes it more difficult for foreigners
to continue living and working in Turkey without a residence and work
permit. Until then, many foreigners used to travel to the nearest country
to officially exit Turkey after their 90-day visa expired and then immedi-
ately re-enter with a new 90-day visa. However, the new law only allows
foreign citizens entering the country with a tourist visa to stay in Turkey
for 90 days, and they are not allowed to re-enter before a 180-day period
has elapsed (Hürriyet Daily News, 2012; Resmi Gazete, 2011).
Prior to the enactment of the new law, the Turkish state enforced
a similar law in 2007 to regulate the entry and exit of Bulgarian and
Romanian citizens in Turkey, who used to have strong economic links
with Turkey. Following the legal barriers set for them, the nationals of
other countries such as those from the Middle East, Armenia, Georgia,
Central Asian Turkic Republics, and the South Mediterranean countries
started to fill in the gap in the informal market, mainly caretaking, house
cleaning, suitcase trading, etc. Such forms of migration are circular in
normal circumstances, but the 2012 law is more likely to increase the
number of undocumented migrants who cannot afford to have a 90-day
break in between their visits to Turkey and therefore have no other choice
than staying in Turkey illegally.
Today, the EU’s impact is visible in the readmission agreement s signed
by Turkey with 15 countries: Belarus, Bosnia Herzegovina, Greece,
Kosovo, Kyrgyzstan, Moldova, Montenegro, Nigeria, Norway, Pakistan,
Romania, Russian Federation, Syria, Ukraine, and Yemen. Turkey has also
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drafted and submitted agreements to Algeria, Egypt, Ethiopia, Georgia,
Israel, Jordan, Kazakhstan, Lebanon, Libya, Mongolia, Morocco, Nigeria,
Sudan, Tunisia, and Uzbekistan (Republic of Turkey Ministry of Foreign
Affairs, 2020).
14.4.2 Readmission Agreement, Visa Liberalization,
and the Instrumentalization of Syrian Refugees
Despite the ongoing asymmetrical character of EU–Turkey relations,
Turkey has transformed its migration and asylum system in the last decade
and harmonized it with the EU acquis . Combating irregular migration
has become a part of the EU-based harmonization process. Turkey’s
engagement with the EU’s readmission agreement can be seen in the
context of the country’s efforts to become a member of the Union; in
this way, it is also directly linked to the country’s aim to have a visa-free
regime for its citizens visiting the EU member states.
EU readmission agreements are based on reciprocal obligations and
are concluded between the EU and non-EU countries to facilitate the
return of people residing irregularly in a country to their country of
origin or to a country of transit. They are negotiated in a broader
context, in which partner countries are usually granted visa facilita-
tion and other incentives such as financial support for implementing the
agreement, or special trade conditions in exchange for readmitting people
residing without authorization in the EU. The EU–Turkey Readmission
Agreement (2013) was signed in parallel with the commencement of the
Visa Liberalization Dialogue (VLD). The agreement was meant to be
another key driver toward Turkey’s alignment with the EU acquis within
the context of migration and asylum. Both sides committed themselves to
international burden sharing, solidarity, joint responsibility, and common
understanding. Accordingly, the EU would start the visa liberalization
process six months after the Readmission Agreement was put into force
at the end of the next three-year period in 2016.
However, visa liberalization is subject to the condition that the EU
will observe Turkey’s implementation of the process for six months to
see if Turkey is going to properly operate this visa regime. The two sides
also agreed on the removal of Turkey’s geographical derogation in the
1951 Geneva Convention on the Status of Refugees. Turkey accepted the
removal of this restriction upon the completion of the accession negotia-
tions to become a full member. The EU–Turkey Statement on migration
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(European Council, 2016) reassessed the determination of both sides to
make sure that the Readmission Agreement operates successfully and that
Turkish citizens will have the right to visa-free travel. However, the failed
coup attempt in Turkey on 15 July 2016, followed by the two-year state
of emergency, interrupted the visa liberalization process.
Irregular migrants and Syrians residing in Turkey, and the Readmis-
sion Agreement, continue to be instrumentalized and used as ‘bargaining
chips’ between Turkey and the EU. This was apparent when Syrians under
temporary protection in Turkey started to feel threatened during the
disagreement between the EU and Turkey over gas drilling on the shores
of Cyprus. In the course of rising tensions in summer 2019, Turkish
Foreign Minister Mevlüt Çavuşoğlu announced the unilateral suspension
of the Readmission Agreement. The crisis resulted in the EU placing sanc-
tions on financial assistance to Turkey. In return, Turkey announced it
would suspend the readmission system as part of the EU–Turkey ‘deal’
that had been operating since March 2016 (Kaya, 2020; Euroefe, 2019).
Irregular migrants and Syrians under temporary protection in Turkey
have also been instrumentalized on other occasions. When 34 Turkish
soldiers were killed in an air strike by Syrian government forces in the
province of Idlib in northwest Syria in February 2020, the Turkish
army immediately responded with explosive drones targeting the regime
forces. One day after the incident, the Turkish Minister of the Interior
announced that Turkey had opened its borders with Greece and Bulgaria
to allow refugees to head toward the EU via land and sea. As the news
spread around the country, buses, taxis, and cars full of refugees made
their way to the western borders of Turkey. The situation at the Turkish-
Greek border led to the rise of a new refugee crisis in the EU. The foreign
ministers of the EU member states discussed the situation, and the EC
announced EUR 700 million support for Greece and EUR 500 million
for Turkey (Erlanger, 2020). The Commission also announced that it
was considering restarting the visa liberalization and visa facilitation talks
with Turkey (Deutsche Welle, 2020). The crisis was eventually resolved
after the Turkish president asked the security forces to seal off the Euro-
pean borders following his meeting in Brussels with the top EU actors
on 17 March 2020 (Wintour & Smith, 2020). It seems that by opening
its borders Turkey has made gains in the short run on its foreign policy
objectives, while the maneuver caused even more suffering to refugees.
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14.4.3 Turkey’s Law on Foreigners and International Protection
Until the enforcement of the Law on Foreigners and International Protec-
tion (Law No. 6458) in 2014, refugee protection in Turkey was regulated
by secondary legislation, mainly by administrative circulars. This had led
to the informal ad hoc implementation of practices toward asylum seekers
by police officers working under the authority of local departments of
foreigners, passport, borders and asylum in different cities, since these
rules were non-binding. The new law was the first domestic law regulating
asylum practices in Turkey. Its adoption represented the first significant
step toward the transformation and regulation of asylum and migration
for Turkey since the ratification of the 1951 Refugee Convention. As an
extension of the NPAA in 2003 and 2008, it regulates the entry, exit,
and the stay of migrants in the country, along with providing scope for
international protection for those who seek asylum in Turkey.
The Law on Foreigners and International Protection is the most
evident illustration of Europeanization in Turkey (Dimitriadi et al., 2018;
see also Alpan, 2021, Chapter 5). It completely changed the main body
of previous law on the status of foreigners. It brought changes to the
Law on Work and Residence Permits for Foreigners and regulated the
rules regarding the rights to family union, long-term residence, educa-
tion, health services, and labor market mobility of regular and irregular
migrants. Under the 2014 law, the management of the Turkish asylum
system is the task of a civil authority under the Ministry of Interior,
ensuring standardized practice across the country. Within the Direc-
torate General of Migration Management a special section called the
Harmonization and Communication Department concentrates on the
integration of migrants of any kind. However, it does not specifically regu-
late the rules regarding political participation, access to nationality, and
anti-discrimination. And although it addresses matters related to funda-
mental rights, residence permits, and work permits, it does not include
relevant articles on the naturalization of foreigners (Migrant Integration
Policy Index, 2015).
Based on Article 91 of the Law on Foreigners and International
Protection, a separate regulation sets out the details of the status of
temporary protection (Regulation No. 2014/6883). On 8 April 2014, a
draft was introduced to 53 public institutions and organizations. Even-
tually, a Temporary Protection Regulation was issued by the Council
of Ministers on 22 October 2014. This regulation aims to resolve the
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unclear status of those living under temporary protection, as the law refers
only to this status with a vague definition, according to which temporary
protection may be provided for foreigners who have been forced to leave
their country, cannot return to the country that they have left, and have
arrived at or crossed the borders of Turkey in a ‘mass influx’ situation
seeking immediate and temporary protection (Article 91/1). Although
this directive does not specify the nationality of refugees, its provisions
are applied solely to Syrians as they are currently protected under the
Temporary Protection Regime (Gümüş and Eroğlu, 2015). Accordingly,
people under temporary protection have the right to remain in Turkey
(Article 25) and access free healthcare (Article 27). Among other positive
features, the directive also prohibits people from being punished for irreg-
ular entry and stay (Article 5); prohibits the forcible return of refugees or
asylum seekers to a country where they are liable to be subject to perse-
cution (refoulement) (Article 6); provides an identity card that can be
used to access state schools and to apply for work permits (Article 22);
makes the work permit process more straightforward (Article 29); and
establishes a provision for free translation services (Article 30).
14.5 The Arab Spring and the Coupling
of Foreign Policy and Migration Affairs
14.5.1 The Transformation of Turkish Foreign Policy
The legal framework formed by the AKP government since 2002 with
regard to the management of migration and asylum issues in Turkey was
successful in aligning with EU legislation. However, one could not argue
the same as far as the political and economic framework is concerned. The
Turkish state’s political and economic motivations gradually contributed
to the de-Europeanization of Turkey, as well as to the growth of reli-
giously motivated foreign policymaking (Özbudun, 2014; Pupcenoks,
2012). In this context, the Syrian refugee crisis and the Arab Spring
acted as turning points in Turkish migration and asylum policies (for key
milestones in EU–Turkey relations see Turhan & Reiners, Chapter 1).
The first group of Syrian nationals found refuge in Turkey by crossing
into the province of Hatay in April 2011. Initially, the AKP government
expected that the Assad regime would soon collapse, and it estimated that
around 100,000 Syrians at most would stay in Turkey for two or three
weeks (Erdoğan, 2014). Following the escalation of the domestic conflicts
in Syria, the AKP government declared an open-door policy toward the
360 A. KAYA
Syrian refugees in October 2011. Accordingly, Turkey allowed Syrians
with passports to enter the country freely, and treated those who had
entered without documents in a similar way. It guaranteed the principle of
non-refoulement, offered temporary protection, and committed itself to
providing the best possible living conditions and humanitarian assistance
for refugees (İçduygu, 2015a). Turkey also immediately responded to the
mass migration through the new legal framework of migration laws, which
was then in the making, in parallel with the alignment of migration and
asylum laws and regulations with the EU. This open-door policy toward
Syrian refugees can be interpreted in different ways, ranging from human-
itarian and religious to political and ethno-cultural drivers. Critically, it
must also be seen in connection with Turkey’s foreign policy objectives,
seeing that the AKP government has so far conceptualized migration and
asylum as intertwined with foreign policy.
When the Arab Spring erupted at the end of 2010, Turkey’s foreign
policymakers were caught off guard. Then Foreign Minister Ahmet
Davutoğlu (2013: 866) considered the process a political ‘earthquake’
in the Middle East. In accordance with this change, Ankara had to
reconsider its ‘zero problems with neighbors’ strategy (see also Torun,
Chapter 13), which entailed a combined approach toward cooperative
security relations and economic interdependence (Davutoğlu, 2010). The
Arab revolutions forced Turkish foreign policy to take on a new role in
the ‘new’ Middle East, although the country did not have the capabilities
to be active beyond its role as a model democracy in Muslim societies
(Gonzales, 2015).
The transformation of Turkish foreign policy was marked by a shift
from a parochial foreign policy structure to a rather imperial one that
harked back to Ottoman times. In this context, the AKP cadres—espe-
cially Davutoğlu, former prime minister and foreign minister—deliber-
ately made neo-Ottoman and Islamic references to meet supporters’
expectations. This new foreign policy imagined a time when peoples
could freely interact culturally, economically, and politically, thereby rein-
tegrating a region (the Middle East) that had been artificially fragmented
(Davutoğlu, 2001). As Bill Park (2018) put it, Turkey’s Kemalist order
had been part of a wider and alien regional order that the AKP and the
Arab Spring movements promised to replace with a return to ‘normal-
ity’, in which the traditional norms and values of ‘the people’ would be
decisive.
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Ahmet Davutoğlu’s school of thought was of particular significance
in the neo-Ottoman and pan-Islamist transformation of Turkish foreign
policy (Özpek & Yaşar, 2018) that sought to expand across three conti-
nent—Asia, Europe, and Africa—and to lead to an imperial revival.
Davutoğlu took the Arab Spring as a perfect opportunity to change
the Western-imposed order associated with the secret Sykes-Picot Agree-
ment of 1916, consisting of artificial borders and nation states in the
Middle East (Çınar, 2018). In his speech as foreign minister addressing
the ambassadors serving in Ankara in 2011, he represented his ambitions
for Turkey as follows:
The Middle East and the Balkans have not seen peace and prosperity since
the collapse of the Ottoman Empire. People in these regions are waiting in
great expectation from Turkey as the heir to the Ottoman Empire. Reuni-
fication between 2011 and 2023 with our brothers in those territories we
have lost between 1911 and 1923, and thereby the establishment of a new
Middle East would mean the rise of not only Turkey but also the Middle
East. (Davutoğlu, 2011, translated from Turkish)
The statement makes clear that Turkey’s foreign policy designers initially
perceived the Syrian civil war as an outcome of the Arab Spring, offering
Turkey opportunities in the Middle East. Under these circumstances,
Turkey developed an ambition to become the actor in the Middle East
with the potential to shape the political order of the region and applied
a more assertive foreign policy. At the early stages of Syrian migration,
it linked its foreign policy objectives to open-door and humanitarian
asylum policies. However, the failure of Turkish foreign policy in the
region, along with the growing number of refugees, ultimately resulted
in the revision of this policy toward one based on ‘temporary protection’,
‘voluntary return’, and ‘burden sharing’.
This transition becomes visible in the rhetorical framing of the situa-
tion. At the beginning of the Syrian migration in 2011, Turkey rejected
international assistance for its humanitarian effort, aiming to prove that it
could deal with matters politically and economically on its own. On inter-
national platforms, the cost of the Syrian refugee flow was used to demon-
strate Turkey’s strength and its role as a model country in the Middle East
helping subordinated peoples. In 2012, Turkey started asking, in mild
tones, for financial support (Aljazeera Turk, 2012), avoiding the represen-
tation of Syrian refugees as a threat or risk in domestic and international
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domains, repeatedly calling them ‘guests’ and ‘brothers’ who would one
day return to their homeland (Haber7, 2014a). This approach continued
until 2015, when the financial burden of the Syrian refugees severely hit
Turkey, and when the EU fell into the so-called ‘refugee crisis’.
14.5.2 Turkey’s Ambition as a Soft Power
One further important driver for Turkey’s response to the Arab Spring
and the Syrian refugee crisis is Turkey’s quest to become a soft power in
the region (see also Torun, Chapter 13). This quest, which implies the
use of both hard and soft power to attain foreign policy objectives in the
region, has radically changed Turkey’s official discourse on becoming a
country of immigration. Nye (2011: 20–21) defines soft power as, ‘the
ability to affect others to obtain preferred outcomes by the co-optive
means of framing the agenda, persuasion and positive attraction’. In this
regard, Nye (2004: 11) suggests that there are three building blocks for
a country’s soft power that coexist within a multi-actor environment:
culture; political values, and a country’s foreign policy.
Following this understanding, creating a visa-free environment can be
regarded as contributing to soft power. In this sense, and in line with
Turkey’s changing foreign policy toward the Middle Eastern countries in
the second half of the 2000s, Turkey abolished visas with neighboring
or regional countries, such as Jordan, Lebanon, Syria, and Saudi Arabia,
despite these being on the EU’s blacklist and subject to strict visa regu-
lations. Motivated by economic gains from further integration in the
region and its power ambitions, Turkey was prepared to de-align its visa
regulations with European legislation and de-Europeanize its foreign poli-
cymaking processes. This liberal visa regime even triggered discussions
about the construction of a new Schengen-like visa-free area in the Middle
East (Elitok & Straubhaab, 2010: 7).
The enforcement of the Law on Foreigners and International Protec-
tion (Law No. 6458) in 2014 also signifies the ruling government’s quest
to leverage the Turkish state’s soft power by using migration and mobility
as an important element of its foreign policy. Originally, the law was partly
designed to attract an increasing number of qualified foreigners, including
students and qualified, skilled labor, to work in Turkey. However, the
Syrian refugee crisis delayed the entry of the law into force, and the
humanitarian element was later added to this quest in response to the
crisis.
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14.6 Discursive Frames of Aliens:
‘Migrants’, ‘Guests’, and ‘Foreigners’
The process of de-aligning Turkey’s migration and asylum policies from
EU norms is also visible in state actors’ religious and de-secularized polit-
ical discourse with regard to the reception of Syrian refugees (Kaya,
2020). The reception of Syrian refugees in Turkey is mainly based on a
discourse of tolerance and benevolence driven by path dependent, ethno-
cultural, and religious premises dating back to the Ottoman Empire of
the late nineteenth century as well as to the establishment of the Turkish
Republic in 1920s. The vocabulary that has been used to identify Syrian
refugees represents a kind of continuity with regard to the naming of
‘migrants’, ‘guests’, and ‘foreigners’ since the early days of the Republic.
The Law on Settlement (1934) is one of the foundational legal texts
defining the ways in which the Turkish state has identified newcomers.
It was adopted with the arrival of ethnic Turks in the early years of
Republic (T.C. Cumhurbaşkanlığı Mevzuat Bilgi Sistemi, 2006) and
continued to be the main legislative text dealing with immigration,
determining who can enter, settle, and/or apply for refugee status in
Turkey. It also provides individuals of Turkish descent and culture with
the opportunity to be accepted as immigrants and refugees in Turkey
(İçduygu, 2015b). For instance, Uzbeks, Turkmen, Bulgarian-Muslims,
and Uyghurs migrating to Turkey from different parts of the world are
referred to as ‘migrants’ (göçmen in Turkish) in the official documents as
well as in everyday life, as they are ethnically of Turkish descent. This
differentiates them from non-Turkish people, who are labelled ‘guest’
(misafir) or ‘foreigner’ (yabancı).
In the official literature, the term ‘guest’ has been hitherto used to refer
to refugees with Muslim origin but without Turkish ethnic origin coming
from outside the European continent. Kurdish refugees in the 2000s and
Syrian refugees in the 2010s were regarded as ‘guests’, since Turkey does
not officially accept refugees coming from anywhere except its western
boundaries. Bosniak and Kosovar refugees seeking refuge in Turkey in
the 1990s were an exception, as they were coming from the western
borders of Turkey and had the right to apply for asylum in Turkey in
line with Turkey’s interpretation of the Geneva Convention’s geograph-
ical limitation clause. On the other hand, the term ‘foreigner’ is often
used in official texts as well as by the public to refer to those who are
neither Turkish nor Muslim. These groups cannot be incorporated into
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the prescribed national identity, which is mainly based on what I call the
‘holy trinity’ of Sunni-Muslim-Turkish elements. Accordingly, not only
non-Muslims coming from abroad but also autochthonous groups such as
Greeks and Armenians are referred to as ‘foreigners’ or ‘local foreigners’
in legal texts (Çetin, 2002).
To this extent, a more recent metaphor to qualify the role that the
Turkish state and the pious Muslim-Turks give to Syrians in Turkey has
been the Ansar spirit (Arabic for helpers). As a metaphor, Ansar refers
to the people of Medina, who supported the Prophet Mohammad and
the accompanying Muslims (muhajirun, or migrants) who migrated there
from Mecca, which was under pagan control. The metaphor of Ansar
originally implied a temporary situation, as the Muslims later returned
to Mecca after their forces recaptured the city from the pagans (Haber7,
2014b). Hence, the Turkish government has used Islamic symbolism to
legitimize its actions on the Syrian refugee crisis. Framing the arrival of
Syrian refugees within the discourse of Ansar and Muhajirun has elevated
public and private efforts to accommodate Syrian refugees from a human-
itarian responsibility to a religious and charity-based duty (Erdemir,
2016).
Government leaders have consistently compared Turkey’s role in
assisting Syrian refugees to that of the Ansar. In his speech in Gaziantep,
one of the most popular destinations for the Syrian refugees in the Syrian
border, then Prime Minister Davutoğlu publicly stated that the inhab-
itants of Gaziantep are a city of Ansar: ‘Gazi[antep] is an Ansar city
now. God, bless you all’ (Akşam, 2014). Similarly, President Recep Tayyip
Erdoğan used the same discourse in his speeches in 2014 and afterwards:
In our culture, in our civilization, guest means honor, and blessing. You
[Syrian guests] have granted us the honor of being Ansar, but also brought
us joy and blessing. As for today, we have more than 1.5 million Syrian
and Iraqi guests. (Hürriyet, 2014, translated from Turkish)
Deputy Prime Minister Numan Kurtulmuş used similar rhetoric when
he introduced the right to work for Syrian refugees under temporary
protection:
The reason why the Syrian refugees are now settled in our country is
hospitality and Ansar spirit that our nation has so far adhered to. There
are other countries that cannot do anything when encountered with a few
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hundred thousands of refugees. But contrary to what the rich and pros-
perous countries could not do for the refugees, our country did its best
for the refugees as a generous host, friend, brother and neighbor. (Sözcü,
2016, translated from Turkish)
The problem is that by framing their efforts on behalf of Syrian refugees
as an act of benevolence, Turkey’s assistance is based on laws of reli-
gious charity rather than on universal laws of human rights. Bureaucrats
working in the migration sector have also embraced such a religious-based
discourse with regard to the reception of Syrian refugees in Turkey.
14.7 Conclusion: De-Alignment from EU Norms
This chapter has revealed the development of Turkey’s asylum and
migration policies under the impact of different influences, including
international sources, historical roots, the EU accession process, and
recent crisis situations in the Middle East. The Arab Spring coupled with
the civil war in Syria directly impacted Turkey’s foreign policy aspira-
tions in connection with its migration and asylum regime, and triggered
Turkey’s quest to become a ‘soft power’ in the region. In line with its
aspirations to become a pivotal power in the region, Turkey’s migration
policies have become more liberal and humanitarian.
In terms of EU–Turkey relations, there were contradictions in Turkey’s
migration policies caused by the processes of Europeanization and de-
Europeanization. The most prominent result of Europeanization was
the formation of the Law on Foreigners and International Protection
(Law No. 6458) (2013). However, the Europeanization of management
of migration and asylum in Turkey was interrupted by growing pres-
sure from Syrian mass migration. The religious-based and de-secularized
discursive frames used by the AKP government and relevant state actors
in relation to Syrians residing in Turkey led to the de-Europeanization of
migration and asylum processes. It went hand in hand with the processes
of Islamization and de-secularization of Turkish foreign and domestic
policymaking.
The EU–Turkey Statement (European Council, 2016) confirms the
strong impetus toward cooperation between the two sides. However, this
chapter has revealed that the source of cooperation between the two sides
is not shared values or the process of convergence, but mutual interests
(see also Tekin, 2021, Chapter 7; Turhan & Wessels, 2021, Chapter 8).
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The EU–Turkey Statement is therefore rather an indication of Turkey’s
de-Europeanization process. The incidents that occurred during the
opening of European borders by Turkey for the passage of irregular
migrants and their push back by the Greek security forces and Frontex
showed that the statement has excluded relevant voices, or has only
heard them in part. Greece and the Western Balkan countries have been
strongly affected by the deal. More importantly, the deal has been indif-
ferent to the concerns of migrants themselves. It harms the needs of
the most vulnerable—Syrians and other irregular migrants in Turkey—
by subjecting them to the precarious Turkish protection system, or by
not helping them to resettle in the EU. In other words, the deal indi-
cates that the ‘principle-based normative EU’ was partly replaced by an
‘interest-based EU’.
The EU–Turkey Statement also shed light on the role of the European
institutions in the development of migration and asylum policy in EU–
Turkey relations. The statement caused great controversies surrounding
its legal nature, and has neglected the role of the European Parliament
and the European Court of Justice as guarantors of EU norms and values.
The EU institutions originally agreed that the EU–Turkey Statement is
not an international agreement and not an EU act either. This position
was taken not only by the European Council and the Council, but also by
the European Parliament and the Commission. EU institutions and repre-
sentatives did not always seem convinced of their ultimate position on
the legal nature of the statement. Eventually, in a debate held within the
European Parliament in 2016, the EU–Turkey Statement was considered
an international agreement concluded by the European Council, acting
on behalf of the EU (European Parliament, 2016). All these controversies
show that the European Council is often more decisive in the formation
of migration and asylum policies between the EU and Turkey than the
Parliament, the Commission, or the European Court of Justice (see also
Reiners & Turhan, 2021, Chapter 16).
Within Turkey, growing animosity and hatred have been observed
against the Syrians in the country, which has been politically and socially
fragmented, economically weakened, and institutionally destabilized after
the inception of the presidential system in April 2017. The growth of
socio-economic and political problems in Turkey seems to have increased
intolerance among Turkish citizens toward all kinds of refugees and
migrants, exacerbating racist, xenophobic, and Arab-phobic sentiments in
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the country. Current developments in Turkey with regard to the percep-
tion of refugees by the majority of Turkish citizens indicate that Turkey is
now on the verge of starting a new chapter called ‘Turkey’s refugee crisis’
(Kaya, 2020).
As of today, the EU and Turkey seem to have lost their trust in
each other in the course of time, shifting from peaceful cooperation to
conflictual cooperation on various agenda items such as migration, energy,
and security (Saatçioğlu et al., 2019). EU member states have shown, and
continue to show, reluctance to share the responsibility of refugees not
only with other member states such as Greece and Italy, but also with
Turkey. Meanwhile, Turkey opted for instrumentalizing refugees in order
to reach its foreign and economic policy objectives. This constellation of
actors and interests is complex and not easy to resolve. But the joint chal-
lenges also demonstrate the potential for common approaches of the EU
and Turkey toward the Middle East to improve the situation of refugees
and migrants and to address the causes of flight from Syria and beyond.
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the Accession Negotiations Framework
Nicolò Sartori
15.1 Introduction
During the last two decades, both Europe and Turkey have perceived
energy as a key area of mutual strategic interest. Before the political stale-
mate took hold at the end of the 2010s, Ankara and Brussels not only
regarded energy as a domain of policy convergence but also considered it
a fundamental platform upon which to strengthen their overall bilateral
dialogue.
Energy security,1 specifically the diversification of gas supplies, is
certainly one of the key areas of bilateral cooperation starting from the
2000s. Since 2003, Turkey has been at the center of the European
1The International Energy Agency (IEA) (2020) defines energy security as the
uninterrupted availability of energy sources at an affordable price.
2The Southern Gas Corridor is an initiative launched by the European Commission to
establish a pipeline network aimed at improving the security and diversity of the EU’s
energy supply by bringing to Europe natural gas from the Caspian and the broader Middle
East region.
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Union’s (EU) most ambitious external energy policy initiative, the real-
ization of the Southern Gas Corridor (SGC).2 Meanwhile, Ankara has
repeatedly presented its ‘contribution to Europe’s energy security’ as one
of the key priorities of its own national energy strategy (Koranyi & Sartori,
2013).
Despite such a strong focus, EU–Turkey energy dialogue has extended
across a wide range of increasingly complex and sensitive issues beyond
security of supply concerns, such as the convergence and integration
of electricity and gas markets and their adaptation to ambitious decar-
bonization and sustainable development objectives undertaken at the EU
and global levels. Although Brussels and Ankara have not yet been able
to launch similarly strong initiatives in these domains, some cooperative
bilateral efforts—e.g., in the case of electricity, market liberalization—have
moved forward. The alignment of Turkey’s energy legislation with the
acquis communautaire is indeed a key factor to ensuring that Ankara will
be able to become a fundamental enabler of energy security and a strategic
energy partner for the EU for the benefit of both partners.
In this context, the chapter explores the evolution of energy relations
between Turkey and the EU starting from the beginning of the 2000s,
paying specific attention to the key energy policies and the main bilateral
dynamics in place in the energy domain. It analyzes the energy profiles
and interests of Brussels and Ankara in order to evaluate whether or not
the EU and Turkey have adopted mutually beneficial initiatives that foster
convergence3 between the parties. On the one hand, the chapter focuses
on the longstanding debate on energy security and on the narrative of
Turkey as an ‘energy bridge’.4 On the other hand, it examines specific
bottom-up technical/regulatory cooperation, the outcome of which can
effectively foster the integration of the two markets, thereby guaranteeing
more secure, competitive, and sustainable energy flows to European and
Turkish citizens and firms. Finally, it assesses the results achieved by the
3The concept of convergence includes the alignment and joint definition of strategies,
policies, and measures between the EU and Turkey in the energy domain.
4Due to its strategic location between abundant energy resources located in the
Caspian/Middle Eastern region and the European markets, Turkey can play a role as
‘bridge’ (both in physical and political terms) to facilitate the oil and—particularly—gas
transit from producers to consumers. While the term ‘bridge’ mainly refers to Turkey’s
transit role, the concept of ‘hub’ defines the capacity of the country to play an either
physical or virtual trading role between producers and consumers but also consumers
themselves.
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institutional initiatives established by Brussels and Ankara in order to
strengthen cooperation in the energy domain, including the effort to
engage Turkey in the framework of the ‘Energy Community’, the launch
of the ‘EU-Turkey Positive Agenda’ and the ‘EU-Turkey High Level
Energy Dialogue and Strategic Energy Cooperation’.
15.2 Energy Profiles and Policies
The EU and Turkey are engaging in necessary energy transition processes
driven by decarbonization commitments and technological develop-
ments. Both are organizing their energy policies around the same three
key objectives: competitiveness, security of supply, and sustainability.5
However, due to different energy profiles (i.e., energy sources avail-
able; demand growth patterns) and diverse priorities regarding time and
varying levels of ambition toward realizing these three objectives, the
energy policy convergence between the two partners is still partial and
limited to certain domains.
Looking at Europe, since the end of 2009 the EU economy has strug-
gled to fully recover, with clear implications for energy demand. Due to
the joint effects of the economic crisis and its ambitious decarboniza-
tion policies, the EU’s primary energy consumption dropped dramatically
from its 2006 peak; in 2014, it reached levels last seen before the 1990s,
only slightly rebounding since 2015 (Eurostat, 2017). According to fore-
casts from the European Commission (EC), the bloc’s energy demand
is projected to decline steadily until 2040, at which time it is likely to
stabilize (European Commission, 2016a).
Responding to these significant energy transformations, in 2015 the
Commission’s Energy Union strategy crystalized the EU’s multidimen-
sional approach aimed at transforming the EU’s current fossil fuel-based,
centralized, and outdated energy system into one which is low-carbon,
flexible, and efficient. The EU’s approach is based on five mutually
reinforcing and closely interrelated dimensions: energy security (where
5Since the release of the ‘Green Paper: A European strategy for sustainable, competitive
and secure energy’ (European Commission, 2006), the EU has based its energy policy
on the three pillars ‘competitiveness’, ‘security’, and ‘sustainability’. In Turkey the three
concepts are identified as the main elements of the national energy strategy (Republic of
Turkey Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2011).
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EU–Turkey relations are expected to play a key role); market inte-
gration; energy efficiency; decarbonization; research, innovation, and
competitiveness (European Commission, 2015a).
In such a context of declining demand and growing concerns about
the effects of climate change, the EU committed itself to an increasingly
ambitious process of energy transition and decarbonization. Europe is
the prime mover and global leader in the fight against climate change,
and it expects to maintain this role in the years and decades to come, as
confirmed during the United Nations Conference of the Parties (COP21)
held in Paris in December 2015 (UNFCCC, 2015a). This was reiterated
in the debate on the 2050 Long-term Strategy, offering a vision for a
prosperous, modern, competitive, and climate-neutral economy by 2050
(European Commission, 2018a). This objective is further strengthened
by the ‘European Green Deal’ initiative launched in 2019 by the new von
der Leyen Commission. The Green Deal aims at radically transforming
the entire European socio-economic system, starting from the energy
sector, in order to become a carbon neutral economy by 2050 (European
Commission, 2019a). At the same time, Brussels is wholly focused on the
liberalization of member states’ energy markets and their full integration
into a unique single European market, the realization of which represents
a precondition for any effective energy security effort—which remains, in
any case, high on the agenda at the EU level.
In regard to Turkey, from 2000 to 2014 Turkey was one of the
fastest growing economies in the world, with annual growth rates aver-
aging around 5%. In this context of economic vitality, energy demand
skyrocketed: electricity consumption increased by almost 90%, while gas
demand grew from 22 billion cubic meters (bcm) to 49 bcm in this
period (Enerdata, 2019). Over the last few years Turkey’s economy
has slowed down compared to the boom started in the 1990s,6 but
energy fundamentals remain strong as well as the concerns about the
sustainability of the country’s energy sector. This is, first, because energy
demand, despite macro-economic trends, is projected to expand at a fast
pace so as to satisfy not only economic activities but also the increasing
living standards of Turkish citizens. Second, the dependence of Turkey
on external hydrocarbon supplies (imports already account for 91% of
6From 2004 to 2014 the GDP of Turkey grew—excluding the effects of the 2008
financial crisis—on average, by 8% per year. Since 2014 the Turkish economy experienced
a relevant degree of volatility, with GDP growth bottoming to 3.2% in 2016.
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total oil demand and 99% of domestic gas consumption) is expected to
continue and possibly increase (Şengül, 2019).
In the context of Turkey’s extreme dependence and vulnerability vis-
à-vis exporters, Ankara’s focus on policies toward energy security and
diversification of supply at the domestic, regional, and international levels
is sensible (Republic of Turkey Ministry of Energy and Natural Resources,
2014a). To achieve this, Ankara envisages, on the one hand, the deploy-
ment of nuclear plants and the revival of coal-based electricity generation
promoted by a new energy strategy (Anadolu Agency, 2017), which is
expected to satisfy the country’s growing electricity demand and reduce
natural gas usage. On the other hand, Ankara has developed an ambitious
regional integration plan centered on the transit of hydrocarbons. In the
oil sector, such a plan was materialized thanks to the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan
pipeline in 2006 and the Kurdistan Regional Government pipeline in
2013. In the gas domain, the realization of the Trans-Anatolian Natural
Gas Pipeline (TANAP)—transporting resources from Azerbaijan and,
potentially, from other sources in the Eastern Mediterranean and the
Middle East—is the cornerstone of Turkey’s strategy to diversify its supply
and, potentially, to becoming a regional gas trading hub.
Along with energy security initiatives, Turkey is moving ahead—
though at a different pace and with different levels of ambition—on
EU-inspired market reforms and decarbonization policies. In particular,
Ankara has achieved significant results in the electricity sector’s liberal-
ization process, as Turkey’s adoption of a new Electricity Market Law in
2013 (Official Gazette, 2013) is largely compliant with the EU’s Third
Energy Package (TEP).7 The situation is different with gas as the Gas
Market Law adopted in 2001 (Official Gazette, 2001) has yet to be fully
implemented, and moreover, its amendment process—in order to comply
with the new rules introduced by the TEP in 2009—has been blocked in
the Turkish Grand National Assembly since 2014.
Finally, in line with its ‘Vision 2023’ strategy, the Turkish government
adopted a set of mid-term energy targets further defined in a number of
7Adopted in 2009, the Third Energy Package consists of two directives and three
regulations. The directives concern common rules for the internal market in gas
(2009/73/EC) and for the internal market in electricity (2009/72/EC). The three regu-
lations concern the conditions for access to the natural gas transmission networks ([EC]
No. 715/2009), the conditions for access to the network for cross-border exchange
of electricity ([EC] No. 714/2009), and the establishment of the Agency for the
Cooperation of Energy Regulators (ACER) ([EC] No. 713/2009).
378 N. SARTORI
national action plans on energy efficiency, renewable energy, and climate
change. Turkey’s objective is to increase its share of renewable energy in
the electricity generation mix to at least 30%, increasing wind power up to
20 GW and solar up to 3 GW (Republic of Turkey Prime Ministry, n.d.).
In addition, the government set a 20% energy efficiency target for the
period from 2011 to 2023. Regarding the fight against climate change,
at the COP21 Turkey committed to a reduction of up to 21% of its green-
house gas emissions by 2030 (UNFCCC, 2015b). This target, however,
is not considered to be in line with interpretations of a fair approach
to reaching a 2 °C pathway and is well below the country’s effective
decarbonization potential (Climate Action Tracker, 2019). Despite these
plans, the implementation of decarbonization policies is partial and largely
remains on paper, as demonstrated by Turkey’s unwillingness to ratify the
Paris Agreement and its renewed emphasis on the use of lignite and coal
by then Turkish Minister of Energy and Natural Resources Berat Albayrak
and confirmed by the current minister, Fatih Dönmez (Hürriyet Daily
News, 2018).
15.3 Turkey’s Contribution
to European Energy Security
As already stressed, in the last two decades EU–Turkey bilateral coop-
eration in the energy domain has mainly focused on security of supply,
specifically on the diversification of gas sources, as a result of the need
of both parties to access new, secure sources of gas and to open transit
routes.
With the rapid emergence of energy security concerns in the EU at the
beginning of the 2000s, the value of Turkey as an energy bridge between
East and West appeared clear. In this context, the EC’s launch of the
SGC—the pipeline network running from the gas-rich Caspian basin to
the EU, thereby bypassing Russian territory—in 2003 expanded the EU’s
energy cooperation with Turkey to the gas sector and granted Ankara
a central role in Europe’s energy diversification strategy.8 Meanwhile,
8The key role of Turkey as a transit country first resulted in the implementation of
the 1994 international agreement on the joint development of the ACG oil fields in
the Azerbaijani sector of the Caspian Sea. The transit through Turkish territory allowed
Azerbaijani oil to bypass the congested Bosphorus, ensuring a secure and profitable way
to reach international markets.
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Turkey’s outstanding economic growth led to the previously mentioned
extraordinary increase in domestic energy demand, forcing Ankara to
expand its gas supplies from abroad, particularly from Russia, which
became the top energy provider for the Turkish market. Given the polit-
ical drift between Russia and the EU following the 2013 Ukraine crisis,
strengthening energy ties between Moscow and Ankara became a major
concern for Brussels’ agenda. Growing anxiety about the use of Russia’s
energy abundance as a weapon aimed at Europe encouraged Brussels to
develop its first ever Energy Security Strategy and to establish the Energy
Union initiative. The strengthening of ties with Ankara, with the main
goal to limit Moscow’s energy leverage on its member states (particu-
larly in Central and Eastern Europe), was part of this vision (European
Commission, 2014a).
From the Turkish perspective, energy cooperation—particularly the
realization of the SGC as a key element of Ankara’s strategic relations
with the EU—has been progressively revised over the past twenty years.
In the first decade of the new century, high level officials in Ankara repeat-
edly stressed Turkey’s indispensable role for European energy security
and its contribution to strengthening the country’s position in the EU
accession process. Up until 2010, the ‘membership perspective and the
[…] accession negotiations with the EU [have been] a driving force for
the realization of joint projects which will enhance the supply security of
Turkey and the EU’ (Koranyi & Sartori, 2013: 4). However, the progres-
sive freezing of negotiations and the uncertain status of the accession
process—considering the high political value Ankara attaches to energy
cooperation with the EU—have negatively impacted the evolution of
the bilateral energy dialogue. Although formal institutional cooperation
frameworks and initiatives are still in place and the role of Turkey as a
key transit country has never been called into question, the balance of
power between regional actors has effectively changed the trajectory of
the SGC. Throughout the last decade, the nature of the Corridor has
been reviewed on a number of occasions for political, geographical, indus-
trial, and commercial reasons, and its current structure is very different
from the one initially envisaged.
According to Brussels’ original plans dating back to 2003, the Corridor
was supposed to be based on ‘the integration of multiple pipeline systems
which would [have] transport[ed] gas not from a single supplier but from
multiple sources’ (Demiryol, 2013: 116). In theory, these sources had
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to include not only Azerbaijan, but also Iran, Iraq, and other poten-
tial suppliers from the broader Middle East and North Africa region.
In the Commission’s original proposal, the flagship project to enable
the SGC was the 3825-km Nabucco pipeline, aimed to deliver 31 bcm
annually to Southeast and Central Europe (RWE, 2009). Turkey’s terri-
tory, which the pipeline would cross from east to west, was central to
enabling the plan and delivering the Caspian gas supplies to the city of
Baumgarten in Austria. However, due to commercial and financial short-
comings—namely the lack of supplies in the early years and the insufficient
gas demand in the Central European target markets—Nabucco (and its
successor initiative, Nabucco West9) failed to gain the support of the
Shah Deniz-producing consortium and was aborted. As an alternative to
Nabucco, the Trans-Adriatic pipeline (TAP) was selected to deliver Azer-
baijani gas from the Turkish/Greek border to Italy via Greece and Albania
(Sartori, 2013).
Turkey, the strategic priorities of which had changed during the years,
played a direct role in determining the Nabucco’s death sentence: Ankara
was in fact first in line, along with Azerbaijan, in proposing the realization
of TANAP,10 which effectively replaced Nabucco for the transportation of
Shah Deniz gas from the Georgian–Turkish border to the Turkish–Euro-
pean one (where it connects to TAP). The Turkish company BOTAŞ,
with 30% of the shares, is one of the key stakeholders in the 16-bcm/year
pipeline (which will gradually be increased to 24 bcm). Other compa-
nies involved include the Baku-controlled Southern Gas Corridor Closed
Joint Stock Company, with 58% of the shares, and British Petroleum with
12%.11
The launch of TANAP certainly boosted the implementation of the
SGC, frustrated for years by the commercial fragility of Nabucco. At
9In May 2012, the Nabucco consortium revised its original plan, putting forward a
shorter, cheaper, and less capable pipeline—Nabucco West—to transport Azerbaijani gas
from the Turkish-Bulgarian border to Central Europe.
10The realization of TANAP was sanctioned by the signature of a memorandum of
understanding between Azerbaijan and Turkey on 24 December 2011, followed by an
intergovernmental agreement and the ‘Host Government Agreement’ on 26 June 2012.
11The SGC was created under the terms of an Azerbaijani presidential decree as the
vehicle to consolidate, manage, and finance the country’s interests in relation to Shah
Deniz, SCP, TANAP, and TAP. The Republic of Azerbaijan, through its ministry of
economy, owns 51% of the SGC’s equity, while the remaining 49% is held by the State
Oil Company of the Azerbaijan Republic (SOCAR) which is entirely owned by Azerbaijan.
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the same time this represented a significant turn from the plan initially
conceptualized by Brussels. In the new framework, upstream companies
that are members of the Shah Deniz consortium took center stage of
the SGC initiative, replacing the group of European companies expected
to run Nabucco and control the transport of the gas supply from Azer-
baijan to Europe. Due to changing domestic energy priorities, particularly
relating to the need to secure additional volumes of gas, and intensified
political clashes with the EU, Turkey revised the nature of its contribu-
tion to the SGC. This shift contributed to downscaling the EU’s role
in the regional energy game, with potentially disadvantageous long-term
consequences for both Turkey and the EU as gas customers vis-à-vis an
empowered Azerbaijan.
Despite the reshuffle of the Corridor, regional energy cooperation
remains a mutual area of interest for both the EU and Turkey, which
are trying to keep the subject at the top of their energy agenda. This was
initially demonstrated by the ‘EU-Turkey High Level Energy Dialogue
and Strategic Energy Cooperation’ launched in 2015 as a platform for
regular exchange of information on energy cooperation at the global and
regional level for the benefit of both sides (Tagliapietra & Zachmann,
2015). However, the High Level Energy Dialogue was then blocked after
the rising tensions between the EU and Turkey given the developments
in the Eastern Mediterranean.
The Eastern Mediterranean is indeed a matter that could lead to a
new low in bilateral energy cooperation (Tziarras, 2019). Tensions in the
region started to rise after a number of gas discoveries were made by Eni
and ExxonMobil off the coast of Cyprus between 2018 and 2019. Conse-
quently, Ankara decided to dispatch drilling exploration ships escorted by
Turkish military vessels in the area in order to run exploration activities
in waters claimed by the Republic of Cyprus (Küçükgöçmen, 2019).
15.4 Institutional Dialogue
and Political Developments
As mentioned above, Turkish authorities have constantly associated bilat-
eral energy cooperation with Ankara’s EU accession process. Energy is
among the 35 policy areas of the acquis communautaire, also called ‘chap-
ters’, covered by the negotiation process in place between the EU and
Turkey since October 2005 (see also Lippert, Chapter 11). Negotiations
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on the energy chapter (also known as Chapter 15) cover EU legisla-
tion related reform of the internal electricity and natural gas markets, the
implementation of energy efficiency measures, the integration of renew-
able energy resources in the energy mix, the strengthening of security of
energy supply policies, and the improvement of nuclear safety.
Turkey’s expectation to become a member of the EU has been a
driving factor in its efforts to restructure the national energy sector. Since
2001, Ankara has been taking important steps toward this by adopting
and implementing a number of EU-derived regulations in order to ensure
its compliance with the acquis and to establish liberalized and competitive
market structures and a business-friendly environment. These include the
adoption of the Electricity Market Law No. 4628 and the Natural Gas
Market Law No. 4646, together with the establishment of the Energy
Market Regulatory Authority (EMRA) in 2001.12 The government also
introduced laws for the Utilization of Renewable Energy Resources (No.
5325) in 200513 and for Energy Efficiency (No. 5627) in 2007.14 The
2015 adoption of the Law No. 6446 amending the electricity market
legislation contributed to significant improvements in the sector.15
Despite evident mutual interests, the advancements achieved, and the
periodic institutional calls both from Brussels and Ankara for the opening
of the energy chapter, negotiations on this chapter have been blocked by
Cyprus since 2009, and the screening report adopted in 2007 was vetoed
12These laws aim at liberalizing the electricity and natural gas markets, respectively,
in order to create financially sound, stable, and transparent markets and to ensure
supply of electricity and natural gas at competitive prices to consumers in a regular and
environmentally sound manner under competitive conditions.
13The law aims to expand the utilization of renewable energy sources for generating
electric energy, encompassing the procedures and principles of the conservation of renew-
able energy resource areas, and certification of the energy generated from these sources
as well as utilization of these sources.
14The law covers principles and procedures applicable to increasing and promoting
energy efficiency in energy generation, transmission, distribution and consumption
phases at industrial establishments, buildings, power generation plants, transmission and
distribution networks and transport.
15The new law does not abolish the former Electricity Market Law 4628 but instead
reorganizes the former law to regulate the powers and duties of the Energy Market
Regulatory Authority (EMRA), introducing new measures such as the pre-licensing system
for generation companies and the Energy Market Operation Corporation (EPİAŞ) to carry
out the market operation activities.
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by Cyprus in the Council of the EU.16 In addition to this, since the
middle of the 2010s the entire accession negotiation process has experi-
enced significant delays due to weakening bilateral relations between the
EU and Turkey, culminating in the 2016 European Parliament’s resolu-
tion which called on the Commission and the member states to ‘initiate
a temporary freeze of the ongoing accession negotiations with Turkey’
(European Parliament, 2016: para. G.1; see also Kaeding & Schenuit,
Chapter 10). The resolution was followed by a number of decisions
adopted by the Council, including the conclusions to halt any kind of
progress on the chapters (Council of the EU, 2018) and to suspend all
high level dialogues, including the one related to energy, after the aggres-
sive approach adopted by Ankara in the Eastern Mediterranean (Council
of the EU, 2019). Despite attempts to keep the dialogue alive, one cannot
be fully optimistic about future prospects for formal EU–Turkey energy
cooperation in such a political landscape. Not opening the energy chapter
naturally encourages a less cooperative stand on this issue by Ankara, as
demonstrated in the case of the SGC and TANAP. The political and insti-
tutional stalemate places limits on the scope and timing of EU–Turkey
energy policy coordination as well as on the market, which requires cross-
border infrastructure together with a stable, transparent common legal
and regulatory framework, particularly in the sensitive gas sector.
In order to bypass the political bottlenecks slowing down the transfer
and implementation of EU energy legislation in Turkey, Brussels and
Ankara have tried to adopt alternative institutional initiatives in order to
promote energy cooperation outside the framework of accession negotia-
tions. Brussels’ attempt to persuade Turkey to join the Energy Commu-
nity—whose contracting parties commit themselves to implementing the
relevant EU acquis on energy, environment, and competition—has been
the first EU attempt to decouple deeper energy cooperation from the
accession process.17 But throughout the years, the EU initiative has been
16The screening report results from the screening analysis, through which EU legis-
lation in the relevant chapters and Turkish legislation are compared, with the report
identifying those areas where compliance is high and those where further policy and legal
harmonization is expected. The screening report forms the very basis of the Commission’s
Draft Common Position for the chapters to be negotiated (see also Lippert, Chapter 11).
17The Energy Community Treaty, in force since June 2006, is an EU initiative to
extend internal energy market toward third countries in the Eastern and South Eastern
neighborhood in order to enhance full market integration. Along with the EU, contracting
parties include Albania, Bosnia-Herzegovina, the Republic of North Macedonia, Kosovo,
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repeatedly rejected by Ankara, which refused (and keeps refusing) the idea
of unilaterally aligning with EU energy legislation as it prefers to link
the process to deeper political dialogue with Brussels in the perspective
of full EU membership status (Aydın-Düzgit & Tocci, 2015). For the
Turkish government, the Energy Community option would be adequate
for countries not eligible for EU membership but not for an accession
candidate such as Turkey. Candidate countries are expected to align with
the EU energy acquis through the energy chapter negotiations and not
in the framework of a parallel cooperation framework such as the Energy
Community.
With an eye to overcoming Turkey’s concerns about its participa-
tion in the Energy Community as an alternative to accession and the
stand-off in negotiations, in May 2012 Brussels launched the ‘EU-Turkey
Positive Agenda’ (European Commission, 2012a). The objective of the
initiative was to reinforce accession talks by fostering cooperation and
practical activities in a set of sectors of mutual interest, including energy.18
The focus on energy was confirmed by the June 2012 joint statement
of EU Commissioners Günther Oettinger and Štefan Füle with then
Turkish Ministers Egemen Bağış and Taner Yıldız, titled ‘Turkey-EU
Positive Agenda: Enhanced EU-Turkey Energy Cooperation’ (European
Commission, 2012b). The Agenda covered six areas of mutual concern,
aiming to contribute to deepening bilateral energy relations through the
following areas: long-term perspectives on energy scenarios and energy
mix; market integration and development of infrastructures of common
interest; global and regional energy cooperation; promotion of renewable
energy; energy efficiency and clean energy technologies; nuclear safety
and radiation protection. Turkish authorities perceived the launch of the
EU–Turkey Positive Agenda initiative as a renewed European attempt to
dissociate energy cooperation from the increasingly problematic issue of
Turkey’s accession to the EU. Despite the attempts of the Commission
to clarify that the Agenda was not aimed at replacing Turkey’s accession
process but rather at supporting the country’s integration into the EU
Moldova, Montenegro, and Serbia. Georgia is currently a candidate country, while
Armenia, Norway, and Turkey maintain their observer status.
18Other areas of cooperation addressed by the EU–Turkey Positive Agenda include
political reforms, alignment with the acquis, dialogue on foreign policy, visas, mobility
and migration, trade, counterterrorism, and participation in EU programs.
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energy system, the initiative has been unsuccessful since the beginning
(see also Bürgin, Chapter 9).
In order to revitalize institutional cooperation in the energy domain
within the context of mounting political distrust, in March 2015
Commission Vice President Maros Sefcovic and former Turkish Minister
for Energy and Natural Resources Taner Yıldız launched the aforemen-
tioned EU–Turkey High Level Energy Dialogue and Strategic Energy
Cooperation. Again, the parties tried to emphasize that the initiative
aims to complement and support Turkey’s accession process and does not
seek to substitute or bypass it. The success of the initiative is, however,
mixed—despite the initial optimism and the two meetings held between
the end of 2015, in the context of the COP21 in Paris, and in 2016,
when then Turkish Minister for Energy and Natural Resources Berat
Albayrak and EU Commissioner for Climate Action and Energy Miguel
Arias Cañete convened in Istanbul (European Commission, 2016b). Since
2016 no new meetings have been organized, while the meetings of all




Despite the fluctuations and the current stalemate in the EU–Turkey insti-
tutional energy dialogue, bottom-up technical/regulatory cooperation
keeps moving forward. In particular, market integration is progressively
taking shape, specifically in the electricity domain, where the results
achieved are particularly prestigious and have established concrete market
convergence between Ankara and Brussels.
Trial activities for the synchronization of Turkey’s electricity network
with the Continental Europe System began on 18 September 2010,
and five years later, in April 2015, the Turkish Electricity Transmission
Company (TEİAŞ) and the continental European members of the Euro-
pean Network of Transmission System Operators for Electricity (ENTSO-
E) signed a long-term agreement on permanent synchronous operations.
In this framework, TEİAŞ agreed to apply the network codes developed
by the EU for the electricity market and their permanent connection to
the Continental Europe Synchronous Area to allow free electricity trade
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through interconnections with Greece and Bulgaria.19 In addition, in
January 2016 ENTSO-E granted ‘observer member status’ to TEİAŞ, a
condition that allows the Turkish system operator to attend the meetings
of the association’s groups and task forces, thereby confirming its compli-
ance with the acquis in most aspects of transmission system operations,
including third party access rules and transmission network regulations,
effective and market-based balancing mechanisms, and auctioning of
interconnector capacities (included in Directive 2009/72/EC).
In the context of growing technical cooperation, in March 2014
TEİAŞ also contributed to the launch of the Coordination Auction
Office in South East Europe (SEE CAO). SEE CAO is a joint network
of ten Southeast European countries aimed at optimizing cross-border
capacity allocation and harmonizing the different national congestion
management methods from Croatia in the north to Turkey in the south.
Since September 2015, the monthly interconnection capacities between
Turkey and Greece have been allocated in a regionally coordinated
manner through SEE CAO mechanisms, which in 2016 were extended to
allocations of yearly bilateral capacities in order to strengthen cooperation.
As part of this progressive convergence with EU standards, over the last
few years Turkey has privatized the distribution segment and most genera-
tion assets. In addition, thanks to the efforts of EMRA, 85% of the market
was opened in 2015 (World Bank, 2015). Organized wholesale opera-
tions in the market are carried out by EXIST (Energy Exchange Istanbul,
EPİAŞ), the Turkish energy exchange, which operates day-ahead and
intra-day electricity platforms, while the electricity transmission company
TEİAŞ is now unbundled and the electricity distribution activities are
privatized.
The integration of the European and Turkish gas markets remains
partial, though some progress has occurred (European Commission,
2018b). Although the Turkish Natural Gas Market Law and the rele-
vant secondary legislation adopted by Ankara are broadly in line with
the main provisions of Directive 2003/55/EC on internal natural gas
market liberalization (including some progress on tariffs and organized
19Under this scheme, Turkey can currently export 400 megawatts of electricity and
import 550 megawatts of electricity from the European network, amounts that are
expected to increase to 1000 megawatts in the future.
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wholesale markets) the acquis targets have not yet been fully achieved.20
In addition to this gap, it has to be stressed that the current Turkish
legislation is not aligned with Directive 2009/73/EC,21 as the new draft
law aimed at enhancing competition on the natural gas market has been
languishing in the Turkish Parliament without being discussed since 2014.
The unbundling of gas activities lags behind EU standards due to the
national incumbent, BOTAŞ, that maintains a dominant position in the
supply, trade, storage, wholesale, and transmission segments, as well as
a large controlling share (between 80 and 90%) of the country’s import
capacity. This situation has a negative impact not only on Turkey’s ambi-
tion to become a regional gas-trading hub but also on the performance of
the electricity market, as by June 2019 natural gas contributed to almost
one-third of total power generation capacity (Republic of Turkey Ministry
of Energy and Natural Resources, 2018).
A positive development was the launch of Turkey’s natural gas spot
trading platform in September 2018, operated by the EXIST Energy
Exchange. The platform enables spot market transactions in natural gas,
balancing transactions and reconciling imbalances, but its effectiveness is
still limited by the dominant position of BOTAŞ in the Turkish market
(European Commission, 2019b).
The integration of energy markets and the development of infrastruc-
ture are also supported within the framework of the EU’s Instrument
for Pre-accession Assistance (IPA) to Turkey (European Commission,
2014b). Funds allocated through the IPA II (2014–2020) scheme aim to
strengthen acquis alignment in the areas of electricity and gas, addressing
in particular the modernization and upgrading of the Turkish Gas Trans-
mission System in line with European Network of Transmission System
Operators for Gas. This includes the soft supply equipment for the super-
visory control and data acquisition system, as well as the harmonization
of the Turkish gas and electricity codes with relevant EU network codes
(European Commission, 2015b).
20Authorization in terms of licensing according to pre-defined, non-discriminatory
conditions, legal unbundling of transmission activities from other energy activities,
approval of regulated tariffs, and third-party access to networks, LNG and storage facilities
by EMRA diminishing eligibility limits and settlement of disputes by EMRA.
21Unbundling of transmission operators, rules on designating a distribution system
operator, combined operator, monitoring reports on security of supply, protection of
vulnerable customers, exemptions concerning new infrastructure.
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Finally, EU–Turkey coordination is taking place—though at a much
slower pace—also in the renewables and energy efficiency sectors. As
a candidate country, in December 2014 Turkey published its National
Renewable Energy Action Plan for the period 2013–2023. This was seen
as a sign of Ankara’s commitment to renewable energy objectives, thereby
conforming to Directive 2009/28/EC and EU norms in general. The
Action Plan analyzes the current situation and challenges to the devel-
opment of renewable energy, identifies national targets, and defines the
actions needed to achieve them (Republic of Turkey Ministry of Energy
and Natural Resources, 2014b). In 2017, in order to comply with the
Energy Efficiency Directive 2012/27/EU, Ankara published its National
Energy Efficiency Action Plan. The plan expects the country to achieve
a 14% reduction of primary energy consumption by 2023, committing
to investing almost 11 billion USD in energy efficiency measures to reach
the target (Republic of Turkey Ministry of Energy and Natural Resources,
2017). In 2019, good progress was registered in the renewables sector
with the launch of three large tenders in photovoltaics and onshore and
offshore wind energy generation (European Commission, 2019b).
The effective establishment of cooperation mechanisms in the renew-
ables sector depends on the degree of alignment with EU legislation
and, in general, on the progression of the high level dialogue—the most
adequate platform to advance strategic convergence in this domain. Adop-
tion of the EU acquis would entail the necessity of Turkey to set an
overall renewable energies target in line with the methodology applied
to EU member states and the Energy Community Contracting Parties, in
exchange for which the country would benefit from access to the cooper-
ation mechanisms set up under EU legislation such as statistical transfers,
joint projects, and joint support schemes. As an alternative to such formal-
ized cooperation schemes, Art. 9 of the Directive 2009/28/EC refers
to ‘joint projects with third countries’, which would allow Turkey (as
well as other EU neighbors) to strengthen its (their) renewable energy
sector through financial assistance, technological support, and/or capacity
development.
15.6 The Way Ahead
At first glance, EU and Turkey energy interests and priorities—
mainly determined by the common ‘security-sustainability-affordability’
mantra—appear to be leading Brussels and Ankara down a virtuous path
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toward bilateral cooperation. However, the parties are still quite different
in terms of their energy and climate profiles and far from fully aligned
when it comes to key interests and policy priorities. The European Green
Deal launched by the Commission in December 2019 further amplifies
the diverging paths between Brussels and Ankara in this domain.
While the need for strengthening energy security and diversification of
gas supplies justifies deepening ties between the EU and Turkey, progress
in this domain remains uncertain due to Ankara’s specific coupling of its
role as Europe’s energy security partner with the success of its EU acces-
sion negotiations. The realization of TANAP and the advancement in the
completion of the SGC are certainly positive aspects of the EU–Turkey
energy relationship. However, Ankara’s full alignment with Europe’s
energy security priorities is far from reassuring, in particular in view of
the rising tensions around Ankara’s hydrocarbon exploration activities off
the coast of Cyprus.
At the same time, however, bottom-up technical/regulatory collab-
oration has proved successful in strengthening bilateral energy relations
between the EU and Turkey, as in the case of the progress registered
in the electricity sector. Other, less debated sectors such as renewable
energy, energy efficiency, nuclear energy, and carbon trading could benefit
from a stronger push on developing bottom-up bilateral initiatives. On
renewables and energy efficiency, the EU should scale up the financial
support it currently provides within the framework of its climate finance
commitments, while on carbon markets, Brussels can replicate what has
been done, for instance, in China by increasing its institutional support
to Ankara.
Only by undertaking these actions, and by decoupling energy coopera-
tion from the formal accession negotiation process and high level political
considerations, can EU–Turkey energy synergy become a positive factor
in the strategic bilateral relationship between Brussels and Ankara.
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Current Trends and Future Prospects
for EU–Turkey Relations: Conditions
for a Cooperative Relationship
Wulf Reiners and Ebru Turhan
16.1 Introduction
Despite the growing institutional instability and fragility of the relation-
ship, the persisting stalemate in Turkey’s EU accession process, and the
weakening communication channels between the two sides, EU–Turkey
relations have endured. EU–Turkey affairs will remain highly relevant in
an age of uncertainty driven by deepening sectoral interdependencies, a
growing number of ‘intermestic’ issues,1 and rapid changes in interna-
tional relations amid processes of geopolitical rebalancing. The EU and
1Intermestic issues ‘involve aspects of both international and domestic affairs’ (Baril-
leaux, 1985: 754).
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Turkey have a shared interest in policy coordination and cooperation that
would unlock the potential for mutual gains, negate the externalities of
regional or global shocks, and develop reciprocal solutions for joint chal-
lenges. Given the relatively short phases of cooperation between the two
sides throughout the last decade, what are the conditions under which
cooperative trends in EU–Turkey relations could be (re)invigorated?
This volume has mapped and analyzed EU–Turkey relations with a
particular focus on developments over the last decade. Our motivation
for this systematic reassessment was threefold: (1) to shed light on the
current determinants, complexities, and multiplicities of the relationship;
(2) to explicate the conditions for a cooperative relationship between
the EU and Turkey; and (3) to create a basis for extrapolation into the
future trajectory of EU–Turkey relations. This analysis was carried out
across three dimensions: theories and concepts, institutions, and poli-
cies. The design of this study rested on the assumption that the survey
of these interconnected dimensions as distinct objects of investigation
offers a multi-angled approach that is fit to examine EU–Turkey rela-
tions as a ‘moving target’. In this context, the volume has utilized a set
of guiding questions related to key turning points and periods, actors and
institutional frameworks, policies, and different explanatory and analyt-
ical models. This concluding chapter of the volume aims to tie together
the lessons from the individual contributions in view of the overarching
objectives of the volume and its guiding questions.
Against this backdrop, in the first part of this chapter, we summa-
rize, contrast, and merge key insights derived from this three-dimensional
approach to studying the EU–Turkey relationship, offer cross-chapter
linkages, and reflect on the different periodizations of the relationship.
In a next step, we assess EU–Turkey relations against a set of funda-
mental, mutually reinforcing enablers of cooperation in order to shed new
light on the conditions for a cooperative relationship between the EU and
Turkey. Finally, we discuss the future trajectory of EU–Turkey relations
and identify avenues for a future research agenda for EU–Turkey studies.
16.2 Theorizing and Conceptualizing
EU–Turkey Relations
The first part of this volume, ‘Theories and Concepts’, brought together
major conceptual and theoretical approaches to studying European
integration and the EU’s relationship with third countries. Starting
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from the premise that ‘we should be constantly theoretically self-aware,
conscious that theoretical perspectives—wittingly or unwittingly—inform
our approach to the world that we observe’ (Rosamond, 2000: 3), this
section offered a comprehensive assessment of EU–Turkey relations and
its major milestones through examining both core and up-and-coming
approaches. Overall, ‘the mosaic of integration theory’ (Wiener & Diez,
2009: 19) is expressed across these contributions, with each theoret-
ical or conceptual approach providing a plausible account for a specific
set of key developments. A systematic review of the comparative and
complementary readings shows variations and similarities, inter alia, in
view of
1. the explanatory factor(s) utilized to explicate the evolution and key
turning points of the EU–Turkey relationship,
2. the ‘best cases’ of the contributions, namely major developments,
milestones, and aspects of EU–Turkey relations they plausibly
analyze and explain (for a similar description, see Wiener & Diez,
2009),
3. the diverse readings of the role of EU institutions, and
4. the specific policy areas used in each contribution and how they
are seen through the respective theoretical or conceptual lens (see
Table 16.1 for a detailed comparison).
Regarding the factors that help explain the EU–Turkey trajectory, the
theoretical and conceptual approaches focus on various exogenous,
endogenous, and bilateral determinants such as the issue-specific interests
of powerful member states and intergovernmental negotiations (liberal
intergovernmentalism), values, identities, ethos-driven obligations and
self-serving normative argumentations (constructivism, rhetorical entrap-
ment), path dependence and temporality (historical institutionalism), or
the EU’s normative effects on domestic processes (Europeanization).
Conceptual frameworks for studying differentiated integration, which
currently occupy the center stage in the scholarly debates on the future
of EU–Turkey relations, usually rest on the key premises and explana-
tory variables as identified in major European integration theories. These
factors range from issue-specific interdependence and sectoral spillover
effects to ideational consensus (Tekin, Chapter 7).
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The second point of comparison between the theoretical and concep-
tual perspectives concerns the strengths and limitations of the main
tenets and propositions to conform to ‘real-world’ patterns. Numerous
approaches offer explanations across a wide array of key developments
in EU–Turkey relations and competently grasp sector-specific, transac-
tional milestones, such as the signing of the Association Agreement,
the establishment of the Customs Union (CU), and the functional
trajectory of EU–Turkey affairs post-2005, including the design of the
EU–Turkey refugee ‘deal’ (liberal intergovernmentalism, Europeaniza-
tion, differentiated integration). Similarly, constructivist approaches and
Europeanization provide useful tools to investigate and comprehend
different milestones relating to Turkey’s accession process. For instance,
by falling back on partly overlapping constitutive factors, these approaches
elaborate on the set of dynamics that brought about Turkey’s first applica-
tion for full membership in 1987 (Alpan, Chapter 5), its exclusion from
the enlargement wave from 1997 to 1999 (Aydın-Düzgit & Rumelili,
Chapter 3), or the EU’s decision to open accession negotiations with
Turkey (Alpan, Chapter 5; Aydın-Düzgit & Rumelili, Chapter 3).
The explanatory strength of other approaches lies in their cogent
reading of one specific facet of EU–Turkey relations. Whereas historical
institutionalism emphasizes the endurance of Turkey’s accession process
despite limited progress (Icoz & Martin, Chapter 4), rhetorical entrap-
ment offers explanations for the launch of accession talks in 2005 and
their abrupt slowdown by the Council decision in December 2006
(Schimmelfennig, Chapter 6). Overall, the EU’s decision to acknowledge
Turkey’s candidate status in 1999 remains a particular puzzle for almost
all approaches. Here, liberal intergovernmentalism provides one of the
most plausible accounts of the shifts in the EU’s position from 1997 to
1999 by emphasizing large member states’ altered preferences (Tsarouhas,
Chapter 2; see also Turhan, 2012).
Regarding the role of EU institutions within the theoretical and
conceptual foci, the contributions disclose two distinct logics. Liberal
intergovernmentalism accentuates the central function of the European
Council as an institutional venue where bargaining between member
states with variable preferences determines the EU’s position on Turkey
(Tsarouhas, Chapter 2; see also Turhan & Wessels, Chapter 8). In turn,
the contributions featuring constructivist and historical institutionalist
accounts as well as the concepts of Europeanization and rhetorical entrap-
ment stress the role of the EU’s supranational institutions. Although
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the approaches address different facets and impacts of the ideational
factors under scrutiny, they show convincingly how the European Parlia-
ment or the European Commission critically and independently influ-
ence EU–Turkey relations through the production and contestation of
ideational structures (Alpan, Chapter 5; Schimmelfennig, Chapter 6; see
also Bürgin, Chapter 9).
The final point of comparison between the approaches analyzed in this
volume is especially pertinent to the policy areas of EU–Turkey relations.
When utilizing the analytical framework of their respective approach to
the empirical enquiry, most contributors use the enlargement framework
as a major point of reference for periods of progress, stagnation, and
setbacks. Beyond that, many authors pay attention to a broader set of
policy areas including trade and economic policies, migration, energy,
judiciary and fundamental rights, as well as foreign, security, and defense
policies (see Table 16.1). The fact that the respective analyses (Alpan,
Chapter 5; Tekin, Chapter 7) deal with the widest scope of issue areas
speaks to the conceptual flexibility of the approaches of Europeanization
and differentiated integration. Overall, the policies analyzed in Part I of
the volume match the issue areas examined in Part III of the volume,
which exhibits their unequivocal relevance for the trajectory of EU–
Turkey relations as well as displays the dense network of issue-specific
interdependencies.
16.3 The Division of Labor and Interplay
of EU Institutions in EU–Turkey Relations
In Part II of this volume, the authors analyzed the functions and pref-
erences of key EU institutions in framing EU–Turkey relations. The
contributions show clearly that EU institutions do not operate in a
vacuum. Contrarily, they are interlinked with each other, making inter-
institutional cooperation a necessity for the EU’s institutional machinery
to function effectively in its relationship with Turkey. For example, the
European Council is neither able to make far-reaching, positive decisions
on Turkey’s accession process like the opening or finalizing of accession
talks nor can the EP vote on a visa-free travel regime for Turkish citizens
without a conclusive recommendation from the Commission. The insti-
tutional dimension of EU–Turkey relations is not static. The functions
and influence of EU institutions are contingent upon both the dynamic
design of the EU’s institutional architecture as well as on the fluctuating
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salience and prominence of key components of the relationship, which
are being continuously reshaped by endogenous, exogenous, or bilateral
developments. For instance, the European Council became a key player
in Turkey’s accession process from 1997 onward, while its central role as
a collaborator with Turkey in managing external shocks became palpable
after the onset of the so-called ‘refugee crisis’ in 2015 (Turhan & Wessels,
Chapter 8). In turn, despite its pivotal role in the implementation of the
refugee ‘deal’, the Commission is mainly responsible for closely managing
the technical aspects of the institutionalized enlargement framework. The
stagnation of Turkey’s accession process has therefore translated into a
partial loss of the Commission’s power to actively shape the relationship.
Even though the institutional balance of the EU–Turkey relation-
ship is subject to constant recalibration, this volume reveals two salient
trends among EU institutions. First, there is a consistent division of
labor among the three EU institutions under scrutiny. The European
Council is at the heart of the EU’s institutional machinery maintaining
relations with Turkey. It develops the relationship through employing
its capacity to make monumental, far-reaching, and path-setting deci-
sions, including the institutionalization of the bilateral relationship.
The initiation of bilateral summits and the establishment of high level
dialogues are examples of the European Council’s role in setting rela-
tions. The European Council is strongly interested in carving a strategic
relationship model that could utilize Turkey’s potential as a regional
security-enabler that would offset the externalities of regional or inter-
national crises (Turhan & Wessels, Chapter 8). Accordingly, the Heads
of State or Government strive to act as an overarching ‘stabilizer’ of
EU–Turkey relations in times of acute political tensions between Turkey
and the EU or its member states. The fact that the European Council
endorsed the ‘conditional’ launch of a ‘positive political EU–Turkey
agenda’ in the event of Turkey’s constructive dialogue with Greece
and Cyprus on the Eastern Mediterranean crisis and the territorial
disputes (European Council, 2020: para. 19) showcases its interest in
maintaining a functional, interest-driven relationship. Contrarily, the
Parliament and the Commission evaluate EU–Turkey relations predom-
inantly from a normative point of view, placing a particular emphasis on
democracy, human rights, fundamental freedoms, and the rule of law
(Bürgin, Chapter 9; Kaeding & Schenuit, Chapter 10). As Bürgin points
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out, given its role as the manager of the EU’s Instrument for Pre-
Accession (IPA) funding for Turkey, the Commission remains an influ-
ential ‘agent of change’ via institution building and social learning, even
in times of conflict, through the largely horizontal and transgovernmental
cooperation frameworks it has maintained with Turkish authorities.
As a second overarching trend we observe that all EU institutions
under scrutiny have progressively distanced themselves from Turkey’s EU
accession prospects on the grounds of partly overlapping and partly exclu-
sive considerations. The Commission has long acted as a ‘critical but
fair supporter of Turkey’s accession’ (Bürgin, Chapter 9), even when
faced with opposition from individual member states that seek to weaken
Turkey’s membership perspective. However, following the normative
concerns expressed in its regular country reports, it no longer blatantly
advocates for Turkey’s membership. The European Council has left the
criticism of Turkey’s normative distance from the EU mostly to other
institutions, particularly after the launch of the accession negotiations in
2005. Still, the contribution by Turhan and Wessels (Chapter 8) contains
plenty of proof that the ‘accession narrative’ has also gradually disappeared
from the agenda of the Heads of State or Government. Regardless of their
overarching, unequivocal ‘Turkey-fatigue’, commitment to the preserva-
tion of Turkey’s accession process prevails in the official discourses of
both institutions. Contrarily, as the EU’s primary ‘normative voice’ (Feliu
& Serra, 2015), the Parliament seems to have officially ‘closed its acces-
sion door for Turkey’ following its successive calls to suspend accession
negotiations and has made severe adjustments to its voting behavior on
Turkey-related files since 2005 (Kaeding & Schenuit, Chapter 10).
16.4 The Role of Policies in EU–Turkey Relations
Inside and Outside the Accession Framework
The contributions in Part III of this volume examined the interactions
between the parties inside and outside the accession context that influ-
ence the most critical policy areas. The studies reveal, inter alia, the
partly paradoxical presence of both complexity and longevity in the EU–
Turkey relationship. In all areas under scrutiny—enlargement policy, trade
and macroeconomic policies, foreign and security policy, migration and
asylum policies, and energy policy—we can observe the puzzling exis-
tence of both fortified sectoral interdependencies, on the one hand, and
increasingly diverging normative and material preferences, on the other.
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Accordingly, the respective contributions bring us full circle to the starting
point of this volume: examining the new complexities of EU–Turkey
relations.
The EU’s enlargement policy is the most important reference point for
the development of the EU’s relationship with candidate countries across
manifold policy areas. It induces a hierarchical type of external governance
through imposing conditionality, which promotes the extraterritorial
expansion of the EU acquis to third countries. The principle of condi-
tionality means that the candidate country’s adoption of EU norms
in respective policy areas usually facilitates and expedites the accession
process. At the same time, a stalemate in accession negotiations can come
with setbacks in policy transfer and convergence. This is particularly true
for policy areas dominated by the strong asymmetry of interests in favor
of candidate countries, on the one hand, and absent or weak EU incen-
tives outside the accession scheme, on the other (Lavenex and Wichmann,
2009; Turhan & Yıldız, forthcoming). Thus, the configuration of the
enlargement framework yields implications for basically all policies—for
better or worse.
In this context, in Chapter 11 Lippert examines how considerations of
Turkey’s ‘Europeanness’ (see also Aydın-Düzgit & Rumelili, Chapter 3;
Alpan, Chapter 5), its strategic position (as either an asset or a burden),
and its conceivable impact on the Union as a full member have shaped
the EU’s enlargement policy vis-à-vis Turkey. Accordingly, the EU has
addressed Turkey with exceptionally ambiguous accession prospects since
its initial application for membership in 1987 and throughout the acces-
sion negotiations. The overarching opacity and eccentricity of the EU’s
enlargement policy have been echoed in the special provisions of Turkey’s
negotiation framework and the vetoes of single member states against
the opening of critical negotiation chapters (see also Turhan & Wessels,
Chapter 8).
The contributions dealing with thematic policy issues disclose the
repercussions of the EU’s ambiguous—and somewhat normatively incon-
sistent—enlargement policy vis-à-vis Turkey for policy convergence and
harmonization. In all domains under scrutiny, the acknowledgment
of Turkey’s candidacy and the launch of accession negotiations have
engendered attractive external incentives that have facilitated Turkey’s
adoption of EU norms. The weakening of the EU’s accession condi-
tionality from 2007 onward as a result of individual member states’
unilateral vetoes has interfered with Turkey’s further alignment with
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the EU acquis. Additional factors beyond the accession context have
contributed to Turkey’s alienation from EU norms as well. These have
ranged from exogenous determinants like the 2008 global financial crisis
and the gradual shift of the economic center of gravity toward Asia
(Akman & Çekin, Chapter 12) to the war in Syria and mounting pres-
sure from mass migration (Kaya, Chapter 14) as well as changing regional
dynamics following the Arab uprisings (Torun, Chapter 13). Endogenous
determinants like the de-secularization of Turkey’s foreign and domestic
policymaking (Kaya, Chapter 14), its dwindling democratic credentials
(Lippert, Chapter 11), and bilateral developments including the EU’s
suspension of all sectoral high level dialogues in July 2019 (see, e.g.,
Sartori, Chapter 15) have added to the estrangement.
Today, the EU’s role as an anchor and its normative model facilitated
by the accession conditionality are no longer considered an ‘elixir’ for
Turkey’s domestic transformation (Akman & Çekin, Chapter 12). Still,
the contributions of Part III of the volume reveal two key features
that need to be taken into account when conjecturing about the future
trajectory of the bilateral relationship. First, the findings emphasize the
need for continued cooperation between the EU and Turkey across
a wide spectrum of issue areas. A cooperative relationship is key to
negating external shocks and power shifts in the respective domestic
contexts and augmenting mutual gains. Second, the comparative
analyses of the policy areas disclose that EU–Turkey relations are likely
to take place along a transactional, sector-driven axis largely decoupled
from Turkey’s EU accession process, at least in the foreseeable future.
Accordingly, policy convergence will be more likely to occur through
ad hoc provisional mechanisms (Torun, Chapter 13) and bottom-up
technical and operational cooperation (Sartori, Chapter 15) that is less
prone to politicization (see also Tekin, Chapter 7).
16.5 Competing and Converging
Periodizations of EU–Turkey Relations
The history of EU–Turkey relations is not linear. Analyses of EU–Turkey
relations from theoretical, institutional, and policy perspectives orga-
nize these developments into various periods according to the respective
approach, institution, or policy field under scrutiny. Periodizations are
a useful tool to understand EU–Turkey relations as they help ‘parti-
tion the stream of events in such a way that important developments
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become visible’ (Zürcher, 2004: 1). The cornerstones within this ‘stream
of events’ according to most perspectives are, inter alia, the 1963 Asso-
ciation Agreement, the start of accession talks in 2005, and the ‘refugee
crisis’ starting in 2015. It is beyond the scope of our analysis to assess in
detail the quality of cooperation among the EU and Turkey within partic-
ular periods of time. However, locating the relationship on a continuum
between cooperation and confrontation can show how policies devel-
oped both independently and together. In this context, elements that
show increasing Europeanization in Turkey or policy convergence and
alignment between the two sides fall along the cooperation side of the
continuum, whereas policy divergence or de-Europeanization trends in
Turkey run closer to the confrontation side.
Most scholars agree that the period subsequent to the December
1999 European Council meeting, where Turkey was granted the status
of EU candidate, can be considered the ‘golden era’ of the relation-
ship. This resulted from the combination of a favorable constellation
of internal EU actors (e.g., domestic political landscape in key member
states), external influences (e.g., the EU’s security considerations after
the Kosovo war), and vigorous transformation processes across various
issue areas on Turkey’s end. However, alternative viewpoints exist on
when this most cooperative phase of the relationship came to an end.
Whereas some scholars (Tsarouhas, Chapter 2; Icoz & Martin, Chapter 4;
Lippert, Chapter 11) stress the emergence of difficulties in Turkey’s acces-
sion talks and the alignment with EU norms from 2005 onward, other
analysts observe the perseverance of a rather cooperative period up until
the global financial crisis in 2008 (Akman & Çekin, Chapter 12). If
constructivist contributions to the field of EU–Turkey relations are taken
as the reference point, the ‘period of convergence’ holds up until 2011
(Aydın-Düzgit & Rumelili, Chapter 3).
There is an agreement, however, that the period of palpably diverging
paths for the EU and Turkey started sometime between 2010 and
2012. To illustrate, Turkey’s constitutional changes in 2010 and other
domestic developments have been identified as the starting point of de-
Europeanization (Alpan, Chapter 5). From the Parliament’s perspective,
decreasing support for Turkey’s EU membership can be observed in the
period beginning in 2012 (Kaeding & Schenuit, Chapter 10). Looking at
international events, the changing political and societal landscape in the
Middle East in 2010/2011 amid the Arab Spring can be marked as the
end of the Justice and Development Party’s (Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi,
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AKP) policy of ‘zero-problems with neighbors’. It also marks the point
of departure and increased divergence between the EU and Turkey over
Syria (Torun, Chapter 13).
16.6 The Future of EU–Turkey Relations: The
Conditions for an (Un)Cooperative Relationship
The findings of the individual chapters of this volume highlight three
interconnected features of contemporary EU–Turkey relations: first, the
bilateral relationship is driven by the paradoxical coexistence of increasing
interdependencies and the growing divergence of normative and material
preferences. Second, as a result of this puzzling equilibrium, EU–Turkey
relations do not exhibit a clear, linear developmental path characterized
by cooperative action. The contributions provide evidence that coopera-
tion has to some degree been replaced by competition and confrontation,
particularly throughout the last decade. Third, there is a growing trend
toward the sustenance and study of the relationship outside the accession
context. When bilateral cooperation becomes constrained or impossible
despite growing issue-specific interdependencies, how will the EU and
Turkey possibly overcome the impasse outside the accession framework?
Against this background, the following sections examine the conditions
for a future (un)cooperative relationship between the EU and Turkey
taking into account the new complexities that epitomize the bilateral
dialogue.
In order to decipher the conditions under which cooperative trends in
EU–Turkey relations could be reinvigorated, we should explicate what
we understand by ‘cooperation’. A standard definition of the term in
International Relations (IR) describes it as the phenomenon ‘when actors
adjust their behavior to the actual or anticipated preferences of others,
through a process of policy coordination’ (Keohane, 1984: 51). Within
this context, the concept of ‘policy coordination’ means that the poli-
cies of the actors involved are designed in a way so that they reduce
the negative consequences for the cooperating partners (Milner, 1992).
Other understandings of cooperation entail ‘collective action applied to
the particular circumstances of the international system’ (Snidal, 1985:
923) that involves ‘either (1) bargaining over the division of new or
potential benefits; or (2) attempts to renegotiate an existing cooperative
arrangement, where one party threatens to revert to noncooperation if
the present terms are not adjusted’ (Fearon, 1998: 275).
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We take up the basic features of the aforementioned definitions in order
to compose our definition of a ‘cooperative relationship’. ‘Relationship’
in this context implies a certain degree of stability, including the exis-
tence of infrastructures and tools that facilitate long-term cooperation
processes. We do not limit our interest to the conditions under which the
EU or Turkey would ‘give up something, or give up more, than the other
party’ as part of the cooperation process (Messner et al., 2016: 49). Our
interest also extends to those instances when the EU and Turkey commu-
nicate, coordinate, or collaborate in order to achieve their (common or
individual) goals and acquire mutual gains (Milner, 1992) in looser (nego-
tiated) yet reasonably stable frameworks. In this context, we build our
analysis on a set of principles that tackles the ‘behavioral dimension’ of
cooperation (Messner & Weinlich, 2016). More precisely, we consider
an environment that stimulates cooperation between the EU and Turkey
to be characterized by the positive repercussions of seven mutually rein-
forcing enablers: reciprocity, trust, communication, reputation, fairness,
enforcement, and common identity (Messner et al., 2016).
16.6.1 High Potential for ‘Reciprocity’ Beyond the Accession Context
‘Reciprocity’ constitutes the key enabler of cooperation (Messner et al.,
2016). It concerns mutually beneficial ‘exchanges of roughly equivalent
values in which the actions of each party are contingent on the prior
actions of the others in such a way that good is returned for good’
(Keohane, 1986: 8). Thus, in the context of EU–Turkey relations, reci-
procity refers to situations where the EU or Turkey do something for
their counterpart in return for something they receive. With a view to
the future traits of the relationship, the assessment of reciprocity is crucial
in particular in the enlargement context, as well as in migration, trade,
security, and energy policies.
With regard to the former, the accession process is no longer perceived
as a reciprocal setup. At the turn of the millennium, the Commission and
Parliament, as well as member states like the United Kingdom (UK), had
a clearer idea of the reciprocal potential of Turkey’s membership (Turhan,
2012; Bürgin, Chapter 9; Kaeding & Schenuit, Chapter 10), and only
few member states like France or Cyprus emerged as key skeptics. Today,
membership-related reciprocity is no longer a dominant narrative in any
member state or EU institution (Lippert, Chapter 11; Turhan & Wessels,
Chapter 8). Given Turkey’s geo-strategically compelling location and its
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direct involvement in conflicts in its unstable neighborhood, the EU’s
calculus features a perspective on Turkey as rather a ‘barrier’ than a
‘bridge’ (Park, 2007: 159). Even if the path dependent nature of Turkey’s
EU accession process endured due to Turkey’s potential as a security
provider (see Icoz & Martin, Chapter 4), the growing turn toward an
illiberal course in various ‘new’ member states that acceded the EU during
the Eastern enlargement as well as ‘enlargement fatigue’ make it difficult
on the EU’s end to envision the gains of Turkey’s full accession. Simi-
larly, Turkey’s perspective has changed, too, as it—after a period of rapid
convergence (see periodizations, above)—no longer seems to be devoted
to implementing a political transformation in line with the Copenhagen
criteria, to ‘Europeanize’, and ultimately, to fully adopt the acquis in
return for increased prospects to ‘gain’ membership in the long run. This
shift away from the membership perspective, however, is not clearly artic-
ulated in Turkey’s official political discourse; membership continues to
constitute rhetorically the only desired and feasible scenario for Ankara.
At the same time, the volume provides plentiful evidence that the
potential for reciprocity in EU–Turkey relations is seemingly greater than
ever given the entanglement of both parties in a growing network of inter-
dependence. Migration is a key policy field in this regard, in particular
since the two sides developed reciprocal ties during the ‘refugee crisis’ in
2015 and 2016 (see Turhan & Wessels, Chapter 8; Kaya, Chapter 14).
The EU–Turkey arrangement to address irregular migration is a prime
example of direct reciprocity. Despite the uncertainties regarding the
continued implementation of the refugee ‘deal’, the cross-border nature
of this issue-area and the asymmetrical interdependence in favor of Turkey
(Turhan & Yıldız, forthcoming) require some form of institutionalized
cooperation between the EU and Turkey. The (re-)configuration of this
reciprocal setup in migration and asylum affairs, however, will also depend
on the ‘process to take stock of the implementation of the EU–Turkey
Statement’ (European Commission, 2020a: 3–4) following Ankara’s call
for a new ‘deal’, as well as on the future shape of the EU’s asylum and
migration system. The EU’s response to the catastrophic conditions of
refugees and asylum seekers in its frontline member states will not only
define how far the EU is able to live up to its proclaimed norms and
values, but it will also define its dependency on Turkey and the extent of
Turkey’s leverage regarding the conditions of cooperation.
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Regarding trade, the EU–Turkey Customs Union (CU) is still
perceived as an institutional arrangement that allows for mutual reci-
procity, despite growing concerns on the Turkish side over its asymmetric
setup. However, even if the CU constitutes one of the remaining func-
tioning pillars of EU–Turkey relations, analysts stress the necessity for
its modernization in order to overcome its outdated form, unlock the
potential for greater mutual economic benefits, and reinforce political
ties between the two sides through Turkey’s participation in regulatory
decision-making. In this way, the modernization could also consolidate
the institutional dimension of the trade relationship with potential for
spillover effects in other policy areas (Akman & Çekin, Chapter 12;
Tekin, Chapter 7). More immanently, the EU’s emergent relationship
with the UK will serve as a reference point in the discussions on EU–
Turkey trade relations and the future trajectory of the CU. The European
Council’s endorsement of the ‘conditional’ launch of a ‘positive political
EU–Turkey agenda with a specific emphasis on the modernization of the
Customs Union and trade facilitation’ in return for Turkey’s cooperative
behavior regarding the Eastern Mediterranean crisis (European Council,
2020: para. 19) demonstrates high potential for reciprocal solutions at
the intersection of trade, energy, and security interests.
In the security dimension, the EU and Turkey face strong interde-
pendencies in the field of counterterrorism and in the Middle East, not
least in pursuit of addressing ‘the causes of flight from Syria and beyond’
(Kaya, Chapter 14). Despite a presumed shared vision of regional stability,
security, and prosperity along each party’s respective borders (European
Commission, 2018; İletişim Başkanlığı, 2019) and the high potential for
reciprocal benefits stemming from cooperation, neither side is currently
ready to adjust its policies in accordance with the strategic preferences
of the other side. Turkey’s considerably unilateral foreign and security
policy in the Middle East is guided by its neo-Ottoman ambitions (Kaya,
Chapter 14), and its distinct security interests along its borders take
advantage of the power vacuum in the region. At the same time, the
EU faces internal problems in translating its traditional championing of
multilateralism into action in the face of unilateral responses from indi-
vidual member states independent of concerted action. The EU and
Turkey face severe incompatibilities in formulating common policy objec-
tives regarding the maritime borders in the Eastern Mediterranean and
the Aegean Sea as well as the Libyan civil war (Torun, Chapter 13).
Still, building on institutionalized security cooperation between the EU
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and Turkey within the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and
beyond, a reassessment of the reciprocity dimension of cooperation might
take place considering endogenous and exogenous factors. These factors
range from increasing conflict-related costs (not only of warfare but also
related to migration and public opinion; see Kaya, Chapter 14) to discon-
tent with a third power’s assertive foreign policy (e.g., Russia) or power
struggles in the region (e.g., between Turkey and Egypt). Given that
‘Turkey [is] increasingly isolated on the global stage’ (EIU, 2020: 26),
foreign policy cooperation with the EU might become more attractive
again.
Finally, in the energy domain, it is important to highlight the relevance
of the new ‘green consensus’ in the EU, which will also be the primary
reference point for the EU’s evaluation of reciprocity in its energy rela-
tions with Turkey (see Sartori, Chapter 15). In the future, the debates
over EU–Turkey energy cooperation will have to consider the develop-
ment of Europe’s new Leitbild as a climate-neutral continent. This new
narrative is most prominently reflected in the ‘European Green Deal’
(European Commission, 2019a), which simultaneously steers the EU’s
growth strategy and response to the COVID-19 pandemic. The EU
has already made clear that the Green Deal is the main reference point
for its prospective global role, which it will address through external
action instruments including diplomacy, trade, and development coopera-
tion (European Commission, 2019b). Hence, alongside disputes over gas
exploration and exploitation in the Eastern Mediterranean, the assessment
of reciprocity in EU–Turkey energy relations will depend on Turkey’s will-
ingness and ability to develop a ‘green agenda’ that responds to the EU’s
re-orientation toward climate protection and the EU’s aspired future
green development model.
16.6.2 The Absence of ‘Trust’ in EU–Turkey Relations
‘Trust’ constitutes a second important enabler of cooperation. The
term can be defined as ‘an expectation of cooperation and reciprocity’
(Rathbun, 2011: 3) despite a lack of total certainty. Whereas mistrust
would constitute the ‘belief that the other side prefers exploiting one’s
cooperation to returning it’ (Kydd, 2007: 6), trust between the EU and
Turkey implies that actors on both sides are confident that interaction will
eventually result in reciprocity and will not harm the respective interests
of any party.
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The issue of trust is not a new topic in EU–Turkey affairs. In the
field of foreign and security policy, scholars have asserted ‘a historical
and instinctive mistrust of European diplomacy in Ankara that dates
back to the Ottoman times’ (Park, 2007: 160). However, in contem-
porary EU–Turkey relations, trust seems to be absent to a large extent
on both sides in interactions in almost all critical policy fields. It must
therefore rather be understood as a fundamental cause for uncoopera-
tive behavior between the EU and Turkey fed by mutual resentments.
Throughout the last few years, trust between both parties has hit historic
lows, as illustrated by the characterization of the relationship as ‘beset
with mistrust, frustration, disillusionment and disappointment’ (Yenel2
quoted in Euronews, 2015). Surveys show that tensions and mistrust at
the political level also trickle down to the public domain both in the EU
and Turkey. In a public opinion poll conducted in Germany in 2018,
92% of respondents stated that Turkey could not be considered as a
trustworthy partner for Germany when it comes to political cooperation
(Forschungsgruppe Wahlen, 2018). Similarly, the Eurobarometer results
show that as of Autumn 2019, only 33% of Turkish citizens trusted the
EU, whereas 60% did not (European Commission, 2019c).
In the EU, Turkey’s progressive backsliding in its alignment with EU
norms plays a significant role in the development of expectations about
the behavior of Turkey’s political leadership. However, the effects of
the domestic transformation on cooperation with the EU at the tech-
nical level have not yet been fully understood (Bürgin, Chapter 9).
The instrumentalization of Syrians residing in Turkey and the read-
mission component of the EU–Turkey ‘deal’ as a bargaining chip by
the Turkish side (Kaya, Chapter 14) also feed into the EU’s disbelief
in Turkey’s intention to return rather than exploit the opportunities
for cooperation. On the Turkish side, an obvious source of mistrust
is the long-lasting ambiguity regarding Turkey’s accession prospects
fueled by the exclusionary rhetoric of European leaders toward Turkey
(Aydın-Düzgit & Rumelili, Chapter 3) and individual member states’
blocking of chapters in the accession negotiations (Turhan & Wessels,
Chapter 8). At the same time, democratic movements and opposition
2Ambassador and permanent delegate of Turkey to the European Union from 2011 to
2017.
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forces in Turkey are disenchanted with the EU’s (missing or ineffec-
tive) response to the erosion of rule of law and human rights in Turkey
(Şenyuva, 2018).
Given the difficulties in the overarching macro-institutional frame-
work of Turkey’s stalled accession process and increasing political tensions
between the highest political representatives from the EU and Turkey,
mutual trust needs to be built up again to overcome the obstacles
to a future cooperative relationship. In this context, multi-level social-
ization processes based on transgovernmental networking can serve as
an important tool. Transgovernmental, horizontal networks facilitate
‘bottom-up, inclusive and voluntary modes of interaction’ (Lavenex &
Wichmann, 2009: 99) between multi-level actors, including regulatory
agencies, local administrators, non-state actors, and technocrats (Lavenex,
2008, 2014). The prospective launch of a ‘positive political EU–Turkey
agenda’ as mentioned in the European Council conclusions of 1 October
2020 envisages enhanced people-to-people contacts (European Council,
2020)—a step that might promote the establishment of a mutual trust
environment through transgovernmental networking.
16.6.3 A Sophisticated but Largely Deactivated ‘Communication’
Infrastructure
‘Communication’ is considered another important enabler of coopera-
tion due to its fundamental impact on mutual trust by reinforcing actors’
ability to assess the other’s expectations, to develop joint understandings
and plans, and to assure each other about intended activities (Messner
et al., 2016). In EU–Turkey relations, communication, rhetorical struc-
tures, and discourses have proved to be simultaneously influential and
complex (see Schimmelfennig, Chapter 6; Aydın-Düzgit & Rumelili,
Chapter 3). The EU and Turkey developed an unparalleled system of
exchange that goes far beyond a regular framework of accession nego-
tiations. It includes, among others, the EU–Turkey Joint Parliamentary
Committee, the EU–Turkey Association Council, the joint summits, and
various sector-specific high level dialogue mechanisms (see Turhan &
Reiners, Chapter 1). That almost all of these critical channels have been
deactivated or significantly downsized since 2019 essentially degrades the
bilateral communication infrastructure to an ordinary setup that does not
correspond to the complex and multilayered cosmos of EU–Turkey rela-
tions. When ad hoc meetings between presidents of key EU institutions
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or the High Representative and Turkey’s president or foreign minister
serve as the primary format for exchange, opportunities—and time—to
create mutual understandings of common challenges and to develop joint
solutions remain limited.
Membership in multilateral organizations and forums such as the G20,
the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe, the Council of
Europe, or NATO provide additional communication channels. However,
they can hardly be seen as sophisticated alternatives to the complex bilat-
eral communication infrastructure between the EU and Turkey given
their broad thematic and geographic scope, the heterogenous capabilities
and preferences of their member states, and the internal problems of these
organizations. In times of regional power struggles and rivalries between
the EU and Turkey—as in the case of the Eastern Mediterranean—NATO
may even emerge as an additional trouble spot rather than a platform for
trust-enabling communication. Such developments generate the paradox-
ical situation in which the EU and Turkey in principle have more elaborate
communication tools at their disposal than most other international rela-
tionships do. At the same time, direct and systematized communication
between both sides at the political level is weak, with the EU and Turkey
remaining compelled to once again ‘create the much-needed space for
dialogue’ (European Commission, 2020b: 18).
In this context, however, differentiation between communication at
the political and the administrative levels is imperative. On the one hand,
we find an increasing reluctance to opt for a diplomatic tone by key
political actors on both sides and a shift in the mode of interaction
‘from arguing to bargaining, from the use of values and norms to the
exchange of threats and promises’ (Schimmelfennig, Chapter 6). On
the other hand, as Bürgin points out in Chapter 9, at the more tech-
nical, operational level, communication and cooperation might remain to
some degree decoupled from the broader political context. Thus, trans-
governmental communication structures with technocratic and functional
features could promote a horizontal cooperative relationship. The reacti-
vation of suspended sectoral high level dialogue mechanisms could further
facilitate the normalization of EU–Turkey communication.
16.6.4 The Vicious Circle of Ruined ‘Reputation’
‘Reputation’ is an enabler—or inhibiter—of cooperation that takes into
account the EU’s and Turkey’s evaluations of the other side’s behavior
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in the past in view of its possible future actions (Messner et al., 2016).
Reputation is subject to constant reproduction as experiences of past and
new performances continuously provide an updated assessment of the
perceived trustworthiness of the cooperation partner(s). At the same time,
it is the result of experiences over a longer period of time. Contempo-
rary EU–Turkey relations can hardly build on this mechanism to facilitate
cooperation between both parties. Changed perceptions of reciprocity,
the lack of mutual trust, and sentiments about unfair/inconsistent deci-
sions and treatment by the other party (see below) have paved the way to
a vicious circle where both the EU and Turkey continually question the
reputation of the respective side’s key actors and institutions. A ruined
reputation imperils cooperation as it inhibits actors from adjusting their
policies to the actual or anticipated preferences of others.
The EU’s reputation in Turkey is embedded in the long-established
mistrust over the EU’s sincerity concerning Turkey’s accession process
and prospects. The deflated credibility of EU conditionality—which
remains contingent on ‘the consistency of an organization’s [here: the
EU’s] allocation of rewards’ (Schimmelfennig & Sedelmeier, 2004:
666)—and individual member states’ vetoes over critical negotiation
chapters have mitigated the EU’s reputation in Turkey. From the perspec-
tive of the Turkish political elite, the EU’s perception as a reputable
cooperation partner was further impaired by shortcomings in the expe-
ditious delivery of incentives as stipulated in the March 2016 EU–Turkey
Statement.
Turkey’s reputation in the EU, on the other hand, has been largely
constructed in consideration of Turkey’s illiberal drift throughout the last
decade, which has weakened its alignment with EU norms and, conse-
quently, the formulation of a reciprocal relationship under the auspices
of the enlargement scheme. In recent years, Turkey’s increasingly inter-
ventionist and independent foreign policy approach toward its immediate
neighborhood (see Torun, Chapter 13) coupled with its occasional instru-
mentalization of refugees in order to reach its foreign and economic
policy goals (see Kaya, Chapter 14) have served as additional drivers of its
problematic reputation.
In order for both the EU’s and Turkey’s reputation to play a positive
role in enabling a cooperative relationship in the future, both actors will
have to adjust their activities in stronger consideration of the preferences
of the other side over a longer period of time. Some starting points for
this process could be the EU’s return to attractive and credible incentives
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for Turkey inside and outside the accession scheme. On Turkey’s end,
increased alignment with Chapters 23 and 24 of the acquis and a recal-
ibration of its foreign policy in pursuit of multilateral instruments could
help mend its weakened reputation within EU circles.
16.6.5 Diverging Conceptions of ‘Fairness’
‘Fairness’ is a factor that can further increase the likelihood, quality, and
stability of cooperation (Messner et al., 2016). In a cooperative arrange-
ment, the principle of fairness engenders certain rights and obligations
for the respective parties. While the rights concern ‘the cooperating
parties’ entitlement to a practice that satisfies the general principle of
reciprocity’, obligations refer to ‘their expectation of compliance from
other participants in and beneficiaries of the practice’ (Kokaz, 2005: 69).
Accordingly, fairness plays a significant role in participants’ ‘adoption of
other-regarding preferences [that] may be crucial to the establishment of
cooperative arrangements—arrangements that are deemed by all parties
to be of mutual advantage’ (Kapstein, 2008: 236).
The principle of fairness has long been a key component of Turkey’s
official discourse on EU–Turkey relations. Turkey’s portrayal as an
‘honourable but victimized side of the relationship; a party that has
exerted itself to the utmost and kept all of its promises and yet been
subjected to an unfair, disrespectable, and deceptive treatment by the
EU’ (Hauge et al., 2019: 28) has often remained at the core of succes-
sive Turkish governments’ readings of the relationship. The analysis
of Turkey’s accession history has made clear that the decision to not
include Turkey in the major enlargement rounds of 2004 and 2007 was
perceived as an unfair exclusion on the Turkish end together with the
unilateral, arbitrary vetoes of individual member states of the opening
of accession talks in critical chapters of the acquis (Turhan & Wessels,
Chapter 8; Lippert, Chapter 11). From the Turkish perspective, unfair-
ness also exists in EU–Turkey relations outside the accession framework.
It prevails within the asymmetric design of the CU (Akman & Çekin,
Chapter 12), the benchmarks for visa liberalization, and responsibility and
burden-sharing related to the management of the Syrian refugee crisis
(see, e.g., Barigazzi, 2016). The Eastern Mediterranean gas dispute, in
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which Turkey’s territorial claims conflict with Greek and Cypriot inter-
pretations of international law, is another example in which Turkey has
called on the EU to ‘be fair’ (Oktay3 quoted in Zeit Online, 2020).
Whereas Turkey’s current perception of EU–Turkey relations largely
centers on the concept of ‘unfairness’, for the EU, fairness in EU–Turkey
relations is first and foremost addressed through the official accession
criteria, which are valid for all candidates. In a similar vein, the EU
refers to fairness in the context of transparent benchmarks that measure
Turkey’s compliance with pre-determined, non-negotiable EU norms,
which become effective in conditionality-driven processes such as the Visa
Liberalization Dialogue.
In order to make fairness a facilitator of a cooperative relationship in
the future, it is important that both sides understand that the assessment
criteria for what is considered fair might be subjective and vary depending
on different cultural and societal settings (Schäfer et al., 2015). Leading
representatives’ ability to arrive at this understanding necessitates an
intensification of communication that respects the specific cross-cultural
and domestic setup of EU–Turkey relations.
Alongside a better understanding of, and respect for, the key deter-
minants of fairness as perceived by the respective other side, fairness in
EU–Turkey relations could also be reinforced by the EU’s and Turkey’s
proper exercise of their roles and responsibilities. In this respect, Turkey
could, for example, make greater effort to reverse the de-Europeanization
process if it wants to be seen as a determined accession candidate. The
EU, on the other hand, could start by addressing the refugee crisis
in a way that goes beyond an externalization strategy shifting central
responsibilities to Turkey.
16.6.6 ‘Enforcement’ Without Accession Incentives
Research on cooperation has shown that certain means of ‘enforcement’
can serve as promoters of cooperation when rewards or punishments
are in place to incentivize compliance with jointly established or unilat-
erally determined norms and condemn misbehavior (Messner et al.,
2016). In EU–Turkey relations, the accession conditionality used to
be the primary apparatus to incentivize cooperation and hierarchical
3Vice president of Turkey since July 2018.
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policy transfer, particularly from 1999 to 2006, until Turkey’s accession
prospects started to weaken (see Alpan, Chapter 5). The IPA funds still
serve to a limited degree as a driver of Turkey’s sectoral alignment with
the EU acquis, not least by promoting social learning processes between
European and Turkish technocrats (Bürgin, Chapter 9). However, these
funds can neither singlehandedly engender the extraterritorial promo-
tion of EU norms and rules in Turkey nor safeguard the longevity of
EU–Turkey cooperation.
For that reason, instruments of enforcement in EU–Turkey relations
operate largely outside the accession framework, except in cases when the
proclaimed revitalization of the accession framework as a whole consti-
tutes an incentive structure, as demonstrated by the March 2016 EU–
Turkey Statement. However, the fragility of the statement as displayed by
Turkey’s temporary withdrawal from the ‘deal’ in February 2020 shows
that the EU needs to be capable and willing to provide Turkey with
attractive and credible incentives to maintain a sustainable cooperation
framework based on conditionality. The most prominent existing enforce-
ment structure outside of the accession framework is the EU–Turkey CU,
which necessitates Turkey’s alignment with the Common Customs Tariff
and commercial policy of the EU. However, the asymmetric CU setup is
not regarded as fair and appealing by Turkey anymore, which weakens the
capacity of the CU as an enabler of cooperation in the long run as long
as the CU does not undergo modernization.
Naturally, punishments in the event of misbehavior as formulated
in Article 7 of the Treaty on European Union do not apply to non-
member states, including Turkey. In multilateral fora, the EU and Turkey
are, for instance, bound to the jurisdictions of the European Court of
Human Rights in view of the compliance with the European Conven-
tion on Human Rights. However, the Court lacks direct enforcement
powers as states are not compelled to execute its judgments. Sanction
or suspension procedures in NATO are formally not enshrined in the
Washington Treaty,4 but the gas dispute in the Eastern Mediterranean
could potentially become subject to the jurisdiction of the International
Court of Justice. In contrast, sanctions, such as those implemented
by the EU in response to Turkey’s drilling activities (Council of the
EU, 2019), cannot be considered as enforcement that facilitates steady
4Expelling a member from NATO, however, is legally possible (see Sari, 2019).
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and veritable cooperation structures between the EU and a key third
country outside the (currently) futile accession setup, as they are unilater-
ally imposed without a jointly established compliance framework. Accord-
ingly, under the current circumstances, external incentives granted by the
EU within the framework of a jointly negotiated ‘transactional’ condition-
ality setup alongside the already existing accession scheme might prove to
be the most effective enforcement mechanism to promote EU–Turkey
cooperation, mutual trust, and political dialogue in the short run.
16.6.7 ‘Identity’ (In)Compatibility Between the EU and Turkey
As a seventh enabler, the sense of a common identity, belonging to the
same group with shared norms and beliefs, and the perception of ethnic or
cultural commonalities as constructed through communicative practices
and political and societal narratives enhances the likelihood of cooperation
(Messner et al., 2016). Acknowledged as ‘role-specific understandings
and expectations about self, […] identities are the basis of interests’
(Wendt, 1992: 397–398). In this context, collective identification with
respective communities and institutions and a strong group identity can
increase the willingness to both cooperate and prioritize group interests
over individual interests; a phenomenon that has been scrutinized in EU
studies since the early days of the European integration project (Risse,
2005). Collective identities also bring about emotions such as ‘in-group
trust’ that promote ‘in-group cooperation and out-group discrimination’
(Mercer, 2005: 97).
In EU–Turkey relations, the discourse on commonalities is simulta-
neously shaped by a wide array of determinants that range from the
norms and values as enshrined in international law and the EU acquis
to questions related to a common foreign and security culture and
religious-cultural debates (see also Aydın-Düzgit & Rumelili, Chapter 3;
Schimmelfennig, Chapter 6; Tekin, Chapter 7). In the EU, European
representations of Turkey’s identity are abundant and ambiguous. While
conceptions of commonalities rest, for instance, on the presence and
integration of citizens of Turkish origin in European societies, strong
objections are built upon the alleged incompatibility of Turkey’s societal,
religious, and cultural foundations with self-proclaimed ‘European values’
(Lindgaard et al., 2018: 16). The Turkish political leadership draws an
ambiguous picture of a potential ‘we-identity’ (Messner et al., 2016:
55) with the EU, too. Reference to a sense of common belonging is
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part of the rhetorical repertoire still today. To illustrate, Turkish Presi-
dent Recep Tayyip Erdoğan stresses Turkey’s determination to gain EU
membership and to proceed on ‘its way persistently despite those trying
to exclude it from the European family’ (TRT World, 2019). The lament
of being excluded speaks to the in-group-out-group mechanism and is a
positive affirmation of a European-Turkish community, even if such refer-
ences might be employed strategically for the mobilization of domestic
sentiments and the pursuit of interests.
One of the most discussed potential dividing lines in the debate over
cultural commonalities between the EU and Turkey concerns the rela-
tionship between religion and democratic consolidation (Aydın-Düzgit
& Rumelili, Chapter 3). Embracing multi-faith realities in both Turkish
and EU societies alongside the possibility of the adherence of Islamic
societies to the EU’s liberal-democratic norms could be one feature of a
common identity in EU–Turkey relations. However, such attempts could
encounter two key challenges. First, democratic backsliding in Turkey
coupled with trends toward the de-secularization of Turkey’s domestic
and foreign policymaking (see Kaya, Chapter 14; Torun, Chapter 13)
strengthen the perceived qualms about Turkey’s ‘Europeanness’. Second,
the resurgence of populist, nationalist, and illiberal tendencies in various
EU member states has sparked discussions over how to conceptualize
‘European’ democratic values and presented increasing challenges to the
cosmopolitan, inclusive contour of European identity. In the present
situation, a common identity does not seem to represent a particu-
larly promising starting point to formulate joint interests and facilitate
a cooperative EU–Turkey relationship. Given the rich set of joint, deep-
rooted historical, societal, and political points of reference, on the one
hand, and the overarching unfavorable macropolitical settings, on the
other, attempts at the construction of a sense of common identity
could be above all undertaken through reinforcing intersocietal ties and
people-to-people communication.
16.7 Conclusion: Advancing EU–Turkey
Relations and EU–Turkey Studies
The findings of this volume have revealed how much more intricate,
contested, yet relevant EU–Turkey relations have become under the influ-
ence of new complexities. This volume is full of evidence of how the
preferences of the EU and Turkey were driven, and continue to be driven,
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by an ever-evolving mixture of internal EU and Turkish domestic devel-
opments, external shocks, and international developments, as well as by
determinants of the bilateral dialogue in the form of the accession process
or sectoral cooperation.
Cooperation between the EU and Turkey remains requisite for both
parties to manage growing, complex interdependencies across a wide array
of issue areas, inter alia, trade, migration, energy, and security. Accord-
ingly, the EU has conveyed that it ‘has a strategic interest […] in the
development of a cooperative and mutually beneficial relationship with
Turkey’ (European Council, 2020: para. 15). However, if cooperation is
about adjusting one’s own behavior to the other’s preferences, we can
underscore that the phases and areas of cooperation between the EU
and Turkey have substantially decreased throughout the last decade. The
last incidence in which organized collective action was undertaken in
view of a common challenge was when the EU and Turkey responded
to the cross-border implications of the war in Syria with a joint ‘deal’
on the management of irregular migration flows in March 2016. EU–
Turkey relations show that enabling conditions are not easy to achieve
even with the high potential for reciprocity, which lies at the heart of
cooperation. Our analysis has revealed that despite this potential, the EU–
Turkey relationship lately rests on unfavorable cooperation conditions,
since other drivers of cooperative behavior—namely, trust, communica-
tion, reputation, fairness, enforcement, and common identity—cannot
properly operate in the current setup.
The good news is that cooperation does not necessarily have to become
less likely in complex setups like the EU–Turkey relationship. Beyond
that, ‘the success conditions for cooperation are known to a great extent
and […] can be influenced, which means we can also think about strate-
gies needed to develop or strengthen them’ (Messner & Weinlich, 2016:
14). In the previous sections of this chapter, we have pinpointed possible
means and ways to allow for these enablers to facilitate cooperative
behavior in EU–Turkey relations. Our analysis and the findings in the
various contributions of this volume suggest that sectoral, transactional
interactions based on the principle of direct reciprocity bear the potential
to reverse the vicious circle in EU–Turkey relations, enabling a favorable
working environment at the operational level. Ad hoc horizontal, sector-
driven transgovernmental networking (Lavenex, 2008, 2014) with the
involvement of actors at multiple levels, including local administrators,
technocrats, regulatory agencies, and a diverse set of non-state actors,
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might facilitate issue-specific de-politicization in the EU–Turkey relation-
ship and encourage trust-building between the two parties in the short
run (see also Turhan & Yıldız, forthcoming).
At the same time, the findings of the volume reveal that the conver-
gence of interests does not necessarily safeguard the longevity of collective
action toward reaching common goals. A truly cooperative relationship
between the EU and Turkey, therefore, implies a long-term, norma-
tive orientation and stable cooperation with continuous communication
in order to decrease the likelihood of misinterpretations and, accord-
ingly, perceptions of unfairness and the development of disrepute. In
this way, learning and socialization processes and rule-based systematized
policy coordination may (re)emerge. Thus, the future trajectory of EU–
Turkey relations requires a normative, ‘institutionalized alternative path’
(Turhan & Wessels, Chapter 8) beyond the formally frozen accession
process in order to negate the phases of estrangement and conflictual
relations and promote the longevity of the periods epitomized by a coop-
erative relationship. In this vein, the concept of external differentiated
integration that concerns the extraterritorial, partial extension of the EU
acquis through ‘alternative forms of integration below the threshold
of membership’ (Lavenex, 2011: 373) constitutes a promising frame-
work ‘for conceptualizing the different forms of Turkey’s integration
and association with the EU’ (Tekin, Chapter 7; see also Turhan, 2017;
Müftüler-Baç, 2017). Should future developments allow for a reinvigo-
rated discussion of the EU–Turkey relationship as a realistic case of EU
enlargement, the preferences and influence of individual member states
such as Germany (Reiners & Tekin, 2020; Turhan, 2016) and of EU
institutions will continue to play a central role in this context as will
EU–Turkey interactions in key policy areas.
Taking into consideration the findings—and thematic boundaries—of
this volume as well as the growing evolution of the EU–Turkey relation-
ship outside the accession process, we propose three avenues for future
research. First, overcoming the unlikelihood of a fully-fledged revitaliza-
tion of Turkey’s EU accession talks accompanied by the indispensability
of policy coordination necessitates further studies on the explanatory
value of the concept of external differentiated integration for EU–Turkey
relations. More specifically, there is significant gap in the literature on
the causes and drivers of variations in Turkey’s external differentiated
integration with the EU. Beyond that, the different modes of inter-
actions between the EU and Turkey through which policy transfer is
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pursued outside the accession framework and the effects of sector-specific,
functional integration on domestic normative transformation in Turkey
require deeper analysis.
Second, micro- and meso-level analyses of EU–Turkey relations still
remain relatively understudied sub-fields. How has the recent deteriora-
tion in political relations affected the relationship at the administrative,
more technical level (Bürgin, Chapter 9)? What channels of communi-
cation and socialization exist between the EU institutions and Turkey’s
opposition parties or civil society? How do mutual identity representa-
tions change in response to key contemporary developments in the EU
and Turkey (Aydın-Düzgit & Rumelili, Chapter 3)?
Finally, without a dynamic accession track, the EU’s relations with
Turkey would resemble the Union’s relations with other emerging
(middle-)powers and become increasingly concerned with the debates
on important overarching questions of inter- and transnational cooper-
ation as well as the quest for effective multilateralism in times of global
power shifts. This emerging setup necessitates attempts to go beyond the
theories of European integration; in other words, we need to expand
theoretical and analytical explorations that further scrutinize the explana-
tory value of mainstream and up-and-coming IR theories and governance
studies for EU–Turkey relations. In this way, it would be possible to
advance EU–Turkey studies as a field of analysis at the intersection of
EU (integration) studies, IR, and (global) governance studies.
The stalemate in Turkey’s EU accession process does not dilute the
relevance of EU–Turkey relations. As seen throughout this volume, even
a comprehensive analysis of contemporary EU–Turkey relations through
the lenses of theories and concepts, institutions, and policies cannot fully
grasp the ever-evolving complexities and components of this unique rela-
tionship. Rather, such an extensive look at the relationship through these
perspectives opens new avenues for future research and innovative forms
of cooperation.
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